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Introduction	
	
The	refereed	papers	contained	in	this	set	of	conference	proceedings	will	be	presented	at	the	2nd	
International	Conference	on	Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	hosted	by	the	Crime	and	Justice	
Research	Centre,	 Faculty	of	Law,	QUT.	Again,	 the	conference	has	attracted	an	 impressive	 list	of	
internationally	distinguished	keynote	and	panel	speakers	from	the	United	Kingdom,	United	States,	
Australia,	 New	 Zealand,	 Canada	 and	 this	 time	 Latin	 America,	 as	 well	 as	 high	 quality	 paper	
submissions.			
	
The	papers	at	 this	 conference,	 some	of	which	are	contained	 in	 this	compendium,	 reflect	on	 the	
crucial	 links	among	social	 democracy,	 crime	 control	 and	 criminal	 justice	policies.	Why	 is	 it	 so	
important	 to	 engage	 in	 this	 critical	 reflection?	 Over	 the	 last	 30	 years,	 many	 Anglophone	
countries	have	been	captured	by	penal	populism,	leading	to	burgeoning	imprisonment	rates	and	
soaring	crime	control	costs.	The	opportunity	cost	is	the	development	of	socially	sustaining	and	
inclusive	societies	of	the	kind	Elliot	Currie	spoke	about	so	persuasively	in	the	opening	keynote	
to	the	first	conference.	As	public	intellectuals,	we	will	gather	at	this	conference	to	engage	with	
these	politically	and	socially	important	tasks	of	reflection	to	re‐imagine	social	democratic	modes	
of	crime	control	and	criminal	justice	for	the	21st	Century.	
	
We	 thank	all	 those	who	made	 the	effort	 to	 submit	 such	high	quality	papers	 for	 review	and	 the	
reviewers	for	taking	the	time	to	review	the	papers	within	tight	timelines.		
	
Juan	Tauri	 Conference	Convenor,	School	of	Justice,	Faculty	of	Law,	QUT	
Kelly	Richards	 Conference	Proceedings	Editor,	School	of	Justice,	Faculty	of	Law,	QUT	
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The	Use	of	‘Queer’	in	Criminal	Justice	Discourses	
	
	
Matthew	Ball,	Queensland	University	of	Technology/Visiting	Fellow,	Durham	University	
	
Conference	Sub‐theme:	Gender,	Sexuality	and	Justice	
	
	
Abstract	
Within	criminological	literature,	there	are	growing	references	to	a	'queer/ed	criminology'.	To	
date,	 ‘queer	 criminology’	 remains	 a	 loose	 collection	 of	 studies	 and	 criminal‐justice	 related	
commentary	 that	 uses	 the	 term	 'queer'.	 Amid	 the	 growing	 calls	 for	 the	 more	 substantial	
development	of	these	criminological	studies,	it	is	timely	to	reflect	on	the	ways	that	the	term	
‘queer’	has	been	used	in	these	discourses,	to	what	ends,	and	with	what	effects.	
	
This	 paper	 considers	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 term	 'queer'	 has	 been	 used	 in	 these	
criminological	and	criminal	justice	discourses.	 It	suggests	that	 ‘queer’	has	been	used	in	two	
dominant	ways:	as	an	'umbrella'	term	for	lesbian,	gay,	bisexual,	intersex,	and	queer‐identified	
people;	 and	 to	 signify	 the	 use	 of	 theoretical	 tools	 with	 which	 to	 represent	 sexuality‐	 and	
gender‐diverse	people	more	effectively	within	criminological	research.	The	paper	will	argue	
that	these	ways	of	using	‘queer’	have	a	variety	of	implications	and	effects.	Specifically,	using	
‘queer’	as	an	umbrella	term	has	the	potential	to	reinforce	identity	categories	and	the	politics	
that	surround	identities	(a	critique	that	has	often	appeared	in	queer	contexts),	while	using	it	
as	a	theoretical	tool	potentially	reproduces	various	investments	in	criminology	and	criminal	
justice	institutions.	Both	uses	may	preclude	other	productive	avenues	for	critique	opened	up	
by	the	term	‘queer’.	
	
The	 paper	 will	 conclude	 by	 suggesting	 that	 using	 ‘queer’	 as	 a	 verb	 to	 signify	 a	 more	
deconstructive	 project	 directed	 towards	 criminology	 is	 a	 possible	 direction	 for	 these	
discussions.	 While	 this	 approach	 has	 its	 own	 effects,	 and	 articulates	 with	 existing	
deconstructive	approaches	in	criminology,	it	is	important	to	explore	these	possibilities	at	this	
point	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	 ‘queer/ed	 criminology’	 for	 two	 reasons:	 it	 highlights	 that	
multiple,	 and	 often	 competing,	 ‘queer/ed	 criminologies’	 exist;	 and	 it	 expands	 the	 diverse	
possibilities	heralded	by	the	notion	of	‘queer’.	
	
	
Introduction	
The	 term	 ‘queer’	 is	being	employed	with	greater	 frequency	 in	research	on	particular	 criminal	
justice	 issues,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 broader	 theoretical	 reflections	 on	 how	 a	 ‘queer/ed	 criminology’	
might	 proceed	 (Tomsen	 1997;	 Groombridge	 1999;	 Woods	 forthcoming;	 Ball	 forthcoming).	
However,	‘queer’	is	a	contested	term,	and	there	are	numerous	debates	as	to	what	it	refers,	and	
how	it	can	and	should	be	used	(Sullivan	2003;	Jagose	1996).	
	
‘Queer’	 largely	 refers	 to	 an	 intellectual	 approach	 that	 seeks	 to	 deconstruct	 binaries	 such	 as	
homosexual/heterosexual	 or	 male/female	 and	 their	 institutionalisation	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 social	
sites	 (see	 Butler	 1990;	 Sedgwick	 1990).	 These	 studies	 developed	 out	 of	 numerous	 radical	
political	 movements	 focused	 on	 HIV	 activism,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 that	 sought	 to	 critique	 the	
assimilationist	and	often	essentialising	 tendencies	of	many	gay	and	 lesbian	political	struggles.	
Queer	 theorists	critique	essentialist	understandings	of	 identity	–	particularly	 in	 the	context	of	
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sexuality	 and	 gender	 –	 and	 prefer	 to	 explore	 the	 historical	 contingencies	 through	 which	
sexuality	and	gender	are	formed	and	regulated	(see	Foucault	1998;	Sullivan	2003;	Jagose	1996).	
	
However,	a	substantial	amount	of	queer	theoretical	work	takes	the	view	that	‘queer’	denotes	an	
attitude	or	a	position,	especially	 in	relation	to	what	 is	 taken	to	be	 ‘normal’.	As	Sullivan	(2003:	
52)	highlights,	dictionary	definitions	of	‘queer’	often	define	it	as	‘to	quiz	or	ridicule,	to	spoil,	to	
put	out	of	order’.	While	many	authors	focus	on	deconstructing	or	‘queering’	norms	of	sexuality	
and	 gender	 (Duggan	 2001:	 223;	 Smith	 in	 Sullivan	 2003:	 43)	 –	 an	 approach	 that,	 as	 will	 be	
discussed	 below,	 is	 also	 dominant	 in	 criminological	 discourses	 –	 others	 suggest	 that	 the	
constituency	of	‘queer’	is	open‐ended,	and	thus	what	connects	those	working	in	this	area	is	their	
shared	position	vis‐à‐vis	norms	and	normativity,	not	just	sexuality	and	gender	(Jagose	1996:	98;	
Sullivan	2003:	43;	Giffney	2004:	73‐74).	
	
Thus,	the	primary	strategy	of	many	queer	theorists	is	denaturalisation,	and	the	confounding	and	
unpacking	of	 categories,	pulling	apart	essences,	oppositions,	 and	 foundational	 assumptions	 to	
understand	 how	 particular	 phenomena	 or	 questions	 about	 our	 social	 world	 have	 been	
constructed	 in	 the	ways	 they	have	been	 (Jagose	1996:	98;	 Sullivan	2003:	50‐51).	 In	 this	 vein,	
David	Halperin	suggests	that	‘queer’	‘...	acquires	its	meaning	from	its	oppositional	relation	to	the	
norm.	‘Queer’	is	by	definition	whatever	is	at	odds	with	the	normal,	the	legitimate,	the	dominant.	
There	 is	 nothing	 in	 particular	 to	which	 it	 necessarily	 refers’	 (Halperin	 1995:	 62,	 emphases	 in	
original).	 ‘Queer’	 can	 therefore	 be	 a	position	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 norm,	 rather	 than	 a	 positivity	
(Halperin	 1995:	 62).	 As	 such,	 for	 many	 theorists,	 ‘queer’	 refers	 to	 more	 than	 simply	
deconstructing	assumptions	surrounding	sexuality	and	gender,	but	extends	to	a	wide	variety	of	
concepts.1	
	
Thus,	it	is	clear	that	there	is	not	one	definition	of	‘queer’,	or	that	there	is	a	shared	understanding	
of	what	the	proper	object(s)	of	‘queer’	might	be.	As	these	debates	over	what	‘queer’	refers	to	are	
unsettled	 and	 every	 citation	 of	 the	 term	 mobilises	 a	 particular	 understanding	 of	 ‘queer’,	
reproducing	the	specific	effects	that	attend	to	that	understanding	along	the	way,	this	paper	does	
not	seek	to	pin	down	a	definition	of	 ‘queer’.	Rather,	 it	explores	the	ways	that	 the	term	 ‘queer’	
has	 been	 used	 in	 criminal	 justice	 discourses,	 and	 charts	 some	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 these	
different	uses.2	It	identifies	two	primary	uses	of	the	term	‘queer’	in	criminal	justice	discourses:	
‘queer’	as	an	umbrella	term	doing	the	work	of	an	identity	category	(‘queer’	as	noun);	and	‘queer’	
as	 signifying	 a	 set	 of	 theoretical	 tools	 mobilised	 to	 effectively	 understand	 and	 represent	
sexuality	 and	 gender	 diversity	 in	 criminological	 research	 (what	 might	 be	 thought	 of	 here	 as	
‘queer’	 as	 ‘sensitising	 concept’).	 It	 then	 explores	 the	 implications	 of	 each	 of	 these	 different	
citations	 of	 the	 term	 and	 concludes	 by	 highlighting	 that	 one	 use	 of	 ‘queer’	 that	 is	 largely	
overlooked	in	these	discussions	is	its	use	as	a	verb,	to	signify	a	position	or	attitude.	It	suggests	
that	 there	 is	 scope	 in	 criminological	 discussions	 to	 further	 utilise	 such	 an	 understanding	 of	
‘queer’.	
	
In	offering	this	analysis,	the	paper	does	not	seek	to	police	the	ways	that	the	term	‘queer’	is	used	
in	criminal	justice	discourses,	nor	to	be	prescriptive	in	its	use,	but	rather	to	extend	the	range	of	
debate	about	its	use,	and,	as	Judith	Butler	puts	it,	 ‘...	make	us	consider	at	what	expense	and	for	
what	 purposes	 [it	 is]	 used’	 (Butler	 1993:	 229).	 Reflecting	 on,	 and	 articulating	 with	 greater	
precision,	the	understanding	of	‘queer’	that	is	being	mobilised	must	become	a	central	part	of	any	
conversation	about	the	use	of	the	term	in	criminological	and	criminal	justice	discourses	for	two	
primary	 reasons:	 because	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 there	 are	 multiple,	 and	 indeed	 competing,	
‘queer/ed	 criminologies’	 that	 ought	 not	 be	 confused;	 and	 it	 expands	 the	 diverse	 possibilities	
heralded	 by	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘queer’	 and	 its	 use	 in	 criminology.	 This	 paper	 seeks	 to	 initiate	 a	
conversation	on	these	issues.	
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The	Uses	of	‘Queer’	
‘Queer’	as	noun	
The	term	‘queer’	has	been	employed	in	some	criminal	justice	discourses	as	a	noun	–	that	is,	to	
refer	 to	 an	 identity	 category	 or	 umbrella	 of	 identity	 categories	 under	 which	 lesbian,	 gay,	
bisexual,	transgender,	intersex,	and	queer‐identifying	(LGBTIQ)	people	may	be	placed,	or	along	
the	 lines	of	which	 they	might	 identify.	Commonly,	 the	 term	 is	used	 ‘almost	 simply’	 (Sedgwick	
2011:	200,	emphasis	in	original)	to	refer	to	same‐sex	sexuality,	but	it	is	also	used	as	a	substitute	
for	the	unwieldy	initialism	of	LGBTIQ	(Duggan	2001:	224).	
	
‘Queer’	 is	used	 in	 this	way	 in	academic	research	such	as	Queering	Conflict:	Examining	Lesbian	
and	Gay	Experiences	of	Homophobia	 in	Northern	 Ireland	 (Duggan	2012),	Queer	 (In)justice:	The	
Criminalisation	 of	 LGBT	People	 in	 the	United	 States	 (Mogul	 et	 al.	 2011),	 and	 Intimate	Partner	
Violence	 in	 LGBTQ	 Lives	 (Ristock	 2011),	 to	 name	 a	 few.	 These	 works	 address	 criminological	
problems	 of	 relevance	 to	 LGBTIQ‐identified	 people	 –	 whether	 this	 is	 a	 unique	 crime	 that	 is	
experienced	 by	 them	 (hate	 crimes,	 for	 example),	 a	 crime	 conventionally	 studied	 by	
criminologists	but	where	 these	 communities	 have	been	overlooked	 (such	 as	 intimate	partner	
violence),	 or	 a	 particular	 (usually	 negative)	 experience	 of	 one	 aspect	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system	(such	as	the	impacts	of	policing	or	prison).	They	comprehensively	discuss	the	problems,	
forms	 of	 discrimination,	 inequalities,	 and	 experiences	 of	 LGBTIQ‐identified	 people	 in	 their	
interactions	with	the	justice	system.	And	this	research	is	often	geared	towards	addressing	these	
injustices,	and	reforming	the	practices	that	are	understood	as	problematic.	
	
This	 particular	 use	 of	 ‘queer’	 also	 appears	 in	 recent	 attempts	 to	 forge	 a	 ‘queer	 criminology’.	
Jordan	Blair	Woods,	for	instance,	has	suggested	that	‘queer	criminology’	would	provide	a	space	
in	 which	 ‘LGBTQ	 people’	 can	 represent	 themselves	 within	 criminological	 conversations,	 be	
recognised	 as	 part	 of	 these	 conversations,	 and	 ensure	 that	 accurate	 and	 appropriate	
understandings	of	themselves	are	furthered	in	this	field.	The	desire	of	such	a	project	appears	to	
be	to	‘[reorient]	the	focus	of	criminological	inquiry	to	give	due	consideration	to	the	relationship	
between	 sexual	 orientation/gender	 identity	 and	 victimisation,	 offending,	 and	 desistance	 from	
crime’	(Woods	forthcoming).	
This	 use	 of	 ‘queer’	 –	 as	 an	 umbrella	 identity	 category,	 or	 as	 a	way	 of	 referring	 to	 a	 group	 of	
people	 –	 is	 productive.	 It	 allows	 for	 those	with	 shared	 experiences	by	 virtue	of	 their	 existing	
outside	 of	 heteronormativity	 to	 be	 represented	 in	 research.	 It	 also	 allows	 researchers	 and	
others	to	bring	criminological	attention	to	bear	on	issues	of	injustice,	or	to	important	silences	in	
these	discourses,	and	open	up	a	space	for	these	injustices	to	be	remedied,	or	these	silences	to	be	
broken.	
	
‘Queer’	as	‘sensitising	concept’	
‘Queer’	 has	 also	 been	 used	 in	 these	 discourses	 to	 signify	 the	 application	 of	 some	 theoretical	
perspectives	 or	 conclusions	 from	 queer	 theory	 in	 criminological	 analyses.	 The	 variety	 of	
research	projects	here	have	utilised	queer	theoretical	insights	about	non‐essentialised	identities	
and	 the	 fluidity	 of	 sexualities	 and	 genders	 –	 the	 primary	 focus	 of	 many	 queer	 theoretical	
analyses	–	to	understand	the	subjects	of	the	research,	while	also	exposing	the	troubling	binaries	
that	underpin	criminological	 thought	or	exploring	 the	heteronormative	regulation	of	sexuality	
and	how	this	intersects	with	crime	and	justice.	
	
For	 example,	 queer	 theoretical	 discussions	 about	 the	 government	 of	 sexuality	 through	 the	
norms	 embedded	 in	 various	 social	 sites	 have	 been	 used	 to	 explore	 the	 regulation	 and	 often	
criminalisation	of	those	that	live	non‐heteronormative	or	non‐cisgendered	lives,	particularly	as	
this	 occurs	 through	 the	 law	 and	 aspects	 of	 the	 justice	 system	 (Dwyer	 2012:	 18;	Mogul	 et	 al.	
2011:	23;	Narrain	2008:	51;	Duggan	1993:	75;	Umphrey	1995:	26;	Stychin	1995:	7;	Moran	et	al.	
1998;	Robson	2011;	Dalton	2007;	Dalton	2006;	Mason	2001;	Backus	2009;	Tomsen	2006:	393‐
394).	Other	works	 look	at	how	forms	of	surveillance	regulate	the	 ‘normal’	use	of	public	space	
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and	govern	public	sex	(Conrad	2009;	see	also	Johnson	and	Dalton	2012).	And	still	others	look	at	
the	regulation	of	other	forms	of	sexual	activity	or	sexual	visibilities	(Dalton	2007;	Dalton	2006;	
Mason	2001;	 Lamble	2009),	 explore	how	criminology	might	 engage	with	 these	 concerns,	 and	
how	criminal	justice	might	be	better	achieved.	
	
The	 queer	 theoretical	 analysis	 of	 essentialised	 identities	 has	 also	 been	 used	 to	 critique	 the	
understandings	 of	 victims	 and	 perpetrators	 (not	 to	mention	 the	 binarised	 understandings	 of	
homosexual	 and	 heterosexual)	 that	 appear	 in	 knowledge	 about,	 and	 current	 approaches	 to	
address,	hate	crimes	(Tomsen	2006:	394;	Tomsen	2009:	10‐13,	15;	Tomsen	1997:	39,	40,	42;	
Lamble	 2008:	 29).	 Additionally,	 these	 theoretical	 tools	 have	 been	 used	 to	 understand	 and	
represent	 gender‐	 and	 sexuality‐diverse	people	 in	 this	 context.	 For	 example,	 Chakraborti	 and	
Garland	 suggest	 that	 such	work	 ‘...	 is	 important	 for	 developing	 a	 framework	 that	 can	 include	
some	of	those	who	are	the	victims	of	homophobic	and	transphobic	violence	...	[because	s]uch	a	
framework	 challenges	 commonly‐held	 societal	 assumptions	 about	 the	demarcation	of	 gender,	
sexual	desire	and	identity’	(Chakraborti	and	Garland	2012:	75).	In	this	approach,	it	is	assumed	
that	queer	theory	can	be	used	to	assist	in	understanding	particular	groups	of	people	and	their	
lived	experiences,	representing	them	effectively	within	research	and	policy.	
	
These	ways	of	employing	the	term	‘queer’	–	to	signify	a	set	of	theoretical	concepts	that	can	be	
used	in	an	analysis	–	are	also	apparent	in	some	of	the	more	explicit	calls	for	the	development	of	
a	‘queer	criminology’	that	have	been	made	since	the	mid‐1990s.	In	1997,	for	example,	Tomsen	
suggested	 that	 the	 critique	 of	 binary	 thinking	 that	 queer	 theory	 offers	 could	 be	 put	 to	
productive	 use	 in	 criminology,	 particularly	 in	 exploring	 the	way	 criminology	 perpetuates	 the	
homo/hetero	binary	and	maintains	‘homophobic	oppression’	–	a	task	that	he	suggested	was	‘...	
imperative	in	any	sexually	emancipatory	politics’	(Tomsen,	1997:	34;	see	further	Tomsen	2006;	
Tomsen	2009).	Tomsen	later	developed	this	argument	to	suggest	that	such	an	approach	would	
also	 include	 an	 ‘ongoing	 emphasis	 on	 the	 performativity	 of	 criminalised	masculine	 identities	
and	a	progressive	psychoanalytic	stress	on	the	tense	proximity	of	homo	and	hetero	desire	that	
feeds	much	male	aggression,	misogyny	and	risk	taking’	(Tomsen	2006:	403).	Groombridge	also	
recommended	 queer	 criminology	 should	 follow	 Seidman’s	 suggestion	 that	 any	 analysis	
informed	by	queer	 theory	ought	 to	 study	 the	ways	 that	 ‘...	 knowledges	 and	 social	 practices	 ...	
organise	 ‘society’	as	a	whole	by	sexualising	–	heterosexualising	and	homosexualising	–	bodies,	
desires,	acts,	identities,	social	relations,	knowledges,	culture	and	social	institutions’	(Seidman	in	
Groombridge	1999:	533).	
	
While	this	paper	can	only	begin	to	explore	the	way	the	term	‘queer’	has	been	employed	in	these	
discourses,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 one	 consistent	 feature	 of	 these	 uses	 is	 that	 they	 signify	 a	
mobilisation	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 queer	 theory	 in	 ways	 that	 assume	 that	 these	 concepts	 offer	
accurate	ways	of	understanding	and	representing	gender‐	and	sexuality‐diverse	people.	Not	only	
do	 these	 concepts	 allow	 researchers	 to	 appreciate	 the	 impact	 of	 heteronormative	 discourses	
and	 regulations	 in	 the	 field	 of	 criminal	 justice,	 but	 they	 offer	 researchers	 what	 might	 be	
considered	 ‘sensitising	 concepts’	 in	 order	 to	 become	 attuned	 to	 the	 complexities	 of	 sexuality	
and	gender	diversity.	 In	 themselves,	such	analyses	provide	novel	critiques	of	various	criminal	
justice	issues,	and	new	directions	for	criminological	discourses	to	follow.	
	
Implications	of	These	Uses	of	‘Queer’	
As	discussed,	each	of	these	ways	of	using	the	term	‘queer’	is	productive.	However,	they	also	have	
a	 variety	 of	 potential	 impacts	 –	 they	 can	 lead	 to	 particular	 courses	 of	 action	 and	 ways	 of	
thinking,	and	preclude	others.	
	
While	 the	 term	 ‘queer’	 is	 often	 used	 productively	 as	 an	 umbrella	 term	 to	 signify	 a	 range	 of	
identities,	 this	 way	 of	 using	 the	 term	 has	 been	 critiqued	 as	 a	 ‘false	 but	 unifying	 umbrella’	
(Giffney	2009:	2),	producing	the	homogenisation	of	those	that	are	considered	to	fit	under	it.	It	
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can	 erase	 very	 important	 differences	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 race,	 ethnicity,	 and	 class	 that	 exist	
between	those	 that	might	be	considered	 ‘queer’	 (Anzaldúa	 in	Sullivan	2003:	44).	Additionally,	
this	 use	 of	 the	 term	 as,	 for	 all	 intents	 and	 purposes,	 an	 identity	 category,	 can	 lead	 to	
essentialised	 understandings	 about	 people,	 and,	 by	 extension,	 lead	 to	 problematic	 forms	 of	
identity	politics	(Giffney	2009:	2;	Anzaldúa	in	Sullivan	2003:	44;	Sedgwick	2011:	200).	
	
These	questions	about	the	political	utility	or	strategic	necessity	of	contingent	identity	categories	
is	 an	 ongoing	 (and	 perhaps	 unresolvable)	 issue	 in	 queer	 politics	 (see	 Gamson	 1995;	 Butler	
1993).	 A	 large	 part	 of	 queer	 theorising	 has	 developed	 as	 a	 response	 to	 and	 critique	 of	
essentialised	understandings	of	sexuality,	gender,	and	identity,	with	many	people	that	 identify	
as	 queer	 embracing	 this	 understanding	 (Jagose	 1996:	 77‐78).	 Using	 ‘queer’	 as	 an	 identity	
category	 in	 order	 to	 include	 these	 people	 in	 particular	 forms	 of	 research	 does	 allow	 for	 the	
production	 of	 knowledge	 about	 their	 experiences	 of	 a	 particular	 crime,	 but	 can	 effectively	
reintroduce	essentialised	understandings	of	identity	into	these	discussions	(Gamson	1995).	This	
is	partly	because	the	deconstruction	that	attends	many	queer	identities	–	and	which	is	the	basis	
for	this	stance	against	essentialism	–	is	not	carried	further	and	directed	towards	other	concepts	
in	the	research.	Put	simply,	the	people	explored	in	the	research	are	‘queer’,	but	other	aspects	of	
the	research	are	not	(see	further	Ball	and	Scherer	2011:	1‐2).	This	argument	can	be	illustrated	
in	the	context	of	intimate	partner	violence.	There	is	a	growing	body	of	research	that	charts	the	
incidence	of	 such	violence	 in	 the	 lives	of	 ‘queers’,	 and	 some	of	 this	work	 engages	with	queer	
theoretical	 insights	 insofar	 as	 they	 point	 out	 that	 our	 discourses	 about	 such	 violence	 are	
heteronormative,	 or	 that	 identities	 are	 not	 stable.	 However,	 in	 much	 of	 this	 research,	 the	
understanding	 of	 violence	 itself	 is	 not	 ‘queered’,	 and	 remains	 heteronormative	 or,	 indeed,	
homonormative	(see	Ball	2013;	Holmes	2009).3	
	
A	related	point	can	be	made	about	 the	ways	 that	 ‘queer’	 is	used	to	signify	 the	mobilisation	of	
queer	 theoretical	 concepts	 and	 tools	 to	 understand	 sexuality	 and	 gender	 diversity	 in	 these	
criminal	 justice	 discourses.	 These	 queer	 theoretical	 concepts	 and	 tools	 are	 used	 primarily	 to	
assist	 in	 the	understanding	of,	 and	 the	appropriate	 representation	of,	 gender	–	and	sexuality‐
diverse	 people.	 However,	 this	 representation	 and	 understanding	 takes	 place	 within	 what	
remain	largely	conventional	criminological	analyses.	Thus,	while	queer	theoretical	insights	are	
used	 here	 to	 guide	 research	 in	 theoretically	 sophisticated	 ways	 and	 allow	 for	 a	 critical	
examination	of	the	problematic	assumptions	that	have	long	characterised	the	engagement	with	
these	 issues	within	 criminal	 justice	discourses,	 the	deconstructive	critiques	 that	queer	 theory	
can	offer	may	be	restricted.	These	queer	theoretical	tools	are	used	to	assist	in	understanding	the	
subjects	of	 research,	 and	 to	appreciate	 the	 forms	of	 regulation	and	normalisation	 that	 impact	
upon	them,	thereby	contributing	to	the	development	of	knowledge	about	these	people	and	their	
experiences,	 and	 to	 the	development	of	more	 effective	policies	 to	 address	 injustice.	However,	
this	 deconstructive	 critique	 is	 not	 often	 turned	 towards	 criminology	 itself,	 its	 own	 project	 of	
producing	such	knowledge,	and	its	attendant	effects.	
	
To	illustrate	this,	consider,	for	example,	Chakraborti	and	Garland’s	statement	(2012:	75)	that	in	
the	context	of	hate	 crime,	queer	 theoretical	work	 ‘...	 is	 important	 for	developing	a	 framework	
that	can	include	some	of	those	who	are	the	victims	of	homophobic	and	transphobic	violence	...’.	
Here,	 queer	 theory	 allows	 for	 a	more	effective	 representation	of	 victims	of	hate	 crime,	and	 is	
mobilised	in	projects	that	seek	both	criminological	knowledge	production	about	this	crime,	as	
well	as	the	development	of	more	effective	responses	to	it.	Groombridge’s	suggestion	that	queer	
criminological	work	be	situated	‘...	squarely	within	mainstream	criminological	concerns,	not	on	
the	 criminological	 margins’	 (Groombridge	 1999:	 543),	 and	 be	 directed	 towards	 producing	
explanations	about	criminal	justice	issues,	are	further	possible	examples	of	this	kind	of	dynamic	
(Groombridge	1999:	539).	
	
Identifying	the	implications	of	these	uses	of	‘queer’	in	criminal	justice	discourses	is	not	intended	
to	suggest	that	these	are	negative	or	undesirable	uses	of	the	term	‘queer’.	The	incorporation	of	
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queer	 theory	 into	criminological	research	can	allow	 for	 the	development	of	 interventions	that	
respond	more	effectively	to	the	injustices	that	are	the	concern	of	many	of	these	researchers,	and	
the	use	of	 ‘queer’	as	an	umbrella	identity	category	can	allow	for	criminological	attention	to	be	
turned	towards	important	injustices.	The	critique	offered	here	is	intended	only	to	point	out	that	
these	uses	of	the	term	have	a	variety	of	implications,	and	these	can	place	limits	on	the	critique	
and	 deconstruction	 that	 is	 possible	 in	 criminal	 justice	 discourses.	 It	 is	 also	 to	 point	 out	 that	
other	 productive	 uses	 of	 the	 term	 ‘queer’	 are	 possible,	 along	which	 ‘queer/ed	 criminologies’	
might	proceed.	
	
Queer	as	a	Verb?	
One	possible	way	of	using	‘queer’,	discussed	above,	is	as	a	verb	–	as	signifying	a	position	or	an	
attitude.	To	say	that	this	particular	approach	is	not	widely	apparent	in	criminology	is	not	to	say	
that	the	work	discussed	above	is	not	critical	or	deconstructive.	Rather,	it	is	to	argue	that	these	
analyses	 that	 use	 the	 term	 ‘queer’	 often	 limit	 the	 deconstructive	 potential	 of	 ‘queer’	 in	 some	
ways	and	thus	still	engage	in	what	might	be	thought	of	as	conventional	criminological	projects.	
This	becomes	apparent	when	one	considers	that	regardless	of	whether	‘queer’	has	been	used	as	
an	identity	category	or	as	a	set	of	‘sensitising	concepts’,	it	is	continually	connected	to	sexuality	
and	 gender,	 and	 these	 appear	 to	 remain	 the	 proper	 objects	 of	 these	 queer	 criminological	
analyses.	 So,	 criminological	research	most	often	mobilises	 ‘queer’	 if	 the	population	of	concern	
within	the	research	are	‘queer’	people	(experiencing	hate	crime	or	violence,	for	example),	or	if	
the	focus	is	on	the	regulation	of	sexuality	or	gender	identity,	or	if	the	particular	activity	explored	
has	a	sexual	aspect	to	it	(such	as	pornography,	or	sex	work).	Other	aspects	of	the	research	are	
not	 ‘queered’,	the	attachment	of	 ‘queer’	to	gender	and	sexuality	 is	not	problematised	(see	Eng	
2005:	3),	and	the	possibilities	of	‘queering’	other	concepts	in	the	research	more	broadly	are	not	
fully	developed	(see	the	example	of	intimate	partner	violence	above).	
	
By	suggesting	that	the	ways	that	‘queer’	is	used	still	engages	to	varying	degress	in	conventional	
criminological	projects	merely	suggests	that	many	of	them	are	still	tied	to	forms	of	knowledge	
production,	 or	 to	 achieving	 criminal	 justice,	 and	 often	 still	 invested	 in	 criminal	 justice	
institutions.	They	help	to	provide	a	ground	for	knowing	about	a	particular	topic,	and	do	not	use	
‘queer’	to	signify	a	more	thoroughly	deconstructive	project	that	could	shift	more	fundamentally	
the	ground	upon	which	such	criminology	–	or,	indeed,	criminologists	themselves	–	stand.	Such	
an	approach	might	not	just	use	queer	insights	to	argue	that	criminology	is	heteronormative,	but	
also	use	‘queer’	as	a	position	from	which	to	highlight	the	costs	of	investing	in	criminology	in	the	
interests	of	‘queers’.	Using	‘queer’	as	a	verb	within	these	discourses	could	help	avoid	these	kinds	
of	investment.	
	
Such	a	project	would,	of	course,	carry	its	own	dangers,	and	certainly	some	are	troubled	by	any	
move	away	from	sexuality	and	gender	within	queer	analyses	(Halley	and	Parker	2011:	6).	Using	
‘queer’	as	an	impetus	for	deconstruction	of	this	kind	may	push	these	criminal	justice	discourses	
in	directions	 that	 criminologists	may	perceive	 as	 irrelevant,	 or	 outside	 the	 bounds	of	what	 is	
taken	to	be	criminology.	Deconstructive	projects	of	this	kind	might	also	be	perceived	as	being	of	
little	 relevance	 to	addressing	 immediate	material	 injustices	 (for	preliminary	 responses	 to	 this	
critique,	see	Ball	forthcoming;	Cohen	1998:	117).	And,	of	course,	articulating	whether	this	way	
of	 using	 ‘queer’	 interacts	 with,	 replicates,	 draws	 from,	 challenges,	 reinvigorates,	 or	 indeed	
‘queers’	 existing	 deconstructive	 approaches	 in	 criminology	 must	 be	 explored	 (Cohen	 1998).	
However,	this	approach	is	potentially	a	fruitful	direction	for	criminologists,	and	is	certainly	one	
among	many	possible	‘queer/ed	criminologies’.	
	
Conclusion	
This	paper	has	briefly	explored	the	two	dominant	ways	that	the	notion	of	 ‘queer’	 is	utilised	in	
criminal	 justice	 discourses,	 and	 pointed	 to	 some	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 uses.	 It	 has	
highlighted	 that	 ‘queer’	 is	 primarily	 used	 either	 to	 refer	 to	 an	 identity,	 or	 to	 signify	 a	 set	 of	
The	Use	of	‘Queer’	in	Criminal	Justice	Discourses	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013																7	
conceptual	tools.	It	has	also	identified	the	implications	of	these	different	uses	of	the	term,	and	
suggested	that	an	alternative	conception	of	‘queer’	–	where	it	signifies	a	disposition	or	attitude	–	
could	be	productively	utilised	in	this	field.	
	
These	discussions	contribute	 to	 the	development	of	a	 ‘queer/ed	criminology’	–	or	what	might	
more	appropriately	be	 termed	 ‘queer/ed	criminologies’	 –	by	encouraging	authors	engaging	 in	
such	 projects,	 or	 employing	 the	 term,	 to	 reflect	 on	 how	 they	 use	 the	 term,	 and	 the	 various	
implications	of	doing	so.	As	each	use	of	the	term	carries	with	it	particular	assumptions	and	can	
preclude	other	ways	of	thinking	or	acting,	ultimately	producing	different	kinds	of	criminological	
analyses,	being	attendant	to	the	effects	of	their	use	of	the	term	can	allow	for	a	more	informed	
discussion	about	the	possibilities	of	‘queer/ed	criminologies’,	and	the	ways	that	‘queer’	might	be	
most	effectively	mobilised.	
	
The	 slipperiness	 of	 ‘queer’	 highlighted	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 advantageous	 to	 criminal	 justice	
discourses,	and	not	something	that	ought	to	be	foreclosed.	As	Judith	Butler	points	out,	the	term	
needs	 to	 ‘...	 be	 vanquished	by	 those	who	are	 excluded	by	 the	 term	but	who	 justifiably	 expect	
representation	by	it’,	by	those	who	use	it	in	different	ways,	in	order	‘...	to	let	it	take	on	meanings	
that	cannot	now	be	anticipated’,	and	also	by	those	‘...	whose	political	vocabulary	may	well	carry	
a	 very	different	 set	 of	 investments’	 (Butler	 1993:	 230).	 Perhaps	 the	only	 thing	 that	 is	 certain	
among	this	variety	of	ways	of	using	‘queer’	is	that	‘[q]ueer,	if	it	names	anything,	names	a	critical	
impulse	that	can	never,	must	never,	settle’	(Kemp	2009:	22).	
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 Here,	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 queer	 theorists	 can	become	difficult	 to	 untangle	 conceptually	 from	other	 forms	 of	
deconstruction.	This	is	the	focus	of	ongoing	work,	and	queer	criminological	work	that	takes	this	direction	needs	
to	explore	this	point.	
2		 Authorial	sovereignty	over	 the	ways	 the	 term	 is	used,	or	 the	effects	produced,	 is	not	 implied	here.	 Instead,	 the	
focus	is	on	the	potential	effects	of	these	uses	of	the	term,	the	assumptions	implied	in	each	of	these	uses,	and	the	
modes	 of	 thought	 they	 preclude.	 Further,	 while	 this	 paper	 primarily	 analyses	 academic	 criminal	 justice	
discourses,	it	does	not	exclusively	consider	those	discourses.	
3		 As	the	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	highlight	the	ways	that	‘queer’	has	been	used	in	criminal	justice	discourses,	and	
to	identify	where	it	might	be	used	differently,	there	is	not	space	to	fully	consider	the	potential,	and	limits,	of	using	
‘queer’	as	a	position	here.	This	remains	an	important	aspect	of	queer	criminological	work.	
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Abstract	
Vulnerable	 and	 marginalised	 populations	 are	 not	 only	 over‐represented	 in	 the	 criminal	
justice	system,	but	also	in	civil	jurisdictions	like	the	coronial	system.	Moreover,	many	of	the	
personnel	who	 deal	with	 criminal	matters,	 especially	 in	 rural	 and	 regional	 areas,	 are	 also	
those	who	manage	the	coronial	death	investigation.	This	movement	back	and	forth	between	
civil	 and	 criminal	 jurisdictions	 is	 difficult	 for	 the	 both	 professional	 personnel	 and	 the	
families,	 but	 especially	 for	 those	 families	 who	 may	 also	 have	 had	 dealings	 with	 these	
personnel	in	the	criminal	justice	system,	or	who	present	as	suspicious	due	to	larger	historical	
and	 global	 issues.	 While	 coronial	 legislation	 now	 allows	 families	 to	 raise	 cultural	 and	
religious	concerns	about	the	process,	particularly	to	do	with	the	autopsy	of	their	loved	one,	
this	 also	 requires	 them	 to	 identify	 themselves	 to	 police	 at	 the	 initial	 stage	 of	 the	 death	
investigation.	This	paper,	part	of	a	larger	body	of	work	on	autopsy	decision	making,	discusses	
the	ways	in	which	this	information	is	gathered	by	police,	how	it	is	communicated	through	the	
system,	 the	ways	 in	which	 families	 are	 supported	 through	 the	 process,	 and	 the	difficulties	
that	ensue.		
	
	
Introduction	
The	 coronial	 investigation	 sits	 between	 civil	 and	 criminal	 jurisdictions,	 as	 an	 inquisitorial	
system	 which	 focuses	 on	 finding	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 matter	 without	 the	 allocation	 of	 blame	 or	
liability.	For	this	reason,	the	coroner	has	wide	powers	of	inquiry,	and	is	not	bound	by	the	usual	
rules	of	evidence,	being	able	to	admit	hearsay	for	example,	and	extend	privilege	to	witnesses	in	
inquests	 (Scott	 Bray	 2010).	 Nevertheless,	 all	 of	 the	 key	 players	 in	 the	 coronial	 death	
investigation	 have	 experience	 (sometimes	 the	 majority	 of	 their	 experience)	 in	 criminal	
investigations	 and	 proceedings,	 and	 until	 2003	 in	Queensland,	 a	 direct	 link	 between	 coronial	
and	criminal	investigations	was	in	place,	since	Coroners	could	refer	matters	to	trial	(Freckleton	
and	Ranson	2006).	Moreover,	Coroners	are	appointed	as	magistrates	and	many	act	concurrently	
–	as	coroners,	investigating	deaths,	and	as	magistrates,	ruling	on	criminal	behaviour.	Similarly,	
the	vast	majority	of	policing	work	 is	 investigation	of	criminal	matters	with	most	police	rarely	
investigating	 more	 than	 a	 few	 coronial	 deaths	 each	 year	 (Drayton	 2011),	 while	 most	
pathologists	who	work	in	the	coronial	jurisdiction	are	forensically	trained	and	appear	in	court	
as	specialist	witnesses	in	both	inquests	and	criminal	trials	(Kramar	2006).	The	important	issue	
here,	 which	 this	 paper	 seeks	 to	 address,	 is	 how	 wider	 social	 assumptions	 about	 the	
dangerousness	of	some	populations	and	the	visibility	of	others	in	the	criminal	justice	space,	can	
impact	on	assessments	of	suspicious	deaths.		
	
At	the	same	time,	research	supports	the	fact	that	vulnerable	populations	are	over‐represented	
in	coronial	death	investigations	(predominantly	the	elderly,	Indigenous	people	and	those	from	
low	 socio‐economic	 status),	 some	 of	 whom	 are	 also	 over‐represented	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	
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system	(most	notably	those	from	low	socio‐economic	and	Indigenous	communities)	(Carpenter	
and	Tait	2009).	This	means	that	many	of	the	bereaved	families	who	are	caught	up	in	a	coronial	
death	investigation	also	move	between	the	criminal	and	coronial	systems.	This	paper	also	seeks	
to	 engage	 with	 the	 implications	 of	 this,	 where	 families	 may	 bring	 with	 them	 pre‐existing	
relationships	(if	the	family	is	known	to	the	local	police	or	magistrate),	as	well	as	‘innuendos	of	
suspicion’	and	the	‘general	 impression’	by	both	the	bereaved	family	and	the	wider	community	
‘that	 it	 is	 wrongdoing	 rather	 than	 tragedy	 that	 is	 being	 investigated’	 (Clarke	 and	McCreanor	
2006:	33).		
	
A	 final	 consideration	 is	 the	 legislative	 requirement,	 variously	 enacted	 in	 all	 Australian	 states,	
that	a	family’s	religious	and	cultural	status	and	concerns	about	the	autopsy	–	also	a	legislative	
requirement	of	a	coronial	investigation	–	be	communicated	to	the	police	at	the	time	of	the	death	
notification.	In	Australia,	those	cultures	and	religions	with	a	known	objection	to	autopsy	are	the	
Indigenous	population	and	members	of	 Islam	and	 Judaism.	This	requires	bereaved	 families	 to	
not	only	identify	themselves	to	police	but	to	understand	and	negotiate,	in	the	traumatised	state	
of	 a	 sudden	 bereavement,	 the	 medical	 and	 legal	 implications	 of	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 internal	
autopsy	of	a	loved	one	(Drayton	2011).	This	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	Coroner	has	the	
final	 determination	 as	 to	whether	or	not	 an	 internal	 autopsy	will	 proceed	and	 that	 a	 family’s	
objection	may,	despite	their	strongly	held	beliefs,	be	over‐ruled.		
	
This	 involvement	 of	 families	 can	 be	 situated	 as	 a	 relatively	 recent	 addition	 to	 coronial	
legislation,	 influenced	 by	 an	 increasing	 multicultural	 tolerance	 of	 difference	 by	 public	
authorities,	 supported	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 through	 laws	 against	 discrimination	 (Humphrey	 2007:	
10).	However,	such	adjustments	to	coronial	law	also	fit	with	the	‘jurisdiction’s	pro‐therapeutic	
potential	 ...	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	 produce	 social	 benefits	 and	 restorative	 outcomes	 from	 tragic	
circumstances’	 (Scott	 Bray	 2010:	 567).	 This	 is	 related	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 coronial	
investigation	from	a	reactive	to	a	proactive	jurisdiction,	with	a	statutory	basis	for	the	prevention	
of	avoidable	deaths	through	recommendations	to	relevant	public	authorities	(Scott	Bray	2010:	
570‐571).	 Embedded	 in	 a	 larger	 research	project	 on	 autopsy	decision	making	 and	 interviews	
with	 key	 professionals	 in	 the	 Queensland	 coronial	 system,	 this	 paper	 explores	 these	 related	
ideas,	especially	the	way	in	which	a	push	toward	therapeutic	 jurisprudence	and	‘the	wishes	of	
the	family’	creates	a	‘dissonance	between	representing	the	dead	body	in	medico	legal	discourse	
and	remembering	or	memorialising	the	dead	in	culture’	(Scott	Bray	2006:	42).	
	
Vulnerable	Populations	
In	 coronial	 legislation,	 the	 expectation	 that	 religion	 and	 culture	 will	 serve	 as	 a	 means	 for	
objecting	to	an	invasive	internal	autopsy,	can	bring	vulnerable	populations	to	the	forefront	of	a	
death	investigation.	In	Australia	the	three	main	groups	in	this	regard	–	Indigenous,	Jewish	and	
Muslim	 –	 find	 themselves	 at	 different	 locations	 within	 both	 social	 and	 coronial	 assumptions	
about	suspicious	deaths.		
	
Islam	
	
...	 and	 I’ve	 found	 that	Muslims	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 object	 big	 time.	 It’s	 not	 that	 I	 hate	
Muslims	it’s	just	that	they	are	prominent	on	the	objection	side,	‘oh	you	don’t	need	to	do	this	
because	you’re	cutting	up	 the	body’	and	well	hang	on,	 I	 immediately	get	suspicious	when	
somebody,	 ‘oh	no	you	shouldn’t	you	shouldn’t’.	What	have	you	had	to	do	with	this	death	in	
that	case,	 I	think	we	need	to	 look	at	this	a	 little	bit	 further	 if	you’re	objecting	so	strongly	
and	putting	it	under	the	guise	of	religious	or	cultural	concerns.	(Police	Officer)	
	
In	general	terms,	Islamic	objections	to	autopsy	are	based	on	the	importance	of	body	wholeness	
at	 death	 (Campbell	 1998:	 295).	 Three	 further	 beliefs	 support	 such	 a	 proscription	 against	
autopsy.	 The	 first	 is	 a	 general	 concern	 that	 the	 autopsy	 procedure	 will	 delay	 burial,	 which	
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according	 to	 Islamic	 law	 should	 occur	within	 24	 hours	 of	 the	death.	 The	 second	proscription	
comes	from	the	Islamic	belief	in	the	sacredness	of	the	body	and	this	is	due	to	the	religious	belief	
that	the	body	belongs	to	God.	The	third	is	the	perception	that	the	dead	perceive	pain,	with	such	
a	belief	based	on	 the	words	of	 the	prophet	Mohammed	who	claimed	that	 ‘the	breaking	of	 the	
bone	of	a	dead	person	is	equal	in	sin	to	doing	this	while	he	is	alive’	(Gatrad	1994:	523,	see	also	
Al‐Adnani	2006;	Lynch	1999).		
	
While	 the	 Islamic	 objection	 to	 autopsy	 is	 well	 founded,	 the	 suspicion	 inherent	 in	 such	 an	
objection	is	also	apparent,	and	in	our	interviews,	missing	from	discussions	of	other	cultural	or	
religious	 objections.	 While	 it	 is	 convenient	 to	 point	 to	 the	 rising	 Islamophobia	 in	 western	
nations	 post	 9/11	 (Spalek	 2008;	 Poynting	 and	 Mason	 2006),	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 Muslim	
immigrants	have	been	seen	as	a	problem	community	since	Lebanese	Muslims	started	arriving	in	
Australia	 in	 significant	 numbers	 from	 the	 1970s	 (Humphrey	 2007:	 12;	 Poynting	 and	 Mason	
2007).	 There	 may	 be	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 for	 this.	 First	 is	 the	 intertwining	 of	 religion	 and	
politics	in	Islam	and	its	portrayal	as	in	opposition	to	secular	modernity,	which	correlates	with	
political	 disloyalty	 to	Australian	 national	 identity.	 Concerns	 over	 ‘Muslim	 first	 and	Australian	
second’,	speak	to	the	‘underlying	expectation	that	all	immigrants	are	on	the	journey	to	becoming	
Australian,	at	least	across	generations’	(Humphrey	2007:	12).	Second	is	the	focus	on	the	cultural	
incompatibility	of	Islam	to	the	West	which	is	positioned	as	a	cultural	backwardness	rather	than	
just	 a	 cultural	 difference,	 and	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 control	 and	 treatment	 of	women.	
Such	 an	 understanding	 constructs	 Muslims	 as	 ‘trapped	 by	 tradition’	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	West	
which	 is	 ‘liberated	 from	 cultural	 constraints	 and	 individually	 autonomous’	 (Humphrey	 2007:	
21).	Finally,	is	the	more	recent	moral	panic	around	terrorism	which	has	led	to	a	situation	‘where	
any	expression	of	 Islamic	religious	 identity	 is	 suspicious’,	possibly	 indicative	of	an	underlying	
and	dangerous	 fundamentalism	(Humphrey	2006:	13).	This	has	 led	to	the	creation	of	 ‘suspect	
communities’	 who	 should	 be	 ‘monitored	 by	 state	 agencies,	 casting	 new	 questions	 about	
citizenship,	identity	and	loyalty’	(Spalek	2008:	211).	Such	an	understanding	is	now	widespread	
in	 Australian	 society	with	 the	 ‘Arab	 other’	 constructed	 through	 a	 ‘complex	 process	 involving	
recurrent	 negative	media	 portrayals,	 prejudiced	 political	 pronouncements	 and	 racist	 populist	
rhetoric’	(White	2009:	366).		
	
Judaism	
	
There	is	a	liaison	for	the	Jewish	community.	I	think	there	is	also	for	the	Samoans	and	so	on,	
through	the	Church.	But	they’re	less	proactive	than	the	Jewish	community.	I	think	there’s	a	
liaison	 fellow	 from	 the	 Jewish	community,	and	he’ll	get	 involved	pretty	quickly.	 It’s	really	
just	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 burial	 takes	 place	 as	 soon	 as	 possible.	 That’s	 not	 necessarily	 an	
objection	 to	 autopsy.	 I	 don’t	 think	 they	mind	 autopsy	 so	much,	 but	 it’s	 got	 to	 be	 done	
quickly.	(Coroner)	
	
He’s	very	much	an	advocate	for	the	Jewish	community	in	New	South	Wales	and	by	default,	
now	 all	 of	 Australia,	 who	 was	 very,	 very	 active	 in	 issues	 of	 objections	 to	 autopsies,	
objections	to	retention	of	tissues,	and	was	very	active	in	changing	initially,	the	way	that	the	
New	South	Wales	Government	operated	and	ultimately,	the	law.	(Pathologist)	
	
In	 Judaism,	 it	 is	 considered	 a	 desecration	 to	 interfere	with	 the	body	of	 the	dead	 (Segal	 2006:	
102).	This	is	because,	according	to	Mittleman	et	al.	(1992:	826),	the	Jewish	faith	never	views	a	
deceased	 person	 as	 a	 corpse.	 ‘Having	 housed	 God’s	 soul,	 the	 body,	 even	 after	 death,	 is	
considered	 a	 holy	 vessel.	 Furthermore,	 the	 soul	 remains	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 the	 body	
immediately	after	cessation	of	physical	life,	thereby	suffering	a	sense	of	separation	anxiety.	The	
dissection	of	the	body	can	therefore	be	considered	painful	to	the	soul	which	should	be	treated	
with	the	highest	level	of	dignity’.	Despite	the	similarities	between	Judaism	and	Islam	in	terms	of	
their	 location	 within	 the	 coronial	 death	 investigation,	 and	 the	 religious	 legitimacy	 of	 their	
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objection,	the	differences	between	the	situation	of	Jewish	advocacy	and	that	of	Muslin	suspicion	
is	 stark	 and	 speaks	 to	 the	 different	 space	 that	 the	 Jewish	 community	 occupy	 in	 Australian	
society.	 Part	 of	 the	 reason	 for	 this,	 according	 to	 Stratton	 (2000)	 is	 that	 the	 ‘Jew’	 is	 a	 socially	
constructed	 ‘gentile,	Western	Other’,	 homogenised	 and	othered	 in	much	 the	 same	way	as	 the	
‘Asian’,	but	not	 to	 the	same	extent	because	 the	 Jew	 is	also	white,	European	and	Western.	 It	 is	
also	 consistently	 noted	 that	 prominent	 members	 of	 the	 Jewish	 community	 were	 part	 of	 the	
founding	government	of	Australia,	and	continued	to	use	their	influence	in	policy	and	legislation	
regarding	 Jewish	 immigration	 after	 WWII	 (Rutland	 2005).	 Research	 also	 demonstrates	 that	
anti‐Semitism	 is	 on	 the	 decrease	 in	 Australia,	 unlike	 many	 other	 countries	 (Stobbs	 2008;	
Rutland	2008)	and	that	the	Jewish	community	are	neither	over‐policed	nor	over‐criminalised	in	
Australia	(Stobbs	2008).	Finally,	the	recasting	of	Judaism	after	the	Holocaust	as	integral	to	the	
history	 of	 the	 West	 would	 appear	 to	 place	 Jewish	 objections	 against	 autopsy	 in	 a	 different	
location	to	either	Muslim	or	Indigenous	concerns	(Mamdani	2004).	
	
Indigenous	
	
But	 interestingly	we	 rarely	have	many	 issues	 concerning	autopsies	within	 the	Aboriginal	
community	and	we	should	do,	there	should	be	more	and	I	don’t	know	why.	Now	it	could	be	
that	it’s	more	of	an	urban	population	and	therefore	it’s	not	a	particular	issue	for	them	or	it	
could	be	that	no‐one’s	asking	the	questions.	(Coroner)	
	
There’s	a	 fair	 few	Aboriginal	autopsies	 that	we	do	as	well	and	 there’s	never	any	 sort	of	
problems	getting	permission	because	 they	don’t	have	a	problem	with	having	an	autopsy.	
There’s	never	been	any	protestation.	So	I	don’t	really	know	what	all	the	hoo	haa	 is	about.	
(Pathologist)	
	
Indigenous	 cultural	 proscriptions	 against	 autopsy	 are	 in	 place	 to	 protect	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	
deceased,	which	it	is	argued	would	be	harmed	by	a	mutilation	of	the	body	and	thus	prevented	
from	entering	the	dreamtime	(Lynch	1999:	72).	As	Vines	(2007:	17)	identifies	‘the	relationship	
between	 Aboriginal	 people	 and	 their	 dead	 is	 one	 of	 custodianship.	 The	 body	 should	 remain	
whole	 so	 that	 the	 spirit	will	have	 somewhere	 to	go.	Autopsy	 is	often	 seen	as	desecration	and	
destructive	of	the	spirit’.	Unlike	the	space	in	which	Muslim	objections	may	find	themselves	–	as	
inherently	 suspicious	 –	 it	 appears	 that	 Indigenous	 objections	 are	 all	 but	 invisible	 in	 the	
Queensland	coronial	system.	There	may	be	a	number	of	reasons	for	this.	First,	a	long	and	well	
documented	history	of	poor	relations	between	police	and	Indigenous	people,	including	‘volatile	
conflict’	and	‘police	abuse	and	harassment’,	 ‘excessive	force’	and	‘institutional	racism’	(Cuneen	
2006),	may	mean	that	Indigenous	people	do	not	wish	to	have	their	cultural	 identity	known	to	
police.	 Second,	 given	 the	 over‐representation	 of	 Indigenous	 people	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system	–	also	well	documented	–	it	may	be	that	if	their	cultural	identity	is	known,	this	is	through	
adverse	 dealings	 with	 police	 and	magistrates.	 In	 such	 a	 context,	 Indigenous	 people	 may	 feel	
powerless	to	have	their	objections	heard.	Unfortunately,	and	as	we	have	noted	elsewhere,	such	
silence	and	invisibility	is	in	the	context	of	Indigenous	over‐representation	in	the	coronial	system	
due	in	part	to	such	factors	as	endemic	violence,	poor	access	to	health	care,	low	life	expectancies	
and	high	rates	of	chronic	disease.	Moreover,	over‐representation	is	not	an	issue	experienced	by	
either	 the	Muslim	or	 the	 Jewish	community	 (Carpenter	and	Tait	2009;	Carpenter	et	al.	2011).	
Ironically,	the	silence	and	invisibility	of	the	Indigenous	community	occurs	against	a	backdrop	of	
‘the	 endemic	 losses	 of	 colonialism	 and	 the	 heightened	 mortality	 of	 ongoing	 alienation’,	 and	
which	 in	 other	 contexts,	 such	 as	Maori	 in	New	 Zealand,	 have	 been	 argued	 to	 increase	 rather	
than	 decrease	 the	 relevance	 of	 cultural	 practices	 in	 relation	 to	 loss	 and	 death	 (Clarke	 and	
McCreanor	2006:	27).		
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Grief	Work	
	
So	the	short	answer	is	that	you	can’t	be	assured	that	they	[the	family]	understand,	you	can’t	
actually	have	any	confidence	that	people	know	what	they’re	even	agreeing	to.	And	this	is	an	
ethical	dilemma	we	struggle	with.	(Counsellor)	
	
Most	people	don’t	object.	I	don’t	know	 ...	I	suspect	part	of	 its	due	to	the	blankness	of	their	
minds	 and	 they	 just	 go	 along	with	whatever	 ...	 Some	 of	 them	 I	 suspect	 probably	 think	
they’re	a	bit	powerless,	you	know,	they’re	unfamiliar	with	death,	they’ve	had	the	police	rock	
up	and	say	this	is	what’s	going	to	happen.	(Pathologist)	
	
...	 and	 dealing	 with	 people	 who	 are	 suddenly	 thrust	 into	 a	 grieving	 process	 is	 totally	
different	from	dealing	with	somebody	who’s	had	their	house	broken	into	or	somebody	who	
was	drunk	and	belligerent.	(Police	Officer)	
	
I	get	 the	 feeling	 that	 it	 [the	death	 investigation]	 is	allocated	 to	quite	 junior	officers	with	
little	or	no	training.	So	I	would	say	no;	I	would	say	that	I	wouldn’t	be	confident	that	it	was	
really	very	carefully	investigated.	(Coroner)	
	
These	 statements	 raise	 a	 number	 of	 relevant	 issues	 in	 the	 grief	 work	 required	 of	 Coronial	
personnel,	which	is	replicated	in	the	little	research	there	is	on	families	dealings	with	a	coronial	
death,	 with	 most	 suggesting	 that	 coronial	 processes	 can	 cause	 further	 trauma	 to	 family	
members	 already	 suffering	 significant	 grief	 (Green	1992;	Harwood	 et	 al.	 2002;	Biddle	2003;	
Robb	 and	 Sullivan	 2004;	 Clarke	 and	 McCreanor	 2006;	 Drayton	 2011).	 While	 this	 has	 been	
noted	in	particular	during	the	inquest	(Biddle	2003;	Green	1992),	and	in	the	scandals	relating	
to	 the	 retention	of	 organs	 (Robb	and	Sullivan	2004;	Drayton	2011)	and	experimentation	on	
bodies	(Walker	2001),	it	is	most	keenly	felt	in	the	commonplace	(and	legislative	necessity)	of	
autopsy,	where	terms	such	as	‘mutilation’,	‘desecration’,	and	‘barbaric	acts’	have	been	used	by	
families	to	describe	images	of	the	autopsy	of	their	loved	one	(Robb	and	Sullivan	2004:	41).	It	
has	been	argued	that	this	demonstrates	‘a	profound	connection	to	the	body	of	the	deceased’	by	
those	 suffering	 from	 grief	 and	 loss	 (Drayton	 2011:	 231)	 in	 part	 because	 the	 dead	 body	
maintains	a	‘social	existence	as	a	powerful	representation	of	the	self’	(Hockey	1996:	56)	which	
is	not	immediately	removed	at	death.	
	
It	 is	also	the	case	that	this	connection	between	the	bereaved	and	the	body	of	the	deceased	is	
intensified	during	a	 coronial	death	 investigation	due	 to	 the	added	 trauma	of	 the	unexpected	
and	often	violent	nature	of	 the	death	 (Neria	and	Litz	2004).	This	 is	partly	because	decisions	
about	autopsy	occur	when	families	are	still	in	the	grip	of	the	shock	and	disbelief	of	the	death	
notification,	 ‘when	 their	 ability	 to	 process	 and	 retain	 complex	 information	may	 be	 severely	
compromised’	(Drayton	2011:	238).	In	such	conversations,	two	competing	representations	of	
the	 dead	 body	 are	 evident:	 the	 medico‐legal	 body	 which	 is	 ‘mechanistic’,	 ‘devoid	 of	
personality’,	‘tissue’;	and	the	body	as	‘beloved	and	lamented’	(Drayton	2011:	240).		
	
Research	has	also	 shown	 that	when	cultural	 difference	 is	added	 to	 the	medico‐legal	 inquiry,	
harm	 and	 trauma	 can	 be	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 coronial	 procedures	 interrupt	
culturally	 specific	 grieving	 practices,	 many	 of	 which	 focus	 on	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 body	 (Tatz	
2005;	Byard	and	Chivell	2005;	Clarke	and	McCreanor	2006).	Moreover,	while	the	appearance	
of	police	at	a	death	investigation	may	cause	alarm	in	many	families,	with	the	innuendos	of	guilt	
and	suspicion	 that	 they	bring,	 this	 is	particularly	pronounced	 for	 those	communities	already	
over	 policed	 and	 over	 criminalised,	 like	 Aboriginal	 people	 in	 Australia,	 or	 Maori	 in	 New	
Zealand	(Carpenter	and	Tait	2010;	Clarke	and	McCreanor	2006;	Tatz	2005).	In	stark	contrast,	
the	 disruption	 of	 religious	 grieving	 practices	 is	 less	 researched	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 coronial	
death	investigation.	Despite	this,	such	practices	appear	to	be	more	familiar	within	the	coronial	
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community	 generally,	 with	 religious	 objections	 influencing	 Coroners	 to	 make	 less	 invasive	
autopsy	decisions	 (Carpenter	 et	 al.	 2011).	 It	 is	 also	 the	 case,	 however,	 that	 such	 knowledge	
does	not	necessarily	decrease	feelings	of	suspicion	and	heightened	trauma	of	grieving	families,	
especially	 in	 Muslim	 communities,	 who	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 feel	 positioned	 as	 ‘outsiders’	
(Yasmeen	2008).		
	
Therapeutic	Jurisprudence	
	
And	 I	 just	think	that’s	so	 important	and	 I	see	the	 fallout	of	what	happens	 if	people	aren’t	
heard	and	you	know	if	someone	has	a	really	strong	objection	because	of	religion	and	I	can	
come	 back	 and	 explain	 why	 it	 has	 to	 happen	 regardless	 of	 that,	 they	 can	 accept	 that	
whereas	if	they’re	not	heard	it’s	like	an	assault	on	their	belief.	And	that’s	an	added	trauma	
to	them.	(Counsellor)	
	
In	 other	 words	 the	 coroners	 are	 really,	 really,	 really	 reluctant	 to	 go	 against	 a	 family	
objection	no	matter	what	the	basis	for	it	is,	no	matter	what	unsupported	evidence	that	they	
provide.	(Pathologist)	
	
I	really	dislike	 it	when	coroners	 lean	too	much	towards	taking	the	religious	objections	on	
board,	 you	 know,	 I	 don’t	 think	 religious	 objections	 should	 have	 any	 part	 to	 do	with	 it.	
(Police	Officer)	
	
There	has	 to	be	a	bloody	good	reason	 to	over‐ride	an	objection	 to	autopsy.	A	really	good	
reason.	Usually	the	only	reason	is	if	there’s	criminal	behaviour	involved.	(Coroner)	
	
There	 is	 clearly	 a	 tension,	 evident	 in	 the	 statements	 above,	 between	 the	 medico‐legal	 death	
investigation	 and	 the	 emotion	 and	 humanity	 of	 the	 family.	 It	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising	 that	
pathologists	stand	in	opposition	to	what	they	perceive	as	this	recent	impost	on	the	process	of	a	
death	 investigation	–	wedded	as	they	are	 to	science	as	 the	point	of	access	 for	 the	 truth	of	 the	
death	(Carpenter	and	Tait	2010)	–	and	perhaps	equally	unsurprising	that	counsellors	are	able	to	
accommodate	and	advocate	for	the	family’s	place	in	the	investigation	of	the	death	of	their	loved	
one	–	positioned	as	they	are	‘in	an	ethical	framework	which	asserts	the	centrality	of	client	self‐
determination’	 (Drayton	2011:	238).	What	may	be	more	 curious	 is	 the	diametrically	opposed	
position	 of	 police	 and	 Coroners	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 familial	 beliefs	 –	 who	 are	 both	 legal	
officers	 of	 the	 court	 and	 yet	 who	 offer	 either	 resentment	 or	 respect	 to	 the	 idea.	 While	 the	
valorisation	 of	 science	 in	 modernity	 may	 be	 able	 to	 accommodate	 the	 police	 officers	 views	
(Carpenter	and	Tait	2010),	 the	views	of	the	Coroner	are	of	a	different	nature,	recognising	 ‘the	
broader	social	implications	of	death’	(Scott	Bray	2010:	568).		
	
Since	 all	 coronial	 legislation	 now	 stresses	 ‘the	 rights	 of	 the	 family	member	 to	 be	 involved	 in	
decisions	concerning	the	deceased’	(Barnes	2003:	1.1),	it	is	increasingly	being	suggested	that	a	
Coroner’s	work	is	intimately	connected	with	‘well	being’	and	thus	fits	squarely	within	the	ambit	
of	 therapeutic	 jurisprudence	 (King	 2009).	 While	 commentators	 are	 quick	 to	 point	 out	 that	
therapeutic	values	should	not	outweigh	procedural	fairness	requirements	(Wexler	and	Winick	
1996;	2003)	it	is	also	acknowledged	that	sensitivity,	clear	communication,	access	to	counselling	
and	support	and	opportunities	 for	 families	to	express	their	distress	and	grief	are	crucial	to	an	
acknowledgement	of	their	loss	and	the	humanity	of	their	loved	one	(Freckleton	2007).	While	we	
have	argued	elsewhere	 (Carpenter	 and	Tait	2010)	 that	 the	 central	debate	within	 the	 coronial	
jurisdiction	 is	 between	 the	pillars	 of	 law	and	medicine,	 it	 also	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	bereaved	
views	 in	relation	 to	autopsy	 introduce	a	 third	discourse	 into	 the	debate	–	 ‘knowledge	born	of	
emotional	attachment’	or	 ‘suffering’	 (Drayton	2011:	236).	Moreover	this	discourse	of	 loss	and	
bereavement	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 be	 particularly	 potent,	 motivating	 governments	 to	 instigate	
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public	inquiries,	and	support	changes	in	policy,	practice	and	legislation	(Drayton	2011:	236,	see	
for	example	Walker	2001;	Redfern	2001).	It	also	appears	to	be	influencing	Coronial	practice.	
	
Conclusion	
The	 introduction	 of	 bereaved	 families’	 views	 into	 the	 medico‐legal	 death	 investigation	 has	
added	 three	 central	 tensions	 to	 the	 process.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 different	 spaces	 occupied	 by	 the	
families,	 depending	 on	 their	 cultural	 or	 religious	 location	 in	 larger	 social	 and	 historical	
processes.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	wider	 fears	 over	 Islamic	 fundamentalism	 post	 9/11	 has	 influenced	
suspicion	 in	 the	minds	of	 some	coronial	personnel,	while	 Jewish	political	 and	 social	 influence	
has	been	used	to	advocate	more	successfully	for	bereaved	families.	The	silence	and	invisibility	
of	 Indigenous	 beliefs	 and	 concerns	 speaks	 to	 their	 ambiguous	 position	 in	 a	 coronial	
investigation	often	overseen	by	personnel	who	also	act	in	the	criminal	justice	space.		
	
Second,	 these	 conflicting	 and	 contradictory	 engagements	 with	 bereaved	 families	 who	 have	
legitimate	 reasons	 for	 objecting	 to	 an	 autopsy	 is	 compounded	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 a	 reportable	
death	 –	 unexpected	 and	 often	 violent	 –	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 coronial	 procedures	 disrupt	
traditional	 grieving	 practices.	 Specifically,	 it	 is	 the	 differing	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 dead	 body	 is	
perceived	 –	 corpse	 or	 beloved	 –	 and	 its	 forced	 removal	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 medico‐legal	
process	of	death	investigation	that	is	most	often	cited	as	the	cause	of	suffering	and	pain	for	the	
family.	This	 is	compounded	by	the	role	of	police	 in	the	 investigation	of	coronial	deaths,	which	
has	been	highlighted	as	particularly	 traumatic	 for	 those	 families	who	are	part	of	communities	
already	over‐policed	and	over‐criminalised.		
	
Finally,	the	differences	between	coronial	personnel’s	attitudes	to	the	role	and	place	of	families	
suffering	through	a	medico‐legal	investigation,	has	indicated	the	importance	placed	by	Coroners	
on	 the	 relation	 between	 their	 role	 in	 the	 prevention	 of	 avoidable	 deaths	 and	 the	 therapeutic	
potential	 of	 a	 death	 investigation	 for	 families.	 As	 the	 primary	 decision	 makers	 in	 a	 coronial	
death	 investigation,	 this	 convergence	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 undermine	 more	 traditional	
knowledges	 like	 science	 and	 medicine	 as	 the	 final	 arbiters	 in	 a	 death	 investigation.	 CSI	 not	
withstanding	 it	 appears	 that	 a	 discourse	 of	 emotion	 and	 suffering	 may	 be	 on	 the	 verge	 of	
entering	the	medico‐legal	space	of	a	coronial	investigation.		
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Abstract	
Persistent	 high	 levels	 of	 recidivism	 among	 young	 offenders	 (Luke	 and	 Lind	 2002;	
Weatherburn	et	al.	2012)	and	the	over‐representation	of	Indigenous	young	people	(Cunneen	
and	White	 2011;	 Snowball	 2008;	 Tauri	 2012)	 have	 long	 been	 features	 of	 youth	 justice	 in	
Australia.	 Other	 problems	 –	 such	 as	 the	 increased	 rates	 of	 young	 people	 committing	 sex	
offences	(Dwyer	2011;	O’Brien	2010),	 increasing	numbers	of	young	people	criminalised	for	
new	offences	such	as	 ‘sexting’	(Lee	and	McGovern	2013),	and	 increasing	numbers	of	young	
female	offenders	being	drawn	 into	youth	 justice	systems	(Carrington	2006;	Carrington	and	
Pereira	 2009)	 –	 have	 emerged	 more	 recently.	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 draw	 on	 the	 concept	 of	
‘imaginary	penalities’	(Carlen	2010)	to	argue	these	chronic	problems	are	partly	informed	by	
‘imaginary’	 understandings	 of	 how	 and	 why	 young	 people	 (re)offend;	 reflect	 ‘imaginary’	
understandings	 of	 what	 works	 to	 address	 young	 people’s	 (re)offending;	 and	 reflect	
‘imaginary’	ideals	about	the	primary	purposes	of	the	youth	justice	system.	We	acknowledge	
up	front	that	answers	to	these	questions	require	a	great	deal	of	new	empirical	research.	This	
paper	is	only	a	beginning	that	sets	out	exactly	what	such	an	ambitious	project	might	look	like.		
	
	
Youth	Justice	Systems	in	Crisis	
Recently	described	as	‘in	crisis’	(The	Australian,	9/01/13	p.	1),	Australian	youth	justice	systems	
have	undergone	little	systemic	change	since	the	separation	of	children’s	from	adult	courts	at	the	
beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 and	 the	 subsequent	 removal	 of	welfare	 offences	 in	 the	 1980s	
(Carrington	 and	 Pereira	 2009).	 Yet	 much	 has	 changed	 over	 the	 last	 century	 that	 shapes	
contemporary	 problems	 of	 youth	 offending	 and	 contemporary	 responses.	 Australia	 has	 eight	
jurisdictions,	 each	 with	 its	 own	 youth	 justice	 system,	 legislation,	 policy	 frameworks	 and	
statutory	 youth	 justice	 agency,	 operating	 within	 a	 national	 policy	 framework	 that	 includes	
strategic	 frameworks	 such	 as	 the	 National	 Youth	 Policing	 Model	 (Attorney‐General’s	
Department	 2010)	 and	 the	 National	 Youth	 Justice	 Framework	 (Australasian	 Juvenile	 Justice	
Administrators	 (AJJA)	 forthcoming).	 There	 are	 stark	 discrepancies	 in	 youth	 justice	 outcomes	
across	Australia	 in	 rates	of	 Indigenous	over‐representation,	 in	 the	efficacy	of	 interventions,	 in	
the	 age	 and	 sex	 of	 youth	 offenders	 involved	 in	 the	 system,	 and	 in	 rates	 of	 recidivism.	 For	
example,	 while	 Indigenous	 young	 people	 are	 overrepresented	 in	 youth	 detention	 in	 every	
jurisdiction,	this	varies	from	three	times	the	rate	of	non‐Indigenous	young	people	in	Tasmania	
to	 69	 times	 in	 Western	 Australia	 (Richards	 2011).	 Moreover,	 policies	 such	 as	 diversionary	
measures	 produce	highly	 varied	 results	 across	 jurisdictions.	While	 youth	 justice	 conferencing	
has	been	legislated	in	every	jurisdiction,	the	proportion	of	young	offenders	referred	by	police	to	
a	conference	varies	substantially	across	jurisdictions,	from	2%	of	young	offenders	in	the	ACT	to	
25%	 in	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 (Richards	 2010).	 Such	 markedly	 different	 outcomes	 require	
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investigation	if	we	are	to	better	understand	why	certain	approaches	are	working	well	in	some	
jurisdictions	and	seemingly	not	in	others.	
	
While	much	new	research	is	required	to	undertake	such	an	ambitious	project,	in	this	paper	we	
simply	 provide	 an	 outline	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 research	 questions	 such	 a	 project	might	 entail.	 Key	
questions	include:	
	
 To	 what	 extent	 are	 youth	 justice	 interventions	 achieving	 crime	 prevention,	 reducing	
recidivism,	empowering	practitioners	to	help	develop	the	capacities	required	for	young	
people	to	function	adequately	and	responsibly	in	their	communities,	and	enabling	young	
people	to	make	good	judgments?		
 What	does	effective	policy	and	practice	look	like	as	opposed	to	how	it	is	imagined?		
	
Framing	the	Analysis	
Our	 analysis	 is	 framed	 by	 a	 range	 of	 criminological	 and	 sociological	 theories	 of	 crime,	 ‘race’,	
youth	 and	 gender.	 It	 draws	 upon	 these	 theories	 to	 explain	 both	 how	 certain	 social	 factors	
predispose	 some	marginalised	 young	 people	 towards	 criminalisation	 (Carrington	 and	Pereira	
2009)	and	how	we	develop	and	use	‘fictions’	of	 ‘criminals’,	 ‘justice’,	and	‘young	offenders’	as	if	
they	are	real	even	when	they	have	little	bearing	on	the	real	(Carlen	2008;	Vaihinger	1935).	The	
concept	 of	 ‘imaginary	 penalities’	will	 also	 be	 used	 to	 frame	 our	 analysis.	 This	 refers	 to	 penal	
policies	 and	 practices	 that	 are	 unrealisable,	 yet	 those	 authorised	 to	 develop	 and	 implement	
them	 act	 ‘as	 if’	 they	 are	 effective	 (Carlen	 2008;	 Vaihinger	 1935).	 As	 a	 result,	 a	 process	 of	
‘institutional	 goal	 adaptation’	 occurs,	 whereby	 the	 unrealisable	 goals	 that	 form	 the	 officially‐
recognised	 rationale	 for	 a	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 or	 practice	 are	 replaced	with	 aims	 that	 are	
easier	 to	 achieve	 (Carlen	 2008).	 Acting	 ‘as	 if’	 policy	works	when	 it	 doesn’t	 is	 a	 phenomenon	
evident	 in	many	other	domains	 from	child	protection	to	national	and	 international	economics	
(Argyris	and	Schön	1974;	Heffernan	2011).	A	number	of	world‐views	referred	to	as	neo‐liberal	
penal	 regimes	 also	 underpin	 ‘imaginary	 penalities’	 of	 this	 kind.	 These	 include	 perhaps	 most	
significantly,	the	institution	of	new	modes	of	governance	of	crime	through	the	paradigm	of	risk	
(O’Malley	2010).	In	what	follows	we	consider	four	problems	that	underscore	the	crisis	in	youth	
justice	 and	 raise	 questions	 about	 how	 much	 this	 crisis	 is	 the	 product	 of	 imaginary	 young	
offenders	and	imaginary	penalities.		
	
Problem	1:	Why	do	young	people	continue	to	reoffend	despite	youth	justice	interventions	
aimed	at	deterring	reoffending?		
Research	 consistently	 demonstrates	 that	 a	 small	 ‘core’	 of	 young	 people	 is	 responsible	 for	 a	
disproportionate	 amount	of	 crime,	 and	 that	 these	young	people	 repeatedly	 come	 into	 contact	
with	youth	justice	systems	(Hua	et	al.	2006;	Weatherburn	et	al.	2012).	While	most	young	people	
who	offend	do	not	have	contact	with	the	justice	system,	more	than	half	of	those	who	proceed	to	
a	 caution,	 conference	or	 the	children’s	 court	do	have	 further	 contact,	 and	 those	who	 reoffend	
are,	 on	 average,	 prolific	 offenders	 (Weatherburn	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Why	 do	 a	 small	 proportion	 of	
young	offenders	reoffend	repeatedly,	despite	interventions	aimed	at	preventing	their	offending?	
What	 role,	 if	 any,	 is	 played	 by	 youth	 justice	 systems	 in	 producing	 this	 effect	 by	 basing	
interventions	on	imagined	constructs	of	young	offenders?		
	
Critical	questions	about	the	nature	of	young	people’s	recidivism	therefore	need	to	be	addressed	
in	 any	 re‐imagining	 of	 youth	 justice	 in	 the	 21st	 century.	 Specifically	 these	 include	 an	
examination	 of	 the	 extent	 to	which	 ‘imaginary	penalities’	 target	 ‘imaginary	 offenders’	 (Carlen	
2008).	For	example,	restorative	justice	measures	are	premised	on	an	‘imaginary’	young	person	
who	 is	emotionally	 intelligent	and	articulate	(Roche	2004),	despite	evidence	 that	many	young	
offenders	 do	 not	 have	 the	 cognitive	 and/or	 communication	 skills	 required	 to	 adequately	
comprehend	the	‘rules	of	the	game’	and	engage	in	such	processes	(Shapiro	1999).	Some	of	the	
critical	questions	 that	 require	 further	 research	 if	 effective	positive	policy	 responses	are	 to	be	
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developed	 to	meaningfully	 address	 problems	 of	 recidivism	 therefore	 include:	 To	what	 extent	
are	 youth	 justice	 policies	 and	 programs	premised	 on	 an	 ‘imaginary’	 young	 offender	who	will	
desist	 from	offending	 after	 contact	with	one	 of	 these	 interventions?	To	what	 extent	 do	 youth	
justice	 policies	 and	 programs	 ‘imagine’	 a	 young	 offender	 who	 easily	 desists,	 rather	 than	 the	
persistent	 young	 offender	 who	 comprises	 the	 bulk	 of	 youth	 justice	 agencies’	 caseloads?	
Currently,	program	and	policy	responses	to	youth	offending	tend	instead	to	exclude	recidivists,	
leaving	detention	and	now	boot	camps,	as	the	only	resort.		
	
Problem	 2:	 Why	 do	 Indigenous	 young	 people	 continue	 to	 be	 over‐represented	 in	
Australia’s	youth	justice	systems,	despite	policies	designed	to	address	this?	
Statistics	 reveal	high	 levels	of	over‐representation	of	 Indigenous	young	people	at	all	 stages	of	
the	youth	justice	system,	and	particularly	at	the	most	severe	end	of	the	system,	with	Indigenous	
young	 people	 being	 24	 times	 as	 likely	 as	 non‐Indigenous	 young	 people	 to	 be	 in	 detention	
(Australian	 Institute	 of	 Health	 and	Welfare	 (AIHW)	 2012).	 While	 the	 over‐representation	 of	
Indigenous	 young	 people	 has	 increased	 steadily	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 this	 increase	 has	
been	 found	 to	 be	 primarily	 the	 result	 of	 decreasing	 rates	 of	 non‐Indigenous	 young	 people	 in	
detention	(Richards	2011).		
	
This	raises	a	critical	question	around	why	youth	justice	interventions	have	to	some	extent	been	
successful	 in	 reducing	 the	 incarceration	 of	 non‐Indigenous	 young	 people	 but	 have	 failed	 for	
Indigenous	 young	 people	 (Cunneen	 2008).	 Moreover	 why	 have	 even	 those	 interventions	
designed	specifically	for	Indigenous	young	people	not	been	successful?	We	think	that	imaginary	
constructs	 of	 young	 offenders,	 based	 on	 Anglophone	 norms,	 are	 part	 of	 this	 problem.	 For	
example,	 why	 is	 it	 the	 case	 that	 most	 youth	 justice	 policies	 and	 programs	 ‘imagine’	 an	
abstracted	 Anglo‐Saxon	 offender	 (see	 Tauri	 2012),	 and/or	 that	 the	 positivistic	 ‘what	 works’	
approach	 to	measuring	 program	 outcomes	 is	 Anglocentric?	 To	what	 extent	 are	 youth	 justice	
policies	 and	 programs	 designed	 for	 non‐Indigenous	 young	 people,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	
nationally,	 half	 of	 all	 young	 people	 in	 detention	 are	 Indigenous?	 While	 we	 know	 and	 have	
known	for	two	decades	that	Indigenous	young	people	are	over‐represented	in	Australian	youth	
justice	 systems,	 how	and	why	 their	 over‐representation	persists	 is	 yet	 to	be	 fully	understood	
and	articulated,	particularly	from	the	perspective	of	Indigenous	young	people	themselves.		
	
Problem	3:	Why	are	rates	of	young	people	convicted	of	sexual	offences	rising?		
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 number	 of	 young	 people	 entering	 the	 youth	 justice	 system	 in	 relation	 to	
sexual	and	related	offences	has	increased	(O’Brien	2010).	Youth	justice	stakeholders	consulted	
during	the	development	of	the	National	Youth	Justice	Framework	have	expressed	concern	about	
this	issue,	as	well	as	their	 lack	of	capacity	to	address	it	(see	AJJA	forthcoming).	There	has	also	
been	a	decrease	in	the	age	of	young	people	committing	sexual	offences	and	an	increase	in	sexual	
offending	 by	 and	 against	 Indigenous	 young	 people	 (Dwyer	 2011;	 O’Brien	 2010).	 The	
criminalisation	of	teen	sexting	has	created	a	new	crime	where	young	people’s	voices	are	largely	
silenced	in	the	public	and	political	debate	about	the	harm	or	innocuousness	of	such	antics	(Lee	
et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 criminalisation	 of	 adolescent	 sexting	 has	 occurred	 in	 the	 perverse	 context	
where	 adult	 sexting	 is	 a	 legitimate	 and	 legal	 adult	 activity	 (Lee	 et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 is	 a	 classic	
example	of	how	an	imaginary	young	offender	 is	created	through	social	reaction	and	then	how	
law	 creates	 deviance	 in	 its	 own	 image.	 This	 all	 begs	 the	 larger	question	of	 to	what	 extent	 do	
rising	 rates	 of	 sexual	 offences	 reflect	 changes	 in	 young	 people’s	 conduct	 or	 changes	 in	 the	
regulation	 of	 young	 people’s	 sexual	 behaviours,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 sexting,	 or	 changes	 to	
definitions	 of	 sex	 offences?	 To	what	 extent	 are	 young	 people	 unwittingly	 criminalised	 in	 the	
justice	 system	 as	 a	 result	 of	 responses	 to	 sexual	 offending	 designed	 for	 adult	 offenders?	
Moreover,	what	 interventions	might	 better	 address	 young	people’s	 sexual	 offending,	much	of	
which	 passes	 undetected	 and	 unregulated	 as	 it	 does	 in	 the	 adult	 population.	 There	 is	 a	
disjuncture	between	the	 ‘imaginary’	sex	offender	upon	which	many	policies	and	programs	are	
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based,	 and	 the	 experiences	 of	 young	 people	who	 come	 into	 contact	with	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system	for	sexual	offences.	
	
Problem	4:	Why	are	rates	of	young	women	drawn	into	the	youth	justice	system	rising?	
While	males	still	dominate	crime	statistics	as	offenders	and	prisoners,	a	body	of	 international	
and	national	trend	data	points	to	consistent	narrowing	of	the	gender	gap	for	officially	reported	
crime	and	violence	for	countries	 like	the	United	States	(US),	Canada,	 the	United	Kingdom,	and	
Australia	 (Arnull	 and	Eagle	2009;	US	Department	of	 Justice	 2011;).	 In	Australia,	 boys	 still	 far	
outnumber	girls	among	those	drawn	into	the	youth	justice	system,	but	from	1960	to	2007	the	
gender	gap	narrowed	significantly	from	around	one	in	thirteen	to	around	one	in	four	females	to	
males	(Carrington	and	Pereira	2009).	During	 this	 timeframe	there	were	dramatic	 increases	 in	
the	 proportion	 of	 young	 women	 appearing	 before	 the	 courts	 charged	 with	 violence‐related	
offences,	more	so	over	the	last	decade.	Recently	the	New	South	Wales	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	
and	Research	released	an	analysis	of	increases	in	female	offending	based	on	police	statistics	of	
persons	of	interest	for	a	10‐year	period	ending	in	June	2009.	The	study	reports	that	the	number	
of	 females	 who	 came	 to	 police	 attention	 over	 that	 period	 ‘increased	 by	 15%,	 whereas	 the	
number	of	males	remained	stable’	(Holmes	2010:	2).		
	
Explanations	 for	 the	 rising	 rates	 of	 female	 violence	 are	 under‐researched,	 remain	 highly	
contentious,	and	raise	a	number	of	questions	(Alder	and	Worrall	2004;	Carrington	and	Pereira	
2009).	 There	 is	 ongoing	 debate	 about	 whether	 statistical	 increases	 in	 female	 offences	 are	
generated	 by	 less	 serious	 offences	 being	 brought	 into	 the	 system	 or	 by	 decreases	 in	 male	
offending	behaviour,	or	whether	young	women	really	are	becoming	more	violent	(Acoca	2004;	
Alder	 and	 Worrall	 2004;	 Arnull	 and	 Eagle	 2009;	 Brown,	 Chesney‐Lind	 and	 Stein	 2007;	
Carrington	2006;	Muncer	and	Campbell	2001).	Are	these	patterns	the	product	of	new	forms	of	
social	 control,	 scrutiny,	 and	 governance,	 changing	 methods	 of	 recording	 and	 reporting	
information,	changes	in	styles	of	policing	and	policy,	or	changes	in	attitudes	to	female	offending?	
Certainly	 the	 idea	of	 the	new	 female	violent	offender	captivates	 the	public	 imagination	and	 is	
partly	an	effect	of	moral	panics	and	attention‐grabbing	media	shock	jocks.	One	argument	is	that	
young	women	 are	 not	 becoming	more	 violent,	 but	 rather	 social	 and	 regulatory	 responses	 to	
their	 violent	behaviour	 are	 changing,	 leading	 to	 a	net‐widening	of	 offences	defined	 as	 violent	
(Alder	and	Worrall	2004;	Chesney‐Lind	and	Shelden	2004;	Steffensmeier	et	al.	2005).		
	
We	are	 interested	 in	how	 the	 ‘imaginary’	 constructs	 of	 (male)	young	offenders	 that	 underpin	
many	youth	justice	programs	and	systems	marginalise	and	fail	young	women.	To	what	extent	do	
criminal	justice	personnel	act	‘as	if’	youth	justice	approaches	designed	for	young	males	should	
just	work	for	young	females,	and	what	are	the	consequences	of	this?	Significantly,	the	voices	of	
young	women	themselves	are	 largely	absent	from	studies	of	youth	 justice.	There	is	a	need	for	
research	and	policy	responses	that	take	account	of	the	experiences	of	young	women	who	have	
been	 in	 contact	with	 the	 justice	 system	 to	 test	 the	 ‘imagined’	 category	 of	 the	 youth	 offender.	
Other	areas	in	dire	need	of	more	empirical	research	include:		
	
 whether	increases	in	girls’	violence	reflect	changes	in	the	regulation	and	policing	of	girls’	
behaviour,	or	changes	in	patterns	of	girls’	offending;	
 whether	rises	in	girls’	violence	are	linked	to	new	cultural	practices	in	new	digital	spaces	
like	cyberspace,	Facebook,	and	online	social	networking;	and	
 what	 can	 be	 done	 to	 address	 the	 rises	 in	 young	 female	 offending,	 given	 the	 imagined	
youth	offender	is	usually	‘male’?		
	
Conclusion	
Youth	 justice	 systems	 in	 Australia	 appear	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 a	 growing	 gap	 between	 the	
‘imagined’	 way	 youth	 justice	 is	 conceptualised	 by	 policy‐makers,	 practitioners	 and	 media	
workers,	and	 the	ways	 it	actually	operates.	For	example,	while	 the	principle	of	detention	as	a	
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last	resort	for	young	people	is	a	principle	espoused	by	a	number	of	international	conventions	to	
which	Australia	 is	a	 signatory,	and	 is	a	 feature	of	every	 jurisdiction’s	youth	 justice	 legislation,	
the	 number	 of	 young	 people	 actually	 in	 detention	 has	 increased	 substantially	 over	 the	 last	
decade	(AIHW	2012).	Some	 jurisdictions	are	placing	more	young	people	on	custodial	remand,	
despite	 evidence	 that	detention	 for	young	people	 is	 criminogenic	 (see	Richards	and	Renshaw	
forthcoming).	 Another	 critical	 ‘gap’	 characterising	 youth	 justice	 systems	 across	 Australia	 has	
opened	 up	 between	 what	 the	 evidence	 tells	 us	 about	 effective	 interventions	 with	 young	
offenders,	 and	 certain	 legislative	 reforms.	 For	 example,	 the	 Queensland	 Government	 has	
recently	introduced	legislative	amendments	that	will	limit	the	use	of	youth	justice	conferences,	
despite	 evidence	 about	 their	 efficacy	 (Luke	 and	 Lind	 2002),	 replacing	 them	with	 boot	 camps	
(see	 Richards	 et	 al.	 2013).	 These	 features	 of	 contemporary	 youth	 justice	 in	 Australia	 clearly	
illustrate	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 overriding	 coherent	 purpose	 and	 rationale	 that	 work	 to	 inform	
policy	and	practice.	Rather	what	we	have	is	a	patchwork	of	diverse	(sometimes	competing	and	
contradictory)	 rationales,	 discourses,	 policies	 and	 practices.	 It	 is	 timely	 to	 systematically	
investigate	the	rationale	and	effectiveness	of	Australia’s	youth	justice	policies,	and	to	re‐imagine	
how	 in	 an	 ideal	 democratic	 world,	 youth	 justice	 actually	 delivers	 justice,	 rather	 than	 just	
imagining	so.		
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Abstract	
The	 current	 discourse	 surrounding	 victims	 of	 online	 fraud	 is	 heavily	 premised	 on	 an	
individual	 notion	 of	 greed.	 The	 strength	 of	 this	 discourse	 permeates	 the	 thinking	 of	 those	
who	 have	 not	 experienced	 this	 type	 of	 crime,	 as	 well	 as	 victims	 themselves.	 The	 current	
discourse	 also	manifests	 itself	 in	 theories	 of	 victim	 precipitation,	 which	 again	 assigns	 the	
locus	 of	 blame	 to	 individuals	 for	 their	 actions	 in	 an	 offence.	 While	 these	 typologies	 and	
categorisations	of	victims	have	been	critiqued	as	‘victim	blaming’	in	other	fields,	this	has	not	
occurred	with	regard	to	online	fraud	victims,	where	victim‐focused	ideas	of	responsibility	for	
the	offence	continue	 to	dominate.	This	paper	 illustrates	 the	nature	and	extent	of	 the	greed	
discourse	 and	 argues	 that	 it	 forms	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 construction	 of	 online	 fraud	 that	 sees	
responsibility	 for	 victimisation	 lie	with	 the	 victims	 themselves	 and	 their	 actions.	 It	 argues	
that	the	current	discourse	does	not	take	into	account	the	level	of	deception	and	the	targeting	
of	 vulnerability	 that	 is	 employed	 by	 the	 offender	 in	 perpetrating	 this	 type	 of	 crime.	 It	
concludes	by	advocating	the	need	to	further	examine	and	challenge	this	discourse,	especially	
with	 regard	 to	 its	 potential	 impact	 for	 victim’s	 access	 to	 support	 services	 and	 the	 wider	
criminal	justice	system.		
	
	
Introduction	
Compared	to	criminology,	victimology	is	young,	emerging	at	the	end	of	world	war	two	(Fattah	
2000:18).	 Early	 explanations	 and	 typologies	 of	 victimisation	 were	 derived	 from	 positivism,	
which	 focused	on	 individual	notions	of	 responsibility	 (Dignan	2005:	32;	Walklate	2012:	174).	
Early	victimisation	theories	argued	that	the	behaviour	and	characteristics	of	victims	contributed	
to	 their	 victimisation	 (Wilcox	 2010:	 983).	While	many	 researchers	 challenged	 the	 validity	 of	
these	assumptions,	victim	blaming	was	strong	and	has	had	an	enduring	and	damaging	effect	on	
victimology	(Rock	2007:	42).		
	
This	paper	focuses	on	victims	of	online	fraud.	The	elements	of	online	fraud	are	discussed	with	
relevance	 to	 how	 victims	 are	 constructed	 by	 society	 and	 themselves.	 The	 current	 discourse	
surrounding	online	fraud	victimisation	is	presented,	using	excerpts	from	interviews	undertaken	
with	 85	 seniors	 (aged	 50	 years	 or	 older)	 who	 had	 received	 a	 fraudulent	 email	 request	 for	
money,	personal	details	or	passwords.	The	analysis	will	demonstrate	that	greed	is	internalised	
by	 the	 victims	 as	 a	 discourse	 about	 others	 rather	 than	 themselves.	 Such	 a	 perception	 is	
premised	upon	a	societal	understanding	that	attributes	responsibility	 to	victims	for	 their	own	
circumstances.	
	
It	is	argued	that	despite	criticisms	leveled	at	typologies	which	seek	to	blame	the	victim	in	other	
fields,	current	discourses	that	surround	online	 fraud	victimisation	are	 inherently	premised	on	
individual	notions	of	blame	and	guilt.	The	strength	of	these	assertions	regarding	the	individual’s	
role	and	level	of	responsibility	in	their	victimisation	transcends	those	who	have	not	responded	
to	a	fraudulent	email	as	well	as	those	who	have.		
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Overall,	 this	 paper	 establishes	 the	 dominance	 of	 positivist	 theories	 underpinning	 current	
discourses	 surrounding	 online	 fraud	 victims.	 This	 is	 argued	 to	 lead	 to	 potentially	 devastating	
consequences,	 in	 that	 it	 fails	 to	acknowledge	 the	 legitimacy	of	 these	 individuals	 as	victims,	 as	
well	as	to	recognise	ability	of	the	offender	to	manipulate	victims	to	elicit	compliance	(Drew	and	
Cross	forthcoming).	It	presents	two	cases	which	serve	to	rebuke	the	perceived	greed	of	victims	
in	responding	to	fraudulent	requests.	This	paper	concludes	by	asserting	the	need	to	examine	the	
greed	discourse	in	terms	of	its	consequences	for	online	fraud	victims	to	access	support	services	
and	the	broader	criminal	justice	system.		
	
Early	Explanations	of	Victimisation	
In	1940,	Benjamin	Mendelsohn	coined	the	term	‘victimology’,	arguing	that	a	new	field	should	be	
dedicated	 to	 the	 study	 of	 victims	 (Burgess,	 Regehr	 and	 Roberts	 2013:	 76).	 All	 early	
victimological	 theories	 were	 based	 on	 acts	 of	 physical	 violence,	 such	 as	 homicide	 and	 rape.	
Mendelsohn	 proposed	 six	 distinct	 types	 of	 victims,	 from	 those	who	 are	 completely	 innocent,	
those	with	minor	guilt	and	responsibility	from	their	own	ignorance,	those	who	are	as	guilty	as	
the	offender	and	share	equal	responsibility,	those	who	are	slightly	guiltier	than	the	offender	(in	
terms	of	provocation),	those	who	are	exclusively	responsible	for	their	victimisation,	and	lastly,	
imaginary	victims,	who	 suffer	no	 actual	harm	but	 falsely	 accuse	another	 party	 (Burgess	et	 al.	
2013:	77).	This	classification	was	primarily	based	on	the	attribution	of	guilt	since	‘the	ascription	
of	 guilt…	 tends	 to	 destroy	 victim	 status’	 (Strobl	 2010:	 9).	 Later	 classifications	 of	 victims	
resemble	this	original	typology,	with	Fattah	proposing	 five	categories	of	victims,	 including	the	
nonparticipating	victim,	the	predisposed	victim,	the	provocative	victim,	the	precipitating	victim	
and	the	false	victim	(Burgess	et	al.	2013:	76).	Both	of	these	classifications	focus	their	attention	
on	the	guilt	and	responsibility	of	the	victim.		
	
Hans	 von	 Hentig	 advocated	 a	 categorisation	 that	 focused	 on	 the	 victim‐offender	 relationship	
(Dignan	2005:	32).	He	proposed	thirteen	distinct	categories	of	victims,	based	on	the	degree	of	
culpability	exhibited	by	the	victim	(Dignan	2005:	32).	Following	this,	Stephen	Schafer	proposed	
seven	categories	of	victims,	being	unrelated	victims,	provocative	victims,	precipitative	victims,	
biologically	 weak	 victims,	 socially	 weak	 victims,	 self	 victimising	 victims	 and	 political	 victims	
(Burgess	 et	 al.	 2013:	 80).	 Schafer’s	 typology	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 victim	
precipitation,	which	attributes	a	level	of	blame	to	the	victim	for	their	victimisation	and	therefore	
implies	 that	 victims	 can	 take	 actions	 to	 prevent	 their	 victimisation.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 early	
victimisation	theory	focused	heavily	on	the	level	of	guilt	and	responsibility	borne	by	victims	in	
contributing	to	their	victimisation.	Each	typology	can	be	viewed	as	a	continuum	of	blame,	from	
the	 completely	 innocent	 to	 the	 fully	 culpable.	 However	 these	 typologies	 did	 not	 just	 ascribe	
blame	 to	 individuals	 who	 were	 seen	 to	 incite	 or	 provoke	 their	 victimisation,	 but	 also	
incorporated	 those	 who	 had	 become	 victims	 through	 unintentional	 actions	 of	 ‘carelessness,	
helplessness,	 negligence	 or	 poor	 judgment’	 (Cook	 2010:	 970).	 Collectively,	 these	 typologies	
reinforced	the	perception	that	victims	should	be	able	to	avoid	victimisation,	through	modifying	
and	regulating	their	own	actions	and	interactions	with	potential	offenders.		
	
The	Current	Study	
In	order	to	substantiate	this	argument,	the	following	analysis	is	based	upon	excerpts	taken	from	
interviews	 conducted	with	 85	 seniors	 (aged	 50	 years	 or	 older)	 across	 Queensland,	 who	 had	
received	a	fraudulent	email	request	for	money,	personal	details	or	passwords.	Semi‐structured	
interviews	were	 held	with	 non‐respondents	 (those	 who	 had	 received	 the	 fraudulent	 request	
and	 not	 responded)	 and	 respondents	 (those	 who	 responded	 in	 some	 way	 to	 the	 fraudulent	
request).	 This	 includes	 a	 number	 of	 individuals	 who	 incurred	 financial	 losses	 up	 to	 several	
hundred	thousand	dollars.		
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The	 remainder	 of	 the	 paper	 presents	 excerpts	 from	 these	 interviews2	 to	 illustrate	 the	
prevalence	 of	 a	 discourse	 founded	 on	 victim	 typologies	which	 ascribe	 blame	 and	 guilt	 to	 the	
victim	for	their	actions.	The	existence	of	this	discourse	manifests	itself	through	the	construction	
of	 online	 fraud	 victims	 as	motivated	 by	 greed.	 This	 is	 an	 individualistic	 characteristic,	 which	
leads	 to	 attributing	 blame	 and	 responsibility	 to	 the	 victim	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 if	 they	were	 not	
greedy	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 they	 would	 not	 respond	 and	 become	 victims.	 It	 is	 derived	 from	
positivist	 thinking,	which	seeks	 to	 find	causal	 explanations	 for	both	victimising	and	offending	
behaviours.	The	paper	also	demonstrates	that	greed	is	internalised	by	victims,	however	this	is	
directed	at	other	victims	of	online	 fraud	and	allows	them	to	disassociate	 themselves	 from	the	
negativity	 that	 such	 a	 discourse	 generates.	 Lastly,	 it	 presents	 evidence	 that	 opposes	 the	
perceived	greed	of	victims,	and	seeks	to	highlight	the	complex	reality	of	fraudulent	approaches.		
	
Understanding	Online	Fraud	Victimisation	
Online	fraud	can	be	defined	as	‘any	type	of	fraud	scheme	that	uses	email,	web	sites,	chat	rooms	
or	 message	 boards	 to	 present	 fraudulent	 solicitations	 to	 prospective	 victims,	 to	 conduct	
fraudulent	transactions	or	to	transmit	the	proceeds	of	fraud	to	financial	institutions	or	to	others	
connected	 with	 the	 scheme’	 (Australian	 Federal	 Police	 2012).	 While	 fraud	 is	 not	 new,	 the	
internet	has	 facilitated	an	 increase	 in	 the	accessibility	of	potential	victims.	While	 there	are	an	
infinite	number	of	possible	 fraudulent	approaches	(Cross	2012),	 the	current	study	 focused	on	
advanced	fee	fraud	(where	a	victim	is	asked	to	send	a	small	amount	of	money	with	the	promise	
of	receiving	a	larger	amount	of	money	in	the	future)	(Ross	and	Smith	2011:	1);	phishing	emails	
(where	 a	 victim	 receives	 an	 email	 from	 a	 legitimate	 institution	 asking	 for	 confirmation	 of	
personal	details)	(Choo	2011:	3);	and	romance	fraud	(where	a	victim	is	defrauded	in	what	they	
believe	 to	 be	 a	 legitimate	 relationship)	 (Rege	 2009:	 497).	 Participants	 were	 asked	why	 they	
responded	to	a	 fraudulent	email	 request	 (where	 relevant)	and	their	perceptions	of	why	other	
people	responded	such	requests.		
	
The	key	element	to	any	fraud	offence	is	deception.	Victims	are	presented	with	a	situation	they	
feel	 is	 plausible,	 based	 on	 the	 offender’s	 skillful	 manipulation	 of	 an	 individual	 weakness	 or	
vulnerability	(Drew	and	Cross	forthcoming).	While	the	situation	may	seem	obviously	false	by	an	
outsider	(such	as	 family,	 friend	or	police	officer),	 the	victim	believes	 in	the	 legitimacy	of	 their	
situation.	Importantly,	once	trust	and	rapport	is	developed	between	the	victim	and	the	offender	
and	 a	 relationship	 is	 established	 (romantic	 or	 otherwise),	 the	 offender	 can	 successfully	 elicit	
compliance	 from	the	victim	to	 their	 requests	 for	money,	personal	details	or	passwords	(Drew	
and	 Cross	 forthcoming).	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 not	 unusual	 for	 victims	 to	 carry	 out	multiple	money	
transfers	 over	 a	 period	 of	 time	 (weeks,	months,	 or	 even	 years)	 before	 they	 either	 run	 out	 of	
money	or	come	to	realise	that	they	have	been	defrauded.	Although	these	victims	willingly	send	
money	to	their	offender,	it	is	essential	to	note	that	they	do	it	under	false	pretenses	and	the	level	
of	deception	perpetrated	against	them	can	be	highly	sophisticated	and	complex.		
	
Internalising	the	Social	Construction	of	Greed	
It	is	evident	that	the	notion	of	attributing	responsibility	to	victims	of	online	fraud	and	blaming	
them	for	their	victimisation	is	a	dominant	discourse.	This	is	primarily	demonstrated	through	an	
overriding	 belief	 in	 the	 greed	 of	 online	 fraud	 victims.	 It	 is	 the	 most	 dominant	 explanation	
offered	by	non‐respondent	participants	as	to	why	individuals	respond	to	fraudulent	emails:		
	
The	 Nigerian	 scams,	 I	 mean	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 messages	 you	 know	 are	 clearly	
absurd,	 I’ve	 heard	 people	 say	 especially	 the	 police	 it’s	 just	 pure	 greed	 that	 draws	
them	 in	 and	 I	 would	 imagine	 it	 is	 just	 pure	 greed	 …	 (Elliott,	 non‐respondent,	 72	
years)	
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There	 is	 that	 incredible	sense	of	greed	that	we	all	have	when	we	think	we	can	get	
something	for	nothing	…	(Vince,	non‐respondent,	58	years)	
	
Apart	from	my	first	thought	that	you	have	got	to	be	a	bloody	idiot,	all	they	can	see	is	
money.	A	quick	way	of	getting	money	and	all	they	can	see	if	I	do	this	I	will	get	money	
and	nobody	will	know	about	it.	(Roberta,	non‐respondent,	69	years)		
	
These	comments	from	non‐respondents	indicate	the	idea	that	greed	is	the	driving	force	behind	
a	 person’s	 decision	 to	 respond	 to	 a	 fraudulent	 email.	 It	 justifies	 an	 overriding	 focus	 on	 the	
individual	actions	of	the	email	recipient	and	insinuates	individual	notions	of	blame	towards	the	
respondent.	This	is	abundantly	clear	in	the	following	comment	from	Russell:	
	
Nobody’s	making	you	do	 it	 are	 they.	Nobody	 is	holding	a	gun	 to	your	head	 saying	
you’ve	 got	 to	 do	 this.	 No	 it’s	 irresponsible,	 they	 thought	 it	 through,	 they	must	 be	
thinking	they	are	getting	something	for	nothing.	Could	be	the	old	greed	thing,	I	don’t	
know.	Everybody	wants	to	win	the	lotto.	(Russell,	non‐respondent,	66	years)		
	
This	 comment	 explicitly	 articulates	 the	 view	 that	 responding	 to	 fraudulent	 emails	 is	 a	 choice	
people	 make	 that	 is	 motivated	 by	 greed.	 However,	 it	 was	 not	 just	 non‐respondents	 who	
expressed	greed	as	the	prime	reason	for	responding.	Nicholas	and	Cynthia	also	cited	greed	as	a	
factor,	 despite	 both	 of	 them	 having	 responded	 to	 fraudulent	 email	 requests	 with	 personal	
information:	
	
Greed,	opportunists	but	I	think	something	for	nothing	sort	of	thing,	they	still	believe	
in	 the	 free	 lunch	or	whatever	 it	 is,	 that	we’ve	been	 told	does	not	exist.	 Is	 it	greed,	
well	 maybe	 that’s	 a	 bit	 harsh,	 I	 think	 people	 get	 involved	 to	 see	 if	 there’s	 really	
something	in	it	for	them	…	Yeah	I	think	that	[it	is]	greed	and	I	think	people	perhaps	
go	down	those	paths,	 thinking	that	 they’re	going	 to	get	all	 that	money…	(Nicholas,	
respondent,	62	years)		
	
They	are	greedy.	They	are	out	for	money	that	they	don’t	earn,	they	didn’t	earn.	The	
money	that	they	shouldn’t	claim	and	really	if	they	respond	to	them,	they	are	being	
dishonest.	(Cynthia,	respondent,	65	years)		
	
The	above	excerpts	 illustrate	 that	although	Nicholas	and	Cynthia	hold	strong	views	about	 the	
greed	of	those	who	respond	to	fraudulent	emails,	it	did	not	stop	them	from	participating	in	the	
process	 themselves.	While	 neither	Nicholas	 nor	 Cynthia	 sent	money,	 they	 both	 sent	 personal	
information	waiting	to	see	how	long	until	they	were	asked	for	money.	While	neither	indicated	a	
preparedness	to	send	money,	they	were	both	willing	to	communicate	with	the	offender	until	a	
request	arrived,	and	would	arguably	have	kept	the	money	if	it	had	come	through	as	promised.	
This	also	 illustrates	the	dilemma	that	exists	whereby	both	Nicholas	and	Cynthia	believe	in	the	
greed	 of	 other	 victims,	 but	 do	 not	 perceive	 their	 own	 actions	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 While	 they	
construct	 other	 respondents	 to	 be	 greedy,	 they	 disassociate	 themselves	 from	 the	 same	
discourse.		
	
The	existence	of	victim	blaming	beliefs	related	to	individuals	who	respond	to	fraudulent	emails	
is	clearly	prevalent.	Participants	in	the	current	research	project	put	forward	a	very	compelling	
argument	 to	 support	 online	 fraud	 victims	 as	 greedy	 and	 therefore	 attribute	 blame	 and	
responsibility	to	them	for	their	victimisation.	Even	victims	themselves	hold	these	same	negative	
beliefs	 towards	 themselves	and	others.	This	 is	evident	 in	 the	 following	example	 from	Patrick,	
who	was	involved	in	an	inheritance	fraud,	and	flew	to	Europe	to	collect	his	money,	jeopardising	
his	safety	and	suffering	financial	losses	through	his	travel:	
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In	the	back	of	your	mind	is	probably	that	bit	of	extra	money,	that	dollars	and	cents.	
We	 are	 ruled	 by	 the	 dollars	 and	 cents	 in	 the	world	 and	 you	 know	yourself	 if	 you	
haven’t	got	money,	or	you	are	out	of	work,	no	one	wants	to	know	you	…	But	down	
the	road	we	are	only	human	beings	and	we	think,	yeah,	righto,	we	are	going	to	get	a	
bit	out	of	it	and	in	the	meantime	we	get	burnt	trying	to	get	that	extra	dollar	that	we	
think	we	can.	That’s	why	we	go	and	buy	lotto	tickets	…	that	bit	of	greed	we	get,	and	
it	depends	how	much	[we]	hunger	for	it	and	if	you	don’t	look	at	the	dollars	and	cents	
behind	yourself,	you	are	just	gone.	(Patrick,	61	years,	respondent)	
	
Patrick’s	 explanation	 demonstrates	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 greed	 discourse,	 albeit	 in	 a	 weaker	
sense	compared	to	the	comments	by	non‐respondents.	In	contrast,	the	comments	of	Hazel,	who	
lost	several	hundred	thousand	dollars	through	an	investment	fraud,	indicate	a	very	strong	belief	
in	the	greed	of	respondents	(herself	included):	
	
I	 think	it	 is	greed.	I	really	think	it	 is	greed…	It	 is	absolute	greed.	And	even	to	get	a	
million	dollars	is	not	easy	out	here	unless	you	win	lotto	so	you	are	driven	by	greed.	
And	anyone	who	says	anything	else	is	a	liar.	You	just	think	oh	no,	it	will	work	out.	All	
along,	because	you	are	told	the	money	will	go	in	your	account,	you	think	they	can’t	
dud	 you	 because	 the	 money	 has	 got	 to	 go	 in	 your	 account.	 But	 they	 do	 dud	 you	
because	the	money	never	gets	into	your	account.	(Hazel,	respondent,	64	years)		
	
Rather	than	her	own	experience	mitigating	or	softening	her	views,	Hazel	provides	evidence	of	
the	same	discourse	that	exists	amongst	those	who	have	not	responded	to	fraudulent	emails.	In	
combination,	 each	 of	 these	 excerpts	 of	 respondents	 and	 non‐respondents	 demonstrate	 the	
prevalence	 of	 greed	 as	 the	 explanation	 as	 to	 why	 people	 respond	 to	 fraudulent	 emails.	 This	
dominant	discourse	of	greed	can	be	seen	as	part	of	the	wider	discourse	of	victim	blaming,	which	
attributes	guilt	 to	victims	for	 their	actions	and	therefore	holds	them	varyingly	responsible	for	
the	negative	consequences	that	arise.		
	
However,	 not	 all	 victims	 believe	 themselves	 to	 be	 greedy	 or	 subscribe	 to	 the	 dominant	
discourse.	Martha,	who	was	involved	in	an	inheritance	fraud	and	lost	over	$50,000	across	a	six	
year	 period,	 introduces	 a	 different	 aspect	 to	 the	 greed	 discourse,	 implying	 that	 losing	 some	
money	to	access	a	larger	amount	is	part	of	the	process:	
	
Interviewer:	There	are	others	as	well	who	have	said	that	responding	to	these	types	
of	emails,	you	are	trying	to	get	something	for	nothing,	so	to	speak,	despite	the	fact	
that	you	have	sent	a	lot	of	money,	how	would	you	respond	to	that	type	of	statement?	
	
Martha:	 Getting	 something	 for	 nothing?	 No	 one	 can	 get	 something	 for	 nothing.	 I	
mean	 anyone	 has	 to	 pay	 for	 something.	 You	 can’t	 get	 something	 for	 nothing.	 You	
have	to	pay.	You	order	something	over	the	internet	and	you	have	to	pay	for	it.	It	is	
the	same	type	of	thing.	You	are	getting	all	this	money	so	you	have	to	pay	for	all	the	
certificates	 and	 everything.	 I	 mean	 if	 I	 ordered	 another	 birth	 certificate	 over	 the	
internet	I	still	have	to	pay	for	it.	(Martha,	respondent,	63	years)	
	
Martha	clearly	refutes	 the	argument	 that	victims	expect	 to	get	 something	 for	nothing	and	she	
denies	greed	as	a	reason	why	she	responded.	When	she	was	informed	of	being	a	beneficiary	to	a	
large	 inheritance,	 she	 expected	 that	 she	would	 need	 to	 pay	 costs	 and	 this	was	 how	 she	was	
defrauded.	While	this	does	not	displace	the	greed	discourse	in	its	entirety,	 it	may	explain	why	
some	victims	continue	to	send	money	over	a	sustained	period	of	time.	
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Beyond	Greed:	The	Reality	of	Victimisation	
It	 is	 evident	 that	 greed	 is	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 surrounding	 online	 fraud	 victimisation,	
expressed	by	both	respondents	and	non‐respondents	alike.	However,	despite	the	dominance	of	
this	 rhetoric,	 the	 reality	 of	 victimisation	 detailed	 by	 victims	 of	 online	 fraud,	 presents	 no	
evidence	 to	 substantiate	 these	 claims	of	 greed.	 Rather,	 the	 narratives	 provided	by	 victims	 on	
how	they	became	involved	in	fraud,	illustrate	the	complexity	by	which	offenders	target	victims	
and	manipulate	 their	 weaknesses	 and	 vulnerabilities	 to	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	 positive	
response.		
	
For	example,	Hazel	clearly	articulated	her	belief	 in	the	greed	of	online	fraud	victims.	However	
her	circumstances	do	not	fit	with	this	discourse.	Hazel	was	the	owner	of	a	small	business	with	
an	online	presence.	 She	 received	 an	 email	 to	her	business	 account	 asking	her	 to	 tender	 for	 a	
contract,	an	accepted	practice	 in	her	 industry.	She	was	awarded	the	contract	and	this	was	the	
entry	point	to	her	victimisation	experience.	The	contract	Hazel	won	concerned	the	construction	
of	an	orphanage	in	Africa	and	appealed	to	her	long‐held	desire	to	help	children	in	need.	This	is	
evident	in	the	following	excerpt	as	she	reflects	on	how	she	became	involved:	
	
Interviewer:	Do	you	think	there	is	anything	that	could	have	stopped	you	back	at	the	
beginning	from	getting	involved	in	this	experience?	
	
Hazel:	 I	 think	 the	way	 that	 they	came	at	 it,	mainly	because	 I	was	so	keen	 to	go	 to	
Africa	 and	 work	 with	 the	 kids.	 And	 [offender]	 was	 keen	 to	 set	 up	 a,	 like	 an	
orphanage	thing	for	children,	so	he	got	to	me	that	way,	you	know	he	was	clever.	He	
was	clever.	That	is	probably	what	got	me	involved.	(Hazel,	respondent,	64	years)	
	
Despite	Hazel	proclaiming	the	greed	of	all	online	fraud	victims,	this	comment	clearly	indicates	
her	 involvement	 was	 initiated	 through	 a	 desire	 to	 help	 children	 in	 Africa	 rather	 than	 a	 self‐
centred	desire	 to	make	money.	The	ability	of	 the	offender	 to	 target	Hazel’s	aspiration	 to	help	
African	children	 increased	the	 likelihood	of	Hazel	responding	to	the	 initial	request	and	can	be	
understood	 as	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	 her	 sustained	 involvement.	 It	 is	 not	 known	 if	 the	
offender	knew	this	prior	to	contacting	Hazel,	or	whether	this	was	an	educated	move	based	on	
the	generosity	of	many	Australians	to	assist	African	orphans.		
	
A	similar	situation	exists	for	Frank.	Frank	had	recently	lost	his	wife	to	a	brain	hemorrhage.	He	
had	started	using	various	social	networking	websites	to	chat	to	women	across	the	globe	and	in	
particular,	 started	 communicating	with	 a	woman	 in	Ghana.	During	 their	 conversations,	 Frank	
had	shared	details	about	himself	and	more	 importantly,	details	about	his	wife’s	death.	After	a	
few	months,	Frank	received	a	request	 for	money	from	the	brother	of	 the	woman	he	had	been	
communicating	with,	after	being	advised	she	had	been	in	a	car	crash	and	was	suffering	from	the	
same	illness	that	had	taken	his	wife:	
	
…	Then	her	brother	calls	me,	sends	me	an	email	under	her	name	and	said	she	got	hit	
by	a	car,	her	brain’s	bleeding	anyway,	I	 just	lost	my	wife	with	a	brain	hemorrhage,	
and	they	wanted	$1000	for	the	doctor	to	operate,	they	won’t	do	anything	unless	you	
pay,	so	I	sent	them	$1000	[or]	$1200,	then	it	started	…	(Frank,	respondent,	73	years)		
	
Frank	was	suspicious	of	the	situation	presented	to	him,	but	was	willing	to	send	the	money	on	
the	off	chance	that	the	situation	was	legitimate	and	that	this	woman	was	sick.	He	had	also	been	
in	phone	contact	with	the	alleged	doctor	who	was	treating	her,	which	added	to	the	plausibility	
of	the	situation:	
	
…	She	got	hit	by	this	car	…	I	phoned	the	doctor	and	everything	I	phoned	the	doctor	
because	I	want	to	know.	My	wife	had	died	from	a	brain	hemorrhage	you	know	and	
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I’d	 spent	 two	 one	 hour	 sessions,	 probably	 a	 long	 time	 with	 two	 different	
neurosurgeons	 down	 there	 I	wanted	 to	 give	 them	my	brain.	 [I	 said	 to	 them]	why	
don’t	you	try	this	and	[this],	and	as	it	turned	out	a	lot	of	the	things	I	suggested	had	
been	tried	and	don’t	work.	She’d	had	a	massive	internal	bleed	in	the	brain,	you	could	
see	the	scan	it	was	just	black…	the	doctor	said	if	it’s	on	the	perimeter	on	the	edge	of	
the	brain,	yeah	they	can	drain	the	pressure	off	and	fix	it	up	and	I	thought	you	know,	
and	that’s	how	they	got	me	with	her.	$1000	wasn’t	much,	but	I	didn’t	really	believe	it	
but	I	said	maybe	if	it	is	going	to	happen	and	she	is	going	to	die	I	said	for	a	thousand	
dollars	they	can	have	it	you	know	…	(Frank,	respondent,	73	years)		
	
Frank’s	 situation	 illustrates	 the	 insidious	 way	 that	 offenders	 will	 manipulate	 a	 person’s	
emotions	 and	 circumstances	 to	 obtain	 financial	 benefits.	 It	 demonstrates	 the	way	 that	 Frank	
was	presented	with	a	situation	that	 involved	multiple	actors	(the	woman,	her	brother	and	the	
doctor)	in	order	to	increase	the	likelihood	that	he	would	consent	to	the	request	for	money.	The	
use	of	 the	 same	 illness	 that	had	 claimed	his	wife	 also	 reinforces	 the	ways	 that	 offenders	will	
specifically	target	victims	to	gain	compliance	to	financial	requests.		
	
Most	importantly	it	demonstrates	that	the	discourse	of	greed	applied	to	victims,	such	as	Hazel	
and	Frank,	does	not	fit	with	the	actual	reasons	why	these	people	became	victims	of	online	fraud.	
It	shows	a	clear	disjuncture	between	the	perception	that	all	victims	are	greedy	and	the	reality	
whereby	 victims	 are	 targeted	 implicitly	 (such	 as	 Hazel	 through	 her	 wish	 to	 help	 African	
orphans)	 or	 explicitly	 (such	 as	 Frank,	 whereby	 his	 wife’s	 death	 was	 used	 as	 a	 means	 to	
manipulate	and	cloud	his	judgment)	to	send	money	to	overseas	offenders.	It	demonstrates	the	
complexity	and	high	 level	of	sophistication	 that	characterise	many	 fraudulent	approaches	and	
the	 difficulties	 that	 victims	 have	 in	 identifying	 them	 as	 fraud.	 It	 clearly	 does	 not	 provide	
evidence	to	substantiate	the	perceived	greed	of	victims,	rather	it	shows	how	victims	were	led	to	
believe	in	the	legitimacy	of	their	respective	situations.		
	
Conclusion	
The	 above	 excerpts	 have	 clearly	 articulated	 the	 negativity	 currently	 associated	 with	 online	
fraud	 victimisation,	 one	 that	 firmly	 holds	 victims	 responsible	 for	 their	 own	 victimisation,	
through	their	decision	 to	respond	to	a	 fraudulent	email	out	of	perceived	greed.	As	mentioned	
earlier,	the	simplicity	of	this	explanation	fails	to	acknowledge	many	factors,	including	the	ability	
of	 the	offender	 to	 skillfully	manipulate	and	exploit	 victim	weaknesses	and	vulnerabilities	 and	
the	dynamics	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	(Drew	and	Cross	forthcoming).	While	victim	
typologies	which	assign	guilt	and	responsibility	to	the	victim	have	sustained	criticism	for	victim	
blaming	 in	other	 fields	 (such	as	 sexual	 assault	 and	 rape),	 this	has	not	 occurred	 for	victims	of	
online	 fraud.	 Rather,	 the	 dominance	 of	 a	 discourse	 that	 places	 victims	 of	 online	 fraud	 firmly	
responsible	for	the	consequences	of	their	actions	includes	individuals	who	have	not	responded	
to	fraudulent	email	requests	as	well	as	those	who	have.	The	influence	of	this	positivist	paradigm	
is	dominant	in	the	ways	in	which	online	fraud	victims	are	constructed	by	themselves	and	others.	
This	paper	also	provided	evidence	that	the	internalisation	of	greed	by	victims	as	a	discourse	to	
explain	 other’s	 victimisation	 is	 not	 always	 internalised	 by	 themselves.	 Lastly,	 through	 the	
examples	 of	 Hazel	 and	 Frank,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 a	 disjuncture	 between	 the	
perceived	 greed	of	 victims	and	 the	 reality	 of	how	 individuals	become	victims	of	online	 fraud.	
These	are	only	two	of	the	many	victim	stories	which	conflict	with	the	dominant	greed	discourse	
perpetuated	by	both	victims	and	non‐victims	alike.	Further	work	needs	to	be	done	to	document	
the	reality	of	online	fraud	victimisation	experiences	against	this	discourse.	
	
In	addition,	the	presence	of	this	discourse	is	likely	to	have	significant	consequences	on	victims	
of	 online	 fraud,	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 access	 support	 services	 and	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system	more	broadly,	 given	 their	 lack	of	 recognition	as	 legitimate	victims.	Further	 analysis	 is	
required	on	 the	 impact	of	 current	discourses	about	online	 fraud	victims,	 (similar	 to	what	has	
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been	achieved	in	other	fields	such	as	domestic	violence,	rape	and	sexual	assault),	with	a	view	to	
challenging	 the	 victim	 focused	 explanations	 and	 instead,	 providing	 an	 account	 of	 this	 crime	
which	adequately	recognises	the	reality	of	the	situation.		
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 This	research	was	undertaken	while	the	author	was	employed	with	the	Queensland	Police	Service.	Appropriate	
permissions	 have	 been	 granted	 to	 use	 these	 data	 and	 present	 these	 research	 findings.	 The	 author	 gratefully	
acknowledges	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Queensland	 Police	 Service:	 however,	 the	 views	 expressed	 in	 this	 paper	 are	
purely	 those	of	 the	author	and	do	not	necessarily	reflect	 those	of	 the	Queensland	Police	Service.	All	errors	and	
omissions	are	solely	the	responsibility	of	the	author.	
2		 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 pseudonyms	 have	 been	 used	 in	 the	 analysis	 to	maintain	 the	 confidentiality	 of	 all	
participants.	
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Abstract	
Throughout	the	common	law	world	trial	by	jury	has	achieved	a	totemic	position.	Interference	
with	the	right	 to	 jury	 trial	 is	characterised	as	a	deviation	 from	the	norm.	However,	 trial	by	
jury	is	consistently	undermined	and	rolled	back	particularly	in	the	context	of	organised	crime	
and	terrorism:	Ireland,	New	Zealand,	the	UK	and	the	United	States	have	all	adopted	measures	
curtailing	 trial	 by	 jury	 in	 these	 contexts.	 In	 contrast	 the	 rhetorical	 support	 for	 jury	 trial	 in	
Australia	 is	matched	by	 an	 apparent	 unwillingness	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 right	 to	 jury	 trial.	
This	paper	will	argue	 that	 its	 resilience	here	 is	dependent	on	 the	extent	of	 its	political	and	
cultural	capital.	The	Australian	counter‐terrorism	experience	provides	evidence	in	support	of	
this	contention.		
	
	
Introduction	
Historically	seen	as	the	‘bulwark	of	liberty’	(Cornish	1968:	126)	and	the	‘lamp	that	shows	that	
freedom	 lives’	 (Devlin	 1966:	 164)	 the	 jury	 has	 achieved	 a	 totemic	 position	 throughout	 the	
common	 law	 world.	 However,	 trial	 by	 jury	 is	 consistently	 undermined	 and	 rolled	 back	
particularly	in	the	context	of	organised	crime	and	terrorism:	Ireland,	New	Zealand,	the	UK	and	
the	 United	 States	 have	 all	 adopted	 measures	 curtailing	 trial	 by	 jury	 in	 these	 contexts	
(Darbyshire	1991;	Davis	2012;	Donohue	2007).	This	paper	will	build	on	previous	work	by	the	
author	 examining	 the	 role	 of	 the	 jury	 in	 the	 counter‐terrorism	 context	 (Davis	 2013).	 It	 will	
contrast	the	willingness	of	other	jurisdictions	to	limit	trial	by	jury	in	the	terrorism	context	with	
the	apparent	reluctance	of	Australian	policy	makers	to	countenance	any	such	suggestion.	
	
The	paper	will	begin	by	outlining	the	role	of	 jury	trial	 in	the	counter‐terrorism	context.	 It	will	
then	 briefly	 examine	 the	 international	 experience.	 The	 paper	 will	 consider	 what,	 if	 any,	
underlying	 justifications	 for	 abandoning	 trial	 by	 jury	 in	 the	 counter‐terrorism	 context	 have	
emerged	 elsewhere.	 It	 should	 then	 be	 possible	 to	 contrast	 the	 international	 practice	 with	
Australian	experience.	If,	as	is	hypothesised	the	Australian	experience	is	different	consideration	
will	be	given	as	to	why	that	might	be	the	case.	Finally,	some	conclusions	will	be	drawn.	
	
The	Role	of	Trial	by	Jury	
There	are	at	least	two	ways	of	thinking	about	trial	by	jury.	Traditionally,	trial	by	jury	has	been	
closely	associated	with	the	right	of	the	accused	to	a	fair	trial.	As	was	noted	in	the	introduction,	
Blackstone	portrayed	the	jury	as	the	‘bulwark	of	liberty’	(Cornish	1968:	126).	The	US	Supreme	
Court	 developed	 that	 view	 emphasising	 the	 role	 of	 the	 jury	 in	 fairly	 determining	 guilt	 or	
innocence.	They	stated	that:		
	
We	do	not	assert	 that	 the	 jury	trial	 is	an	infallible	mode	of	ascertaining	truth.	Like	
everything	human,	it	has	its	imperfections.	We	only	say	that	it	is	the	best	protection	
for	innocence	and	the	surest	mode	of	punishing	guilt	that	has	yet	been	discovered.	
(Ex	parte	Milligan	71	US	2,	65	(1866))		
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Thus	 the	 justification	 for	 maintaining	 trial	 by	 jury	 is	 that	 it	 is	 the	 best	 available	 means	 of	
ensuring	a	 fair	 trial.	 Ironically,	 characterising	 the	 jury	 in	 this	 light	might	 actually	 facilitate	 its	
removal	–	as	will	be	considered	in	the	next	section.	
	
An	alternate	approach,	to	casting	jury	trial	as	a	mechanism	for	securing	a	fair	trial,	is	to	see	the	
jury	as	an	institution	of	our	democracy.	There	is	nothing	innovative	in	such	an	approach.	In	the	
American	Federalist	debates	‘the	question	was	not	fundamentally	whether	the	lack	of	adequate	
provision	for	jury	trial	would	weaken	a	traditional	bulwark	of	individual	rights	…	but	whether	it	
would	fatally	weaken	the	role	of	the	people	in	the	administration	of	government’	(Amar	1991:	
1187).	Alexis	de	Tocqueville	argued	 that	 the	 jury	was	a	 ‘predominately	republican	 institution’	
which	‘entrusts	the	actual	control	of	society	into	the	hands	of	the	ruled	…	rather	than	into	those	
of	the	rulers’	(de	Tocqueville	2003:	317‐18).	And,	as	we	shall	see,	Governor	Macquarie	and	the	
Australian	 emancipists	 saw	 trial	 by	 jury	 as	 a	 means	 of	 integrating	 former	 convicts	 into	 free	
society	(Bennett	1959‐61:	465).		
More	recently,	proponents	of	deliberative	democracy	have	stressed	the	important	contribution	
of	the	jury	as	means	of	involving	the	citizen	in	civil	society:	
	
Members	of	a	democratic	society	need	to	connect	not	just	with	each	other	but	also	
with	 the	 state	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 inspiring,	 empowering,	 educational,	 and	 habit	
forming	…	This	perspective	provides	a	new	appreciation	of	 the	unique	position	of	
the	 jury	 through	 which	 a	 state	 institution	 brings	 private	 citizens	 together	 to	
deliberate	on	a	public	problem.	(Gastil	et	al.	2010:	9)	
	
The	New	Zealand	Law	Commission	has	argued	that	the	‘role	of	jury	service	as	a	cohesive	force	in	
society	 is	 clear’;	 noting	 that	people	who	actually	 serve	on	 juries	overwhelmingly	 feel	positive	
about	the	institution	and	feel	‘satisfaction	at	having	done	their	civic	duty’	(2001:	para.	474).	This	
‘cohesive	 force’	 is	 measurable:	 there	 is	 a	 demonstrable	 link	 between	 jury	 service	 and	 voter	
participation	(Gastil	et	al.	2002:	593).	
	
In	 keeping	with	 the	 view	of	 the	 jury	 as	 a	 communal	means	of	 political	 participation	 the	High	
Court	of	Australia	has	stressed	that	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	is	not	solely	a	right	of	the	accused,	
but	is	a	‘constitutional	guarantee	…	for	the	community	as	a	whole’	(Brown	v	the	Queen	at	201).	
Similarly,	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court	 emphasised	 the	 right	 of	 the	 individual	 to	 serve	 on	 a	 jury	
(Powers	v	Ohio,	 499	U.S.	400	 (1991).	These	 communal	 interpretations	 represent	 a	 reversal	of	
the	traditional	hierarchy:	 ‘justifying	juries	not	as	an	efficient	form	of	dispute	resolution,	but	as	
an	important	opportunity	to	inculcate	civic	virtue	and	induce	political	participation’	(Gastil	et	al.	
2002:	586	fn1).	
	
The	value	of	 the	 jury	as	a	communal	good	becomes	all	 the	more	 important	 in	the	context	of	a	
terrorist	threat	(Davis	2013).	The	threat	of	terrorism	weakens	civil	society	–	 it	can	distort	the	
political	 debate	 and	 impede	 parliamentary	 dissent	 (Ivie,	 2002:	 277).	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	
executive	claims	to	possess	peculiarly	sensitive	information	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	
ability	 of	 the	 courts	 to	 act	 as	 a	 restraint	 on	 executive	 power	 (de	 Londras	 and	 Davis	 2010;	
Fenwick	 and	 Philipson	 2011).	 In	 such	 circumstances	 the	 role	 of	 the	 jury	 as	 a	 democratic	
institution	is	all	the	more	important.		
	
The	Terrorism	Context	
A	number	 of	 reasons	 have	 been	 advanced	 to	 justify	 the	 international	willingness	 to	 abandon	
trial	 by	 jury	 in	 the	 context	 of	 counter‐terrorism.	On	a	 general	 level	 there	have	been	question	
marks	over	the	ability	of	jurors	to	perform	the	function	of	determining	guilt	or	innocence.	Juror	
comprehension	was	tested	by	Thomas	in	2010.	Jurors	were	asked	to	identify	the	two	questions	
the	judge	had	directed	them	to	answer.	Only	31%	of	jurors	accurately	identified	both	questions	
(Thomas	2010:	36).	In	mitigation	Thomas	noted	that	20	of	the	21	juries	examined	contained	at	
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least	one	juror	who	correctly	 identified	the	questions	(Thomas	2010:	37).	More	alarmingly,	 in	
New	South	Wales	277	jurors	from	25	real	cases	were	asked:	‘what	was	the	verdict	in	this	case?’	
Surprisingly,	the	vast	majority	of	jurors	erred	when	recalling	the	verdict	in	their	case.	In	only	six	
cases	did	all	participating	jurors	report	the	same	verdict	(Cashmore	and	Timboli	2006:	12).	This	
demonstrates	 a	 significant	 problem	 with	 juror	 understanding	 of	 legal	 proceedings.	 Juror	
comprehension	of	complicated	scientific	evidence	has	also	been	seen	as	problematic	(Myers	et	
al.	1999:	150‐56).	There	is	evidence	that	jurors	believe	that	they	have	understood	the	evidence	
presented	 (Matthews	 et	 al.	 2004:	 72‐74).	 However,	 there	 remains	 a	 problem	 with	 assessing	
whether	 or	 not	 jurors	 in	 fact	 understand	 that	 evidence	 (UK	 House	 of	 Commons	 Science	 and	
Technology	Committee	2005:	72‐74).	If	juries	cannot	understand	the	legal	proceedings	and	the	
complicated	evidence	presented	in	court	then	they	cannot	be	relied	upon.	Such	arguments	apply	
to	all	cases,	including	cases	of	suspected	terrorism.	
	
In	 the	specific	context	of	 terrorism	there	are	 two	additional	concerns.	Lord	Diplock	noted	 the	
vulnerability	of	juries	to	intimidation	(1972:	para.	36).	The	actual	risk	and	extent	of	intimidation	
are	difficult	 to	assess.	 Indeed	Diplock	was	criticised	 for	adducing	 little	evidence,	 ‘statistical	or	
otherwise’,	 in	 support	 of	 his	 findings	 (Twining	 1973:	 413).	 Lord	 Diplock	 sidestepped	 that	
difficulty	by	arguing	that	it	does	not	matter	whether	juror	fears	are	well	founded:	a	‘frightened	
juror	is	a	bad	juror	even	though	his	own	safety	and	that	of	his	family	may	not	actually	be	at	risk’	
(para.	 36).	 If	 jurors	 are	 unable	 to	 comprehend	 the	 evidence	 presented	 or	 they	 are	 too	
intimidated	 to	 independently	 reach	 a	 verdict	 it	 calls	 into	 question	 their	 ability	 to	 fulfil	 the	
traditional	 function	 of	 a	 jury	 outlined	 above	 –	 namely	 to	 effectively	 determine	 guilt	 or	
innocence.	
	
A	further	argument	in	support	of	the	abolition	of	trial	by	jury	in	the	terrorism	context	places	an	
emphasis	on	the	rights	of	the	accused.	The	European	Court	of	 the	Human	Rights,	 for	example,	
has	 stressed	 that	 ‘a	 tribunal,	 including	 a	 jury,	must	 be	 impartial’	 (Sander	 v	 the	UK,	 para.	 22).	
Accusations	of	bias	on	the	part	of	jurors	must	be	investigated	unless	they	are	‘manifestly	devoid	
of	merit’	(Remli	v	France	para.	48).	In	the	terrorism	context	it	has	been	argued	that	the	potential	
for	juror	bias	should	operate	as	a	barr	to	trial	by	jury.	For	example,	in	Northern	Ireland	it	was	
argued	 that	 widespread	 sectarianism	 meant	 that	 juries	 were	 an	 impediment	 to	 a	 fair	 trial	
(Diplock	 1972:	 paras	 35‐41).	 Similarly,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	
referring	to	the	European	Court	of	the	Human	Rights	jurisprudence,	held	that	the	right	to	trial	
by	jury	was	not	a	prerequisite	to	a	fair	trial.	As	a	result,	it	upheld	the	suspension	of	trial	by	jury	
in	 all	 terrorism	 cases	 because	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 terrorist	 threat	 would	 prevent	 juries	 from	
functioning	effectively	(Constitutional	Court	of	 the	Russian	Federation	8‐P	/2010,	 s.	2.1).	This	
supposed	inability	of	the	jury	to	guarantee	a	fair	trial	rests,	in	part,	on	the	fear	that	jurors	will	be	
biased	 against	 those	 accused	 of	 committing	 acts	 of	 terrorism.	 As	 Donohue	 argues,	 ‘those	
appalled	at	the	latest	acts	of	violence	may	be	 looking	to	find	someone	–	anyone	–	responsible.	
Jurors	 may	 be	 biased	 against	 defendant	 sharing	 an	 ethnic	 or	 religious	 background	 of	 those	
engaged	 in	 violence’	 (2007:	 1324).	 This	 genuine	 fear	 of	 juror	 bias	 can	 be	 used	 to	 justify	 the	
suspension	of	trial	by	jury	in	the	interests	of	a	fair	trial.		
	
The	Jury	in	Australia	
Interference	with	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	in	the	context	of	counter‐terrorism	has	been	justified	
in	Northern	 Ireland	and	Russia	and	by	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights.	There	 are	other	
examples:	Military	Commissions	 at	 Guantánamo	Bay	 (de	 Londras	 2008);	 the	 Special	 Criminal	
Court	 in	 the	Republic	of	 Ireland	 (Davis	2007);	non‐jury	 trial	 in	New	Zealand	 (Davis	2012).	 In	
each	 of	 these	 jurisdictions	 some	 variation	 upon	 the	 argument	 that	 juries	 are	 incapable	 of	
effectively	 determining	 guilt	 or	 innocence,	 either	 due	 to	 bias,	 inability	 to	 comprehend	 the	
evidence	or	the	risk	of	 intimidation,	has	been	used	to	justify	the	interference	with	the	right	to	
trial	by	jury	in	the	context	of	counter‐terrorism	cases.	Australia	swims	against	this	tide.	
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An	atypical	case	
Australian	history	gives	 trial	by	 jury	an	additional	political	significance:	 the	 jury	 is	 tied	 to	 the	
broader	national	narrative.	Following	the	initial	European	settlement,	trial	by	jury	was	deemed	
inappropriate	 by	 the	 colonial	 power.	 In	 the	 early	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 there	was	 a	
concerted	 push	 by	 the	 emancipists	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 trial	 by	 jury	 in	NSW	 (Neal	 1991,	
Chapter	7).	Between	1810	and	1823	juries	began	to	be	used	in	coronial	inquests	and	this	began	
a	 process	 of	 gradual	 attainment	 of	 the	 right	 to	 trial	 by	 jury	 (Bennett	 1959‐61).	 Governor	
Macquarie	believed	 that	 ‘once	a	convict	has	become	a	 freeman	…	he	should	 in	all	 respects	be	
considered	on	a	footing	with	every	other	man	in	the	colony’	and	that	this	should	extend	to	the	
right	 to	 sit	 on	 a	 jury	 (Bennett	 1959‐61:	 465).	 Eventually,	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 Act	 1823	
provided	for	a	modified	form	of	trial	by	jury,	albeit	one	that	suffered	from	executive	influence.	
Trials	 were	 conducted	 by	 ‘the	 respective	 judges	 of	 the	 said	 courts	 and	 jury	 of	 seven	
commissioned	 officers	 of	 His	 Majesty’s	 sea	 or	 land	 forces’2	 accompanied	 by	 a	 gradual	
normalisation	of	 trial	by	 jury	 in	civil	 cases.	Civil	 juries	were	 recognised	as	a	success	and	over	
time	the	jury	of	seven	officers	of	the	defence	forces	was	decried	as	the	‘rude	experiments	of	rude	
times’	 (Bennett	 1959‐61:	 471).	 Just	 as	 the	 emancipists	 saw	 trial	 by	 jury	 as	 a	 means	 of	
integrating	 former	 convicts	 into	 free	 society,	 the	 steady	 spread	 of	 the	 jury	 was	 part	 of	 the	
rehabilitation	 of	 NSW	 from	 penal	 colony	 to	 free	 State	 (Thackery	 2006:	 276).	 That	 historical	
positioning	of	jury	trial	is	somewhat	unique.	
	
The	constitutional	position		
Arguably	as	a	result	of	that	history,	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	was	afforded	explicit	protection	by	
section	80	in	Chapter	III	of	the	Australian	Constitution	which	states	that	 ‘trial	on	indictment	of	
any	offence	against	any	law	of	the	Commonwealth	shall	be	by	jury’.	This	restricted	form	of	the	
right	to	jury	trial	was	present	in	all	early	drafts	of	the	constitution	–	from	the	First	Official	Draft	
of	the	Constitution	Bill,	Sydney	1891	to	the	final	Constitution	(Williams	2005).3	At	 first	glance	
section	 80	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 substantive	 guarantee	 but	 it	 actually	 only	 applies	 to	 ‘trials	 on	
indictment’.	An	‘indictment’	is	‘a	written	accusation	of	crime	made	at	the	suit	of	the	prosecution	
against	 one	 or	more	 persons’	 which	 ‘must	 be	 signed	 by	 a	 person	 authorised	 to	 do	 so’	 (Ross	
2010:	para.	9.160).	A	‘trial	on	indictment’	is	the	‘opposite’	of	a	trial	held	summarily;	it	means	a	
trial	 commenced	by	an	 indictment,	with	a	 jury	deciding	 the	guilt	of	 the	accused	rather	 than	a	
judge	or	magistrate	sitting	alone.	Thus	the	description	‘the	trial	on	indictment	of	any	offence’	is	
a	 description	 of	 a	 certain	 procedure.	 Read	 literally,	 section	 80	 does	 not	 require	 that	 certain	
types	of	crimes	be	tried	by	jury,	as	one	might	expect.	The	High	Court	has	endorsed	that	literal	
interpretation	 of	 section	 80.	 It	 has	 refused	 to	 interpret	 section	 80	 so	 as	 to	 require	 ‘serious’	
offences	 or	 offences	 attracting	 significant	 penalties	 to	 be	 tried	 on	 indictment:	 ‘if	 there	 be	 an	
indictment,	there	must	be	a	jury,	but	there	is	nothing	to	compel	procedure	by	indictment’	(R	v	
Archdall	and	Roskruge;	Ex	parte	Corrigan	and	Brown	at	[139‐140]).	These	cases	are	somewhat	at	
odds	with	Brown,	referred	to	above,	which	denied	the	right	of	the	accused	to	waive	their	right	to	
trial	by	jury	(Brown	v	the	Queen)	.	The	limited	interpretation	of	section	80	has	been	repeatedly	
re‐affirmed	by	the	High	Court	(Kingswell	v	the	Queen;	Cheng	v	the	Queen)	and	there	is	no	reason	
to	suspect	that	this	will	change	(Davis	2007:	86).	
	
This	Constitutional	point	 is	 significant.	 It	might	have	been	supposed	 that	 the	reason	Australia	
has	not	eagerly	followed	Ireland,	Russia,	New	Zealand,	the	UK	and	the	US	is	limiting	trial	by	jury	
for	terrorism	offences	rests	on	the	constitutional	guarantee.	That	is	not	the	case.	In	fact	in	every	
state	 and	 territory	 and	 at	 the	 Commonwealth	 level,	 many	 offences	 which	 are	 classified	 as	
indictable	are	nevertheless	capable	of	being	tried	without	a	jury.	The	High	Court	has	held	that	
this	 does	 not	 alter	 the	 character	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 that	 the	 offence	 remains	 an	 indictable	
offence,	even	though	it	is	tried	summarily	(Ross	v	R	(1979)	141	CLR	432	at	439‐40).		
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Commonwealth	
The	Crimes	Act	1914	 (Cth)	 enables	 indictable	 offences	 to	be	 tried	 summarily	 in	 certain	 cases.	
The	Act	defines	 ‘indictable	offences’	as	offences	 ‘punishable	by	 imprisonment	 for	a	period	not	
exceeding	10	years’.	All	indictable	offences	–	apart	from	a	handful	of	exceptions	–	‘may,	unless	
the	contrary	intention	appears,	be	heard	and	determined	...	by	a	court	of	summary	jurisdiction’,	
if	both	the	accused	and	the	prosecutor	consent	(section	4J).	Section	4JA	makes	similar	provision	
for	the	summary	trial	of	indictable	offences	punishable	by	fine	only.	When	an	indictable	offence	
is	tried	summarily,	the	sentence	which	the	court	can	impose	is	lower	than	that	which	could	be	
ordered	 if	 the	 matter	 were	 tried	 on	 indictment.	 The	 Crimes	 Act	 does	 not	 permit	 trial	 on	
indictment	to	be	other	than	by	jury.		
	
States	and	territories	
Similar	provision	is	made	in	each	state	and	territory.	For	example,	in	New	South	Wales,	there	is	
a	distinction	between	 ‘strictly	 indictable	offences’	 and	 indictable	offences	which	may	be	 tried	
summarily.	 The	 starting	 position	 is	 that	 an	 offence	 must	 be	 tried	 on	 indictment	 unless	
legislation	provides	that	it	may	or	must	be	dealt	with	summarily	(Criminal	Procedure	Act	1986	
(NSW)	s	5).	Also	of	note	is	section	42	of	the	Serious	and	Organise	Crime	(Control	Act)	2008	(SA)	–	
the	 ‘anti‐bikie’	 legislation,	held	 invalid	(on	other	grounds)	 in	South	Australia	v	Totani.	This	act	
created	 some	 criminal	 offences	 –	 for	 example,	 it	made	 it	 an	 offence	 to	 associate	with	 outlaw	
motorcycle	gangs.	These	offences	were	punishable	by	up	to	five	years	imprisonment.	Section	42	
of	 the	act	 then	provided	 that	all	such	offences	were	to	be	 tried	summarily.	The	provision	was	
somewhat	unusual;	 the	 offence	 could	be	 tried	 summarily	 at	 the	discretion	of	 the	prosecution	
(without	 any	 need	 for	 consent	 of	 the	 accused),	 but	 if	 the	 court	 determined	 that	 the	 accused	
should	 be	 sentenced	 to	 a	 term	 of	 imprisonment	 exceeding	 2	 years,	 the	 matter	 had	 to	 be	
committed	to	the	District	Court	 for	sentence.	 It	seems	the	rationale	behind	this	provision	was	
the	 fear	 that	 jurors	would	be	 threatened	or	 intimidated	by	the	accused	(Government	of	South	
Australia,	2011).		
	
In	 some	 states	 and	 territories,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 for	 an	 indictable	 offence	 to	 be	 tried	 on	
indictment,	but	by	judge	alone.	This	does	not	affect	the	indictable/summary	distinction;	rather,	
it	 changes	 the	procedure	of	 a	 trial	 on	 indictment	 so	as	 to	 remove	 the	 jury.	This	 is	possible	 in	
NSW	 (Criminal	Procedure	Act	1986	 s	132),	 Queensland	 (Criminal	Code	1899	 ss	 614,	 615),	 SA	
(Juries	Act	1927	s	7),	WA	(Criminal	Procedure	Act	2004	s	118)	and	the	ACT	(Supreme	Court	Act	
1933	68B).	 There	 are	 restrictions	 on	 this;	 for	 example,	 a	 court	may	 need	 to	 be	 satisfied	 that	
proceeding	without	a	 jury	would	be	 in	the	 interests	of	 justice,	and	 if	 there	are	more	 than	one	
accused	all	must	consent	to	the	application.		
	
Additional	restrictions	on	trial	on	indictment		
In	 some	 states	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 for	 an	 accused	 to	be	 convicted	 on	 the	majority	 (rather	 than	
unanimous)	 verdict	 of	 the	 jury.	 This	 is	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 traditional	 process	 of	 trial	 on	
indictment	and	trial	by	jury	which	the	High	Court	has	said	would	not	be	permitted	at	the	federal	
level	(Cheatle	v	R	at	552‐3).	Once	again,	this	may	mean	that	such	provisions	infringe	section	80,	
if	section	80	were	held	to	apply	with	equal	force	to	the	states	(Gray	2009).	Majority	verdicts	are	
permitted	in	some	circumstances	in	NSW	(Juries	Act	1977	s	55F),	Queensland	(Juries	Act	1995),	
Victoria	(Juries	Act	2000	s	46),	South	Australia	(Juries	Act	1927	s	57)	and	Tasmania	(Juries	Act	
2003	s	43).	Unanimous	verdicts	for	all	criminal	offences	are	still	required	in	WA,	the	ACT	and	NT	
(Gray	2009;	Jones	2005).		
	
Discussion	
It	is	obvious	from	the	preceding	sections	that	the	constitutional	guarantees	to	trial	by	jury	are	
not	a	formal	legal	impediment	to	restrictions	upon	the	right	–	even	for	trials	on	indictment.	At	
state	 and	 territory	 level	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 circumvent	 the	 Commonwealth	 Constitution’s	
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provisions.	 Furthermore,	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 High	 Court	 of	 Australia	 indicates	 that	 a	
Commonwealth	 government	 would	 be	 free	 to	 describe	 any	 counter‐terrorism	 offences	 as	
summary	 –	 no	 matter	 how	 serious	 –	 and	 have	 them	 heard	 without	 a	 jury.	 Internationally,	
successful	attempts	at	 limiting	 the	 right	 to	 trial	by	 jury	 in	 the	counter‐terrorism	context	have	
rested	on	the	supposed	inability	of	the	jury	as	an	institution	to	effectively	deliver	a	fair	trial	–	for	
the	victims	of	terrorism	or	for	the	accused.		
	
Since	 2001	 Australian	 governments	 have	 shown	 a	willingness	 to	 adopt	 and	 adapt	 a	 range	 of	
counter‐terrorism	measures	 from	 other	 jurisdictions	 (Roach	 2011:	 Chapter	 6).	 Indeed	 some	
such	measures	have	gone	well	beyond	those	adopted	elsewhere	(Roach	2011;	Williams	2011).	
That	Australia	has	not	kept	step	with	other	states	in	abandoning	the	jury	places	it	as	an	outlier	
in	the	common	law	world.	It	seems	reasonable	to	suggest	that	the	cultural	capital	attaching	to	
the	 jury	 in	 Australian	 society	 is	 such	 that	 despite	 adopting	 a	 range	 of	 other	 draconian	 anti‐
terrorism	measures	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	remains	peculiarly	secure.	
	
Conclusion	
This	paper	is	part	of	a	broader	project	on	trial	by	jury	in	the	counter‐terrorism	context.	At	this	
point	we	can	conclude	that	trial	by	jury	occupies	and	unusual	space	within	Australian	counter‐
terrorism	 laws.	 Precisely	 why	 the	 right	 has	 been	 so	 resilient	 is	 unclear.	 Commonwealth	
governments	have	adopted	a	range	of	measures	which	have	gone	little	utilised	but	unlike	other	
jurisdictions	it	would	appear	that	the	political	cost	associated	with	undermining	the	institution	
of	the	jury	so	publicly	is	too	great.	The	next	phase	in	this	research	will	be	to	inquire	into	what	it	
is	about	terrorism	that	has	enabled	the	jury	to	survive	here	while	withering	elsewhere.		
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Abstract	
The	battered	women’s	movement	 in	 the	United	States	contributed	to	a	sweeping	change	 in	
the	recognition	of	men’s	violence	against	female	intimate	partners.	Naming	the	problem	and	
arguing	 in	 favour	 of	 its	 identification	 as	 a	 serious	 problem	meriting	 a	 collective	 response	
were	key	aspects	of	this	effort.	Criminal	and	civil	 laws	have	been	written	and	revised	in	an	
effort	 to	 answer	 calls	 to	 take	 such	 violence	 seriously.	 Scholars	 have	 devoted	 significant	
attention	to	the	consequences	of	this	reframing	of	violence,	especially	around	the	unintended	
outcomes	of	the	incorporation	of	domestic	violence	into	criminal	justice	regimes.	Family	law,	
however,	 has	 remained	 largely	 unexamined	 by	 criminologists.	 This	 paper	 calls	 for	
criminological	attention	to	family	law	responses	to	domestic	violence	and	provides	directions	
for	future	research.	
	
	
Introduction	
The	battered	women’s	movement	in	the	United	States	contributed	to	a	sweeping	change	in	the	
recognition	of	men’s	violence	against	female	intimate	partners.	Naming	the	violence	and	arguing	
in	favor	of	its	identification	as	a	serious	problem	meriting	a	public	response	were	key	aspects	of	
this	effort	(Coker	2001‐2002;	Schneider	2000).	Criminal	and	civil	 laws	have	been	written	and	
revised	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 answer	 calls	 to	 take	 such	 violence	 seriously,	 with	 most	 substantive	
changes	 on	 the	 order	 of	 reforms	 to	 policing	 and	 legal	 practice,	 especially	 around	 arrest	 and	
orders	 for	 protection	 (Buzawa	 2012,	 Coker	 2001‐2002;	 Gerstenberger	 and	 Williams	 2013;	
Schneider	2000).		
	
Criminologists	 have	 devoted	 significant	 attention	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	 reframing	 of	
violence.	 Scholars	 in	 criminology,	 law,	 and	 social	 work	 have	 investigated	 the	 operation	 and	
impact	 of	 legal	 responses	 to	 violence	 (See	 for	 example	 Bell	 	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Breines	 and	Gordon	
1983;	 Pleck	 1987;	 Pleck	 1989).	 In	 addition	 to	 changes	 in	 criminal	 law	 and	 its	 application,	
criminologists	have	investigated	the	utilization	and	efficacy	of	civil	 legal	remedies	to	domestic	
violence,	 (Connelly	 and	 Cavanagh	 2007;	 DeJong	 and	 Burgess‐Procter	 1996;	 Fleury‐Steiner,	
Fleury	 Steiner	 and	Miller	 2011).	 They	 have	 also	 highlighted	 the	 unintended	 outcomes	 of	 the	
incorporation	of	domestic	violence	into	criminal	justice	regimes	as	new	policies	have	variously	
been	 co‐opted,	 resisted,	 and	 ignored	 in	 practice	 (Daniels	 1997;	 Durfee	 2012;	 Ferraro	 1996;	
Goodmark	 2011;	 Kim	 2012;	Miller	 1989;	 Miller	 and	Meloy	 2006;	 Moore	 2008;	 Ptacek	 2010;	
Richie	 2012).	 As	 a	 result,	 some	 scholars	 have	 called	 for	 a	 turn	 away	 from	 legal	 responses	 to	
violence	against	women	(Bumiller	2010;	Goodmark;	2011;	Richie	2012).	To	date,	however,	this	
conversation	has	rarely	broached	the	subject	of	family	law	and	domestic	violence.	
	
Family	Law	and	Domestic	Violence	
In	addition	to	frequent	engagement	with	the	criminal	law	and	civil	orders	for	protection,	family	
law	 is	 a	 central	 system	 of	 concern	 for	 abused	women.	 Family	 law	 systems	 are	 located	 at	 the	
intersection	of	two	sets	of	contradictory	gendered	expectations.	In	family	court,	abused	mothers	
find	themselves	in	a	catch‐22	situation	where	they	are	expected	to	separate	from	their	abusers	
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and	divorce	for	the	sake	of	the	children.	If	the	child	protection	system	is	involved,	mothers	face	
removal	 of	 their	 children	 for	 ‘failure	 to	 protect’	 if	 they	 fail	 to	 do	 so.	 However,	 at	 separation,	
married	mothers	 are	expected	 to	 facilitate,	 promote,	 and	encourage	ongoing	 contact	 between	
their	children	and	their	abuser,	also	for	the	sake	of	the	children	(Gill	and	Radford	2007;	Hannah	
and	Goldstein	2010).		
	
A	small	body	of	research	has	begun	to	document	what	has	been	termed	‘paper	harassment’,	the	
use	of	legal	institutions	to	retaliate	against	women	and	children	who	disclose	abuse	informally	
or	report	it	formally,	especially	at	divorce	(Miller	and	Smolter	2011).	This	variety	of	harassment	
is	 the	 latest	 variation	 on	 the	 victim	 blaming	 and	 discrediting	 tactics	 that	 have	 cropped	 up	 in	
response	to	public	acknowledgement	of	abuse	by	family	members	and	intimates	stretching	back	
to	the	early	twentieth	century	(Olafson,	Cordwin	and	Summit	1993;	Salter	2012;	Smart	2000).	
While	 research	 in	 family	 studies,	 public	 health,	 and	 law	 have	 begun	 to	 document	 abuse	 that	
occurs	 at	 separation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 family	 law	 proceedings	 (Hardesty	 2002;	 Hardesty	 and	
Chung	2006;	Hardesty	and	Ganong	2006;	Haselschwerdt,	Hardesty	and	Hans	2010;	McMurray	
1997;	 McMurray	 	 et	 al.	 2000),	 criminology	 stands	 to	 make	 a	 valuable	 contribution	 to	 this	
conversation.	Such	inquiries	fit	well	within	the	remit	of	this	conference.		
	
Family	Law	and	Criminology		
The	move	to	no‐fault	divorce	in	the	United	States	in	the	1970s	facilitated	rising	divorce	rates.	It	
also	contributed	to	uncertain	child	custody	outcomes	at	divorce	as	a	poorly	defined	best	interest	
of	the	child	standard	was	implemented	at	custody	determination.	Lobbying	to	influence	which	
factors	were	deemed	important	 in	determining	the	best	 interest	of	the	child	 intensified	as	 the	
federal	government	encouraged	U.S.	states	to	offload	the	cost	of	supporting	children	from	social	
systems	onto	individual	fathers.	The	U.S.	rewarded	child	support	collection	schemes	as	part	of	
retrenchment	 of	 public	welfare	 programs	 during	 the	 1980s.	 The	 confluence	 of	 rising	 divorce	
rates,	child	support	enforcement,	and	legal	 intervention	into	domestic	violence	resulted	in	the	
coalescence	of	organized	resistance	to	 interventions	 in	violence	against	women	in	the	 form	of	
antifeminist	men’s	and	fathers’	groups	(Dragiewicz	2008;	Dragiewicz	2012).		
	
But	 these	 were	 not	 the	 only	 groups	 to	 organize	 in	 the	 face	 of	 such	 changes.	 Increasing	
privatization	of	fact	finding	in	the	family	court,	another	outcome	of	rising	divorce	rates,	unclear	
criteria	for	custody	determination,	and	efforts	to	offload	the	costs	of	state	functions	onto	private	
citizens,	 contributed	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 a	 cottage	 industry	 of	 forensic	 psychologists,	 special	
masters,	 guardians	 ad	 litem,	 mediators,	 and	 parenting	 coordinators	 who	 assess,	 report,	 and	
testify	for	pay	in	child	custody	cases	that	shape	child	support	and	custody	arrangements.	These	
pseudo‐legal	personnel	regularly	invoke	social	science	research	on	violence	and	abuse	as	part	of	
their	practice.	They	also	 increasingly	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	via	 their	own	peer	 reviewed	
journals	and	propose	and	promote	theories	that	are	useful	in	their	consulting	work.		
	
Although	a	surprising	amount	of	 the	divorce	and	custody	 literature	 refers	 to	delinquency	and	
criminality	 as	 a	 putative	 outcome	of	 divorce	 and	mother	 custody,	 criminology	 does	not	 often	
engage	with	the	 field.	As	a	result,	claims	about	the	criminogenic	 influence	of	single	mothering	
and	 divorce	 go	 largely	 unchallenged.	 Concerns	 about	 the	 safety	 and	 well‐being	 of	 abused	
women	and	their	children	are	buried	in	individualizing	discourses	that	gloss	over	the	violence	
and	structural	inequalities	that	engender	the	social	ills	attributed	to	fatherlessness.	
	
Recent	federal	reforms	to	child	support	enforcement	mean	that	a	greater	number	of	adults	and	
children	 than	 ever	 before	will	 be	 drawn	 into	 the	 family	 law	 system.	While	 these	 changes	 are	
explicitly	 intended	 to	 offload	 the	 cost	 of	 child	 maintenance	 from	 the	 state	 onto	 individual	
fathers,	they	also	include	provisions	to	decrease	payment	amounts	relative	to	‘parenting	time’.	
Although	 motivated	 by	 austerity,	 these	 proposed	 changes	 cannot	 be	 understood	 without	
attention	 to	 gender,	 racism,	 and	 class	 due	 to	 their	 differential	 impact	 on	 different	 families.	
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‘Responsible	 fatherhood’	 programs	 promote	 marriage	 and	 male	 breadwinning	 in	 minority	
communities	in	order	to	push	children	and	mothers	off	of	welfare	rolls.	At	the	same	time,	cutting	
child	 support	 payments	 in	 proportion	 to	 ‘parenting	 time’	 is	 sure	 to	 please	 upper	 income	
divorced	 fathers.	 However,	 the	 earning	 ability	 of	mothers	 is	 not	 altered	 by	 the	 percentage	 of	
‘parenting	 time’	 allocated	 to	 each	 parent.	 Nor	 is	 the	 cost	 of	 raising	 a	 child	 lessened	
proportionately	to	custody	arrangements.	Such	facially	neutral	income	support	policies	penalize	
all	lower	income	parents,	but	are	especially	damaging	for	survivors	of	abuse	who	face	increased	
pressure	 to	 promote	 easy	 access	 to	 fathers	 even	 when	 they	 are	 abusive.	 Often	 custody	
arrangements	are	made	via	ostensibly	restorative	and	non‐adversarial	practices	like	mediation	
which	many	survivors	of	abuse	experience	as	coercive	and	unsafe.		
	
Privatisation	 of	 income	 support	 via	 responsibilising	 low	 income	 fathers	 on	 the	 one	hand	 and	
appeasing	high	 income	 fathers	on	 the	other	presents	a	barrier	 to	abused	women	who	seek	 to	
leave	an	abuser	who	 is	 the	 father	of	her	 children.	Despite	 requirements	 to	 consider	domestic	
violence	 as	 a	 factor	 at	 custody	 determination	 in	 nearly	 every	 state,	 the	 interests	 of	 abused	
parents	and	their	children	are	left	by	the	wayside	in	these	schemes.	In	family	law	systems	where	
violence	is	a	salient	factor,	state	interests	in	privatized	patriarchies	win	out.		
	
Violence	Against	Women,	Law	and	Social	Democracy		
Recent	 critical	 criminological	 critiques	of	 domestic	violence	policies	and	practices	have	called	
for	a	turn	away	from	the	law	based	on	serious	concerns	for	the	ways	in	which	criminal	law,	in	
particular,	 is	 deployed	 in	 ways	 that	 reproduce	 harm	 within	 the	 larger	 discriminatory	 social	
context.	However,	the	focus	on	disempowering	women	by	removing	their	agency	via	restriction	
of	choices	to	not	involve	the	law	does	not	adequately	account	for	family	law.	At	divorce,	women	
and	men	are	forced	into	participation	in	family	law	processes	which	overwhelmingly	fail	to	take	
violence	 and	 abuse	 into	 account.	 As	 part	 of	 divorce	 agreements,	 child	 custody	 and	 support	
orders	 increasingly	 force	 unwilling	 parties	 into	 heterosexual	 co‐parenting	 regardless	 of	 the	
presence	of	 violence	and	despite	 improvements	 in	 recognizing	violence	 in	other	areas	of	 civil	
law.		
	
The	 possibilities	 of	 legal	 responses	 to	 violence	 in	 the	 family	 law	 system	 will	 be	 profoundly	
shaped	 by	 state	 approaches	 to	 a	 number	 of	 social	 and	 structural	 issues	 including	 income	
support	 for	mothers	 and	 their	 children	 and	 the	 privatization	 of	 fact	 finding	 and	 legal	 orders	
enforcing	heterosexual,	patriarchal	family	structures.	As	the	U.S.	moves	to	tether	child	support	
to	 custody	 orders,	 abused	 women’s	 need	 for	 safety	 and	 support	 stand	 to	 be	 subsumed	 by	
competing	exigencies.		
	
In	addition	to	calls	for	police	and	court	accountability,	anti‐violence	advocates	have	addressed	
the	need	to	 improve	housing,	employment,	wages	and	child	care	as	part	of	efforts	to	decrease	
men’s	violence	(Menard	2001).	Criminologists	can	contribute	to	this	discussion	by	 listening	to	
the	concerns	and	priorities	of	survivors	of	violence	and	thinking	carefully	about	the	persistent	
gender,	 class,	 and	 racialized	 inequalities	 that	 lead	 to	 violence	 and	 produce	 many	 of	 the	
shortcomings	and	 inconsistencies	of	 legal	responses	 to	violence	against	women.	This	 includes	
investigating	 what	 is	 happening	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 the	 family	 courts,	 participating	 in	 debates	
about	 the	 nature	 of	 violence	 and	 abuse,	 and	 turning	 critical	 faculties	 toward	 the	 interests	
driving	conflicting	policy	changes	as	well	as	resistance	to	them.	As	Postmus		et	al.	(2009:	865)	
put	it:	
	
Our	 intervention	 strategies	must	 go	 beyond	 offering	 emotional	 support;	 we	must	
offer	 survivors	 help	 locating	 and	 securing	 the	 types	 of	 tangible	 services	 (financial	
assistance,	child	care,	transportation,	housing,	and	educational	assistance)	that	will	
support	their	survival	and	the	termination	of	abuse.	Perhaps,	as	some	advocates	are	
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doing,	 it	 is	 time	 to	bring	greater	emphasis	and	awareness	 to	economic	 justice	and	
the	self‐sufficiency	of	survivors.	
	
At	the	same	time,	critical	criminologists	cannot	abandon	the	law.	As	Martha	T.	McClusky	(2010:	
363)	argued:	
	
Critical	 feminism	 rejects	 the	 fantasy	 that	 we	 stand	 outside	 law’s	 power	 in	 some	
neutral	space	free	from	imperfect	empirical	assumptions	and	imperfect	political	and	
social	 commitments.	We	 always	 live	 embedded	 in	 law,	 privileged	 or	 penalized	 by	
legal	 institutions;	 all	 our	 actions	 or	 inactions	 work	 to	 reinforce	 or	 change	 a	 legal	
regime	 and	 the	 assumptions	 about	 the	 empirical	 world	 that	 legal	 regime	 helps	
shape.	Refusing	to	know	about,	care	about,	or	respond	to	the	injustices	that	pervade	
our	daily	lives	is	 itself	and	action	with	potentially	far‐reaching	and	complex	effects	
on	others.	
	
Calls	 for	expanded	social	programs	to	promote	substantive	equality	are	one	important	part	of	
efforts	 to	 reduce	 the	 social	 harm	 caused	 by	 violence	 and	 abuse,	 but	 criminologists	 cannot	
abandon	legal	systems.	People	are	much	more	likely	to	be	pulled	into	family	law	systems	than	
criminal	legal	systems.	If	50%	of	marriages	end	in	divorce,	family	law	and	policy	have	massive	
implications	for	substantive	equality.	Where	the	marriage	has	ended	due	to	abuse,	the	potential	
for	harm	and	healing	are	both	multiplied	within	the	system.		
	
Conclusion	
There	is	a	pressing	need	for	criminologists	to	contribute	to	building	our	understanding	of	what	
happens	in	family	court,	how	people	end	up	there,	and	what	survivors	need	in	order	to	develop	
short	and	long	term	strategies	to	promote	safety	and	well‐being.	Survivors’	voices	need	to	be	at	
the	center	of	this	research	agenda.	A	key	part	of	this	inquiry	will	be	to	develop	an	understanding	
of	the	different	priorities	and	issues	for	different	survivors.	As	same‐sex	marriage	is	adopted	in	
more	 states	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 more	 survivors	 of	 violence	 by	 same‐sex	 partners	 will	
undoubtedly	play	out	differently	in	court.	Likewise,	the	contradictory	forces	created	by	millions	
of	dollars	being	poured	into	marriage	and	fatherhood	promotion	programs	in	under‐resourced	
and	 racialized	 communities	 and	 welfare	 surveillance	 practices	 that	 discourage	 co‐habitation	
create	specific	resource	needs.	For	immigrant	women	whose	visa	and	custody	status	is	explicitly	
linked	to	their	spouse,	another	set	of	concerns	is	at	the	fore.		
	
Ultimately,	the	idealisation	of	patriarchal	families	and	co‐parenting	post‐separation	will	play	out	
differently	across	lines	of	gender,	sexuality,	age,	income,	immigration	status,	ethnicity,	and	skin	
color.	Empirical	research	on	what	happens	in	family	court	is	almost	non‐existent	in	the	United	
States.	What	 does	 exist	mostly	 ignores	 the	 possibility	 of	 violence	 and	 abuse	 due	 to	 incorrect	
assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 abuse	 in	 the	 field	 of	 family	 studies	 and	 the	 overwhelming	
involvement	of	scholars	with	financial	and	professional	conflicts	of	interest.	There	is	a	real	need	
for	 research	 from	 critical	 criminologists	 whose	 income	 is	 not	 linked	 to	 paid	 testimony	 and	
whose	 lines	 of	 inquiry	 are	 not	 dictated	 by	 federal	 funding	 which	 is	 increasingly	 focused	 on	
crude	performance	indicators.	
	
It	 is	 essential	 that	 critical	 criminologists	 address	 epistemological	 issues	 as	well.	 The	 creeping	
menace	of	poorly	conceived	‘evidence	based	practice’,	the	continuing	fetishisation	of	ostensibly	
representative	 sample	 surveys	 that	 are	 utterly	 unable	 to	 contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	
violence	 and	 its	 effects,	 a	 lack	 of	 conversation	 with	 scholars	 in	 other	 fields	 that	 deal	 with	
violence	and	abuse,	and	criminologists’	unwillingness	 to	acknowledge	 the	politics	of	scholarly	
knowledge	production	are	central	concerns	for	those	of	us	who	seek	to	understand	violence	and	
responses	 to	 it.	We	 need	 to	 have	 honest	 conversations	 about	 the	 persistent	 unwillingness	 to	
foreground	 consent	 in	 discussion	 about	 rape,	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 sexism,	 reluctance	 to	 deal	
Domestic	Violence	and	Family	Law:	Recognition	and	Appropriation	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013							45	
with	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 in	 the	 family,	 idealization	 of	 heterosexual	 nuclear	 families,	 and	 the	
contradictory	 social	 norms	 promoting	 and	 proscribing	men’s	 and	women’s	 violence.	We	 also	
need	 to	 be	 cognizant	 of	 the	 certainty	 that	 self‐critique	will	 be	 appropriated	 in	 the	 service	 of	
backlash	efforts	to	eliminate	those	legal	remedies	and	resources	that	are	available,	with	specific	
risks	for	different	survivors	along	the	lines	of	established	social	hierarchies	(Pleck	1987;	Ptacek	
2010).	Attention	 to	 the	history	of	 antiviolence	and	anti‐oppression	social	movements	 and	 the	
forms	of	resistance	they	have	faced	can	provide	a	map	of	the	perils	and	possibilities	of	multiple	
formal	and	substantive	approaches	to	social	justice.	
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Abstract	
Since	 the	 late	 1980s,	 an	 international	 group	of	 scholars	has	made	 some	key	 empirical	 and	
theoretical	 contributions	 to	 a	 rich	 social	 scientific	 understanding	 of	 various	 types	 of	
separation/divorce.	 Still,	 there	 is	much	more	 research	 to	be	done	and	more	 theories	 to	be	
constructed	 and	 tested.	 The	main	 objective	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 offer	 recommendations	 for	
future	social	scientific	work	in	the	field.	
	
	
New	Directions	in	the	Social	Scientific	Study	of	Separation/Divorce	Assault	
Keeping	 up	with	 the	 rapidly	 growing	 social	 scientific	 literature	 on	woman	 abuse	 in	 intimate	
relationships	is	a	daunting	task.	Nearly	every	week,	most	of	our	colleagues	in	the	field,	receive	
announcements	 from	 Sage	 Publications	 about	 new	 articles	 in	 the	 Online	 First	 version	 of	 the	
journal	Violence	Against	Women.	This	is	because	it	is	one	of	the	most	successful	scholarly	outlets	
in	 the	 world,	 with	 12	 hard	 copy	 issues	 published	 each	 year.	 The	 editor,	 Dr.	 Claire	 Renzetti,	
recently	 told	 us	 that	 she	 receives	 over	 400	 submissions	 a	 year	 and	 the	 acceptance	 rate	 is	
roughly	 12%.	 As	 well,	 hundreds	 of	 manuscripts	 on	 topics	 ranging	 from	 male‐to‐female	
psychological	abuse	to	intimate	femicide	are	submitted	each	year	to	other	prominent	academic	
periodicals,	such	as	Journal	of	Family	Violence,	Journal	of	Interpersonal	Violence,	Aggression	and	
Violent	Behavior,	and	Trauma,	Violence,	&	Abuse.	Indeed,	what	Schwartz	and	DeKeseredy	(1988)	
stated	25	years	ago	 is	 still	 valid:	 advances	 in	 the	 social	 scientific	 study	of	woman	abuse	have	
been	even	faster‐paced	than	those	in	some	of	the	physical	sciences.	
	
Researchers	around	the	world	have	generated	a	wide	range	of	ground‐breaking	data	over	 the	
past	40	years	using	a	variety	of	methods,	but	one	of	the	most	important	findings	is	that	there	are	
intimate	relationship	status	variations	in	woman	abuse.	For	example,	close	to	20	studies	done	in	
North	America	and	New	Zealand	uncovered	major	differences	 in	violence	rates	obtained	from	
married	people	and	cohabitors.	In	fact,	the	rate	of	violence	for	the	latter	is	typically	twice	that	of	
married	persons,	but	the	difference	can	be	greater	than	four	times.	Cohabiting	women	are	also	
more	 likely	 to	 experience	 more	 severe	 types	 of	 violence	 than	 their	 married	 counterparts	
(Brownridge	and	Halli	2001;	DeKeseredy	2007).		
	
It	 is	 also	 well	 known	 today	 that	 North	 American	 separated	 and	 divorced	 women	 are	 at	
significantly	 greater	 risk	 of	 being	 beaten,	 sexually	 abused,	 and	 even	 killed	 than	 are	 married	
women	 (Brownridge	 et	 al.	 2008;	DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2009;	 Rennison,	DeKeseredy	 and	
Dragiewicz	2012).	In	fact,	the	process	of	exiting	a	marriage	or	cohabiting	relationship	is	one	of	
the	 most	 dangerous	 times	 for	 women	 (Brownridge	 2009;	 Dawson	 Bunge	 and	 Balde	 2009).	
Basile	 and	 Black	 (2011:	 119)	 correctly	 point	 out	 in	 their	 review	 of	 the	 separation/divorce	
assault	research	that,	‘Rage,	despair,	loss	of	control,	and	patriarchal	expectations	of	male	rights	
and	 dominance	 are	 common	 motives	 behind	 lethal	 violence	 males	 perpetrate	 against	 their	
estranged	female	partners’.	
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Separation/divorce	assaults	are	not	restricted	to	North	America.	Consider	that	McMurray	et	al.	
(2000)	 found	 that	 21%	 of	 the	 146	 separated	Western	 Australian	 men	 in	 their	 sample	 were	
violent	during	separation.	Hence,	as	Brownridge	(2006:	517)	observes	in	his	in‐depth	review	of	
the	international	social	scientific	literature	on	violence	against	women	post‐separation:	
	
In	short,	studies	that	allow	a	comparison	of	violence	among	separated,	divorced,	and	
married	women	show	a	consistent	pattern	of	separated	and	divorced	women	being	
at	 elevated	 risk	 for	 violence	 compared	 to	married	women,	with	 separated	women	
having	 by	 the	 far	 the	 greatest	 risk	 for	 post‐separation	 violence.	 It	 appears	 that	
separated	women	have	as	much	as	thirty	times	the	likelihood,	and	divorced	women	
have	 as	 much	 as	 nine	 times	 the	 likelihood,	 of	 reporting	 non‐lethal	 violence	
compared	to	married	women.	
	
Brownridge’s	statement	and	the	research	supporting	it	have	major	policy	implications.	Criminal	
justice	 officials,	 shelter	 workers,	 and	 scores	 of	 others	 assert	 that	 abused	 women’s	 most	
important	 tool	 in	 the	 struggle	 to	 end	 their	 victimization	 is	 to	 divorce	 or	 separate	 from	 their	
partners.	Most	battered	women	make	 ‘dangerous	exits’,	but	separation	or	divorce	alone	often	
does	not	make	 them	safer.	Thus,	women	 ‘fleeing	 the	house	of	horrors’	 require	more	effective	
and	 creative	 solutions	 (DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2009;	 Sev'er	 2002).	 Developing	 such	
initiatives,	though,	requires	a	richer	social	scientific	understanding	of	woman	abuse	during	and	
after	separation/divorce.	The	main	objective	of	this	paper,	then,	is	to	help	achieve	this	goal	by	
charting	 some	new	empirical	 and	 theoretical	directions,	 some	of	which	 involve	 ‘going	back	 to	
the	future’.2		
	
Conceptualisation	of	Separation/Divorce	
New	studies	are	being	conducted	and	some	new	theories	are	being	constructed,	but	one	thing	
the	 social	 scientific	 community	 does	 not	 have	 is	 an	 agreed‐upon	 firm	 definition	 of	
separation/divorce.	Nonetheless,	 unlike	 debates	 about	whether	 to	 use	narrow	or	 broad	or	 to	
employ	 gender‐neutral	 or	 gender‐specific	 definitions	 of	 violence	 in	 intimate	 heterosexual	
relationships,	 the	disagreements	 among	 scholars	 over	 conceptualizing	 separation/divorce	 are	
not	 as	 ‘old,	 fierce,	 and	 unlikely	 to	 be	 resolved	 in	 the	 near	 future’	 (Kilpatrick	 2004:	 1218).3	
Actually,	 those	who	study	separation/divorce	assault	admire	 each	other’s	work	 and	 routinely	
exchange	ideas	and	publications.	Even	so,	they	remain	divided	into	two	camps	when	it	comes	to	
defining	 the	 concept	 of	 separation/divorce.	 This	 is	 hardly	 a	 trivial	 concern	 because	 how	
relationships	 and	 behaviours	 are	 defined	 have	 major	 effects	 on	 the	 lives	 of	 many	 people.	
Further,	definitions	are	used	as	tools	in	social	struggles.	Together	with	poverty,	unemployment,	
terrorism,	 and	 other	 social	 problems,	 violence	 against	 women	 is	 a	 highly	 politicized	 topic	 of	
social	 scientific	 inquiry,	 and	 definitions	 of	 concepts	 related	 to	 this	 harm	 reflect	 this	 reality	
(DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	2011;	Dragiewicz	and	DeKeseredy	2012;	Ellis	1987).	
	
Most	 separation/divorce	 assault	 studies	 assume	 couples	 must	 live	 apart	 to	 be	 separated	 or	
divorced.4	Consequently,	the	large	number	of	beatings,	rapes,	and	other	attacks	that	occur	when	
a	 woman	 emotionally	 exits	 a	 relationship	 but	 remains	 in	 the	 home,5	 decides	 to	 leave	 her	
partner,	 or	 when	 she	 makes	 an	 unsuccessful	 escape	 from	 a	 ‘dangerous	 domain’	 are	 not	
measured	(DeKeseredy	in	press;	Johnson	1996;	Ptacek	1999).	For	example,	Brownridge	(2009:	
56)	restricts	his	analysis	to	‘post‐separation	violence’,	which	he	defines	as	‘any	type	of	violence	
perpetrated	 by	 a	 former	married	 or	 cohabiting	male	 partner	 or	 boyfriend	 subsequent	 to	 the	
moment	of	physical	 separation’.	The	problems	with	definitions	 such	as	Brownridge’s	 are	well	
documented	 elsewhere	 (see	 DeKeseredy	 in	 press;	 DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2009),	 but	 it	 is	
necessary	to	revisit	two	concerns.	First,	narrow	conceptualizations	contribute	to	the	perennial	
problem	 of	 underreporting.	 Consequently,	 an	 entire	 survey	 can	 be	 discredited	 if	 researchers	
cannot	 discern	 if	 the	 separated/divorced	 women	 who	 reported	 having	 been	 abused	 are	
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representative	of	all	the	survivors	in	the	sample.	Struggles	for	effective	social	support	services	
are	also	hindered	because	high	 levels	of	underreporting	 result	 in	 low	estimates	of	abuse,	 and	
ultimately	decrease	the	probability	of	mobilizing	resources	to	curb	separation/divorce	assault	
and	other	variants	of	female	victimization	in	intimate	contexts	(DeKeseredy	1995;	DeKeseredy	
and	Schwartz	1998;	Smith	1994).	
	
Also	contributing	to	the	problem	of	underreporting	is	the	fact	that	a	woman’s	decision	to	leave	a	
relationship	may	be	long	and	complex,	as	violence	against	women	researchers	have	long	known	
(Goetting	1999).	She	may	feel	simultaneously	oppressed	and	trapped	by	an	inability	to	leave	a	
relationship	 right	 now.	 This	 may	 be	 for	 financial	 or	 economic	 reasons,	 or	 because	 she	 was	
unable	to	make	adequate	arrangements	to	care	for	her	children,	or	for	a	variety	of	other	reasons	
(Davies	2011;	Renzetti	2011).	As	a	 result,	 some	 feminist	 scholars	do	not	view	separation	and	
divorce	 as	 purely	 functions	 of	 proximity	 because	 exiting	 a	 relationship	 generally	 takes	 place	
over	time	(DeKeseredy	et	al.	2004;	DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz,	2009;	Mahoney	1991).	
	
Though	broader	feminist	definitions	of	separation/divorce	generate	higher	estimates	of	abuse	
and	help	researchers	more	accurately	describe	the	complex	reality	of	women’s	dangerous	exits,	
definitions	 like	 Brownridge’s	 (2009)	 have	 a	 positive	 element	 that	 other	 feminist	
conceptualizations	have	so	far	not	addressed,	which	is	recognizing	that	dating	breakups	are	also	
dangerous.	 In	 fact,	 to	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge,	 every	 study	 of	 separation/divorce	 assault	
conducted	to	date	has	overlooked	the	fact	that	the	termination	of	a	dating	relationship	may	also	
lead	to	physical	and	sexual	violence	(Brogan	2013;	Compton	1991).6	Therefore,	it	is	essential	to	
acknowledge	that	women	who	were	romantically	and/or	sexually	 involved	with	men	but	who	
never	lived	with	them	warrant	inclusion.	It	is	logical	to	assume	that	researchers	would	uncover	
a	high	rate	of	victimization	during	and	after	the	process	of	 leaving	a	dating	relationship	given	
the	alarmingly	high	rates	of	various	types	of	abuse	in	teen	and	adult	dating	relationships.7	
	
As	Ball	(2013:	186),	puts	it,	‘The	existence	of	intimate	partner	violence	within	non‐heterosexual	
and/or	non‐cisgendered	relationships	is	gaining	greater	recognition’.	One	would	not	know	this	
from	 reading	 the	 separation/divorce	 assault	 literature.	 This	 body	 of	 knowledge	 is	 guilty	 of	
heteronormativity,	 but	 the	 same	 can	 be	 said	 about	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 empirical,	 theoretical,	 and	
policy	work	on	any	type	of	intimate	partner	violence.	Needless	to	say,	there	is	violence	in	same‐
sex	relationships,8	but	 there	 is	 little	 information	about	 the	abuse	 that	occurs	during	and	after	
exiting	them.9	Exiting	a	relationship	is,	to	be	sure,	not	purely	a	heterosexual	phenomenon	and	
new	conceptualizations	should	broaden	to	account	for	this	reality.		
	
The	 separation/divorce	 assault	 research	 community	 responded	 faster	 to	 critiques	 of	 narrow	
definitions	of	sexual	assault	than	it	has	to	narrow	definitions	of	exiting.	Why	this	is	the	case	is	an	
empirical	question	that	can	only	be	answered	empirically.	In	spite	of	this,	we	suggest	that	it	is	
because	debates	about	defining	abuse	have	a	longer	history,	are	more	intense,	and	involve	many	
more	 researchers.	Moreover,	 there	 is	much	more	published	material	on	definitions	of	various	
types	of	abuse	in	intimate	relationships.	
	
Beyond	the	Victimization	Survey	
Since	the	early	1980s,	over	150	scientific	articles	on	the	extent	of	male	violence	against	female	
marital	and/or	cohabiting	partners	have	been	published,	with	most	of	them	written	by	United	
States	(US)	social	scientists	(DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	2014;	Machado,	Dias	and	Coelho	2010).	
This	is	not	surprising	because	the	US	is	the	world’s	center	of	crime	survey	research.	Certainly,	
measuring	 the	 incidence,	 prevalence,	 correlates,	 and	 consequences	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 harms	
women	endure	in	ongoing	relationships	and	in	the	process	of	or	after	leaving	intimate	partners	
is	now	an	international	concern.	Even	so,	the	 field	would	not	be	where	it	 is	today	without	the	
methodological	 advances	made	 in	 the	 US	 Canadian	work	 also	 had	 a	major	 impact	 on	 survey	
research	 conducted	 around	 the	world.	 Note	 that	 Statistics	 Canada’s	 Violence	 Against	Women	
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Survey	(VAWS)	is	the	world’s	first	national	survey	specifically	designed	to	investigate	multiple	
types	of	male‐to‐female	violence	(Jacquier,	Johnson	and	Fisher	2011).	Consequently,	the	VAWS	
yielded	much	higher	rates	of	violence	and	abuse	than	earlier	surveys	designed	to	measure	crime	
or	family	conflict	(Dobash	and	Dobash	1995).10	The	impact	of	the	path‐breaking	methodological	
developments	made	in	this	study	is	still	 felt	today	(DeKeseredy	and	Dragiewicz,	in	press),	and	
the	VAWS	has	been	 replicated	 in	national	 studies	 in	 countries	 such	 as	Australia,	 Finland,	 and	
Iceland	(Walby	and	Myhill	2001),	as	well	as	in	regional	studies	like	the	Chicago	Women’s	Health	
Risk	Study	(Block	et	al.	2000).	
	
The	Canadian	national	survey	of	woman	abuse	in	university/college	dating	(CNS)	is	also	the	first	
country‐wide	study	of	 its	kind	(DeKeseredy	and	Kelly	1993;	DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	1998),	
expanding	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 an	 earlier	 US	 study	 of	 campus	 sexual	 assault	 (Koss,	 Gidycz,	 and	
Wisniewski	1987).	Additionally,	Canadian	scholars	like	Brownridge	(2009)	are	at	the	forefront	
of	examining	violence	against	women	during	and	after	separation/divorce.	 In	 fact,	 the	bulk	of	
the	 research	 on	 this	 topic	 has	 thus	 far	 been	 done	 by	 Canadian	 sociologists	 (DeKeseredy	 and	
Dragiewicz,	in	press).	
	
Despite	some	incredible	methodological	advances	and	regardless	of	where	these	tools	are	used,	
almost	all	separation/divorce	studies	used	victimization	survey	technology.	What	accounts	for	
this?	Perhaps	Jacquier	et	al.	(2011:	26)	provide	the	best	answer:	
	
It	is	generally	agreed	that	populations	surveys,	in	which	random	samples	of	women	
are	 interviewed	 about	 their	 experiences	 of	 violence	 using	 detailed,	 behaviorally	
specific	questions,	yield	more	valid	and	reliable	estimates	of	the	prevalence	of	these	
phenomena	in	the	population	...	
	
Undeniably,	due	to	social	desirability	effects	and	other	factors,	listening	to	women’s	voices	and	
inviting	 them	to	 fill	out	surveys	enables	researchers	to	uncover	much	higher	estimates	of	any	
type	 of	 woman	 abuse	 than	 those	 derived	 from	 self‐report	 surveys	 administered	 to	 men	
(DeKeseredy	 et	 al.	 2004).	 Still,	 the	 research	 community	 is	 now	 at	 the	 point	 where	 it	 can	
confidently	 state	 that	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 women	 experience	 separation/divorce	 assault	
and	 hence	 it	 is	 time	 to	 use	 some	 different	 techniques	 to	 yield	 better	 answers	 to	 some	 very	
important	questions,	such	as	‘Why	Does	He	Do	That?’	(Bancroft	2002).	This	is	not	to	say,	though,	
that	interviewing	women	or	administering	victimization	surveys	do	not	help	achieve	this	goal.	
They	 certainly	 do	 and	 DeKeseredy	 and	 colleagues’	 interviews	 with	 43	 rural	 southeast	 Ohio	
women	 uncovered	 some	 rich	 information	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 men	 who	 engage	 in	
separation/divorce	assault.	The	women	revealed	 that	 receiving	patriarchal	male	peer	support	
for	abuse,	the	consumption	of	pornography,	drugs	and	alcohol,	and	an	adherence	to	the	ideology	
of	 familial	 patriarchy	 were	 strongly	 associated	 with	 their	 ex‐partners’	 abusive	 behaviors	
(DeKeseredy	and	 Joseph	2006;	DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	2009;	DeKeseredy,	Schwartz,	Fagen	
and	 Hall	 2006).	 Kurz’s	 (1995)	 interviews	 with	 129	 divorced	 Philadelphia	 women	 produced	
some	 similar	 findings.	 Nonetheless,	 interviews	with	men	 are	 in	 short	 supply	 and	 so	 are	 self‐
report	surveys	administered	to	men.	Terry	Arendell	 (1995:	3)	 is	one	of	 less	 than	a	handful	of	
scholars	 to	 glean	 interview	 data	 from	 men	 about	 separation/divorce	 assault	 and	 what	 she	
stated	18	years	ago	still	holds	true	today:	
	
Men	are	relatively	neglected	in	divorce	research.	A	dearth	of	 information	on	men’s	
perceptions	 and	 actions	 persists	 even	 though	 divorce	 research	 increased	
dramatically	over	the	past	several	decades,	as	the	divorce	rate	remained	strikingly	
high.	This	neglect	of	men,	and	particularly	of	divorced	fathers,	 is	not	unique	but	 is	
characteristic	 of	 fathers	 and	 fathering	more	 generally	 ...	 Neither	mothers’	 reports	
nor	survey	findings,	however,	give	expression	to	fathers’	views	or	experiences.	
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Another	 relevant	 point	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 is	 that	 separation/divorce	 is	 a	major	 determinant	 of	
intimate	 femicide	 in	 the	 US,	 which	 a	 country	 characterized	 by	 a	 vast	 amount	 of	 homicide	
research.	Yet,	Adams’	 (2007)	 interviews	with	31	men	who	killed	 intimate	partners	 constitute	
the	first	US	study	that	elicited	information	directly	from	male	perpetrators.	Again,	there	is	also	a	
dearth	of	male	self‐report	survey	data.	This	is	somewhat	surprising	because	there	is	a	sizeable	
portion	of	self‐report	surveys	of	men’s	experiences	with	other	types	of	woman	abuse	in	intimate	
relationships.	
	
Self‐report	data	 from	men	will	 tell	us	much	about	what	drives	 them	to	be	abusive	and	enable	
researchers	 to	 more	 effectively	 test	 some	 of	 the	 theories	 of	 separation/divorce	 recently	
developed	by	DeKeseredy	et	al.	 (2004)	and	DeKeseredy,	Donnermeyer,	Schwartz,	Tunnell	and	
Hall	 (2007).	 Several	 hypotheses	 derived	 from	 them	 could	 easily	 be	 tested	 using	measures	 of	
male	 peer	 support	 developed	 by	 DeKeseredy	 (1988),	 Smith’s	 (1990)	 familial	 patriarchal	
ideology	 items,	 as	well	 as	 other	measures.	Much	 support	 for	 parts	 of	 the	 above	 theories	 are	
found	in	interview	data	collected	in	rural	Ohio	by	DeKeseredy	and	his	colleagues,	but	there	has	
been	 no	 attempt	 to	 determine	 their	 explanatory	 power	 using	 quantitative	 techniques.	
Essentially,	in	recent	years,	Block	and	DeKeseredy	(2007)	and	Brownridge	(2009)	are	the	only	
scholars	 to	 be	 guided	 by	 theoretical	 perspectives	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 statistical	 data	 on	
separation/divorce	 assault.	 Block	 and	 DeKeseredy	 tested	 an	 element	 of	 Wilson	 and	 Daly’s	
(1992,	1993)	male	proprietariness	theory	of	violence	against	wives,	while	Brownridge’s	use	of	
Canadian	national	victimization	survey	data	was	heavily	informed	by	an	ecological	framework	
and	Ellis	and	DeKeseredy’s	(1989)	DAD	(dependency,	availability,	and	deterrence)	model,	which	
is	 an	 attempt	 to	explain	marital	 status	variations	 in	woman	abuse.	Ecological	models	address	
multiple	 levels	 of	 influence	 and	 maintain	 that	 violence	 against	 women	 should	 be	 examined	
within	 a	 nested	 set	 of	 environmental	 contexts	 or	 systems	 (Graham‐Berman	 and	 Gross	 2008;	
Dragiewicz	2011).	
	
In	 sum,	a	variety	of	methods	enhances	a	 social	 scientific	understanding	of	 separation/divorce	
and	 new	 techniques	 are	 always	 welcome.	 Then	 again,	 it	 appears	 that	 contemporary	
developments	in	woman	abuse	research	methodology	have	ignored	some	innovative	techniques	
developed	nearly	30	years	ago.	A	central	argument	of	this	paper	is	that	they	should	be	revisited.	
	
Back	to	the	Future	
Regardless	of	what	type	of	survey	is	used	in	future	research,	there	are	some	important	lessons	
from	 the	 past	 that	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	 If	 the	 pioneering	 woman	 abuse	 survey	
researcher	Michael	D.	Smith	(1987:	185)	were	alive	today,	he	would	surely	repeat	what	he	said	
26	years	ago:	‘Obtaining	accurate	estimates	of	woman	abuse	in	the	population	at	large	remains	
perhaps	 the	 biggest	methodological	 challenge	 in	 survey	 research	 on	 this	 topic’.	 Regardless	 of	
how	 carefully	 a	 survey	 is	 crafted,	 many	 abused	 women	 and	 male	 offenders	 do	 not	 disclose	
incidents	 because	 of	 embarrassment,	 fear	 of	 reprisal,	 ‘forward	 and	 backward	 telescoping’,	
deception,	 and	memory	 error	 (DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	1998;	 Schwartz	 2000;	 Smith	1994).	
Additional	reasons	 for	underreporting	are	the	reluctance	to	recall	 traumatic	 incidents	and	the	
belief	that	abusive	acts	are	too	trivial	or	inconsequential	to	mention	(DeKeseredy	1995;	Straus,	
Gelles	and	Steinmetz	1981).	
	
These	 problems	 still	 plague	 woman	 abuse	 researchers	 and	 they	 are	 perhaps	 getting	 worse	
because	of	the	neglect	to	answer	Smith’s	(1987,	1994)	call	for	the	use	of	supplementary	open‐	
and	 closed	 ended	 questions.	 While	 a	 growing	 cadre	 of	 survey	 researchers	 employ	 multiple	
quantitative	 measures	 of	 abuse	 (see	 Jacquier	 et	 al.	 2011),	 in	 numerous	 studies,	 many	
respondents	 are	 not	 given	 additional	 opportunities	 to	 disclose	 abusive	 experiences	 and	 this	
problem	is	endemic	to	survey	research	on	separation/divorce	assault.	At	the	outset,	people	may	
not	 report	 incidents	 for	 reasons	 described	 previously	 (e.g.,	 embarrassment,	 shame,	 fear	 of	
reprisal).	Yet,	there	is	ample	empirical	evidence	showing	that	if	respondents	are	probed	later	on	
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by	 an	 interviewer	 or	 asked	 to	 complete	 self‐report,	 supplementary,	 open‐	 and	 closed‐ended	
questions,	some	silent	or	forgetful	participants	will	reveal	having	been	victimized	or	abusive.11	
For	example,	Smith	(1987)	found	that	some	silent	or	forgetful	female	victims	(N	=	60)	changed	
their	 answers	 when	 asked	 again	 in	 different	 words	 by	 a	 telephone	 interviewer.	 Belated	
responses	 increase	 the	 overall	 violence	 prevalence	 rates	 by	 roughly	 10%,	 and	 21	 belated	
disclosures	increased	the	severe	prevalence	rate.12	
	
Below	is	one	example	of	a	supplementary	open‐ended	question.	It	was	located	at	the	end	of	the	
CNS	questionnaire	(see	DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz,	1998)	and	can	easily	be	tailored	for	use	in	a	
separation/divorce	assault	survey:13	
	
We	really	appreciate	the	time	you	have	taken	to	complete	this	survey.	And	we’d	like	
to	assure	you	that	everything	you	have	told	us	will	remain	strictly	confidential.	We	
realise	that	the	topics	covered	in	this	survey	are	sensitive	and	that	many	women	are	
reluctant	 to	 talk	 about	 their	 experiences.	 But	 we’re	 also	 a	 bit	 worried	 that	 we	
haven’t	asked	the	right	questions.	So	now	that	you	have	had	a	chance	to	think	about	
the	topics,	have	you	had	any	(any	other)	experiences	in	which	you	were	physically	
and/or	 sexually	 harmed	 by	 your	 dating	 partners	 while	 you	 attended	 college	 or	
university?	Please	provide	this	information	in	the	space	below.	
	
On	 top	of	 giving	 respondents	more	opportunities	 to	 reveal	 information	 about	 abusive	events,	
supplementary	 open‐ended	 questions	 build	 researcher‐respondent	 rapport	 and	 respond	 to	
well‐founded	 concerns	 about	 the	 hierarchical	 nature	 of	 ‘male‐stream’,	 positivist	 research	
(Schwartz	2000).	According	to	Smith	(1994:	115):		
	
For	 one	 thing,	 an	 open	 format	 may	 reduce	 the	 threat	 of	 a	 question	 on	 violence,	
because	it	allows	the	respondent	to	qualify	her	response,	to	express	exact	shades	of	
meaning,	 rather	 than	 forcing	her	 to	choose	 from	a	number	of	possibly	 threatening	
alternatives.	For	another,	open	questions	may	reduce	the	power	imbalance	inherent	
in	 the	 interview	 situation	 (the	 relationship	 between	 researcher	 and	 researched	
parallels	 the	 hierarchical	 nature	 of	 traditional	male‐female	 relationships)	 because	
open	 questions	 encourage	 interaction	 and	 collaboration	 between	 interviewer	 and	
respondent	 ...	 The	 less	 threatening	 the	 question	 and	 the	 more	 equal	 the	 power	
relationship,	the	greater	the	probability	of	rapport	and,	in	turn,	of	eliciting	an	honest	
answer	to	a	sensitive	question	on	violence.	
	
Supplementary	 open‐ended	 questions	 and	 other	 qualitative	 techniques	 used	 in	 surveys	 have	
proven	to	be	successful.	However,	these	approaches	are	typically	given	short	shrift	compared	to	
quantitative	ones	in	journal	articles	and	book	chapters	that	offer	in‐depth	reviews	of	methods	
used	 to	glean	woman	abuse	data.14	 It	 seems,	at	 least	 in	 the	North	America,	 that	Smith’s	path‐
breaking	efforts	to	improve	the	quality	of	survey	research	are	forgotten	or	dismissed.	Even	so,	it	
would	be	remiss	not	to	state	that	the	US	National	Crime	Victimization	Survey	(NCVS)	includes	
‘incident	 narratives’,	 which	 are	 open‐ended	 responses	 to	 a	 final	 question	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
survey	that	asks	participants	to	report	what	happened	to	them.	Albeit	qualitative	in	nature,	the	
narratives	are	not	the	actual	victims’	verbatim	accounts,	but	rather	statements	transcribed	by	
NCVS	 interviewers	 (Jacquier	 et	 al.	 2011).	Moreover,	 the	 narratives	 lack	 rich	 contextual	 detail	
about	events	leading	up	to	an	assault	or	after	an	attack,	and	it	is	hard	to	determine	from	reading	
them	why	incidents	were	not	reported	to	the	police	(Weiss	2009,	2011).	
	
Diversity	Issues	
If	the	assaults	on	people	leaving	same‐sex	relationships	are	not	adequately	examined	in	the	bulk	
of	 separation/divorce	 assault	 studies,	 the	 same	 can	 said	 about	 the	 victimization	 of	 female	
members	of	some	racial/ethnic	groups.	For	example,	the	only	experiences	of	ethnic	groups	to	be	
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examined	in	Brownridge’s	(2009)	Canadian	study	are	those	of	Aboriginal	peoples,	and	he	does	
not	specify	which	tribes	they	belong	to.	Additionally,	he	does	not	compare	the	aboriginal	data	
with	statistics	gleaned	 from	a	variety	of	other	racial/ethnic	groups.	Rather	 those	who	are	not	
Aboriginal	are	simply	clustered	into	one	category	referred	to	as	‘non‐Aboriginal’.	
	
A	 somewhat	 similar	 problem	 plagues	 US	 separation/divorce	 assault	 research.	 For	 instance,	
Fleury,	Sullivan	and	Bybee	(2000),	as	well	as	Block	and	DeKeseredy	(2007),	included	categories	
like	 African	 American,	White,	 Asian,	 Hispanic/Latina,	 in	 their	 interview	 schedules.	 Of	 course,	
almost	every	US	study	of	any	type	of	crime	or	other	social	problem	takes	the	same	approach.	It	
is	 subject	 to	 much	 criticism	 because	 these	 and	 other	 ‘pan‐ethnic	 categories’	 are	 treated	 as	
homogenous	groups	but	in	reality	include	‘diverse	subpopulations	that	have	very	distinct	ethnic,	
religious,	 historical,	 philosophical	 and	 social	 values	 that	 may	 have	 important	 roles	 in	 the	
dynamics	 of’	 violence	 against	women	 (Perilla	 et	 al.	 2011:	 205).	Needless	 to	 say,	 not	 all	 Black	
people	 are	 the	 same	 and	 there	 are	 differences	 in	 rates	 of	 violence	 among	African‐Americans,	
African‐Caribbeans,	 and	 Africans.	 As	 well,	 there	 are	 variations	 in	 rates	 of	 violence	 among	
different	Aboriginal	groups	(Aldarondo	and	Castro‐Fernandex	2011;	Aldarondo	and	Fernandex	
2008;	DeKeseredy,	Dragiewicz	and	Rennsion	2012).	As	far	as	we	know,	the	National	Alcohol	and	
Family	 Violence	 Survey	 is	 the	 only	 major	 US	 survey	 specifically	 designed	 to	 overcome	 or	
minimize	these	 limitations	and	hopefully	other	 large‐scale	studies	will	 follow	suit	(Aldarondo,	
Kaufman	Kantor	and	Jasinski	2002;	Kaufman	Kantor,	Jasinski	and	Aldarondo	1994).		
	
Additionally,	the	plight	of	immigrant	and	refugee	women	warrants	better	empirical	scrutiny	in	
US	 studies.	 These	 women	 are	 often	 classified	 as	 ‘White’	 in	 large	 surveys,	 obscuring	 issues	
related	to	ethnicity	and	immigration	status.	Related	to	these	pitfall	is	that	some	common	types	
of	 abuse	 directed	 at	 immigrant	 and	 refugee	 women,	 such	 as	 using	 immigration	 status	 as	 a	
method	of	coercive	control,	are	not	measured	in	mainstream	surveys	or	by	widely	used	violence	
measures	such	as	Straus,	Hamby,	Boney‐McCoy,	and	Sugarman’s	(1996)	revised	Conflict	Tactics	
Scale	(CTS)	(Dutton,	Orloff	and	Hass,	2000;	Perilla	et	al.	2011).	Likewise,	national	studies	may	
hide	 important	 local	 factors	 determining	 separation/divorce	 assault	 victimization	 rates,	
pointing	to	the	need	for	community‐specific	studies	(DeKeseredy	et	al.	2012).	
	
Obviously,	too,	it	is	vital	to	always	avoid	stereotyping	or	constructing	perpetrators	of	any	type	
of	 violence	 against	 ethnic/minority	 women	 as	 ‘Others’.	 As	 Aronson	 Fontes	 and	 McCloskey	
(2011:	152)	remind	us,	‘there	are	few	forms	of	violence	that	belong	exclusively	to	any	particular	
culture’.	 Many	 would	 agree	 with	 DeKeseredy	 et	 al.’s	 (2012)	 assertion	 that	 the	 ubiquity	 of	
patriarchy	is	more	important	in	shaping	woman	abuse	than	are	location	and	race/ethnicity.	
	
Conclusion	
Noted	earlier	was	the	fact	that,	in	this	current	era,	members	of	the	international	woman	abuse	
research	 community	 are	 fully	 aware	 that	 separated/divorced	women	 are	 at	 very	 high	 risk	 of	
being	killed,	beaten,	raped,	subjected	to	coercive	control,	and	hurt	by	a	myriad	of	other	brutal	
behaviors.	Nevertheless,	there	is	still	much	we	do	not	know	about	dangerous	exits.	For	example,	
there	are	still	no	conclusive,	empirically	informed	answers	to	this	question	raised	by	Fleury	et	
al.	(2000:	1381):	‘Why	do	some	batterers	leave	their	ex‐partners	alone,	whereas	others	do	not?’.	
To	be	sure,	there	are	many	other	questions	that	demand	answers	and	readers	could	add	more	
suggestions	to	our	list	of	recommendations	for	new	empirical	and	theoretical	directions	in	the	
field.	Such	contributions	would	be	well	received	because	the	only	way	to	 improve	the	current	
state	 of	 social	 scientific	 knowledge	 about	 separation/divorce	 assault	 is	 to	 use	 ‘a	 creative	
combination	of	measures	and	methods’	(Jacquier	et	al.	2011:	43).		
	
No	 matter	 what	 research	 techniques,	 research	 sites,	 or	 samples	 are	 selected,	 it	 is	 equally	
important	 to	 develop	 and	 tests	 theories	 of	 separation/divorce	 assault	 because	 theoretical	
developments	have	not	kept	pace	with	the	burgeoning	empirical	literature.	On	top	of	being	tools	
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that	help	researchers	make	sense	of	data,	 theories	of	separation/divorce	assault	are	practical.	
They	 can	 help	 inform	 the	 development	 of	 effective	 policies	 that	 prevent	 departures	 from	
intimate	relationships	from	becoming	dangerous	exits	(Block	and	DeKeseredy	2007).		
	
Above	 all,	 when	 doing	 any	 type	 of	 social	 scientific	 work	 on	 separation/divorce	 assault,	
researchers	 should	 always	 remember	 that	 exiting	 an	 intimate	 relationship	 demands	 an	
incredible	 amount	of	energy	and	 resolve,	but	 leaving	an	abusive	partner	 requires	much	more	
strength	and	bravery	 (Walker,	Logan,	 Jordan	and	Campbell	2004).	 It	 is	 also	vital	 to	 recognize	
that	 the	 people	 who	 are	 or	 who	 have	 been	 abused	 are	 more	 important	 than	 the	 data	 they	
provide.	 Since	 separation/divorce	 is	 a	 very	 dangerous	 time	 for	 many	 women,	 researchers	
should	always	consider	the	potential	dangers	associated	with	their	projects	and	strive	to	gather,	
analyze,	and	disseminate	their	findings	in	a	sensitive,	ethical,	and	responsible	manner.		
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 Paper	presented	at	the	2nd	Crime,	 Justice	and	Social	Democracy	Conference,	Brisbane,	Australia,	 July	2013.	We	
would	like	to	thank	Joanne	Belknap,	Kerry	Carrington,	Molly	Dragiewicz,	Katie	Edwards,	Shana	Maier,	Claire	M.	
Renzetti,	and	Jaun	Tauri	for	their	assistance.	
2		 Back	to	the	Future	is	a	Hollywood	science	fiction/comedy	movie	about	a	teenager	(played	by	Michael	J.	Fox)	who	
is	accidentally	sent	back	in	time	from	1985	to	1955.		
3		 See	 DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 (2011)	 for	 an	 in‐depth	 review	 of	 narrow,	 broad,	 gender‐neutral,	 and	 gender‐
specific	definitions.	
4		 See	DeKeseredy	(in	press),	DeKeseredy,	Rogness,	and	Schwartz	(2004),	and	DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	(2009)	for	
reviews	of	these	studies.	
5		 Emotional	 exiting	 is	 a	woman’s	 denial	 or	 restriction	 of	 sexual	 relations	 and	 other	 intimate	 exchanges	 (Ellis	 &	
DeKeseredy,	 1997).	Emotionally	 exiting	 a	 relationship	 can	be	 just	 as	 dangerous	 as	physically	 or	 legally	 exiting	
because	it,	too,	increases	the	likelihood	of	male	violence	and	sexual	abuse	(Block	&	DeKeseredy,	2007).		
6		 However,	some	researchers	have	gathered	data	on	the	stalking	of	ex‐girlfriends	(e.g.,	Davis,	Ace,	&	Andra,	2000;	
Edwards	&	Gidycz,	in	press;	Fisher,	Daigle,	&	Cullen	2010,	Williams	&	Frieze,	2005),	but	not	in	the	broader	context	
of	examining	separation	assault.	
7		 See	 Basile	 and	 Black	 (2011)	 and	 DeKeseredy	 (2011)	 for	 reviews	 of	 the	 North	 American	 literature	 on	woman	
abuse	in	dating	relationships.	
8		 The	rates	of	violence	in	same‐sex	relationships	are	similar	to	those	in	heterosexual	ones	(Basile	&	Black,	2011;	
Brown	&	Groscup,	2009).	
9		 It	appears	that	Block	and	DeKeseredy	(2007)	are	the	only	ones	thus	far	to	conduct	a	separation/divorce	assault	
study	 that	 reports	data	on	harms	done	 to	heterosexual	women	and	 to	women	 trying	 to	 leave	or	who	have	 left	
same	sex	relationships.	
10		 See	Johnson	(1996)	for	more	information	on	the	VAWS	methods	and	the	data	gleaned	by	them.	
11		 See	DeKeseredy	(1995),	DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	(1998),	Schwartz	(2000),	and	Smith	(1987,	1994)	for	reviews	
of	research	supporting	this	claim.	
12		 Smith	defined	prevalence	as	the	percentage	of	women	who	reported	ever	having	been	physically	abused.	
13		 This	is	a	modified	version	of	one	of	Smith’s	(1987)	supplementary	questions.	
14		 For	example,	see	Jacquier	et	al.	(2011). 
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Abstract	
In	2010	a	couple	 in	Cairns	were	charged,	and	 later	 found	not	guilty,	of	 illegally	obtaining	a	
medical	 abortion	 through	 the	 use	 of	 medication	 imported	 from	 overseas.	 The	 court	 case	
reignited	the	contentious	debate	surrounding	the	illegality	and	social	acceptance	of	abortion	
in	 Queensland,	 Australia.	 Based	 on	 a	 critical	 discourse	 analysis	 of	 150	 online	 news	media	
articles	 covering	 the	 Cairns	 trial,	 this	 paper	 argues	 that	 the	 media	 shapes	 perceptions	 of	
deviance	 and	 stigma	 in	 relation	 to	 abortion	 through	 the	 use	 of	 language.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	
Cairns	couple	were	positioned	as	deviant	for	pursuing	abortion	on	the	basis	that	they	were	
rejecting	 the	social	norm	of	motherhood.	This	paper	 identifies	 three	key	 themes	evident	 in	
the	 articles	 analysed	 which	 contribute	 to	 shaping	 the	 construction	 of	 deviance	 –	 the	
humanising	of	 the	 foetus,	 the	stereotyping	of	 the	traditional	 female	role	of	mother,	and	the	
demonising	 of	 women	 who	 choose	 abortion.	 This	 paper	 argues	 that	 the	 use	 of	 specific	
language	 in	 media	 coverage	 of	 abortion	 has	 the	 power	 to	 disrespect	 and	 invalidate	 the	
experiences,	rights,	and	health	of	women	who	choose	to	terminate	pregnancies.		
	
	
Introduction	
On	20	March	2009,	Cairns	Police	searched	the	North	Queensland	property	of	19‐year‐old	Tegan	
Simone	 Leach	 and	 her	 partner,	 21‐year‐old,	 Sergie	 Brennan.	 As	 part	 of	 an	 ongoing	 murder	
investigation,	 police	were	 routinely	 searching	houses	 in	 the	 area	 for	witnesses	 or	 informants	
(Betts	2009:	25).	During	the	search,	police	found	empty	blister	packets	and	instructions	written	
in	 Ukrainian.	 The	 blister	 packets	 were	 of	 Mifepristone	 (commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 RU486),	
Misoprostol	and	painkillers.	During	a	police	interview	with	Leach	and	Brennan,	Leach	revealed	
that	the	drugs	were	used	to	induce	a	miscarriage,	and	indicated	to	police	that	she	believed	there	
to	be	no	medical	reason	to	undergo	an	abortion	in	order	to	preserve	her	life	(Schwarten	2009).	
Subsequently,	Leach	and	Brennan	were	charged	under	the	Queensland	anti‐abortion	 laws	and	
on	11	September	2009	they	were	committed	to	stand	trial	(Barry	2009;	Schwarten	2009).	There	
was	some	speculation	at	the	time	that	the	couple	had	obtained	the	drugs	illegally,	however	they	
were	 never	 charged	 for	 illegally	 procuring	 medication	 to	 induce	 a	 miscarriage.	 Rather,	 they	
were	charged	for	having	an	abortion.	Leach	was	charged	under	Section	2251	and	her	partner,	
Brennan,	was	charged	under	Section	2262	of	the	Criminal	Code	Act	1899	(QLD)	under	Chapter	
22:	Offences	against	morality	and	state.	
	
More	than	a	year	after	 the	couple	were	charged,	 following	intense	media	attention	and	a	high	
profile	trial	lasting	three	days,	it	took	a	jury	less	than	one	hour	to	find	the	couple	not	guilty	of	
both	 charges	 on	 14	 October	 2010.	 While	 the	 couple	 were	 both	 acquitted,	 the	 court	 case	
reignited	the	contentious	debate	surrounding	the	illegality	and	social	acceptance	of	abortion	in	
Queensland.	Public	outrage	over	the	case	increased	pressure	on	the	Queensland	Government	to	
decriminalise	 abortion.	 Sections	 225	 and	 226	 have	 not	 been	 repealed	 or	 reformed	 since	 the	
acquittal	of	Leach	and	Brennan.	However,	eight	days	prior	to	the	date	when	Leach	and	Brennan	
were	due	to	stand	trial,	the	Queensland	Government	rushed	through	an	amendment	to	Section	
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2823	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code,	 giving	 doctors	 the	 same	 legal	 protection	 to	 carry	 out	 medical	
abortions	 as	 was	 already	 available	 for	 surgical	 procedures	 (Betts	 2009:	 26).	 The	 defence	
available	under	section	for	doctors	performing	surgery	was	reformed	during	the	trial	to	extend	
to	administering	medical	treatment.	However,	even	if	the	abortion	is	performed	and	the	doctor	
has	protection	under	section	282,	the	woman	is	still	at	risk	of	being	prosecuted.	
	
The	Cairns	abortion	case	not	only	raises	questions	about	abortion	law	in	Queensland,	but	also	
about	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	media	 depicts	 and	 discusses	 abortion	 and	 those	who	 choose	 to	
abort.	 The	 couple	 involved	 in	 the	 Cairns	 case	 were	 faced	with	 significant	 attention	 from	 the	
media,	 as	well	 as	 being	 pursued	 by	 the	 police	 and	 the	 legal	 system.	 In	 addition	 to	 numerous	
media	articles	condemning	their	actions,	the	media	published	Leach	and	Brennan’s	names	and	
addresses.	They	were	 forced	 to	move	house,	 and	pay	 for	 security	 and	a	 guard	dog	after	 their	
house	was	‘hit	by	a	Molotov	cocktail’	and	their	car	was	vandalised	(Viva	Hyde	2009).	Brennan	
said	of	the	firebomb,	‘Everyone	in	Australia	knew	who	we	were,	and	where	we	lived’	(Viva	Hyde	
2009).	Despite	their	acquittal	of	the	charges	against	them,	they	were	still	victimised.	This	paper	
explores	how	media	discourses	 socially	construct	and	 label	 those	who	abort,	arguing	 that	 the	
use	 of	 language	 and	 key	 terms	 in	media	 coverage	 during	 the	 Cairns	 Trial	 demonstrates	 that	
those	who	abort	are	frequently	stigmatised	as	deviant.	Firstly	the	importance	of	 language	and	
labelling	 in	 media	 coverage	 of	 social	 issues	 is	 discussed,	 followed	 by	 an	 examination	 of	 key	
terms	and	phrases	consistently	used	in	the	media	representation.	It	is	argued	that	the	choice	of	
terms	such	as	‘baby’	and	‘mother’	align	more	closely	with	a	pro‐life	ideology,	and	results	in	the	
condemnation	 of	 women	 for	 allegedly	 rejecting	 the	 motherhood	 role	 by	 committing	 violent	
crimes	against	their	unborn	children.	
	
Language	and	Labelling	in	the	Media	Coverage	of	Abortion	
Language,	 including	 conversation	 and	 textual	 practises,	 has	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 constructing	
social	 meaning	 and	 political	 identities,	 as	 they	 are	 shaped	 and	 reshaped	 through	 power	
struggles	(Torfin	2011:	192‐197).	The	social	construction	of	women	who	choose	to	abort	is	thus	
strongly	 influenced	 by	media	 discourses	 in	 which	 the	 choice	 of	 some	 terms	 over	 others	 can	
depict	this	action	as	justifiable	or	condemned,	as	normal	or	deviant.	
	
Much	of	the	existing	literature	on	abortion	in	Australia	focuses	on	the	current	state	of	abortion	
law	in	Australia	(de	Crispigny	and	Savulescu	2004;	Petersen	2005;	Pesce	2006;	de	Costa	et	al.	
2007;	 Betts	 2009;	 Douglas	 2009)	 and	 the	 debate	 between	 pro‐life	 and	 pro‐choice	 beliefs	
(Coleman	1988;	Singer	1993;	Dean	and	Allanson	2004;	Brown	2004;	Wyatt	and	Hughes	2009).	
The	overarching	conclusion	of	the	literature	is	that	the	variations	in	abortion	law	state	to	state	
create	 confusion	 and	 uncertainty,	 and	 that	 both	 policy	 and	media	 representations	 have	 been	
heavily	influenced	by	a	pro‐life	ideology.	A	notable	gap	in	the	existing	literature	on	abortion	is	
the	relation	to	deviance	from	a	labelling	perspective.	While	abortion	has	been	linked	to	deviance	
(Rosen	 and	 Martindale	 1980),	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 deviance	 has	 been	 framed	 within	 a	
feminist	 context	 rather	 than	 an	 implementation	 of	 labelling	 theory.	 This	 project	 attempts	 to	
address	this	gap	in	the	literature.	
		
This	paper	is	drawn	from	research	analysing	150	articles	concerning	the	Cairns	abortion	case	in	
order	 to	 determine	 how	 choices	 of	 language	 and	 terminology	 can	 contribute	 to	 these	
constructions.	The	articles	examined	cover	a	time	period	commencing	with	the	first	reporting	of	
the	committal	hearing	on	2	September	2009	up	to	30	November	2010	(the	 ‘not	guilty’	verdict	
was	related	on	the	15th	October	2010).	The	‘media’	is	represented	in	this	project	by	online	news	
material	only.	This	choice	was	not	a	reflection	on	the	lack	of	importance	of	television	and	print	
media	 in	 framing	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	 abortion.	 Instead,	 it	 was	 a	 reflection	 of	 two	 key	
points.	Firstly,	mainstream	news	articles	available	in	papers	are	also	being	published	online	and	
the	greater	 availability	of	online	news	websites	has	 increased	online	 sources	becoming	 ‘more	
influential	sources	of	news	and	entertainment’	(Department	of	Broadband	Communications	and	
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the	 Digital	 Economy	 2011:	 13).	 Secondly,	 the	 online	 archiving	 of	 news	 available	 in	 papers	
creates	 longevity	 of	 news	 sources	 which	 made	 the	 data	 set	 preferable	 as	 the	 study	 was	
conducted	over	two	years.	This	data	set	was	therefore	the	most	relevant	and	accessible	for	this	
project.	
	
The	 150	 articles	 were	 located	 with	 key	 terms	 in	 internet	 search	 engines	 as	 well	 as	 online	
databases	with	all	duplications	being	removed.	The	majority	of	the	articles	(99	of	the	150	total	
of	 articles)	 were	 published	 by	 the	 Cairns	 Post,	 Australian	 Associated	 Press,	 Sydney	Morning	
Herald,	 ABC	 Online	 and	 The	 Australian.	 Qualitative	 content	 analysis	 was	 primarily	 used	 to	
analyse	the	data.	A	qualitative	approach	best	aligned	with	this	project	because	the	examination	
of	 texts	 for	analysis	enabled	a	critique	of	 the	 linguistic	choices	and	how	they	carry	 ideological	
meaning	(Fairclough	1995:	25).	This	preliminary	content	analysis	identified	key	words	in	order	
to	 demonstrate	 what	 language	 was	 being	 communicated	 to	 the	 reader.	 The	 content	 analysis	
involved	counting	of	key	terms	including	abort/ion,	miscarriage,	procedure,	baby,	fetus/foetus4,	
unborn,	and	mother.	The	 findings	of	 this	content	analysis	were	 then	 interpreted	using	critical	
discourse	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 discover	 patterns	 and	 meanings	 reflecting	 or	 reinforcing	
hierarchies	 of	 power,	 injustice,	 and	 political	 or	 social	 change	 (Champion	 2006;	 Keating	 and	
Duranti	 2011).	 This	 project	 interpreted	 the	 communication	 using	 critical	 discourse	 analysis	
informed	by	deviance	 theory	 focusing	 on	how	 the	 language	 stigmatised	 abortion	 and	 created	
conceptions	of	deviance.	The	method	of	critical	discourse	analysis	was	therefore	used	to	analyse	
how	 the	media	 constructs	 and	 produces	 ideologies,	 contexts	 and	 power	 relations	 which	 can	
stigmatise	abortion	and	construct	it	as	deviant.	
	
Guardians	of	the	Unborn	Child	
Throughout	 the	media	coverage	of	 the	Cairns	 trial,	 articles	 frequently	used	 the	 terms	 ‘foetus’,	
‘baby’,	 ‘child’,	or	 ‘unborn’	 in	discussing	abortion.	 In	the	construction	of	women	who	abort,	 the	
impact	 and	 importance	 of	 these	 terms	 differs	 greatly	 as	 they	 connote	 competing	 social	
responses	 to	 the	 decision	 to	 terminate	 a	 pregnancy.	 The	 word	 ‘foetus’	 appeared	 45	 times	
throughout	the	150	articles.	Meanwhile	the	more	emotive	terms	‘baby’	and	‘child’	appeared	45	
times	and	91	 times	 respectively	 throughout	 the	150	articles.	The	use	of	 the	words	 ‘baby’	and	
‘child’	are	more	likely	to	humanise	the	foetus	and	are	often	used	to	present	a	pro‐life	message,	
where	abortion	is	not	a	clinical	term	to	describe	the	termination	of	a	pregnancy,	but	rather	the	
killing	 of	 a	 baby/child	 (Singer	 1993;	 Carey	 and	 Newell	 2007).	 The	 taking	 of	 a	 human	 life	 is	
considered	 murder,	 which	 has	 been	 enacted	 into	 Australian	 law	 as	 a	 serious	 crime.	
Consequently,	by	choosing	the	words	‘baby’	and	‘child’	over	‘foetus’,	the	foetus	is	humanised	and	
therefore	this	message	of	abortion	as	child	murder	is	made	clearer	to	the	reader.	It	also	has	the	
power	to	 ‘trigger	or	compound	anxiety,	distress	or	shame’	for	those	women	who	do	not	share	
this	 relationship	with	 the	 foetus	 (Allanson	2008:	 24).	 The	 use	 of	 the	words	 ‘baby’	 and	 ‘child’	
over	‘foetus’	serves	to	amplify	the	stigma	surrounding	abortion	contributing	to	the	construction	
of	deviance.	
	
An	 example	 of	 how	 this	 negative	 construction	 is	 achieved	 is	 by	 associating	 the	 foetus	 with	
‘unborn’.	 ‘Unborn’	 appeared	26	 times	 in	 the	150	articles.	 The	phrase	 ‘unborn	 child’	 appeared	
seven	times,	with	‘unborn	baby’	appearing	six	times	and	‘unborn	infant’	appearing	two	times	in	
the	total	150	articles.	An	article	which	provides	a	clear	example	of	humanising	the	foetus	is	from	
The	Catholic	Leader	website	titled	‘We	are	the	guardians	of	the	unborn’s	silent	innocence’	on	17	
October	 2010.	 One	 excerpt	 states	 ‘The	 existing	 Queensland	 law	 on	 abortion	 maintains	 a	
consistent	message	to	adults	that	intentional	violence	against	their	offspring	is	never	justified,	
whether	 before	 or	 after	 birth’	 (Van	 Gend	 2010).	 The	 use	 of	 the	 phrase	 ‘intentional	 violence	
against	their	offspring’	presents	two	key	elements	of	a	pro‐life	message.	Firstly,	the	reference	to	
‘offspring’	 elevates	 the	 foetus	 to	 the	 equivalent	 status	 of	 a	 child,	 establishing	 the	 humanising	
elements	consistent	with	the	choice	of	the	word	‘baby’	in	much	of	the	media	coverage.	Secondly,	
the	 words	 ‘intentional	 violence’	 labels	 the	 woman	 procuring	 the	 abortion	 as	 violent	 and	
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murderous.	Other	media	 stories	 also	positioned	women	who	abort	as	 guilty	of	violent	 crimes	
against	unborn	children.	The	Salt	Shakers,	a	Christian	pro‐life	action	group,	published	an	article	
which	critiqued	 the	 judge’s	 instructions	 that	a	not	guilty	verdict	would	 require	proof	 that	 the	
drugs	ingested	by	Tegan	Leach	were	not	noxious	and	caused	no	ill	effect	to	Tegan.	The	article	
proclaimed,	‘What	about	the	baby	–	it	certainly	suffered	an	“ill	effect”!’	(Salt	Shakers	2010).	By	
referring	to	the	foetus	as	a	baby	and	referring	to	the	damaging	effect	of	abortion	on	the	foetus,	
the	language	is	constructing	this	image	of	murder	and	therefore	stigmatising	those	who	choose	
abortion	 as	 murderers.	 This	 criminalises	 abortion	 and	 serves	 to	 further	 the	 construction	 of	
those	who	obtain	an	abortion	as	deviants.	
	
While	 these	 two	 examples	 are	 from	 declared	 Christian	 news	 sites,	 and	 therefore	 predictably	
select	 emotive	 language	 to	 invoke	 a	 pro‐life	 message,	 several	 examples	 can	 be	 found	 from	
mainstream	news	media	sites.	One	article	from	The	Australian	on	the	15th	October	2010	quotes	
‘the	jury	must	be	satisfied	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	the	drugs	Ms	Leach	took	were	noxious	
to	 her	 health,	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 health	 of	 her	 unborn	 child’	 (Elks	 2010).	 In	 this	 sentence,	
‘unborn	child’	could	have	been	substituted	with	‘foetus’.	Another	article	from	The	Australian	on	
the	16	October	referred	to	the	foetus	as	an	‘unborn	infant’	and	‘unborn	baby’	(Jane	2010).	This	
was	an	opinion	piece	where	the	author	wanted	to	argue	how	one	could	be	pro‐choice	and	not	
‘anti‐infant’.	 The	 article	 included	 ‘foetus’	 four	 times	 and	 ‘infant’/‘baby’/‘child’	 seven	 times.	
These	 two	 examples	 provide	 instances	 where	 journalistic	 choice	 could	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	
selective	term	of	‘foetus’	which	is	less	emotive	and	not	furthering	the	construction	of	abortion	as	
deviant.	
	
While	there	are	clear	instances	where	‘foetus’	could	be	substituted,	journalistic	choice	is	limited	
when	the	legislation	is	being	quoted.	Several	instances	where	‘child’	was	included	in	the	articles	
involved	quoting	Section	225	of	 the	Criminal	Code	Act	1899	 (QLD)	(for	example	Walker	2010;	
Petrinec	 2010;	 Ackland	 2009).	 The	 legislation	 refers	 to	 those	who	 are	 liable	 as	 ‘women	with	
child’	 and	 that	 the	 charge	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	woman	whether	 she	 ‘is	 or	 not	 is	 not	with	 child’.	
While	 an	 argument	 can	 be	 clearly	 made	 that	 the	 Queensland	 legislation	 criminalises	 women	
who	 abort,	 by	 including	 it	 in	 the	 legislation	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 said	 that	 the	
legislation	 further	 stigmatises	 those	who	abort	by	 referring	 to	 them	as	 ‘with	 child’.	 Arguably,	
each	 time	 the	 media	 refers	 to	 the	 legislation	 without	 paraphrasing	 it	 to	 select	 less	 emotive	
language,	 the	construction	of	abortion	as	deviant	 is	subsequently	amplified	whether	 it	 is	their	
intent	or	not.	
	
Rejecting	Motherhood	
The	 casting	 of	women	who	 abort	 as	 committing	 violent,	murderous	 acts	 against	 children	 not	
only	acts	to	humanise	the	foetus,	and	criminalise	women,	but	also	further	constructs	abortion	as	
a	 deviant	 act	 and	 as	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 traditional	 expectations	 of	motherhood.	 The	 language	
choice	of	many	of	the	media	articles	serves	to	embed	notions	of	femininity	as	intrinsically	linked	
to	 motherhood	 by	 persistently	 using	 the	 term	 ‘mother’	 instead	 of	 women	 when	 discussing	
abortion.	‘Mother’	is	referred	to	72	times	in	the	150	articles.	In	the	22	articles	by	a	single	source,	
the	Australian	Associated	Press	(which	are	published	on	multiple	news	sites),	‘mother’	appeared	
12	 times.	 It	 is	 not	 unusual,	 or	 unexpected,	 that	 declared	 pro‐life	 news	 sources	 such	 as	 Salt	
Shakers	or	The	Catholic	Leader	would	select	terms	such	as	‘baby’	and	‘mother’	in	their	coverage	
of	the	Cairns	abortion	case.	However,	these	terms	also	frequently	appeared	in	more	mainstream	
media	articles	both	in	the	reporting	of	events,	and	also	in	the	reporting	of	pro‐life	activism	and	
perspectives.	One	Australian	Associated	Press	 article	 reported	on	 the	 sign	of	 a	pro‐life	 activist	
that	read	‘Thank	your	mother	you	were	not	aborted’	(Martin	2010).	Referring	to	Tegan	Leach	in	
the	 articles	 as	 the	 mother	 humanises	 the	 foetus	 as	 a	 child	 waiting	 to	 be	 born.	 In	 this	
construction,	the	definition	of	a	mother	as	one	who	has	conceived	a	foetus,	rather	than	one	who	
has	 given	 birth,	 or	 one	 who	 is	 caring	 for	 a	 child,	 devalues	 the	 life	 of	 the	 woman,	 while	
simultaneously	elevating	their	value	as	a	mother,	a	value	which	is	lost	once	they	terminate	the	
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pregnancy.	In	this	perspective,	Tegan	Leach	not	only	lost	a	child,	but	also	the	opportunity	to	be	a	
mother.	 Rosen	 and	 Martindale	 (1980:	 103)	 argue	 that	 this	 ‘rejection	 of	 motherhood’	 is	
considered	to	be	a	deviation	from	the	traditional	role	of	womanhood	enabling	those	who	have	
abortions	to	be	socially	constructed	as	deviant.	
	
An	 article	 that	 furthered	 the	 stereotyping	 of	 the	 traditional	 female	 role	 of	 motherhood	 was	
published	 by	 Cherish	 Life	 in	 October	 2010	 titled	 ‘Cairns	 abortion	 case	 restates	 principle	 of	
justice	 –	 a	 deterrent	 to	 unjustifiable	 abortion’.	When	 describing	 the	 Cairns	 couple,	 they	 state	
‘These	were	consenting	adults	who	conceived	a	child	and	then	allegedly	ended	the	life	of	their	
child	because,	as	they	told	the	media,	they	were	not	“ready”	for	that	child’.	They	then	continue	
saying	‘Consenting	adults	who	conceive	a	child	have	a	duty	of	care	to	their	child	from	which	they	
cannot	walk	away’	(Cherish	Life	Queensland	2010).	This	excerpt	provides	an	example	where	the	
woman	choosing	to	have	an	abortion	is	critiqued	for	her	choices	and	stigmatised	for	neglecting	
their	 ‘duty	of	care	to	their	child’.	This	 language	 that	a	pregnant	woman	has	a	 ‘duty	of	care’	 to	
continue	with	pregnancy	assists	in	perpetuating	the	stereotype	of	the	traditional	role	of	women	
as	mothers	who	protect	their	young.	Kumar	et	al.	(2009:	628)	explain	that	while	definitions	of	
womanhood	and	therefore	the	traditional	role	of	women	in	society	is	varied	across	cultures,	‘a	
woman	who	seeks	an	abortion	is	inadvertently	challenging	widely‐held	assumptions	about	the	
“essential	nature”	of	women’.	The	decision	to	use	the	term	 ‘mother’,	 rather	than	 ‘woman’,	and	
the	 references	 to	 a	 woman’s	 duty	 of	 care	 constructs	 abortion	 and	 those	 who	 obtain	 one	 as	
deviants	challenging	the	traditional	role	of	womanhood	by	rejecting	motherhood.	
	
Wounded	Identity	
The	 use	 of	 language	 that	 demonises	 and	 isolates	women	who	 obtain	 an	 abortion	 can	 further	
position	 those	who	 abort	 as	 ‘spoiled’	 or	 ‘harmed’	 and	 therefore	 deviant	 from	 the	 norm.	 In	 a	
Brisbane	Times	article	published	on	the	14	October	2010,	the	Cherish	Life	Queensland	President	
Teresa	Martin	was	quoted	as	 stating	 ‘We	don't	believe	 that	abortion	ever	helps	a	 situation,	 it	
does	harm,	it	harms	physically,	mentally,	spiritually	and	emotionally’	(Trenwith	2010).	Another	
example	is	from	Van	Gend,	in	his	article	published	by	The	Catholic	Leader	on	17	October	2010,	
who	describes	women	having	an	abortion	as	‘good‐hearted	women	whose	inner	lives	have	been	
wounded	by	abortion	–	having	created	a	place	of	death	in	their	body’.	This	language	stigmatises	
the	procedure	of	abortion	as	leaving	women	‘wounded’	with	their	body	now	‘a	place	of	death’	
which	 causes	 harm	 ‘physically,	mentally,	 spiritually	 and	 emotionally’.	 This	 language	positions	
these	as	the	consequences	facing	women	who	have	an	abortion.	
	
The	 impact	 of	 this	 negative	 talk	 describing	 the	 body	 of	 a	 woman	 having	 an	 abortion	 as	
‘wounded’	and	a	‘place	of	death’	is	consistent	with	Engeln‐Maddox	et	al.’s	(2012)	discussion	of	
‘negative	body	talk’	in	which	women	talk	about	their	own	bodies	by	making	comparisons	with	
fellow	women.	Engeln‐Maddox	et	al.	argue	that	this	negative	body	talk	has	become	a	social	norm	
amongst	women	reflecting	and	perpetuating	‘body	disturbance’	in	women.	This	construction	of	
women	as	‘injured’,	‘wounded’,	or	‘fallen’	as	a	result	of	certain	experiences	is	consistent	with	the	
ways	 in	which	women’s	 bodies	 have	 been	 governed	over	 the	 centuries.	 For	 example,	women	
who	engage	in	sex	work	are	often	positioned	as	‘wounded’,	or	‘fallen’,	for	rejecting	expectations	
of	 femininity	 that	 protect	 sexual	 activity	 as	 something	 that	 should	 occur	 only	 in	 committed,	
heterosexual	relationships	where	procreation	is	a	possibility	(Agustin	2007).	 In	a	similar	way,	
women	 who	 have	 chosen	 to	 abort	 are	 positioned	 as	 ‘wounded’,	 for	 acting	 outside	 the	
expectations	of	women	as	mothers.	In	this	instance,	the	decision	to	procure	an	abortion	is	not	
only	a	rejection	of	motherhood,	but	also	a	rejection	of	sexual	activity	primarily	for	the	purposes	
of	 procreation.	 These	 actions	 challenge	 traditional	 conceptualisations	 of	 femininity,	 and	 also	
challenge	the	primacy	of	the	state	in	the	governing	of	women’s	bodies.	
	
The	 Queensland	 abortion	 law	 itself	 positions	 women	 who	 choose	 to	 abort	 as	 deviant,	 by	
demanding	 that	 this	 decision	be	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of,	 essentially,	 life	 and	death.	 As	 noted	
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previously,	the	current	 legal	situation	places	abortion	as	 legal	to	carry	out	by	doctors	through	
surgery	 or	 medical	 treatment	 if	 it	 is	 to	 preserve	 the	 mother’s	 life	 (Betts	 2009:	 26).	 The	
pregnancy	can	therefore	only	be	 terminated	 if	a	medical	professional	can	be	satisfied	 that	 the	
life	of	the	mother	is	threatened	by	an	ongoing	pregnancy.	This	positions	women	who	choose	to	
abort	for	other	reasons	as	‘selfish’	and	criminally	deviant.	This	constructs	Tegan	Leach’s	choice	
to	abort	as	a	further	rejection	of	femininity	where	women	are	expected	to	become	mothers	that	
protect	their	child	at	all	costs.	This	depicts	women	who	choose	to	abort	for	reasons	outside	of	
life	 and	 death	 as	 rejecting	 the	norm	of	motherhood	 and	 femininity.	Kumar	 et	 al.	 (2009:	 629)	
states	 over‐simplifying	 abortion	 and	 not	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 complex	 circumstances	
possibly	surrounding	the	decision	to	abort,	assists	in	creating	‘a	category	of	“women	who	abort”	
as	deviant	from	the	norm’.	By	creating	this	concept	that	abortion	is	a	deviation	from	the	norm	of	
motherhood	 for	women,	 the	 label	of	 those	who	abort	as	spoiled	 is	applied	contributing	 to	 the	
construction	of	abortion	as	deviant.	
	
Conclusion		
The	Cairns	abortion	case	sparked	a	flurry	of	debate	in	Queensland	over	abortion	law.	Changes	
made	to	the	 legislation	were	minor,	granting	women	no	greater	control	over	termination	than	
they	had	before,	while	 the	media	 coverage	of	 the	Cairns	 case	demonstrated	 that	women	who	
choose	to	abort	are	largely	stigmatised	for	their	choices.	The	choice	of	key	terms	such	as	‘baby’	
and	 ‘child’	 versus	 ‘foetus’,	 and	 ‘mother’	 versus	 ‘woman’	 imply	 certain	 expectations	 about	 the	
acceptability	of	women’s	decisions.	In	this	paper	we	have	argued	that	the	use	of	the	terms	‘baby’	
and	‘child’	humanises	the	foetus,	invoking	a	greater	judgement	over	women’s	decisions	to	end	a	
pregnancy.	This	is	clearest	in	articles	by	pro‐life	organisations,	which	talk	about	the	violence	of	
women	against	their	unborn	children,	but	is	also	perpetuated	by	mainstream	media	through	the	
selection	 of	 the	 terms	 baby,	 child	 and	mother.	 Elevating	 the	 foetus	 to	 the	 status	 of	 baby	 and	
child	also	instantly	applies	the	label	of	mother	to	pregnant	women.	A	decision	to	reject	this	role	
by	pursuing	a	termination	is	constructed	as	a	rejection	of	the	ultimate	role	that	women	should	
play,	resulting	in	a	wounded	body	and	a	spoiled	identity	for	women	who	abort.		
	
This	 analysis	 of	 the	 media	 portrayal	 of	 the	 Cairns	 trial	 clearly	 demonstrates	 how	 media	
discourses	 contribute	 to	 the	 stigmatisation	 and	 social	 construction	 of	 abortion	 as	 deviant.	 If	
women	 are	 to	 be	 empowered,	 rather	 than	 criminalised,	 media	 representations	 must	 refrain	
from	applying	damaging	labels	which	judge	women	and	condemn	their	choices.		
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 Section	225:	Any	woman	who,	with	 intent	 to	procure	her	own	miscarriage,	whether	she	 is	or	 is	not	with	child,	
unlawfully	administers	 to	herself	any	poison	or	other	noxious	 thing,	or	uses	any	 force	of	any	kind,	or	uses	any	
other	means	whatever,	or	permits	any	such	thing	or	means	to	be	administered	or	used	to	her,	is	guilty	of	a	crime	
and	is	liable	to	imprisonment	for	7	years.	
2		 Section	226:	 Supplying	drugs	or	 instruments	 to	procure	 an	 abortionAny	person	who	unlawfully	 supplies	 to	or	
procures	 for	 any	 person	 anything	whatever,	 knowing	 that	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 unlawfully	 used	 to	 procure	 the	
miscarriage	 of	 a	 woman,	 whether	 she	 is	 or	 is	 not	 with	 child,	 is	 guilty	 of	 a	 misdemeanour,	 and	 is	 liable	 to	
imprisonment	for	3	years.	
3		 Surgical	abortions	are	carried	out	in	Queensland	each	year	under	common	law	precedent	set	in	the	1986	case	of	R	
v	Bayliss.	Under	section	282	of	the	Criminal	Code	Act	1899	(QLD),	which	was	used	as	a	defence	in	R	v	Bayliss	and	
accepted	 by	 the	 Justice	McGuire	 who	was	 the	 presiding	 judge,	 “a	 surgical	 operation	 upon	 any	 person	 for	 the	
patient’s	benefit,	or	upon	an	unborn	child	for	the	preservation	of	the	mother’s	life”	is	legal	(Betts	2009,	26).	While	
this	created	a	situation	where	women	were	able	to	go	to	a	private	clinic	for	an	abortion,	it	created	ambiguity	with	
medical	abortion	as	section	282	only	refers	to	a	surgical	operation,	leading	to	a	reform	allowing	doctors	to	carry	
out	medical	abortions	 through	the	prescription	of	drugs.	Section	282	of	 the	Criminal	Code	Act	1899	 (QLD)	 falls	
under	Chapter	27:	Duties	relating	to	the	preservation	of	human	life	and	now	states:	
	 282:	 Surgical	 operations	 and	 medical	 treatment(1)	 A	 person	 is	 not	 criminally	 responsible	 for	 performing	 or	
providing,	in	good	faith	and	with	reasonable	care	and	skill,	a	surgical	operation	on	or	medical	treatment	of—	
	 (a)	a	person	or	an	unborn	child	for	the	patient’s	benefit;	or	
	 (b)	a	person	or	an	unborn	child	to	preserve	the	mother’s	life;		
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	 if	performing	the	operation	or	providing	the	medical	treatment	is	reasonable,	having	regard	to	the	patient’s	state	
at	the	time	and	to	all	the	circumstances	of	the	case.	
4		 The	 spelling	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 ‘foetus’	 as	 most	 media	 articles	 reporting	 on	 the	 Cairns	 abortion	 trial	 used	 this	
spelling.	 The	 Oxford	 Dictionary	 online	 definition	 of	 fetus/foetus	 is	 “an	 unborn	 or	 unhatched	 offspring	 of	 a	
mammal,	in	particular,	an	unborn	human	more	than	eight	weeks	after	conception”	(2013).	In	the	context	of	the	
media	 articles	 analysed,	 when	 foetus	 was	 used,	 it	 was	 assumed	 to	 broadly	 refer	 to	 an	 ‘unborn	 human’	 from	
conception	to	birth.	
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Abstract	
Covert	 recordings,	 from	hidden	 listening	devices	 and	other	 sources,	 feature	 as	 evidence	 in	
increasing	numbers	of	 criminal	 cases.	Due	 the	manner	of	 their	 recording,	 they	are	often	of	
extremely	poor	quality,	so	much	so	that	only	those	with	background	knowledge	of	the	case	
can	make	out	what	is	said.	Current	law	allows	police,	in	the	role	of	so‐called	‘ad	hoc	expert’,	to	
provide	 their	own	transcripts	of	such	material.	As	protection	against	 inaccurate	 transcripts	
misleading	juries,	the	judge	is	required	to	caution	that	the	transcript	should	be	used	only	as	
an	aid,	and	the	jury	should	come	to	their	own	opinion	as	to	what	is	said	in	the	recording.	But	
is	this	caution	a	sufficient	safeguard?		
	
This	 paper	 outlines	 two	 experiments	 using	 hard‐to‐hear	 audio	 from	 a	 recent	murder	 trial,	
along	with	 an	 inaccurate	 police	 transcript	 that	 formed	 crucial	 evidence	 in	 the	 prosecution	
case.	 The	 results	 add	 weight	 to	 previous	 arguments	 that	 a	 caution	 from	 the	 judge	 is	
insufficient	 to	 prevent	 juries	 being	 ‘primed’	 to	 hear	 words	 suggested	 by	 an	 inaccurate	
transcript.	 Transcripts	 must	 be	 properly	 verified	 before	 they	 are	 presented	 to	 a	 jury.	
However,	 these	 experiments	 go	 further,	 demonstrating	 that,	 in	 this	 particular	 case,	 the	
inaccuracy	 of	 the	police	 transcript	 is	 readily	 apparent	 to	 people	who	are	 enabled	 to	 listen	
carefully	 to	 the	 audio.	 This	 raises	 the	 significant	 question:	 why	 did	 no	 one,	 from	 either	
prosecution	or	defence,	challenge	this	manifestly	 inaccurate	police	transcript?	The	answers	
point	to	serious	failings	in	our	legal	system’s	handling	of	hard‐to‐hear	covert	recordings	used	
as	 evidence	 in	 criminal	 cases.	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 lawyers	 take	 a	more	 critical	 attitude	 to	
police	 transcripts	 than	 is	 currently	 common.	 This	 paper	 aims	 to	 provide	 background	
knowledge	to	help	them	do	so.	
	
	
Introduction	
The	 1980s	 saw	 mounting	 concern	 about	 courts	 accepting	 –	 with	 no	 more	 evidence	 than	 a	
detective’s	 say‐so	 –	 that	 a	 suspect	 had	 given	 a	 ‘verbal	 confession’	 (Wood	 1997).	 Widely	
publicised	 reforms	 in	 the	 1990s	 prevented	 this	 kind	 of	 ‘verballing’,	 by	 requiring	 assertions	
about	 what	 a	 suspect	 may	 or	 may	 not	 have	 said	 to	 police	 to	 be	 backed	 up	 by	 an	 electronic	
recording	 (Dixon	2008).	What	 is	 less	well	 known	 is	 that	 the	 same	era	brought	other	 changes	
with	 the	unintended	effect	of	 creating	a	new	path	by	which	police	can	put	words	 in	suspects’	
mouths	–	without	even	 intending	 to	do	 so.	The	context	was	 increasing	use	of	 covert	 listening	
devices.	These	can	provide	very	useful	evidence.	Unfortunately,	however,	 the	audio	 is	often	of	
extremely	 poor	 quality,	 to	 the	 extent	 background	knowledge	 of	 the	 case	 is	 need	 to	make	out	
what	 is	said.	For	 this	reason,	current	 law	allows	police,	 in	 the	role	of	so‐called	 ‘ad	hoc	expert’	
(Edmond	and	San	Roque	2009),	to	provide	their	own	transcripts	of	covert	recordings	obtained	
in	their	investigations.		
	
Of	course,	it	was	never	the	intention	of	the	legal	system	that	police	should	be	allowed	simply	to	
assert	that	a	barely	audible	recording	contains	words	only	they	can	hear.	To	guard	against	this,	
the	 jury	 is	required	to	receive	a	caution	from	the	 judge	that	the	police	transcript	 is	only	as	an	
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aid;	their	decision	as	to	what	is	actually	said	in	the	recording	should	be	based	on	what	they	hear	
with	their	own	ears	(Wood	2012).	However,	well	established	findings	of	phonetic	science	(see	
Fraser	2003)	suggest	this	caution	is	unlikely	to	be	effective.	This	is	backed	up	by	experimental	
findings	 (Fraser,	 Stevenson,	 and	 Marks	 2011)	 showing	 how	 easily	 juries,	 fully	 believing	
themselves	to	be	obeying	the	judge’s	caution,	might	still	be	heavily	influenced	by	an	inaccurate	
transcript.	
	
The	 present	 paper	 puts	 the	 focus,	 not	 on	 the	 jury,	 but	 on	 the	 lawyers	who	 allow	misleading	
and/or	inaccurate	police	transcripts	to	be	accepted	as	reliable	accounts	of	what	was	said.	Based	
on	 experiments	 using	 a	 covert	 recording	 from	 a	 real	 murder	 case,	 it	 demonstrates	 how	 an	
inaccurate	transcript	can	affect	the	perception	of	poor	quality	audio	by	everyone	involved	in	a	
case.		
	
The	research		
The	case	concerned	a	father,	son	and	grandfather	from	a	single	family.	One	night	the	son	visited	
the	grandfather,	drank	some	beer	with	him,	and	then	shot	him.	The	grandfather	died	the	next	
day.	 After	 several	 weeks,	 police	 arrested	 the	 son,	 who	 eventually	 confessed	 to	 the	 murder,	
claiming	the	grandfather	had	repeatedly	humiliated	and	abused	him.	A	few	days	later,	the	father	
was	arrested.	A	conversation	between	father	and	son,	recorded	by	a	covert	listening	device,	was	
alleged	 by	 police	 to	 include	 a	 confession	 showing	 the	 father	 had	 been	 an	 accomplice	 in	 the	
murder.	The	half‐hour	recording	was	of	extremely	poor	quality,	but	was	nevertheless	admitted	
unopposed	 as	 evidence	 –	 along	with	 a	 police	 transcript,	 presented	 to	 the	 jury	with	 a	 caution	
from	the	 judge	–	and	played	an	 important	role	 in	convicting	the	father,	now	serving	a	 lengthy	
sentence.		
	
No	phonetics	expert	was	consulted	at	the	time	by	either	prosecution	or	defence.	However,	the	
audio	and	transcript	were	later	provided	to	the	present	author,	an	expert	in	phonetics	with	long	
experience	in	forensic	transcription,	who	found	the	transcript	to	be	inaccurate,	incomplete	and	
misleading	 in	a	number	of	ways.	A	small	section	of	 the	audio	and	transcript	were	used	as	 the	
basis	 of	 two	 experiments.	 In	 the	 first,	 participants	 heard	 the	 audio	 without	 background	
knowledge	 of	 the	 case,	 while	 in	 the	 second,	 context	 was	 provided	 before	 the	 audio	 was	
presented.		
	
The	 experiments	 used	 an	 online	 survey	 tool	 (Qualtrics)	 enabling	 participants	 to	 listen	 to	 the	
audio	 repeatedly,	 and	 indicate	what	 they	heard	under	various	conditions.	Here	 there	 is	 space	
only	for	a	summary,	the	main	aim	being	to	use	this	case	as	an	example	to	publicise	common	but	
little‐known	issues	likely	to	be	of	concern	to	many	in	the	criminal	justice	field.	
	
Experiment	1	
Experiment	1	aimed	to	explore	how	people	would	react	to	the	audio	and	the	transcripts	if	they	
knew	nothing	about	the	case.	
	
Participants	
Participants	were	recruited	via	personal	and	academic	email	lists,	and	comprised	a	wide	cross‐
section	 of	 demographic	 characteristics.	 Experiment	 1	 had	 56	 participants,	 randomly	 divided	
into	two	statistically	similar	groups,	of	30	and	26.		
	
Materials	
Audio	
The	audio	was	a	14‐second	excerpt	from	the	half‐hour	covert	recording	described	above.	Like	
the	entire	recording,	the	excerpt	–	chosen	for	its	crucial	role	in	the	trial	–	 is	of	extremely	poor	
quality.	Voices	can	be	made	out,	in	which	the	father	appears	to	speak	five	separate	phrases	in	a	
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whispered,	urgent	 tone,	and	 the	 son	responds	several	 times	with	 ‘mm’,	but	 few	words	can	be	
heard	 with	 any	 confidence.	 The	 material	 would	 likely	 have	 been	 evaluated	 by	 a	 phonetics	
expert,	 if	 called,	 as	 ‘untranscribable’;	 i.e.	 while	 interpretations	might	 be	 offered	 none	 can	 be	
verified	 with	 sufficient	 confidence	 for	 use	 as	 evidence	 in	 a	 trial	 (see	 Fraser,	 Stevenson,	 and	
Marks	2011).		
	
Transcripts	
The	 experiment	 also	 used	 the	 relevant	 section	 of	 the	police	 transcript,	which	 interpreted	 the	
five	phrases	as	shown	as	Transcript	1	(Table	1).	
	
Table1:	Transcript	1	
Phrase	 Interpretation	
1.	 I'm	not	saying	you're	going	in	...	fucking	...	you	know
2.	 just	in	case	mate	
3.	 at	the	start	we	made	a	pact	(the	pact phrase,	or	PACT)
4.	 in	it	till	the	end	
5.	 you	know	what	I	mean
	
This	transcript	can	readily	be	demonstrated	by	a	phonetics	expert	to	be	unreliable.	While	a	few	
words	can	be	given	some	limited	credence	(notably	Phrase	5,	You	know	what	I	mean),	none	can	
be	verified	with	 full	confidence,	and	some	(notably	Phrase	3	At	 the	start	we	made	a	pact),	are	
clearly	contradicted	by	the	acoustics.	
	
The	 experiment	 also	 used	 an	 alternative	 interpretation	 of	 the	 audio,	 shown	 as	 Transcript	 2	
(Table	2).	This	differs	from	Transcript	1	only	in	Phrase	3.	It	is	important	in	understanding	the	
results	 of	 the	 experiments	 to	 be	 clear	 that	 this	 transcript	 is	 not	 suggested	 as	 an	 accurate	
interpretation	 of	 Phrase	 3.	 In	 fact,	 it	 was	 intentionally	 made	 up	 for	 these	 experiments	 as	 a	
plausible	but	inaccurate	distractor.	
	
Table	2:	Transcript	2	
Phrase	 Interpretation	
1.	 I'm	not	saying	you're	going	in	...	fucking	...	you	know
2.	 just	in	case	mate	
3.	 it’s	fucking	payback	(the	payback phrase,	or	PAYBACK)
4.	 in	it	till	the	end	
5.	 you	know	what	I	mean
	
Method	
Experiment	1	started	by	presenting	 the	audio	 to	both	groups	with	no	 information	beyond	the	
fact	it	was	a	covert	recording	from	a	real	murder	trial,	and	asking	participants	what	they	heard.	
It	 then	provided	 a	 suggested	 transcript,	 asking	participants	 to	 listen	 again	 and	 state	whether	
they	agreed	with	each	phrase	of	the	transcript,	and	if	they	did	not,	what	they	heard.	Finally,	 it	
provided	an	alternative	transcript,	drawing	participants’	attention	to	the	fact	the	only	difference	
was	in	Phrase	3,	and	again	asked	whether	they	agreed	with	each	phrase,	and	if	not,	what	they	
now	heard.	Group	1	saw	Transcript	1	first,	as	their	suggested	transcript,	and	then	Transcript	2,	
as	their	alternative	transcript.	Group	2	saw	Transcript	2	first,	then	Transcript	1	(Table	3).	
	
Table	3:	Method	of	Experiment	1	
Group	1	 Group	2	
Open	condition	(no	transcript)	 Open	condition	(no	transcript)	
Transcript	1	(with	PACT	phrase)	 Transcript	2	(with	PAYBACK	phrase)
Transcript	2	(PAYBACK	phrase)	 Transcript	1	(with	PACT	phrase)
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Results	(Experiment	1)	
The	non‐crucial	phrases	
It	is	useful	to	consider	first	the	non‐crucial	phrases	(1,	2,	4	and	5),	recalling	that	both	groups	had	
the	same	experience	of	these	phrases,	which	were	each	presented	once	in	open	condition	(with	
no	 transcript),	 then	 twice	 with	 transcripts	 differing	 only	 in	 Phrase	 3.	 Chart	 1	 presents	 the	
percentage	of	participants	who	agreed	with	each	phrase	of	the	transcript	in	open	condition,	and	
upon	first	and	second	presentation	of	the	transcript.	Phrase	5,	You	know	what	I	mean,	was	heard	
by	 about	 one‐third	 of	 participants	 in	 open	 condition,	 and	 by	 nearly	 three‐quarters	 with	 the	
transcript.	 Phrases	 1,	 2	 and	 4	 were	 heard	 by	 no	 one	 in	 open	 condition,	 but	 as	 soon	 as	 the	
transcript	was	presented,	around	half	the	participants	claimed	to	hear	the	words	suggested	for	
each	phrase.	The	 latter	 is	a	 typical	 ‘priming’	effect	 for	hard‐to‐hear	audio	(Fraser	2003).	With	
priming,	 by	 a	 transcript	 or	 context,	material	 that	 seems	 uninterpretable	 on	 its	 own	 suddenly	
becomes	 ‘clear’	when	a	 transcript	seems	to	 ‘aid’	perception.	 It	provides	a	useful	baseline	with	
which	to	compare	results	for	the	crucial	phrase,	shown	in	Chart	1,	and	discussed	below.	
	
		
Chart	1:	How	many	participants	heard	Phrases	1,	2,	4	and	5	exactly	as	in	Transcript	1.	Results	for	
Phrase	3,	shown	with	solid	and	dashed	horizontal	lines,	are	far	lower	(see	text).	
	
The	crucial	phrase	(3)	
Participants’	interpretations	of	the	crucial	phrase	(3)	were	categorised	as	in	Table	4.	
	
Table	4:	Categorisation	of	participants’	interpretations	of	Phrase	3.	
PACT	 The	exact	‘pact’	phrase
PACT	SIM	 Something	similar	to	the	‘pact’	phrase
Any	phrase	including	the	word	‘pact’,	or	a	similar‐sounding	word	such	as	‘pack’	or	
‘fact’	
PAYBACK	 The	exact	‘payback’	phrase
PAYBACK	SIM	 Something	similar	to	the	‘payback’	phrase
Some	examples:	it’s	fucked	you	made	it	back,	it’s	nothing	…	layin’	back,	it’s	fucking	
payback	time,	it’s	stuck	play	back,	it’s	stuck/dark	…	pay	you	back	
OTHER	 Something	different	from	either	PACT	or	PAYBACK
Some	examples:	it’s	that	plain	bag	there,	it’s	fucked	bloody	bad,	it’s	not	reliable,	it’s	
back,	try	your	best,	it’s	about	the	main	advantage,	it’s	back	I	begged,	yeah	yeah	it’s	
fine	
NOTHING	 No	words	could	be	made	out
	
0%
53% 53%
0
47%
59%
0
43%
50%
33%
71% 72%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Open 1st	suggestion 2nd	suggestion
Condition
Phrase	1
Phrase	2
Phrase	4
Phrase	5
Hard‐to‐hear	Covert	Recordings	used	as	Evidence	in	Criminal	Cases:	Have	We	Brought	Back	Police	‘Verballing’?	
Open	condition	
Chart	2	 shows	how	many	participants	offered	 interpretations	of	Phrase	3	 in	 each	 category	 in	
open	 condition.	 Note	 that	 nearly	 half	 heard	 something	 quite	 unlike	 either	 PACT	 or	 PAYBACK	
(with	a	wide	range	of	interpretations	offered),	while	13%	were	unable	to	decipher	any	words	at	
all.	The	‘pact’	phrase	was	offered	by	0	participants,	and	no	similar	suggestion	was	made	by	any	
participant	(PACT	SIM	=	0).	PAYBACK	was	offered	by	2	participants	(4%),	with	similar	phrases	
(PAYBACK	SIM)	suggested	by	39%.		
	
	
Chart	 2:	 How	 participants	 interpreted	 Phrase	 3	 in	 ‘open’	 condition,	 with	 no	 context	 and	 no	
transcript	
	
Agree	to	suggestion	and	alternative	
Having	 interpreted	 the	 audio	 in	 open	 condition,	 participants	 were	 shown	 their	 group’s	
suggested	and	alternative	transcripts	(which	differed	only	in	the	crucial	Phrase	3).	In	Group	1,	
who	received	PACT	first,	27%	agreed	with	that	interpretation,	while	in	Group	2,	who	received	
PAYBACK	 first,	35%	agreed	with	 their	 transcript.	As	shown	 in	Chart	1,	both	PACT	(solid	 line)	
and	 PAYBACK	 (dashed	 line)	 were	 far	 less	 plausible	 interpretations	 than	 any	 of	 the	 other	
phrases.	
	
Participants’	 reaction	 to	 their	alternative	 transcripts	confirmed	 the	 implausibility	of	 the	PACT	
interpretation.	Group	1,	having	 seen	 the	PACT	suggestion,	preferred	 the	PAYBACK	alternative	
when	it	was	presented	(43%	compared	to	27%).	However,	Group	2,	having	seen	the	PAYBACK	
suggestion,	was	 less	 impressed	with	 the	PACT	 alternative	 (21%	 compared	 to	 35%).	Whether	
presented	first	or	second,	PACT	is	a	significantly	less	plausible	interpretation	of	this	audio	than	
PAYBACK.	
	
Disagree	with	suggestion	and	alternative	
Participants	 who	 disagreed	 with	 the	 transcripts	 were	 invited	 to	 provide	 their	 own	
interpretation	 in	 a	 comments	 box.	 These	 interpretations	were	 coded	 as	 described	 in	 Table	 4.	
Chart	 3	 shows	 that	 all	 27%	of	Group	1	who	 initially	 agreed	 to	 the	 PACT	phrase	when	 it	was	
suggested,	abandoned	that	interpretation	when	the	PAYBACK	phrase	was	suggested,	with	57%	
offering	 the	 PAYBACK	 phrase	 or	 something	 similar	 (PAYBACK	 SIM),	 and	 none	 suggesting	
anything	 similar	 to	 the	PACT	phrase.	 For	Group	2,	 50%	of	 participants	 initially	 either	 agreed	
with	 the	 PAYBACK	 suggestion	 (35%),	 or	 provided	 a	 similar	 interpretation	 (PAYBACK	 SIM	 =	
15%).	No	one	who	disagreed	with	PAYBACK	provided	PACT.	When	this	group	was	shown	the	
‘pact’	 phrase	 in	 their	 alternative	 transcript,	 79%	disagreed	with	 it.	 Of	 these,	 only	 one	 person	
offered	a	similar	phrase	(it’s	like	?	we	made	a	pack),	while	25%	offered	the	PAYBACK	phrase	or	
something	similar	(PAYBACK	SIM).		
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Chart	 3:	 How	 many	 participants	 in	 each	 group,	 who	 disagreed	 with	 suggested	 or	 alternative	
transcript,	offered	an	interpretation	similar	to	PACT	or	PAYBACK?	
	
Discussion	(Experiment	1)	
The	 key	 observation	 from	 Experiment	 1	 is	 that	 PACT	 is	 not	 only	 an	 inaccurate	 but	 also	 an	
implausible	 transcription	 of	 Phrase	 3.	 No	 one	 ever	 heard	 the	 ‘pact’	 phrase	without	 it	 having	
been	 explicitly	 suggested.	 Its	 priming	 effect	 is	 also	 remarkably	 low	 and	 non‐persistent,	 with	
even	 those	 few	 who	 initially	 accepted	 it,	 readily	 abandoning	 it	 when	 an	 alternative	 was	
suggested.	The	relatively	high	acceptance	of	PAYBACK	and	PAYBACK	SIM	in	all	conditions	(even	
in	the	 face	of	priming	with	PACT)	 indicates	 this	 is	a	more	plausible	 interpretation	than	PACT.	
That	 is	 not	 an	 indication	 that	 PAYBACK	 is	 an	 accurate	 transcription	 (it	 is	 not),	 but	 does	 add	
weight	to	the	extreme	implausibility	of	PACT.		
	
In	 short,	 Experiment	 1	 shows	 the	 police	 transcript	 of	 Phrase	 3	 is	 so	 implausible	 that	 just	
listening	to	the	relevant	portion,	is	enough	to	demonstrate	its	inaccuracy	to	most	listeners.	This	
raises	 the	 serious	 question	 of	why	 the	manifest	 unreliability	 of	 the	 police	 transcript	was	 not	
picked	 up	 by	 either	 prosecution	 (who	 have	 the	 duty	 of	 fairness	 in	 relation	 to	 evidence)	 or	
defence	 (who	 have	 the	 duty	 of	 protecting	 the	 accused	 person	 from	 false	 allegations).	 Some	
answers	are	suggested	by	the	results	of	Experiment	2,	which	is	a	closer	approximation	to	how	
hard‐to‐hear	covert	recordings	are	experienced	in	real	legal	cases.	
	
Experiment	2		
Experiment	 2	 had	 43	 (different)	 participants,	 in	 one	 group.	 They	were	 recruited	 in	 a	 similar	
manner,	 and	 were	 similarly	 diverse	 in	 demographic	 characteristics,	 to	 Experiment	 1	
participants,	 and	 the	 same	audio	 and	 transcripts	were	used,	 in	 a	 broadly	 similar	 survey‐style	
method.	 The	 main	 difference	 was	 that,	 where	 Experiment	 1	 presented	 the	 audio	 ‘cold’,	
Experiment	2	participants	were	heavily	primed	with	a	story	similar	to	the	one	given	in	the	case	
description	above,	but	with	the	following	additional	information.		
	
Police	allege	this	conversation	refers	to	a	pact	made	before	the	murder,	in	which	the	
son	agreed	to	kill	the	grandfather	at	a	time	the	father	had	a	clear	alibi,	and	the	father	
agreed	to	share	the	proceeds	of	the	grandfather’s	will	with	him.	If	arrested,	the	son	
was	to	claim	provocation,	and	serve	a	short	sentence,	getting	his	share	of	the	money	
when	he	was	released.	Existence	of	such	a	pact	of	course	would	make	the	father	an	
accomplice	to	murder,	at	least	as	guilty	as	the	son	who	pulled	the	trigger.	However,	
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the	father	denies	the	allegation,	and	claims	the	conversation	shows	him	encouraging	
his	 son	 to	 turn	himself	 in	 to	police,	 and	making	 a	pact	 to	 stand	by	him	no	matter	
what.	 The	 listening	 device	 recording	 is	 crucial	 evidence	 in	 deciding	which	 side	 is	
telling	 the	 truth.	 This	 experiment	 asks	 for	 your	 opinion	 as	 to	what	 kind	 of	 pact	 is	
discussed	in	the	recording.		
	
Having	read	this	story,	participants	were	asked	for	a	preliminary	opinion	as	to	the	father’s	guilt,	
and	then	further	primed	with	the	following	contextual	information	about	the	recording.		
	
The	full	conversation	is	half	an	hour	in	duration.	Here	you	hear	just	the	14	seconds	
in	which	 the	 father	 discusses	 the	 pact.	 The	 recording	 is	 of	 very	 poor	 quality.	 You	
might	 not	 hear	 anything	 much	 except	 the	 word	 PACT,	 but	 try	 to	 make	 out	 the	
sentences	 in	which	 the	word	appears,	as	 these	contain	evidence	as	 to	whether	 the	
father	is	guilty	or	innocent.		
	
Next,	participants	were	enabled	to	listen	to	the	audio,	with	no	transcript,	and	asked	what	they	
heard.	They	were	 then	shown	Transcript	1	and	asked	whether	 they	agreed	with	each	phrase,	
and,	if	not,	what	they	heard	instead.	Next,	they	were	told	that	a	phonetics	expert	had	indicated	
Transcript	 1	 was	 inaccurate,	 invited	 to	 listen	 to	 just	 the	 crucial	 phrase	 (2.5	 seconds),	 in	
isolation,	and	(with	no	alternative	 transcript)	asked	 to	 indicate	what	 they	now	heard.	Finally,	
they	 were	 offered	 Transcript	 2	 as	 an	 alternative,	 with	 the	 (untrue)	 indication	 that	 it	 was	
endorsed	by	phonetics	experts,	and	again	asked	to	state	whether	they	agreed	with	each	phrase,	
and,	if	not,	to	say	what	they	heard.	At	the	very	end,	they	were	asked	to	re‐rate	their	impression	
of	the	father’s	guilt.	
	
Results	(Experiment	2)	
Effect	of	each	condition	on	interpretation	of	Phrase	3	
As	 shown	 in	 Chart	 4,	 even	 with	 the	 very	 heavy	 contextual	 priming	 of	 Experiment	 2,	 no‐one	
heard	 the	 exact	 phrase	 alleged	 by	 police	 (PACT)	 before	 seeing	 the	 transcript.	 However,	 37%	
claimed	to	hear	a	different	phrase	including	the	word	‘pact’	(PACT	SIM).	(It	will	be	recalled	that	
the	audio	contains	no	acoustic	evidence	to	support	perception	of	this	word.)		
	
	
Chart	 4:	 How	 many	 heard	 the	 crucial	 phrase	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 transcript	 under	 each	
condition	
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When	Transcript	1	was	provided,	65%	claimed	 to	hear	 exactly	 the	PACT	phrase	 (recall	 again	
that	 the	 acoustics	 contradict	 this	 interpretation).	 A	 further	 9%	 claimed	 to	 hear	 a	 different	
phrase	 including	 the	 word	 ‘pact’	 (PACT	 SIM).	 When	 participants	 were	 invited	 to	 doubt	
Transcript	1,	and	listen	just	to	Phrase	3	in	isolation,	the	number	hearing	either	PACT	or	PACT	
SIM	 fell	 to	a	 total	of	47%	(from	74%).	When	a	 specific	alternative	 (PAYBACK)	was	 suggested,	
7%	 still	 confidently	 claimed	 to	 hear	 PACT,	 while	 a	 further	 12%	 heard	 a	 different	 phrase	
including	the	word	‘pact’	(PACT	SIM).	
	
Consider	now	 the	 results	 for	 the	 alternative	 interpretation	of	Phrase	3,	PAYBACK.	Before	any	
transcript	 was	 offered,	 a	 total	 of	 21%	 heard	 either	 PAYBACK	 or	 PAYBACK	 SIM,	 despite	 the	
heavy	 contextual	 priming	 for	 PACT.	 After	 PACT	 was	 suggested,	 support	 for	 PAYBACK	 or	
PAYBACK	SIM	fell	to	a	total	of	9%.	However,	when	doubt	was	cast	on	the	PACT	interpretation,	
PAYBACK	 or	 PAYBACK	 SIM	 reverted	 to	 19%.	 When	 Transcript	 2	 was	 shown,	 the	 number	
claiming	to	hear	PAYBACK	or	PAYBACK	SIM	rose	to	33%,	with	several	participants	commenting	
‘This	is	what	I	heard	all	along’	(apparently	assuming	PAYBACK	to	be	an	accurate	interpretation	
of	this	audio,	which	it	is	not.)	
	
Effect	of	audio	on	opinions	about	guilt	
At	 the	 start	 of	 this	 experiment,	 and	 again	 at	 the	 end,	 participants	 were	 asked	 whether	 they	
thought	the	father	was	guilty.	At	first,	as	shown	in	Chart	5,	77%	said	they	had	no	opinion.	By	the	
end,	 only	 40%	 said	 they	 had	 no	 opinion,	with	 35%	 inclined	 to	 think	 he	was	 guilty	 and	 26%	
inclined	to	think	he	was	not	guilty	(and	various	reasons	offered	in	support	of	these	opinions).	In	
other	 words,	 listening	 to	 this	 audio	 (which	 is	 uninterpretable	 and	 thus	 incapable	 of	
demonstrating	guilt	or	innocence)	tended	to	give	participants	–	even	those	who	did	not	accept	
the	transcripts	–	an	opinion	as	to	whether	the	father	was	guilty.		
	
	
Chart	5:	Opinions	about	guilt.	
	
Discussion	(Experiment	2)	
Experiment	 2	 confirms	 the	 manifest	 implausibility	 of	 the	 inaccurate	 police	 transcript	 of	 the	
crucial	phrase	demonstrated	by	Experiment	1.	However,	 it	shows	that	knowing	 the	context	of	
the	 case	makes	 listeners	 highly	 susceptible	 to	 overlooking	 that	 inaccuracy	 and	 accepting	 the	
police	 interpretation	 of	 what	 was	 said.	 Chart	 6	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 contextual	 priming	
provided	 in	 Experiment	 2	 increased	 acceptance	 of	 the	 police	 transcript	 in	 comparison	 with	
Experiment	1,	in	which	participants	listened	with	no	background	‘story’.	
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Chart	6:	Comparison	of	percentage	of	participants	under	each	 condition	 in	Experiment	2	 (with	
contextual	priming)	vs.	Experiment	1	 (without	contextual	priming)	who	accepted	 that	Phrase	3	
included	the	word	‘pact’	(PACT	or	PACT	SIM).		
	
General	discussion	
Experiment	2	is	a	more	realistic	simulation	than	Experiment	1	of	the	experience	of	participants	
in	the	many	Australian	trials	that	feature	hard‐to‐hear	covert	recordings.	This	may	explain	how	
even	manifest	inaccuracy	of	police	transcripts	in	cases	like	this	so	often	goes	unnoticed.	
	
Long	before	they	hear	the	audio,	all	personnel,	 including	both	defence	and	prosecution	teams,	
are	 heavily	 primed,	 first	 by	 contextual	 knowledge	 of	 the	 case,	 then	 by	 the	 transcript.	 An	
important	 difference	 from	 Experiment	 2	 is	 that	 it	 is	 rare	 for	 any	 alternative	 to	 the	 police	
transcript	 to	 be	 suggested,	 leaving	 listeners	 in	 a	 situation	 like	 that	 of	 ‘Experiment	 2,	 PACT	
transcript’	(Chart	5),	where	three‐quarters	of	listeners	accepted	the	inaccurate	police	transcript.	
(It	may	be	worth	noting	 explicitly	 that	 simply	 having	 an	 alternative	 transcript	 is	 no	panacea.	
Here,	 though	 seeing	 an	 alternative	was	useful	 in	 reducing	 confidence	 in	 the	police	 transcript,	
many	 participants	 simply	 accepted	 the	 alternative,	 itself	 inaccurate,	 and	 many	 more	 were	
influenced	by	it.	Remarkably	few	gave	the	right	answer,	which,	in	this	case,	is	that	the	audio	is	
uninterpretable.	 Listeners	 lacking	 training	 in	 phonetic	 science	 are	 unable	 to	 make	 reliable	
judgments	on	transcripts	of	poor	quality	audio.)	
	
In	 fact,	 the	 position	 of	 lawyers	 is	 typically	 far	 worse	 than	 that	 of	 these	 participants.	 The	
experiment	presented	a	tiny	portion	excised	from	the	half‐hour	recording,	with	a	special	player	
enabling	 participants	 to	 focus	 on	 individual	 phrases,	 and	 a	 guided	 sequence	 of	 listening	
experiences.	 Such	 facilities,	 of	 course,	 are	 rarely	 available	 in	 legal	 cases.	 Without	 them,	 few	
untrained	 individuals	 can	 even	 locate	 relevant	 portions	 within	 a	 half‐hour	 recording	 of	 this	
quality.	 Even	 14	 seconds	 of	 such	 audio	 initially	 rushes	 past	 in	 an	 unpleasant,	 confusing	 blur,	
with,	at	best,	a	word	emerging	here	and	there	–	and,	as	we	know,	what	seems	to	‘emerge’	may	
be	a	poor	reflection	of	what	is	actually	there.	Listening	critically	takes	a	great	deal	of	time	and	
patience.	These	participants	spent	at	least	10	minutes	listening	to	the	14‐second	excerpt,	many	
far	longer.	At	that	rate,	checking	the	full	half	hour	recording	would	take	more	than	20	hours.		
	
It	 is	surely	understandable,	 then,	 if	 lawyers,	 lacking	appropriate	 facilities	and	 time	 for	 critical	
listening,	 simply	 accept	 the	 solution	 offered	 to	 them	 by	 the	 law	 itself,	 which	 says	 the	 police	
transcript,	the	result	of	many	hours	of	listening	by	a	so‐called	‘ad	hoc	expert’,	is	likely	accurate;	
and	if	it	is	not,	the	jury,	cautioned	by	the	judge	to	use	the	transcript	only	as	an	aid,	are	likely	to	
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find	that	out.	But	is	it	really	reasonable	to	expect	a	jury	to	be	better	able	to	critique	transcripts	
of	barely	audible	recordings	than	lawyers	are?		
	
Finally,	 even	 with	 the	 necessary	 facilities	 and	 time,	 careful	 listening	 results	 only	 in	 an	
interpretation	not	 the	correct	 interpretation.	 In	the	experiments,	many	participants	expressed	
confidence	in	their	own	interpretations	–	unaware	that	others	had	come	with	equal	confidence	
to	very	different	interpretations.	For	all	these	reasons	and	more,	evaluating	transcripts	of	hard‐
to‐hear	 audio	 requires	 specific,	 high‐level	 expertise	 in	 relevant	 branches	 of	 phonetic	 science.	
Leaving	this	task	to	the	jury	is	not	fair	to	juries,	let	alone	defendants.	
	
Conclusion	
Covert	 recordings	 and	 police	 transcripts	 are	 used	 as	 evidence	 in	 ever‐increasing	 numbers	 of	
criminal	 cases.	 The	 process	 by	which	 they	 are	 presented	 in	 court	 is	 deeply	 flawed,	 arguably	
more	so	than	the	earlier	system	which	allowed	traditional	‘verballing’.	The	power	of	priming	to	
make	even	a	radically	inaccurate	transcript	seem	believable	means	a	caution	from	the	judge	is	
insufficient	to	prevent	inaccurate	police	interpretations	of	barely	audible	recordings	misleading	
juries.	For	this	reason,	hard‐to‐hear	audio	and	associated	transcripts	should	be	fully	evaluated	
by	independent	analysts	with	genuine	expertise	in	relevant	branches	of	phonetics	before	being	
admitted	as	evidence	in	legal	cases	–	ideally	before	being	circulated	to	legal	teams.	Preventing	
this	 new	 form	 of	 ‘verballing’	 requires	 individuals	 at	 all	 levels	 and	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 our	
adversarial	 system	 to	 take	 a	 far	 more	 critical	 attitude	 to	 police	 transcripts	 than	 is	 currently	
common.	
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Abstract	
Queensland	 legislation	 currently	 defines	 two	 legally	 recognised	 forms	 of	 prostitution:	 sex	
work	conducted	 in	a	 licensed	brothel;	or,	 sex	work	conducted	privately	by	a	sole	operator.	
Despite	 prostitution’s	 legality	 in	 these	 contexts,	 it	 continues	 to	 be	 heavily	 controlled	 and	
restricted	 by	 authorities,	 while	 also	 being	 rejected	 by	 surrounding	 communities.	 Such	
resistance	towards	prostitution	is	demonstrated	in	Queensland	where	over	200	towns	with	
populations	 of	 less	 than	 25,000	 have	 been	 successful	 in	 applying	 for	 exemption	 from	 the	
development	 of	 licensed	 brothels	 in	 those	 jurisdictions	 (Prostitution	 Licensing	 Authority	
2012).	 Queensland’s	 legislative	 acknowledgement	 of	 prostitution	 as	 a	 legal	 act,	 while	
simultaneously	 allowing	 small	 communities	 to	 reject	 such	 activity,	 seems	 somewhat	
contradictory.	 This	 paper	 will	 provide	 a	 theoretical	 examination	 of	 common	 community	
objections	 to	 prostitution	 in	 modern	 society,	 determining	 whether	 such	 attitudes	 are	
applicable	to	communities	 in	rural	and	regional	Queensland	towns.	Additionally,	 this	paper	
will	 incorporate	 an	 analysis	 of	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas	 via	 the	 ‘gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft’	
dichotomy	 to	 understand	 the	 potential	 justification	 for	 opposing	 areas	 being	 subject	 to	
differential	treatment	under	the	law.		
	
	
Introduction	
Despite	an	existence	that	spans	across	numerous	cultures	and	centuries,	prostitution	continues	
to	 be	 socially	 and	 politically	 positioned	 as	 the	 pinnacle	 of	 immorality,	 deviance	 and	 risk	
(Weitzer	2009;	O’Neill	et	al.	2008;	Hubbard	and	Sanders	2003;	Saunders	and	Kirby	2011),	and	
as	 a	 consequence,	 legislative	 frameworks	 enforced	 by	 governments	 to	 address	 prostitution	
activity	 are	 often	 dominated	 by	 elements	 of	 formal	 control	 and	 regulation.	 Ultimately,	 such	
regulatory	 regimes	 aim	 to	 minimise	 the	 prevalence	 and	 negative	 impacts	 of	 a	 vice	 like	
prostitution,	whilst	 at	 the	 same	 time	protecting	 surrounding	 communities	where	prostitution	
occurs	 (Hubbard	 et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 is	 currently	 demonstrated	 in	 Queensland	 where	 the	
regulatory	 approach	 enforced	 through	 the	 legislation	 limits	 and	 contains	 prostitution	 to	
designated	 areas,	 partly	 based	 on	 community	 concerns	 and	 negative	 attitudes	 about	 such	
activity.	 Though	 two	 forms	 of	 legal	 prostitution	 are	 currently	 recognised	 in	 Queensland	 the	
legislation	 provides	 towns	 with	 populations	 of	 less	 than	 25,000	 with	 the	 right	 to	 apply	 for	
exemption	from	the	development	of	 legal	brothels,	thereby	prohibiting	such	establishments	in	
those	jurisdictions	(Prostitution	Act	1999:	s.155;	Sustainable	Planning	Act	2009:	sch1.5).		
	
Queensland’s	 legislative	acknowledgement	of	prostitution	as	a	 legal	act,	 simultaneously	aligns	
with	the	law’s	acceptance	of	small	communities	rejecting	or	disallowing	such	activity,	and	thus	
seems	somewhat	 contradictory.	This	paper	will	provide	a	 theoretical	examination	of	 common	
community	objections	to	prostitution	in	modern	society,	and	examine	the	legislation	in	terms	of	
its	 acceptance	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 prostitution	 is	 an	 act	 inherently	 associated	 with	 urban	 or	
gesellschaft	 activities,	 and	 in	 opposition	 to	 rural	 or	 gemeinschaft	 communities.	 A	 brief	
examination	 of	 current	mining	 practices	will	 also	 be	 conducted	 to	 identify	 how	gemeinschaft	
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communities	in	rural	Queensland	are	being	disrupted	by	the	influences	of	the	industry,	resulting	
in	the	increase	of	gesellschaft	practices	(such	as	prostitution)	in	those	areas.		
	
Queensland	Prostitution	Legislation	
The	foundation	of	Queensland’s	regulatory	framework	for	the	sex	industry	is	enforced	through	
the	 Prostitution	 Act	 (1999)	 which	 identifies	 legal	 and	 illegal	 forms	 of	 prostitution;	 lists	
requirements	and	provisions	for	such	activity;	and	provides	small	towns	with	the	right	to	apply	
for	exemption	from	brothel	development.	The	underlying	principles	of	the	legislation	aim	to:	
	
 Ensure	the	quality	of	life	for	local	communities;		
 Safeguard	against	corruption	and	organised	crime;	
 Address	social	factors	which	contribute	to	the	involvement	in	the	sex	industry;	
 Ensure	a	healthy	society;	and	
 Promote	safety	(Prostitution	Bill	Explanatory	Notes	1999:	1)	
	
When	 initially	 implemented,	 the	 Act	 provided	 provisions	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
Prostitution	 Licensing	 Authority,	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 strict	 licensing	 and	monitoring	 of	
legal	prostitution	 in	Queensland	(PLA	2012).	Currently,	 the	PLA	manages	and	decides	brothel	
licence	applications,	monitors	the	provision	of	prostitution	through	licensed	brothels,	receives	
complaints	 about	 prostitution	 from	 the	 community,	 liaises	 with	 the	 police	 service	 and	 other	
agencies	regarding	prostitution,	and	promotes	sexual	health	care	(Prostitution	Act	1999	s.101).		
	
The	PLA	(2012:	21‐2)	reported	that	as	of	June	2012,	there	were	a	total	of	24	licensed	brothels	
operating	 throughout	 Queensland,	with	 the	majority	 of	 establishments	 located	 in	 the	 greater	
Brisbane	 city	 region.	 The	PLA	 (2012:	 23)	 additionally	 reported	 that	 currently,	 there	 are	 over	
200	Queensland	towns	with	populations	of	 less	 than	25,000	that	are	considered	exempt	 from	
the	 development	 of	 legal	 brothels	 (PLA	2012:	 23).	 This	 presents	 an	 interesting	 juxtaposition.	
Though	diverse	community	reactions	and	opinions	of	various	social	vices	can	be	present	in	and	
amongst	 differing	 environments	 and	 populations,	 it	 seems	 apparent	 that	 negative	 attitudes	
towards	 prostitution	 in	 smaller,	 rural	 or	 regional	 towns	 are	 given	 more	weight	 than	 similar	
concerns	 in	 large	 regional	 and	 urban	 areas.	 Before	 examining	 potential	 explanations	 for	 the	
differential	treatment	of	rural,	regional	and	urban	areas	under	the	law,	it	is	important	to	gain	an	
understanding	of	the	reasons	why	communities	might	stand	in	opposition	to	prostitution.	
	
Prostitution	as	a	‘Problem’	
Negative	community	attitudes	towards	various	social	phenomena	often	centre	on	the	principle	
presumption	 that	 the	 activity	 in	 question	 is	 inherently	 bad	 or	 problematic.	 In	 regards	 to	
prostitution,	the	most	common	community	objections	to	such	activity	generally	relate	to	factors	
of	morality,	public	nuisance,	safety,	crime	and	health.		
	
Though	 there	 are	many	 configurations	 of	 sex	work	 (such	 as	male	 sex	work,	 transgender	 sex	
work,	or	 sex	work	between	only	 females),	prostitution	most	 commonly	 involves	 a	 female	 sex	
worker	 selling	 sex	 to	 a	 heterosexually	 identified	 man	 (Hubbard	 2012:	 60).	 This	 commercial	
exchange	 of	 sex	 is	 therefore	 often	 socially	 contested	 because	 it	 deviates	 from	 the	 socially	
acceptable	‘norm’	of	sex;	with	a	loving	partner	or	between	spouses	in	a	nuclear	family	(Agustin	
2005:	67).	Such	an	act	 is	additionally	portrayed	as	a	threat	to	the	 institution	of	marriage	as	 it	
breaks	 the	 link	between	sex,	 love	and	reproduction	(Weitzer	2010:	70).	Those	who	engage	 in	
prostitution	are	similarly	condemned	by	society	and	considered	morally	degenerate	as	a	result	
of	their	willingness	to	reduce	sex	to	a	simple	commercial	exchange	(O’Neill	et	al.	2008:	76;	Scott	
2011:	54).	However,	this	construction	of	deviance	is	largely	directed	toward	female	sex	workers	
rather	than	male	clients.	Males	are	often	assumed	to	have	a	‘biological	need	for	sex’	(Carpenter	
2000:	19);	therefore	their	engagement	in	such	activity	is	often	regarded	as	biologically	normal.		
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In	contrast	however,	the	practice	of	prostitution	highly	conflicts	with	the	constructed	ideals	of	
femininity,	which	are	described	as	representing	notions	of	purity	and	chastity	(Sanders,	O’Neill	
and	Pitcher	2009:	2).	Females	who	engage	in	prostitution	are	separated	from	those	females	who	
do	not,	and	are	positioned	as	being	an	abject	‘other’	in	society	(O’Neill	and	Campbell	2006:	39).	
They	are	considered	deviant	and	psychologically	damaged,	with	the	ability	to	corrupt	men	and	
‘good’	 women	 (Sullivan	 1997:	 100).	 Female	 sex	 workers	 are	 argued	 to	 symbolise	 an	
unacceptable	form	of	femininity	due	to	how	their	‘deviant	sexual	behaviour’	diminishes	overall	
levels	 of	 female	 ‘purity’	 (Sanders,	 O’Neill	 and	 Pitcher	 2009:	 2)	 and	 undermines	 the	 ‘family’	
character	 of	 the	 surrounding	 neighbourhood	 of	 where	 such	 behaviour	 occurs	 (O’Neill	 et	 al.	
2008:	 78).	 Through	 their	 positioning	 as	 the	 anti‐social	 ‘other’	 in	 society,	 sex	 workers	 are	
identified	 as	 engaging	 in	 behaviour	 that	 fails	 to	 positively	 contribute	 to	 surrounding	
communities	(O’Neill	and	Campbell	2006:	38;	O’Neill	et	al.	2008:	78).		
	
Aside	 from	 being	 perceived	 as	 an	 act	 of	 immorality,	 prostitution	 is	 also	 considered	 to	 have	
strong	association	with	other	social	problems.	The	proliferation	of	drugs,	violence,	disease	and	
corruption	in	society	are	frequently	considered	to	be	largely	influenced	by	the	mere	existence	of	
prostitution	(Scott	2011:	63;	Scoular	2004:	344;	Weitzer	2010:	71).	Additionally,	prostitution	is	
often	argued	to	be	form	of	sexual	exploitation	that	is	fuelling	global	human	trafficking	on	a	large	
scale	(Outshoorn	2005:	141;	Hubbard,	Matthews	and	Scoular	2008:	145;	Raymond	2004:	1157).	
Communities	 therefore	 commonly	 express	 concern	 about	 the	 level	 of	 potential	 risk	 that	 is	
created,	 not	 only	 for	 those	who	 engage	 in	 such	 activity,	 but	 also	 for	 individuals	 in	 the	wider	
community.	 Sex	workers	 are	 often	 portrayed	 as	 having	 a	 heightened	 risk	 of	 being	 subject	 to	
violence,	 abuse,	 homicide,	 sexual	 assault,	 robbery	 and	 sexually	 transmitted	 diseases	 (O’Neill	
2008:	 83;	 Hubbard	 and	 Prior	 2012:	 152;	 May	 and	 Hunter	 2006:	 178).	 Though	 community	
residents	can	be	vulnerable	to	similar	risks,	the	presence	of	prostitution	in	a	neighbourhood	is	
seen	to	expose	residents	to	a	number	of	negative	impacts	as	a	result	of	such	activity.		
	
Residents	 for	 example	 can	 often	 feel	 intimidated	 about	 leaving	 their	 homes	 for	 fear	 of	
witnessing	sexual	acts	being	conducted	in	public,	or	a	 fear	of	being	harassed	or	propositioned	
by	 clients	 and	 sex	 workers	 (O’Neill	 and	 Campbell	 2006:	 34;	 O’Neill	 et	 al.	 2008:	 76;	 Sanders,	
O’Neill	and	Pitcher	2009:	133;	Scoular	et	al.	2007:	12).	Residents	are	also	argued	to	be	at	risk	of	
coming	into	contact	with	hazardous	paraphernalia	in	public,	such	as	used	condoms	and	needles	
that	have	been	discarded	by	those	engaging	in	prostitution	(Sanders,	O’Neill	and	Pitcher	2009:	
132).	The	existence	of	prostitution	in	communities	is	additionally	argued	to	depreciate	property	
values,	impact	the	viability	of	businesses,	as	well	as	increase	the	traffic	and	noise	in	areas	where	
public	 solicitation	occurs	 (O’Neill	 et	al.	2008:	76;	Scoular	et	al.	2007:	12;	Sanders,	O’Neill	and	
Pitcher	 2009:	 132;	 Shdaimah	 et	 al.	 2012:	 9).	 Overall,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 prostitution	 negatively	
impacts	on	 the	quality	of	 life	 for	residents	 in	surrounding	communities	(Anderson	2002:	748;	
Scoular	et	al.	2007:	12;	Sanders,	O’Neill	and	Pitcher	2009:	132;	Shdaimah	et	al.	2012:	9;	O’Neill	
et	al.	2008:	78).		
	
The	 preceding	 summary	 of	 common	 community	 objections	 to	 prostitution	 identifies	 two	
important	 points.	 Firstly,	 the	majority	 of	 existing	 empirical	 research	 on	 community	 attitudes	
towards	 prostitution	 has	 been	 conducted	 in	 an	 urban	 context.	 Community	 objections	 to	
prostitution	 that	 have	 been	 identified	 within	 the	 literature	 therefore	 relate	 more	 closely	 to	
instances	of	sex	work	that	are	specific	to	urban	environments,	such	as	illegal	street	prostitution,	
While	there	is	the	assumption	that	these	negative	community	attitudes	can	be	applied	to	rural	
and	 regional	 communities,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 and	 empirical	 focus	 toward	
investigating	 objection	 to	 legal	 prostitution	 within	 those	 contexts.	 Work	 that	 has	 been	
conducted	on	prostitution	in	a	specifically	rural	context	is	limited	(see	Scott	et	al.	2006,	2008),	
and	reinforces	the	requirement	for	further	investigation	into	the	area.		
	
Secondly,	a	brief	summary	of	relevant	literature	clearly	identifies	that	objection	to	prostitution	
is	 indeed	 present	 in	many	 urban	 contexts.	 From	 these	 findings	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 such	
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attitudes	 towards	 prostitution	 are	 also	 likely	 prevalent	 in	 highly	 populated	 and	 urbanised	
locations	 throughout	Queensland.	Despite	 this,	 it	 is	 apparent	 through	 the	exemption	 rule	 that	
Queensland	legislation	is	more	accommodating	to	the	attitudes	of	those	communities	in	smaller	
rural	or	regional	areas.	In	order	to	understand	the	potential	justification	or	explanation	for	the	
differential	 treatment	 of	 locations	 under	 Queensland’s	 prostitution	 law,	 an	 overview	 of	
traditional	conceptualisations	of	rural	and	urban	areas	is	required.		
	
Rural	(gemeinschaft)	vs.	Urban	(gesellschaft)	
Rural	 and	 urban	 areas	 are	 considered	 characteristically	 different	 (Bouffard	 and	Muftic	 2006:	
57)	and	are	often	compared	through	Ferdinand	Tönnies’	 ‘gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft’	dichotomy	
(Christenson	 1984:	 160;	 Kamenka	 1965:	 3;	 Donnermeyer	 2007:	 15).	 Tönnies’	 dichotomy	
represents	two	opposing	models	of	society:	an	organic,	homogenous	collective	practicing	shared	
values,	 moral	 obligations	 and	 natural	 wills	 (gemeinschaft),	 in	 opposition	 to	 a	 superficial	
mechanical	 order	 based	 on	 individualistic	 needs,	 interests	 and	 contractual/legal	 obligations	
(gesellschaft)	(Tönnies	1957;	Segre	1998:	413).	Gemeinschaft	is	associated	with	smaller	entities	
that	share	similar	beliefs	and	ways	of	life,	engage	in	frequent	interaction,	and	experience	strong	
emotional	bonds	–	with	gesellschaft	contrastingly	linked	to	larger	entities	that	practice	limited	
interaction,	 engage	 in	 high	 competition	 and	 hold	 dissimilar	 beliefs	 (Brint	 2001:	 2‐3).	 Whilst	
originally	not	 intended	by	Tönnies	as	a	comparative	distinction	between	specific	geographical	
locations	 (Bonner	 1998:	 174),	 the	gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft	 dichotomy	 is	 considered	 a	 useful	
typology	for	comparing	rural	and	urban	areas.	
	
The	 concept	 gemeinschaft	 most	 closely	 relates	 to	 rural	 areas,	 where	 such	 communities	 are	
thought	to	consist	of	small,	socially	intimate	and	cohesive	populations	that	share	social	norms	
and	 are	 free	 from	 social	 conflict	 (Donnermeyer	 2007:	 15;	 Scott	 et	 al.	 2006:	 153;	 Scott,	
Carrington	and	McIntosh	2011:	148).	A	fundamental	basis	of	gemeinschaft	is	family	life;	where	
communities	consider	themselves	to	be	large	families	responsible	for	accepting	or	rejecting	the	
membership	 of	 outsiders	 (Tönnies	 1957:	 228).	 ‘Gemeinschaftlich’	 relations	 are	 identified	 as	
being	sustained	through	these	strong	familial	bonds	that	 flourish	within	 typical	rural	 ‘ways	of	
life’	(Bonner	1998:	175‐4;	Tönnies	1957).	Individuals	within	gemeinschaft	rural	societies	are	not	
distinguishable	 from	 each	 other,	 as	 all	 work	 together	 for	 common	 tasks	 and	 experience	
enjoyment	 from	 this	 level	of	 communality	 (Aldous	1972:	1195).	Overall,	 the	nurturing	of	 this	
particular	 social	organisation	 is	what	Tönnies	 considered	most	 significant	about	gemeinschaft	
rural	life	(Bonner	1998:	175).		
	
In	 contrast,	 gesellschaft	 is	 depicted	 as	 a	 mechanical	 society	 consisting	 of	 an	 artificial	
construction	of	an	aggregate	of	human	beings	(Tönnies	1957:	64).	It	is	argued	that	gesellschaft	
in	 its	 purest	 form	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 larger,	 urbanised	 metropolitan	 centres	 (Aldous	 1972:	
1195).	 The	 emphasis	 on	 commerce	 and	 large‐scale	 capitalist	 industries	 within	 urbanised	
locations	encourages	 ‘gesellschaftlich’	relations	(Bonner	1998:	173;	Aldous	1972:	1197),	which	
are	 perceived	 as	 impersonal	 and	 formal	 and	 defined	 purely	 by	 contractual	 obligations	
(Donnermeyer	2007:	15‐16).	Within	gesellschaft,	 an	 individual	will	not	give,	 grant	or	produce	
anything	for	another	person,	unless	it	is	for	an	exchange	of	a	gift	or	labour	deemed	to	be	of	an	
equivalent	nature	(Tönnies	1957:	65).	Gesellschaft	individuals	thus	only	interact	in	the	prospect	
of	gaining	some	form	of	profit	(Aldous	1972:	1195).		
	
It	is	through	this	framework	therefore	that	we	can	see	how	prostitution	is	generally	situated	as	
product	of	extreme	gesellschaft	relations	and	regarded	as	a	distinctly	urban	phenomenon	(Scott	
et	al.,	2006).	The	act	of	prostitution	is	argued	to	align	with	gesellschaft	practices	as	 it	 involves	
the	 contractual	 exchange	 of	 labour	 for	 a	 profit	 (see	 Tönnies,	 1957).	 In	 contrast,	 prostitution	
conflicts	with	gemeinschaft	ideals	which	perpetuate	an	understanding	of	a	gendered	division	of	
labour;	where	women	are	placed	into	domestic	duties	within	the	home,	 in	comparison	to	men	
who	work	 closely	 together	 in	 farming	 and	 grazier	 roles	 (Tönnies	 1957:	 40;	 Scott	 et	 al.	 2006:	
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153).	Prostitution	is	not	considered	to	be	a	productive	form	of	labour	within	rural	gemeinschaft	
communities;	the	image	of	a	sex	worker	conflicts	not	only	with	the	image	of	a	farmer	or	grazier,	
but	also	with	the	acceptable	female	‘wholesome	homemaker’	role	(Scott	et	al.	2006:	153).	Whilst	
this	dichotomy	identifies	a	number	of	useful	explanations	for	resistance	to	prostitution	in	rural	
vs.	urban	areas,	can	it	be	solely	relied	upon	for	such	an	investigation?	
	
As	 expected,	 Tönnies’	 gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft	 dichotomy	 has	 been	 met	 with	 a	 number	 of	
criticisms.	 Overall,	 there	 is	 an	 apparent	 consensus	 that	 Tönnies’	 theory	 has	 failed	 to	 meet	 a	
standard	level	of	neutral	objectivity	(Bonner	1998;	Aldous	1972;	Brin,	2001).	The	discussion	of	
the	 two	 concepts	 is	 argued	 to	 convey	 a	 sense	 of	 favouritism	 or	 preference	 towards	 rural	
gemeinschaft	 communities	 (Aldous	 1972:	 1198).	 This	 is	 identified	 as	 problematic	 as	 the	
gemeinschaft	concept	 is	seen	to	portray	a	misrepresentative	and	overtly	romanticised	portrait	
of	 rural	 communities	based	upon	assumptions	and	myths	 (Brint	2001:	2;	Bonner	1998:	176).	
For	 Tönnies,	 there	 is	 a	 presumption	 that	 rural	 gemeinschaft	 communities	 are	 completely	
homogenous,	 with	 heterogeneity	 therefore	 being	 an	 intrinsic	 trait	 of	 urbanised	 gesellschaft	
areas	 (DeKeseredy	 et	 al.	 2007:	 298).	 However,	 Brint	 (2001:	 3)	 argues	 that	 small	 numbers	 of	
people	 don’t	 necessarily	 mean	 common	 ways	 of	 life	 and	 shared	 beliefs;	 nor	 do	 continuous	
relationships	imply	strong	emotional	bonds.	Gesellschaft	is	therefore	are	no	less	natural	or	more	
artificial	than	gemeinschaft	(Bonner	1998:	176).		
	
In	 contemporary	 society,	 rural	 areas	 traditionally	 categorised	 as	gemeinschaft	 are	 now	 being	
increasingly	influenced	by	external	cultural,	social	and	economic	gesellschaft	forces	(DeKeserdy	
et	al.	2007:	298).	An	example	of	this	is	demonstrated	through	current	mining	industry	practices	
within	Australia.	Contemporary	mining	work	practices	have	resulted	in	a	heavy	reliance	upon	
non‐resident	 ‘Fly‐In,	 Fly‐Out’	 (FIFO)	 or	 ‘Drive‐In,	 Drive‐Out’	 (DIDO)	 workforces	 (Carrington,	
Hogg	 and	 McIntosh	 2011:	 337).	 Rural	 and	 regional	 mining	 towns	 previously	 familiar	 with	
traditional	 gemeinschaft	 dynamics	 are	 now	 being	 increasingly	 subject	 to	 influences	 from	
gesellschaft	 lifestyle.	 Such	 communities	 are	 experiencing	 increases	 in	 non‐resident	
(predominantly	male)	visitors	to	the	area,	who	impose	significant	burdens	on	local	services	and	
frequently	 engage	 in	 socially	 undesirable	 activities	 such	 as	 excessive	 alcohol	 consumption,	
gambling	and	prostitution	(Carrington,	Hogg	and	McIntosh	2011:	340,	402).		
	
It	is	evident	therefore	that	the	seemingly	simplistic	distinction	of	rural	and	urban	areas	through	
the	 gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft	 dichotomy	 needs	 to	 be	 used	 with	 caution	 when	 examining	
prostitution	 in	 contemporary	 society.	 However	 despite	 the	 identified	 limitations,	 the	 distinct	
categorisation	 of	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas	 portrayed	 through	 the	 dichotomy	 is	 deemed	 highly	
relevant	 for	 this	 specific	 investigation,	as	 these	 ideas	of	 such	areas	appear	 to	be	 incorporated	
into	 the	 foundation	 of	 Queensland’s	 prostitution	 legislation.	 The	 brothel	 exemption	 rule	
afforded	to	small	towns	by	the	Act	has	been	described	as	a	means	of	‘respecting	the	interest	of	
local	 communities’	 (Schloenhardt	 and	 Cameron	 2009:	 199).	 With	 such	 an	 exemption	 only	
applicable	to	towns	who	meet	specific	population	criteria,	it	seems	that	respect	for	community	
attitudes	 towards	 prostitution	 is	 negated	 by	 the	 legislation	 if	 those	 communities	 are	 not	
representative	 of	 harmonious,	 cohesive	 areas	where	 prostitution	 is	 considered	 to	 simply	 not	
belong.		
	
Conclusion	
Investigation	 into	 various	 social	 phenomena	 in	 specifically	 rural	 contexts	 is	 often	 largely	
ignored	 throughout	 most	 disciplines;	 however	 such	 focus	 is	 recently	 gaining	 more	 attention	
(see	 Hogg	 and	 Carrington:	 2006;	 Scott	 et	 al.:	 2007).	 This	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 unique	
differences	 between	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas	 is	 vitally	 important	 to	 achieve	 a	 greater	
understanding	of	how	community	attitudes	towards	particular	social	issues	are	influenced.	With	
regard	 to	 prostitution	 in	 Queensland,	 further	 investigation	 conducted	 into	 rural	 or	 regional	
community	 attitudes	 could	 provide	 an	 insight	 into	 whether	 objection	 to	 such	 activity	 is	
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influenced	 by	 stereotypical	 or	 generalised	 concerns	 expressed	 by	 those	 in	 urban	 contexts,	 or	
whether	such	opinions	are	reinforced	by	traditional	rural	customs,	which	ascribes	commercial	
sex	strictly	to	urban	environments.	The	consideration	of	the	impacts	of	current	mining	regimes	
to	such	community	attitudes	also	needs	to	be	further	examined.		
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Abstract	
There	is	a	growing	academic	literature	that	scrutinises	the	effects	of	technologies	deployed	to	
surveil	 the	 physical	 bodies	 of	citizens.	 Here,	 we	 consider	 the	 role	 of	 affect—that	 is,	 the	
visceral	 and	emotive	 forces	underpinning	 conscious	 forms	of	 knowing	 that	 can	drive	one’s	
thoughts,	feelings	and	movements.	Drawing	from	research	on	two	distinctly	different	groups	
of	 surveilled	 subjects,	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 and	 elite	 athletes,	 this	 paper	 examines	 the	
mundane	practices	of	biosurveillance	 in	 their	 lives	and	how	their	 reflections	 reveal	unique	
insight	into	how	subjectivity,	citizenship,	harm	and	deviance	become	constructed	in	intimate	
and	 public	 ways	 vis‐à‐vis	 technologies	 of	 bodily	 regulation.	 ‘Ordinary	 affects’,	 we	 argue,	
reveal	 cultural	 conditions	 of	 biosurveillance,	 particularly	 how	 risk	 becomes	 embodied	 and	
internalised	in	subjective	ways.	This	paper	describes	affective	responses	to	biosurveillance	as	
a	 mode	 of	 exploring	 the	 complexities	 of	 these	 regulatory	 tactics,	 which	 current	 debates,	
particularly	in	relation	to	civil	liberties	and	social	democracy,	often	negate.		
	
	
Introduction	
Criminological	literature	on	the	use	of	surveillance	focuses	primarily	around	two	conversations.	
The	 first	 discusses	 the	 efficacy	 of	 surveillance	 systems	 for	 crime	 prevention.	 The	 second	
examines	the	rapid	growth	of	surveillance	systems	within	criminal	justice	policy	as	reflective	of	
socio‐political	 changes	 in	 liberal	 democracies.	 Exploring	 the	 links	 between	 the	 emergence	 of	
neo‐liberal	policies	and	actuarial,	risk‐based	criminology,	scholars	have	analysed	them	through	
the	 lens	 of	 governmentality,	 suggesting	 that	 surveillance	 evidences	 a	 ‘new	 means	 to	 render	
populations	thinkable	and	measurable,	 through	categorisation,	differentiation	and	sorting	into	
hierarchies,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 government’	 (Stenson	 2001:	 22‐23).	 Here,	 our	 aim	 is	 to	
highlight	 the	affective	 contours	of	 these	practices—that	 is,	 the	 sensory	encounters	with	 these	
technologies	and	the	emotive	forces	they	index.	
	
To	do	so,	we	consider	commonalities	between	two	distinctly	different	populations,	paroled	sex	
offenders	 on	 GPS	 under	 Jessica’s	 Law	 in	 California	 and	 elite	 athletes	 subjected	 various	
surveillance	 techniques	 under	 the	 World	 Anti‐Doping	 Code	 (WADC).	 This	 paper	 specifically	
addresses	 the	 effects	 and	 affects	 of	 biosurveillance,	 which	 entails	 technologies	 that	 track	 or	
detect	 individual	 bodily	 activities,	 including	 physical	 movement	 and	 internal	 functions.2	 The	
commonalities	 between	 these	 two	 seemingly	 divergent	 populations	 demonstrate	 how	
biosurveillance	 both	 relies	 upon	 and	 instills	 meanings	 of	 risk	 and	 risk	 management	 and	 its	
intimate	 implications.	 In	both	cases,	biosurveillance	renders	people	as	risk‐objects:	 that	 is,	not	
only	are	they	subjected	to	risk	management	strategies,	they	are	also	cast	as	the	source	of	risk.		
	
Administrative	 strategies	 of	 risk	 management	 have	 become	 central	 components	 of	 law	 and	
governance	 (Scott	 2007).	 As	 Nikolas	 Rose	 (1998:	 177)	 notes,	 this	 ‘risk	 frame’	 channels	
‘institutional	practices	and	systems	into	the	following	mold:	assess,	predict	and	manage’	in	ways	
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that	 transform	 ‘pervasive	 uncertainties	 and	 indeterminacies’	 into	 ‘calculable	 probabilities	 of	
harm	to	be	managed	by	rational	experts’.	Managing	risks	disregards	forms	of	resistance	outside	
of	 the	 governing	 risk	 frame	 as	 unnecessary	 and	 irrational,	 carrying	 far‐reaching	 effects.	 The	
emphasis	on	risk,	write	Norris	and	Armstrong	(1999:	24),	makes	each	person	a	legitimate	target	
for	surveillance	because	 ‘everyone	 is	assumed	guilty	until	 the	risk	profile	assumes	otherwise’.	
Given	the	various	‘risk	logics’	at	play	(Ericson	and	Doyle	2003),	we	embrace	recommendations	
to	 attend	 to	 risk	 as	 a	 ‘heterogenous’	 and	 ‘variable’	 technique	 of	 governance	 by	 examining	
particular	manifestations	in	two	contexts	(O’Malley	2004;	Valverde,	Levi	and	Moore	2005).		
	
This	 analysis	 of	 parolees	 and	 athletes	 gleans	 insight	 into	 the	 perspectives	 of	 persons‐as‐risk	
objects.	 Its	 attention	 to	 affect	 highlights	 how	 acts	 and	 emotions	 register	 in	 visceral	 ways,	
enabling	a	critical	analysis	of	bodily	encounters	with	social	forces	(Seigworth	and	Gregg	2010).	
Affects,	explains	Kathleen	Stewart	(2007:	40),	are	not	so	much	‘units	of	knowledge,	as	they	are	
expressions	of	ideas	or	problems	performed	as	a	kind	of	involuntary	and	powerful	learning	and	
participation’.	As	surveillance	is	central	to	the	everyday	lives	of	both	sex	offender	parolees	and	
elite	athletes,	we	focus	on	their	sensory	and	emotive	responses	to	surveillance	in	order	to	better	
grasp	how	they	develop	intimate	relationships	with	technologies	that	surveil	them	and	come	to	
view	 themselves	 and	 others	 as	 ‘suspect’.	 In	 attending	 to	 their	 experiences,	we	 hope	 to	move	
conversations	about	surveillance	from	questions	concerning	administrative	and	‘scientific’	risk	
management	to	those	of	autonomy,	subjectivity	and	ethics.		
	
Relying	 upon	 narratives	 elicited	 through	 focus	 groups	 with	 parolees	 on	 GPS	 (N	 =	 47)	 and	
interviews	with	athletes	 in	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	the	United	States	(N	=	83),	 this	paper,	
while	acknowledging	evident	differences	 in	regulatory	objectives	and	environments,	discusses	
affective	consequences	of	surveillance.	The	following	accounts	illustrate	how	these	persons‐as‐
risk‐objects	cease	to	be	seen	as	individuals	in	need	of	care	and	support,	but,	instead,	emerge	as	
suspect	 subjects—a	 complicated	 challenge	 to	dwell	 on	when	considering	how	 to	deliver	 ‘just’	
modes	of	regulation	in	these	spaces.		
	
Research	Background	and	Legal	Context	
While	we	contend	that	biosurveillance	similarly	renders	sex	offender	parolees	and	elite	athletes	
as	 risk‐objects,	 these	 regulatory	 environments	 are	 distinct.	 Jessica’s	 Law,	 which	 mandated	
lifelong	surveillance	and	stringent	tracking	of	sex	offenders	on	parole,	was	originally	passed	by	
the	Florida	 legislature	 in	 2005	 (Fla.	 St.	 §	 775.21)	 and	has	 been	adopted	by	43	 additional	U.S.	
states.	Most	notably,	this	law	created	strict	residency	restrictions,	limiting	the	location	of	where	
sex	 offenders	may	 live	 or	 work	 and	 surveiling	 them	 for	 life.	 The	 anti‐doping	movement	 is	 a	
global	regulatory	regime	spearheaded	by	the	World	Anti‐Doping	Agency	(WADA),	governed	by	
the	 World	 Anti‐Doping	 Code	 and	 backed	 by	 an	 international	 legal	 convention.	 Since	 its	
establishment	 in	 1999,	 WADA	 has	 implemented	 a	 multifaceted	 approach	 crossing	 multiple	
geographic	areas	and	sports.	Random	drug	testing	in	and	out	of	competition,	monitoring	high‐
level	 athletes’	 whereabouts,	 and	 blood	 profiling	 have	 become	 common	 practice.	 WADA’s	
activities	 rely	 upon	 and	 actively	 encourage	 innovation	 to	 detect	 new	 substances	 and	 develop	
new	methods	of	surveiling	athletes.	
	
The	impetus	for	monitoring	subjects	is	also	distinct:	Whereas	the	use	of	GPS	targets	paroled	sex	
offenders	 after	 they	 have	 served	 their	 sentence	 for	 crimes	 committed,	 anti‐doping	 regulation	
aims	 to	 deter	 the	 use	 of	 prohibited	 substances	 and	methods	 in	 sport.3	 Put	 another	way,	 GPS	
monitors	 and	 delineates	 impure	 parolees	 from	 others	 in	 the	 community,	 while	 anti‐doping	
regulation	aims	to	preserve	the	purity	of	athletes.	The	composition	of	these	populations	is	thus	
vastly	different;	however,	their	experiences	are	analogous	in	the	surveillance	regimes	watching	
over	 them	retain	a	shared	tenet:	 their	 justification	 is	 to	prevent	 future	offending	behaviour.	A	
similar	 affective	 theme	 emerges:	 participants	 internalise	 regulatory	 messages	 by	 seeing	
Kathryn	Henne,	Emily	Troshynski	
86	 Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013	
themselves	 and	 others	 like	 them	 as	 suspect	 subjects,	 while	 developing	 intimate,	 yet	 tenuous	
relations	with	mechanisms	of	surveillance	targeting	their	bodies.		
	
Seeing	the	Self	and	Others	as	Suspect		
Parolees	and	athletes	 take	deeper	meanings	 from	 the	 forms	of	 surveillance	 to	which	 they	are	
subject,	 seeing	 themselves	 as	 suspect	 in	 ways	 that	 reflect	 regulatory	 distinctions.	 Parolees	
internalise	a	shared	negative	suspect	status,	while	athletes	come	to	find	their	own	bodies	as	well	
as	their	competitors	suspect.	
	
The	 shame	 and	 anxiety	 of	 occupying	 the	 legal	 category	 of	 ‘Sexually	 Violent	 Predator’	 (SVP)	
brings	with	 it	 a	 heightened	 awareness	 of	 parolees’	 social	 exclusion	 and	 dehumanisation.	 Not	
only	do	they	speak	of	being	‘stalked	by	the	state’,	they	also	feel	like	they	are	deprived	of	human	
qualities.	To	borrow	the	words	of	one	interviewee,	 ‘It	 is	very	depressing.	It	robs	a	piece	of	my	
humanity.	 I	 am	not	 trying	 to	negate	my	crime;	we	are	 talking	about	 the	 impact	of	GPS	on	us’.	
Overall,	they	are,	as	many	participants	reiterated,	‘shit’.		
	
One	parolee	mentioned,	‘This	thing	[GPS]	just	keeps	reminding	us	that	we	are	bad,	we	are	shit,	
we	 are	 outcasts	 in	 our	 community	 and	we	 are	 shit	 in	 this	 society.	 That	makes	 a	 tremendous	
impact	 on	 us,	 our	 self‐esteem.	 It’s	 very	 hard’.	 Another	 explained,	 ‘We’re	 the	 worst	 thing	 in	
everybody’s	 eyes.	We’re	 looked	down	on.	We’re	 hated.	 People	kill	 a	 baby	 and	 it’s	 not	 as	bad.	
People	 shoot	 someone	 in	 the	 head,	 still,	 not	 as	 bad’.	 One	 participant	 expressed,	 ‘Now	 who’s	
America’s	most	wanted?’	to	which	another	parolee	answered,	‘We	are!’	All	parolees	articulated	
deeply	 rooted	 feelings	 of	 social	 exclusion,	 and	 the	 struggle	 of	 being	 surveiled	 inscribed	 this	
negative	subjectivity.		
	
Many	parolees	paralleled	wearing	a	GPS	akin	to	individuals	with	life‐long	physical	ailments	or	
permanent	visible	marks.	One	participant	declared,	 ‘It’s	like	a	disease’,	and	 ‘they	might	as	well	
be	 tattoos’,	 while	 another	 explained,	 ‘You	 feel	 like	 you	 have	 the	 mark	 of	 Cain’.	 These	 were	
common	sentiments,	elaborated	upon	as	being	‘like,	[using	both	hands	to	point	to	himself],	I’m	
Freddy	 Kruger	 mother	 fucker!	 People	 perceive	 it	 like	 that.	 They	 see	 the	 monitor	 and	 they	
perceive	me	as	a	predator’.	Other	conversations	discussed	 feelings	of	 individual	shame	due	to	
wearing	 GPS	 and	 how	 that	 shame	 prompts	 fear,	 as	 the	 unit	 symbolises	 a	 perceived	 risk	 to	
reoffend.	One	participant	stated,	 ‘The	crime	you	commit	should	not	have	this	on	your	leg,	and	
then	 you	 show	 it,	 and	 people	 think,	 “Dude,	 this	 is	 a	 fucking	murderer,	 we	 should	 kill	 him!”’	
Another	agreed,	‘And	the	stigma	everybody	associates	because	they	made	such	a	big	issue	out	of	
it—the	whole	GPS	with	 child	molesters’	 thing.	 I	 don’t	 even	want	 to	 go	 through	 that	 hassle	 of	
people	 thinking	 the	worst	 of	me’.	 One	 parolee	 also	 acknowledged,	 ‘I	 am	 fearful—everyone	 is	
after	you’.	Feelings	of	shame	thus	emerge	as	interconnected	with	internalised	social	stigma	and	
concern	about	public	consequences	(i.e.,	vigilante	justice).		
	
This	 subjective	 interplay	 is	 so	 profound	 that	 it	 prevents	 parolees	 from	 enjoying	 the	 simplest	
pleasures.	As	explained	by	one	participant,	upon	being	released	from	prison:	
	
I	wanted	 to	go	 to	Carl’s	 Junior—they	had	been	advertising	 that	mushroom	burger	
for	three	years,	and	I	was	going	to	have	one	when	I	got	out.	That	day,	I	couldn’t	eat	it.	
I	was	stunned.	I	felt	so	bad.	I	can’t	remember	the	last	time	I	felt	that	bad—that	day	
was	 the	 worst	 day	 of	 my	 life.	 I	 was	 like,	 ‘Oh	 my	 God,	 they	 are	 looming	 over	 my	
shoulder	constantly’,	and	I’m	making	sure	my	pant	leg	was	down	[to	hide	the	GPS].		
	
He	was	 unable	 to	 enjoy	 a	meal	 because	 of	 the	 nagging	 anxiety	 associated	with	 his	 new	 legal	
status	of	SVP	and	the	wearing	of	a	visible	GPS	unit.		
	
Technologies	of	Biosurveillance:	Bodily	Regulations	through	the	Lens	of	Ordinary	Affection	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013							87	
Athletes	 are	 not	 compelled	 to	 physically	wear	monitoring	 technologies	 on	 an	 everyday	 basis,	
but	 they	 do	 live	 regimented	 lives,	 focusing	 on	 the	 pursuit	 of	modifying	 their	 bodies	 so	 as	 to	
competitively	 excel.	 Although	many	 social	 inputs	 inform	 athletes’	 beliefs	 and	 behaviors,	 ‘the	
horizons	of	an	athlete’s	world	can	never	stray	far	beyond	her	body’	(Brownell	1995:	10).	Anti‐
doping	regulation	shapes	these	horizons	by	mediating	the	boundaries	of	acceptable	substances	
and	methods	athletes	can	use	and	requiring	them	to	comply	with	various	forms	of	surveillance,	
including	drug	testing	and	blood	profiling	as	well	as	whereabouts	reporting	so	that	they	are	on	
call	 for	unannounced	sample	collections.	 If	an	athlete	tests	positive	 for	a	banned	substance	or	
fails	 to	comply	with	regulatory	conditions,	he	or	she	 is	 liable	 for	an	anti‐doping	rule	violation	
(ADRV).	
	
Many	 interviewees	acknowledged	 that	 regulation	shifted	 their	perspectives	 toward	what	 they	
ingested—and	 their	 bodies	more	generally.	As	 one	 rugby	 league	athlete	 reflected,	 ‘It	 changed	
the	way	 I	 look	 at	what	 I	 eat.	 I	 have	 to	 be	 smart	 about	what	 [supplements]	 I	 take...	 I	 can’t	 be	
smoking	 that	 shit	 [marijuana],	 either’.	 Like	many	 other	 athletes,	 he	 acknowledged	 that	 rules	
held	 athletes	 individually	 responsible	 for	 contaminations	 detected	 through	 testing	 (even	 if	
unintentional)	and	that	many	drugs	used	primarily	for	recreational	purposes,	such	as	cannabis,	
would	result	in	sanctions	if	detected	during	competition.	Similarly,	a	rugby	union	player	stated,		
	
I	never	used	to	think	about	what	I	ate	being	bad	or	if	I’d	test	positive	for	something.	
Now	I	 look	at	my	body	differently.	When	I	 look	at	stuff	[supplements]	on	the	shelf	
and	after	I	take	something,	I	am	always	worried	about	it—even	when	they	[support	
staff]	tell	me	it’s	okay	to	use.		
	
As	most	first‐time	sanctions	result	in	a	two‐year	ban	from	sport,	many	athletes	recognised	that	
an	 ADRV	 could	 end	 their	 athletic	 careers	 and	 jeapordise	 their	 livelihoods.	 Regulation	 thus	
compelled	them	to	take	responsibility	for	these	risks	to	avoid	punishment.	Of	the	athletes	who	
shared	 these	anxieties,	none	expressed	a	 fear	of	others	cheating	or	 the	need	 to	 catch	athletes	
cheating.	 Instead,	 they	 internalised	 the	 regulatory	 gaze	 cast	 onto	 their	 bodies,	 and	 their	
narratives	prioritised	feelings	of	self‐consciousness	about	what	they	consumed.		
	
Not	all	athletes	conveyed	this	sense	of	responsibilisation.	In	fact,	many	who	competed	in	sports	
with	documented	histories	of	doping,	such	as	cycling,	weightlifting	and	track	and	field,	projected	
suspicions	onto	other	competitors.	One	former	sprinter	who	narrowly	missed	qualifying	for	the	
Olympics	explained	that	he	was	naïve	for	not	using	performance‐enhancing	drugs:	
	
I	 still	 just	 want	 to	 know	 just	 how	 fast	 I	 could’ve	 been.	 So	 many	 of	 those	 guys	 I	
competed	against	went	on	to	the	next	level.	They	were	Olympians,	and	almost	all	of	
them	were	 on	 something.	Well,	 at	 least	 that’s	what	 everyone	 says.	 I	 guess	 I	 really	
don’t	know	if	they	did,	but,	by	the	looks	of	them,	I	am	pretty	sure	they	were!	I	 just	
know	that	I	didn’t,	and	I	don’t	know	how	fast	I	could’ve	been.		
	
He	disclosed	that	some	of	his	friends	had	used	performance‐enhancing	drugs,	prompting	him	to	
presume	 that	 the	most	 successful	 runners	 had	 as	 well,	 even	 though	 he	 admittedly	 relied	 on	
anecdotal	evidence.		
	
Other	 interviewees	 reflected	 competing	 in	 a	 sport	 ‘plagued	 by	 widespread	 doping’.	 One	
participant	felt	so	strongly	about	the	pervasiveness	of	doping	in	her	sport	that	she	competed	for	
another	 country.	 (She	 was	 born	 in	 another	 country	 and	 therefore	 eligible	 to	 do	 so.)	 She	
expressed	 frustration	 that	 she	 failed	 to	 qualify	 for	 the	 Olympics,	 stating	 that	 she	 could	 not	
believe	others	were	that	much	better	than	her—unless	they	were	doping.	Her	evidence?	Beyond	
her	 competitors’	 improved	 performances,	 she	 responded	 bluntly,	 ‘Well,	 I	 could	 tell	 just	 by	
looking	 at	 them.	 It	 just	 didn’t	 look	 right,	 you	 know?’	With	 no	 evidence	 of	 cheating	 available,	
seemingly	unnatural	female	muscularity	served	as	proof.		
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Gendered	transgressions	are	longstanding	grounds	for	rendering	particular	women	suspect.	As	
a	retired	athlete	explained,	‘[S]ome	of	those	[Soviet	bloc]	women	weren’t	women	any	more.	You	
could	tell	back	in	those	days	who	was	cheating.	Today,	with	all	that’s	out	there,	it’s	not	so	easy.	
You	 really	 can’t	 trust	 anyone’.	 This	 participant,	 among	 others	who	 did	 not	 share	 his	 opinion,	
acknowledged	 that	 regulatory	messages	 advance	 a	 climate	 of	 suspicion,	 reiterating	 to	 ‘clean’	
athletes	that	they	are	‘under	attack’	by	those	who	cheat	by	doping.		
	
Some	athletes	perceived	anti‐doping	regulation	as	an	extension	of	state	surveillance.	This	was	
especially	prevalent	among	male	athletes	from	marginalised	ethnic	backgrounds	(young	Māori	
and	Pacific	Islander	men	in	New	Zealand	and	Australia,	mostly	Latino	men	in	the	United	States).	
Though	particularities	varied,	all	 relayed	that	 it	was	 ‘normal’,	 as	 they	were	already	viewed	as	
suspect	in	other	facets	of	social	life.	One	player	of	Samoan	heritage	said	that	he	expected	higher	
levels	of	scrutiny:		
	
I	expect	it.	I	should	expect	it,	‘cos	they’re	always	looking	out	anyways.	You	know,	it’s	
like	this,	they	know	I’m	going	to	do	good,	‘cos	I	am	good	at	what	I	do	[sport].	And,	I	
gotta	watch	my	back	‘cos	of	it.	.	.	.	I	got	it,	though.		
	
Rather	than	admitting	to	or	describing	frustrations,	he,	and	many	others,	iterated	how	to	handle	
it,	 paralleling	 it	 to	 other	 challenges	 they	 faced	 as	 immigrants	 (here,	 to	 New	 Zealand).	 As	
discussed	 in	 the	 following	 section,	 these	 shared	 suspect	 subjectivities	 took	 shape	 through	
intimate	relations	with	regulatory	technologies.		
	
Intimacies	of	Surveillance	Technologies	
Both	 parolees	 and	 athletes	 maintained	 close,	 albeit	 conflicted,	 relationships	 with	 the	
technologies	of	surveillance	aimed	at	their	bodies.		
	
Once	released	from	prison,	paroled	sex	offenders	are	equipped	with	a	GPS	unit	worn	around	the	
ankle,	 then	 told	 briefly	 how	 the	 technology	 works	 (that	 it	 ‘tracks’	 them),	 to	 charge	 the	 unit	
regularly,	 not	 to	 get	 it	 wet	 or	 tamper	 with	 it	 (otherwise	 a	 parole	 violation	 would	 ensue).	
Parolees	 are	 therefore	 constantly	 concerned	 with	 the	 maintenance	 of	 their	 GPS	 unit,	 even	
though	their	technological	knowledge	of	GPS	and	how	it	‘tracks’	them	varies.	What	is	common	is	
how	the	GPS	unit	becomes	both	inconvenient	and	risky.	
	
Participants	described	how	GPS	was	a	daily	hindrance	that	impacted	how	they	navigated	their	
life,	thus	making	many	‘normal’	activities	impossible.	In	speaking	about	always	being	aware	of	
the	unit,	a	parolee,	like	many	others,	mentioned,	‘You	can’t	wear	shorts,	because	you	have	to	try	
to	 hide	 it.	 It’s	 a	 stigma.	 People	 look	 at	 you	 so	 you	 have	 to	 hide	 it’.	 Feeling	 physically	
uncomfortable	 in	 public,	 parolees	 often	 changed	 their	 outward	 appearance	 for	 two	 primary	
reasons:	First,	parolees	acknowledged	the	need	to	cover	and	safeguard	the	GPS	unit	so	as	to	not	
receive	 violations	 for	 tampering.	 Secondly,	 they	 hid	 the	 unit	 to	 safeguard	 themselves	 and	
minimise	 public	 shame.	 Several	 participants	 also	 commented	 on	 changes	 in	 physical	 activity,	
and	many	elucidated	that	their	feelings	of	freedom	and	mobility	changed	drastically:	‘You’re	not	
as	free	to	go	places	once	you’re	invited	to	do	different	things.	You	can’t	do	as	much…	It’s	a	big	
life	 stopper’.	Relationships	with	 personal	 GPS	 units	 directly	 informed	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	
parolees’	identity:	from	being	active,	social	individuals	to	inactive,	suspect	subjects.		
	
Being	 equipped	 with	 GPS	 prompted	 changes	 to	 daily	 hygiene	 routines	 and	 physical	 leisure	
activities	 as	 well	 as	 concerns	 about	 physical	 injuries/harm.	 One	 participant	 explained	 that	
parole	 agents	 ‘tell	 you	 that	you	can’t	 take	a	bath,	we	can’t	 go	 swimming,	we	can’t	 take	a	 long	
shower	 even	 if	 you	 like	 long	 showers’.	 In	 discussing	 problems	with	 GPS	 units,	 the	 following	
conversation	occurred:	
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Participant	4:	 [Laughs]	Once	 it	 came	up	with	 a	 technical	 violation.	 They	 [Parole]	
thought	I	was	tampering	with	it.	They	came	out,	looked	at	it,	opened	it	up	and	found	
water.		
	
Participant	3:	See,	these	things	can’t	be	too	accurate.	It	seems	like	they’re	more	apt	
to	get	you	into	trouble	without	you	doing	anything.	
	
Through	their	experiences	with	fragile,	inconsistent	GPS	units,	parolees	interpreted	conditions	
placed	upon	them	as	not	being	about	helping	them	succeed	as	individuals	but	about	helping	the	
GPS	remain	active	and	functioning.	The	relationship	between	man	and	machine	became	one	of	
co‐dependence—so	 much	 so	 that	 it	 hindered	 parolees’	 personal	 physical	 and	 emotional	
preservation.		
	
Interviewees	 expressed	 intense	 frustration	 over	 not	 being	 able	 to	 appropriately	 cleanse	
themselves	or	engage	in	social	activities.	They	longed	for	normalcy.	One	said,	‘I	just	want	to	take	
a	 long	 soak	 in	 the	 bathtub!’	 Another	mentioned,	 ‘Since	 the	 first	 day	 they	 put	 that	 [GPS]	 on,	 I	
couldn’t	take	a	bath.	I	had	wanted	one	since	prison’.	Despite	attempts	to	preserve	devices,	units	
caused	 personal	 injury.	 Burns,	 lesions,	 scabs	 and	 scars	 were	 common,	 as	 was	 apprehension	
about	long‐term	health	consequences.	As	one	described,		
	
I	almost	broke	my	leg	getting	it	snagged	up.	But	one	thing	I’ve	always	thought	about,	
you	 know	 cell	 phones	 and	microwaves?	What	 affect	 do	 these	 have	 over	 the	 long	
term	with	 cellular	 structure	 and	microwaves?	 You’re	 being	 exposed	 to	 something	
you	don’t	want	to	be	exposed	to.		
	
One	 parolee	 even	 asked,	 ‘What	 does	 this	 button	 mean	 [pointing	 to	 his	 GPS]?	 It	 says,	 “Don’t	
touch.”	Does	it	blow	you	up?’	Their	remarks	highlighted	a	catch‐22:	though	promoted	as	a	safe	
and	 effective	 tool	 for	 the	 supervision	 of	 parolees,	 GPS,	 its	 limitations	 and	 physical	 hazards	
preoccupied	participants.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 injuries,	 some	 parolees	 revealed	 anxieties	 about	 meeting	 health	 care	
practitioners.	One	stated,	‘I	am	embarrassed.	I	haven’t	been	to	a	doctor	since	I	got	it’.	Two	other	
participants	discussed	how	they	normalised	conversations	while	visiting	their	doctor,	one	lying	
that	the	unit	was	an	mp3	player	and	another	stating	that	it	was	a	condition	of	bail	for	vehicular	
manslaughter,	 not	 a	 sex	 offense.	 Several	 others	 shared	 similar	 stories,	 including	 one	 that	
resulted	in	a	delayed	surgery	because	he	had	to	go	through	an	extended	process	to	temporarily	
remove	the	GPS	unit.	In	sum,	the	risks	of	the	anklets	had	far‐reaching	effects.	
	
Anti‐doping	 surveillance	 also	 exacerbated	 risks	 for	 athletes,	 prompting	 criticisms	 that	 such	
methods	 incentivise	more	dangerous	doping	products	 that	 evade	detection.	 For	 interviewees,	
risk	 gave	 way	 to	 fear	 of	 authorities,	 not	 doping.	 Many	 athletes	 characterised	 anti‐doping	
regulation	 as	 a	monitoring	 system	 in	 place	 to	 ‘catch’—not	 help—them.	 Even	more	 expressed	
resentment	 toward	 being	 monitored	 ‘like	 criminals’,	 rarely	 acknowledging	 that	 some	 anti‐
doping	agencies	try	to	help	them	avoid	inadvertent	ADRVs.	Instead,	on	more	than	one	occasion,	
athletes	 asked	 if	 authorities	 wanted	 access	 to	 interview	 transcripts,	 explaining	 regulators	
‘wanted	to	know	everything	else’.		
	
Most	participants	complained	about	restricted	mobility	due	to	the	Whereabouts	Program,	which	
requires	 athletes	 to	 provide	 information	 regarding	 where	 they	 are	 in	 or	 out	 of	 competition.	
Although	 surveillance	 was	 not	 always	 present	 (compared	 to	 how	 sex	 offenders	 endure	 GPS	
units),	anxieties	around	the	scope	and	power	of	surveillance	were	still	prevalent.	For	example,	
although	 anti‐doping	 agencies	 provide	 information	 regarding	 substances,	 many	 participants	
were	reluctant	to	call.	One	Australian	athlete	stated,	‘If	I	call	the	hotline,	they	may	start	tracking	
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me’.	 Even	 though	 he	 did	 not	 think	 he	 was	 doing	 anything	 wrong,	 he	 became	 increasingly	
suspicious	of	sport	staff	when	high‐profile	doping	accusations	surfaced.	Other	athletes	shared	
this	 suspicion	 after	 being	 ‘treated	 like	 lab	 rats’	 for	 research	 studies	 and	 performance	
evaluations.	 Overall,	 they	 retained	 a	 common	 distrust	 but	 did	 not	 express	 these	 feelings	 to	
authorities,	because	they	were	nervous	about	possible	consequences	or	‘just	didn’t	see	the	point	
because	it	won’t	change	things’.	
	
Gendered	distinctions	also	emerged,	particularly	 regarding	 resistance	 to	 surveillance.	For	 five	
female	 participants,	 it	 crystallised	 around	 urine	 sample	 collection	 for	 drug	 testing,	 which,	 as	
described	by	one	athlete,	requires	‘being	naked	from	the	nipple	down’.	Almost	all	athletes	came	
to	accept	it	as	a	‘tradeoff’	for	being	elite	competitors,	but	many	women	reflected	on	the	shock	of	
their	first	sample	collection.	As	one	stated,	‘They	tell	you	what	it’s	going	to	be	like,	but	you	don’t	
get	it	until	you	are	there	peeing	in	front	of	someone’.	Another	affirmed,	‘The	first	time	felt	like	I	
was	 being	 violated’.	 Others	 described	 programs	 that	 sent	 adolescents	 home	 with	 cups	 to	
‘practice’.	Overall,	interviewees	often	normalised	biosurveillance,	suggesting	that	regular	bodily	
scrutiny	and	intrusion	are	tacitly	accepted	duties	of	elite	competitors	today.	
	
Conclusion	
The	 focus	on	affect	attests	how	these	surveiled	subjects	respond	to	 feeling	as	 though	they	are	
continuously	watched.	They	 internalise	messages	about	 themselves	and	others	seemingly	 like	
them	 as	 being	 ‘suspect’.	 Despite	 evident	 differences	 between	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 and	 elite	
athletes,	they	emerge	as	‘at	risk’	for	future	offending	behavior,	thus	justifying	and	perpetuating	
surveillance.	 Though	 preventative	 in	 aim,	 biosurveillance	 exacerbates	 risk	 and	 risk‐taking	 in	
ways	that	subjects	both	internalise	viscerally	and	negotiate	actively.	This	analysis	reveals	some	
of	 participants’	 complex	 relationships	 with	 mechanisms	 of	 surveillance	 that	 govern	 their	
mobility,	bodily	behaviors	and	desires.		
	
Perspectives	featured	here	provide	insight	into	how	biosurveillance	entails	and	relies	upon	co‐
constitutive	 processes,	 complicating	 depictions	 of	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 as	 undeserving	 and	
predatorial	subjects	and	those	of	elite	athletes	as	privileged	and	archetypal	subjects.	Everyday	
surveillance	practices	as	understood	through	an	affective	lens	demonstrate	that	such	regulatory	
tactics	 shift	 risk	 and	 responsibility	 onto	 individuals,	 carrying	 profound	 effects	 on	 embodied	
subjectivity.	 Not	 only	 do	 the	 boundaries	 between	 human	 and	 surveillance	 become	 blurred,	
confounded	 and	 interrelated,	 so	 too	 do	 the	 boundaries	 of	 regulation.	 Participants’	 intimate	
feelings	about	 their	engagement	with	surveillance	evidence	how	regulation	 feels	constant	and	
pressing.	They	also	point	to	a	more	general	concern	around	 justice:	 the	use	of	biosurveillance	
both	transcends	and	forecloses	the	possibility	of	more	democratic	forms	of	governance	and	the	
recognition	of	rights	to	privacy	and	bodily	integrity.		
	
	
																																																													
	
1  This	paper	is	based	on	research	supported	by	the	National	Science	Foundation	(Grants	No.	SES‐0851536	and	SES‐
0961803)	and	the	International	Olympic	Committee.	
2		 This	 is	 to	 distinguish	 our	 focus	 from	 the	 increasingly	 common	medical	 practice	 of	 documenting	 vital	 signs	 of	
citizens,	which	is	among	the	practices	analysed	here.	
3		 Under	current	rules,	doping	is	a	broad	category	that	encompasses	many	more	substances	and	methods	than	those	
believed	to	have	performance‐enhancing	qualities,	including	drugs	used	primarily	for	recreational	purposes.	
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Abstract	
This	paper	is	focused	on	the	use	and	usefulness	of	‘culture’	as	an	analytical	tool,	in	the	context	
of	 prisoners’	 return	 to	 the	 community.	 Whereas	 the	 analytic	 dimensions	 of	 the	 culture	
concept	 have	 been	 explored	 in	 anthropological	 circles,	 its	 criminological	 applications	 have	
been	 limited.	 While	 the	 growth	 of	 ‘cultural	 criminology’	 signifies	 a	 resurgent	 interest	 in	
ethnography,	subjectivity,	lived	experience	and	the	phenomenological,	for	instance,	it	can	be	
argued	that	its	concept	of	culture	lacks	explanatory	or	analytical	power.	This	paper	considers	
the	 analytic	 possibilities	 of	 ‘culture’	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 uncovering	 aspects	 of	 the	 post‐
imprisonment	experience.	 It	draws	on	 interviews	with	 released	prisoners	and	post‐release	
support	 workers,	 conducted	 for	 PhD	 research	 on	 the	 post‐release	 experience	 of	 men	 in	
Victoria,	to	illustrate	how	culture	applied	in	this	way	can	illuminate	processes	underpinning	
and	 constituting	 the	 cycle	 of	 reimprisonment,	 or	 what	 Halsey	 (2006)	 has	 termed	 the	
‘reincarceration	assemblage’.	Seeing	culture	as	both	a	‘product	and	producer’	(Sampson	and	
Bean	2006)	of	this	assemblage	reveals	elements	which	contribute	to	the	continuation	of	the	
cycle,	and	which	can	counteract	efforts	–	on	the	part	of	ex‐prisoners	themselves	and	society	
more	 broadly	 –	 towards	 reintegration	 and	 reduced	 reoffending.	 A	 cultural	 perspective	 can	
thus	 provide	 a	 way	 of	 understanding	 men’s	 experience	 of	 getting	 out	 and	 staying	 out	 of	
prison,	and	how	penological	thinking	may	make	use	of	such	a	lens.		
	
	
Introduction	
	
Offenders	 emerge	 from	 prison	 afraid	 to	 trust,	 fearful	 of	 the	 unknown,	 and	with	 a	
vision	of	the	world	shaped	by	the	meaning	that	behaviours	had	in	the	prison	context.	
…	 [T]he	 system	 we	 have	 designed	 to	 deal	 with	 offenders	 is	 among	 the	 most	
iatrogenic	in	history,	nurturing	those	very	qualities	it	claims	to	deter.	(Miller	2000	in	
Liebling	and	Maruna	2005:	1)	
	
In	a	recent	news	article	in	the	Hobart	Mercury	(Smith	2013),	‘James’,	a	long‐term	prisoner	and	
resident	 at	 the	 newly	 opened	 transitional	 units	 at	 Risdon	 Prison,	makes	 plain	why	 prisoners	
need	help	to	adjust	to	life	on	the	outside:	‘You	want	people	to	go	out	better,	not	worse.’	Yet,	as	
Miller	 (2000)	observes,	prisoners	often	emerge	 from	prison	marked	by	 the	 very	qualities	 the	
correctional	 system	 is	 meant	 to	 ‘correct’,	 qualities	 that	 can	 make	 life	 in	 the	 community	
unsustainable	 and	 reimprisonment	 inevitable.	 Striking	 is	 that	 since	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 modern	
prison,	despite	two	hundred	years	of	penal	advancement	and	knowledge,	so	little	has	changed:	
in	 1831,	 in	 France,	 38%	 of	men	were	 reimprisoned	 following	 their	 release	 (Foucault	 1979);	
today,	in	Australia,	the	figure	is	almost	identical	(ABS	2010).		
	
The	 hardening,	 damaging	 effects	 of	 imprisonment	 and	 its	 endemic	 cultural	 codes	 are	 well	
established.	That	the	culture	of	the	prison	leaks	out	into	the	post‐prison	sphere	is	axiomatic.	Yet	
analyses	 of	 the	 factors	 associated	 with	 recidivism	 and	 cyclic	 imprisonment	 frequently	 leave	
culture,	and	the	cultural	components	of	prisoners’	experience,	unexamined.	This	paper	critically	
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engages	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 culture	 as	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 understanding	 men’s	 post‐release	
experience	and	how	and	why	so	many	become	ensnared	in	cycles	of	reimprisonment.	The	focus	
is	 on	men	 in	particular	 since	 they	 comprise	 the	majority	of	 prisoners	 released	and	hence	 the	
bulk	of	 the	 ‘post‐release	problem’.	 It	begins	with	 the	concept	of	 ‘culture’	which,	as	an	analytic	
device,	 has	 been	 embraced	 in	 anthropological	 circles	 yet	 remains	 underdeveloped	 in	
criminology.	A	distinction	is	drawn	between	‘culture’	as	a	socially	bounded	frame	and	‘culture’	
as	a	meaning‐making	‘toolkit’.	The	ensuing	section	explains	the	cultural	lens	applied	in	the	PhD	
research	 on	which	 this	 paper	 draws,	 and	briefly	 outlines	 the	 study.	 Finally,	 research	 findings	
illustrate	the	analytic	possibilities	of	culture	in	a	post‐prison	context.		
	
Conceptualising	Culture	
Culture	is	a	complicated	and	contested	term.	It	has	been	defined,	rejected	and	elaborated	since 
its  earliest  anthropological  formulation  as  ‘that  complex  whole  which  includes  knowledge, 
belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member 
of  society’  (Tylor  1871	 in	Eagleton 2000: 34). Notwithstanding an ongoing  lack of consensus, 
the	anthropological	concept	of	culture	as	a	way	of	life	peculiar	to	a	social	group	–	the	collected	
ideas	 and	 habits	 learned,	 shared	 and	 transmitted;	 its	 material	 and	 symbolic	 aspects	 –	 has	
seeped	 into	 other	 disciplines	 as	 a	 nascent	 theoretical	 concept	 and	 burgeoning	 analytical	
approach.		
	
Criminology,	however,	has	been	slow	on	the	uptake.	Until very recently, penological research 
conceived  cultural  forms  narrowly,  if  at  all  (Garland  2006).  The  growth  of  ‘cultural 
criminology’ (e.g.	Ferrell	1999;	Hayward	and	Young	2004;	Ferrell,	Hayward	and	Young	2008)	
embodies	a	 resurgent	 interest	 in	ethnography,	 lived	experience,	 and	 the	phenomenological.	 It	
foregrounds	 ‘cultural’	 aspects	 of	 crime	 and	 its	 control:	 ‘the	 subjective,	 affective,	 embodied,	
aesthetic,	material,	performative,	 textual,	symbolic	and	visual	relations	of	space	…	recognising	
that	 the	settings	of	crime	are	…	relational,	 improvised,	contingent,	constructed	and	contested’	
(Campbell	 2012	 in	 Hayward	 2012:	 450).	 Yet	 O’Brien	 (2005)	 argues	 cultural	 criminology	
undertheorises	 its	 concept	 of	 culture	 and	 thus	 lacks	 explanatory	 or	 analytical	 power,	 indeed	
that	 it	 is	 political	 rather	 than	 analytical	 in	 orientation.	Cultural criminology  then, despite  its 
promise, offers little in the way of analytic tools.	
	
So	what	 are	 the	 analytical	 possibilities	 of	 ‘culture’	 as	 a	 concept?	 Critics	 argue	 that	 ‘culture	 is	
essentialised,	 reified,	 and	overhomogenised’	 (Brumann	2004:	199).	 It	 is	 either	 conceptualised	
so	 broadly	 as	 to	 render	 it	 meaningless,	 or	 so	 narrowly	 as	 to	 limit	 its	 theoretical	 validity;	 it	
appears	 ‘torn	between	an	empty	universalism	and	a	blind	particularism’	 (Eagleton	2000:	44).	
Rational	choice	 theorists	have	rejected	cultural	accounts	as	 ‘tautological,	untestable,	or	beside	
the	point’	 (Wedeen	2002:	714).	 Sewell	 (2004:	 202),	however,	 draws	an	 important	distinction	
between	 the	 use	 of	 the	 plural	 form	 (‘cultures’),	 describing	 ‘concrete	 and	 bounded	 worlds	 of	
beliefs	and	practices’,	and	the	singular	concept	denoting	a	‘semiotics	of	social	life’.	Sewell	argues	
that	 it	 is	 the	elision	of	 these	 two	distinct	meanings	of	 culture	 that	causes	confusion	and	gives	
rise	 to	 criticism	 of	 the	 latter	 concept	 based	 on	 the	 shortcomings	 inhering	 in	 the	 former.	 For	
instance,	Larmour	(2007:	228)	 refers	 to	 three	common	misuses	of	culture	as	a	concept:	as	an	
‘uncaused	cause’;	as	an	‘explanation	of	last	resort’;	and	as	a	‘veto	on	comparison’,	which	seem	to	
illustrate	 Sewell’s	 contention.	 Certainly	 culture	 used	 in	 this	 way	 appears	 ‘outmoded	 and	
unhelpful’	 (Wedeen	2002:	714).	Sewell’s	distinction	 is	 therefore	useful	 to	differentiate	culture	
as	an	analytic	concept	from	its	use	as	a	‘totalising	term’	(Garland	2006:	423).	
	
Prison	culture	epitomises	this	 ‘totalising’	 form:	the	closed	setting	where	hegemonic	masculine	
norms	 are	 exaggerated	 into	 extreme	 models	 of	 hypermasculinity;	 where	 violence	 and	
intimidation	become	normalised,	legitimised.	The	ways	of	being	that	Miller	(2000)	describes	–	
‘afraid	 to	 trust,	 fearful	of	 the	unknown’	–	are	entrenched	 in	prison	culture.	This	conception	of	
culture,	as	located	within	a	particular	bounded	set	of	social	relations,	provides	rich	descriptive	
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insight.	 It	 is	 limited,	 however,	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	 explain	how	 culture	 functions.	Miller’s	 ‘world	
shaped	by	the	meaning	that	behaviours	had	in	the	prison	context’	gives	an	important	clue	as	to	
how	culture	might	take	on	an	analytic	 function;	how	we	might	think	about	culture	 in	terms	of	
meaning	and	behaviour.	
	
A	Culture‐in‐action,	Semiotic‐practical	Lens	
Building	 on	 Sewell’s	 ‘semiotics	 of	 social	 life’	 definition,	 Wedeen	 (2002:	 720)	 argues	 for	 a	
conceptualisation	 of	 culture	 as	 ‘the	 practices	 of	meaning‐making	 through	which	 social	 actors	
attempt	to	make	their	world	coherent’.	Cultural	analysis	from	this	perspective	involves	studying	
the	 relations	 between	 peoples’	 practices	 and	 their	 signifying	 systems	 of	 language	 and	 other	
symbols,	an	approach	characterised	as	‘semiotic	practices’	(Wedeen	2002:	714).	Culture	in	these	
terms	 refers	 to	what	 people	 do,	 how	 those	 things	 are	 invested	with	meaning,	 and	how	 those	
meanings	 produce	 effects.	 Thus	 culture	 refers	 not	 to	 essential	 values	 or	 particular	 traits	
isolating	 one	 group	 from	another;	 rather,	 a	 cultural	 view	obliges	 ‘an	 account	of	 how	 symbols	
operate	 in	practice,	why	meanings	generate	action,	 and	why	actions	produce	meanings,	when	
they	 do’	 (Wedeen	 2002:	 720).	 This	 approach	 builds	 on	 Swidler’s	 (1986)	 ‘culture‐in‐action’	
model.		
	
Swidler	(1986:	273)	views	culture	as	a	‘toolkit’	–	a	‘repertoire’	of	habits,	skills,	and	styles	which	
shape	people’s	problem‐solving	and	decision‐making,	and	from	which	they	construct	‘strategies	
of	action’.	‘Strategy’	here	means	‘a	general	way	of	organising	action’	rather	than	a	conscious	plan	
(Swidler	 1986:	 277).	 Culture	 is	 causative	 in	 that	 it	 ‘shapes	 the	 capacities	 from	 which	 such	
strategies	 of	 action	 are	 constructed’	 (Swidler	 1986:	 277).	 Importantly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 post‐
prison	 experience,	 Swidler	 (1986:	 278)	 distinguishes	 between	 how	 culture	 affects	 action	 in	
‘settled	 lives’	 and	 ‘unsettled	 lives’	 in	 terms	 of	 sustaining	 continuities	 and	 constructing	 new	
patterns.	In	‘unsettled	lives’,	she	explains,	‘[p]eople	developing	new	strategies	of	action	depend	
on	 cultural	models	 to	 learn	 styles	 of	 self,	 relationship,	 cooperation	 [and]	 authority’,	 and	 that	
these	models	 ‘make	 explicit	demands	 in	a	 contested	 cultural	 arena’	 (Swidler	1986:	279).	 It	 is	
this	contested	space	that	emerges	so	palpably	in	sociological	accounts	of	the	prison	world.	The	
initial	experience	of	imprisonment	and	adaptation	to	prison	life	may	be	viewed	in	this	way,	as	a	
period	 during	 which	 competing	 ways	 of	 organising	 behaviours	 contend	 for	 dominance	 (the	
prison	regime,	officers’	culture,	prisoners’	social	hierarchies,	 individual	histories	and	identity),	
and	new	strategies	of	action	are	 constructed	 from	an	available	 repertoire	of	 ‘symbols,	 rituals,	
stories,	and	guides	to	action’	(Swidler	1986:	77).		
	 	
In	 contrast,	 settled	 cultures	 claim	 ‘authority	of	 habit	 [and]	normality’	 yet	 ‘constrain	 action	by	
providing	a	limited	set	of	resources	out	of	which	individuals	and	groups	construct	strategies	of	
action’	(Swidler	1986:	281).	In	prison,	for	instance,	‘masculinity	resources	are	severely	limited’	
(Karp	2010:	66).	The	process	of	settling	into	prison	life	or	into	a	‘prisoner’	identity	can	similarly	
be	 seen	 as	 constraining	 future	 action,	 due	 to	 what	 Swidler	 calls	 the	 ‘high	 costs	 of	 cultural	
retooling’	(Swidler	1986:	284)	involved	in	crafting	new	ways	of	being,	particularly	when	post‐
release	cultural	resources	are	limited;	if	an	ex‐prisoner’s	friends	and	family	share	habits,	skills	
and	 styles	 oriented	 towards	 violence	 and	 drug	 abuse,	 for	 example.	 Thus	 Swidler’s	 culture‐in‐
action	model	can	explain	how	culture	influences	behavioural	choices	in	prison,	as	well	as	ways	
of	being	upon	release	and	return	to	community.		
	
Wedeen’s	(2002)	semiotic‐practical	approach	clearly	draws	on	Swidler’s	(1986)	formulation	of	
the	relations	between	meaning	and	action.	From	this	relational	perspective,	culture	is	seen	as:		
	
...	 an	 inter‐subjective	organising	mechanism	 that	 shapes	unfolding	 social	processes	
and	that	is	constitutive	of	social	structure	…	[C]ulture	is	simultaneously	an	emergent	
product	 and	 producer	 of	 social	 organisation,	 interaction,	 and	 hence	 structure.	
(Sampson	and	Bean	2006:	27)	
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To	focus	on	meanings	(via	language	and	symbols)	and	how	they	relate	to	behaviour	(practices)	
is	useful	because	 it	emphasises	 the	observable.	Further,	 it	enables	analysis	of	 the	relationship	
between	‘narratives	of	identification	and	everyday	activities’	(Wedeen	2002:	724)	which,	if	left	
uninterrogated,	 serve	 to	 perpetuate	 themselves.	 This	works	on	 a	micro	 (prisoner)	 and	macro	
(societal)	 level,	 in	what	Arrigo	 and	Milovanovic	 (2009:	 101)	 describe	 as	 ‘the	 coproduction	 of	
penological	reality’.	In	this	way	culture	is	seen	as	cause	(producer)	and	effect	(product)	of	the	
carceral	assemblage.	Taking	up	Garland’s	(2006:	438)	challenge	to	‘show	how	culture	relates	to	
conduct’	 by	 examining	 how	 meanings	 relate	 to	 actions	 allows	 insight	 into	 how	 this	 process	
unfolds.	
	
The	Study	
This	 cultural	 approach	 forms	 a	 key	 theoretical	 component	of	 the	PhD	 research	 on	which	 this	
paper	 draws1.	 The	 study	 sought	 to	 qualitatively	 map	 men’s	 subjective	 experience	 of	 release	
from	prison	 in	Victoria,	by	 interviewing	released	prisoners	and	post‐release	support	workers.	
The	Victorian	Department	of	 Justice	 funds	 ‘Link	Out’,	 and	 its	 Indigenous	equivalent,	 ‘Konnect’,	
which	offer	 twelve	months	 intensive	post‐release	support	 to	prisoners	deemed	at	high	risk	of	
reoffending	post‐release.	The	agencies	delivering	these	programs	were	the	starting	point	for	the	
snowball	 sampling	 strategy	 employed.	 Link	Out	 and	Konnect	workers	were	briefed	 about	 the	
study	and	invited	to	recruit	voluntary	participants.	Other	services	identified	during	the	research	
process	 included	 WISE	 Employment’s	 Ex‐offender	 Program	 and	 Five8,	 a	 community‐based	
restorative	 approach	 to	 building	 ‘micro‐communities’	 of	 support	 around	 individual	prisoners.	
Workers	 in	 these	 programs	were	 included	 in	 the	 sample.	 Released	 prisoners	were	 recruited	
through	the	workers,	word	of	mouth,	and	flyers	in	local	employment	agencies.	Twelve	released	
prisoners	 and	 fourteen	 workers	 were	 interviewed.	 The	 ex‐prisoner	 participants	 (only)	 were	
offered	a	twenty	dollar	Coles	voucher	to	acknowledge	their	participation.	
	
Semi‐structured	 in‐depth	 interviews	were	conducted	 individually,	 face‐to‐face,	 in	settings	that	
were	 familiar	 and	 convenient	 to	 participants.	 Interviews	 were	 transcribed	 verbatim	 and	
analysed	phenomenographically.	This	involved	careful	reading	and	re‐reading	of	the	interviews	
to	 gather	 the	 range	 of	 qualitatively	 different	 ways	 of	 understanding	 and	 experiencing	 the	
phenomenon	of	release	from	prison.	The	conceptions	and	ways	of	experiencing	were	organised,	
through	subsequent	aggregation	of	the	data,	into	‘categories	of	description’	which	encapsulated	
the	various	ways	of	experiencing	across	the	sample.	The	aim	of	this	methodological	approach	is	
to	 capture	 variation	 in	 the	 collective,	 rather	 than	 individual,	 experience	 of	 a	 phenomenon	
(Trigwell	2006),	and	to	portray	relationships	between	conceptions	and	experience.	Illustrative	
quotes	 from	 the	 data	 attest	 to	 the	 categories	 and	 themes	 being	 rooted	 in	 participants’	 own	
words2	and	understandings.	Thus	the	focus	is	firmly	on	the	subjective	and	the	relational,	a	logic	
connecting	phenomenography	to	the	study’s	cultural	lens.		
	
Findings	
So	 what	 can	 a	 culture‐in‐action	 model	 of	 semiotic‐practices	 reveal	 about	 the	 effects	 of	
imprisonment	on	post‐release	experience?	Two	themes	emerging	from	the	research	findings	are	
illustrative.	Firstly,	the	data	reveal	that	there	is	an	embodied	way	of	being	an	ex‐prisoner.	A	set	
of	habits	and	acculturations	which	manifest	in	physicality:	a	man’s	walk,	his	posture;	his	way	of	
observing	those	around	him	without	looking	at	them;	the	rolling	of	a	cigarette.	Indeed,	smoking	
a	particular	brand	of	tobacco	is	indicative	of	how	prison	habits	persist	post‐release	as	symbols	
of	a	prison‐inflected	identity:		
	
They’ll	roll	cigarettes	like	they	are	still	in	prison,	like	pencil	thin.	They	will	smoke	a	
particular	 brand	 of	 tobacco	 called	 White	 Ox	 that	 everyone	 smokes	 that	 has	 ever	
been	in	jail	…	they	all	smoke	the	one	type	of	tobacco.	(SW08)	
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The	men	 interviewed	attest	 to	 the	universality	of	 ‘Ox’	 as	prison	 tobacco,	and	how	it	 identifies	
people	as	having	been	inside.	As	well	as	its	strength	–	 ‘it’d	be	milder	smoking	tree	bark	…	and	
gum	leaves,	god	 it	nearly	knocked	me	out!’	 (RP21)	–	and	hence	 its	addictive	quality,	 cigarette	
smoking	 represents	 a	 punctuating	 rhythm	 in	 the	 daily	 routine	 of	 prison	 life,	 a	 physical	 and	
psychological	 habit	 which	 –	 through	 frequent	 repetition	 –	 becomes	 entrenched.	 As	 RP21	
recounts:		
	
I	tried	to	stop	smoking	when	I	was	in	there	and	I	gave	that	up	for	a	month,	and	that	
was	just	torture,	because	that’s	all	you’ve	got	in	there	is	coffee	and	cigarettes	…	[Are	
you	 still	 smoking?]	 Yes,	 guess	what,	 I’m	 smoking	 this	 stupid	 pouch	 [of]	White	 Ox,	
yeah,	that’s	what	I	did	when	I	got	paid,	I	bought	two	pouches	of	that,	and	I	bought	a	
couple	of	papers	and	four	train	tickets	…	
	
Implying	it	is	one	of	his	daily	necessities	–	along	with	newspapers	and	train	tickets	–	RP21	links	
smoking	 Ox	 to	 prisoner	 ways	 of	 being	 which,	 despite	 ‘trying	 to	 move	 away	 from	 that’	 and	
admitting	‘cringing’,	is	a	hard	habit	to	break:		
	
I’m	 on	 the	 outside	 and	 I’m	 smoking	 whatever	 it	 is	 mild	 or	 something,	 all	 these	
people	smoking	Super	Mild,	Ultra	Mild,	and	they	go	to	prison	and	everyone’s	making	
these	 [thin	 ‘roll‐your‐owns’	with	Ox]	…	you	 can	 get	 [other	brands]	…	 [but	people]	
say	 if	 you	have	 this	 it’s	 stronger,	 and	 you	 get	used	 to	 it,	 and	 you	don’t	 even	want	
another	cigarette	as	quickly.	I	said	Christ	I	don’t	need	a	cigarette	for	six	hours	after	
that	one!	I	said	 I’d	be	 in	an	 iron	 lung	before	I	have	one	of	 these	again!	…	But	yeah	
that’s	about	the	only	thing	that	I’ve	got	a	prison	culture	on	me,	as	much	as	I	cringe	…	
yeah	 I	don’t	have	 to	buy	Ox,	 I	don’t	know	why	 I	 keep	buying	 it,	 I	 think	 just	out	of	
habit	…	
	
Though	RP21	 shielded	 himself	 from	 the	 absorption	 of	 prison	mores	 or	 the	 development	 of	 a	
prison	 identity	 through	 his	 sense	 of	 passing	 through,	 of	 never	 belonging	 in	 prison,	 he	
nevertheless	took	on	the	habit	of	smoking	Ox,	without	really	being	aware	of	how	or	why.	
	
Just	as	prison	tattoos	inscribe	the	skin,	ways	of	being	in	prison	can	thus	permeate	thinking	and	
inhabit	prisoners’	bodies.	As	SW08	describes:	
	
...	when	 the	 guys	 come	out	of	prison	and	 they	meet	up	here	 for	 instance	 they	will	
often	pace	up	and	down	in	their	little	basketball	yard	at	the	back,	have	you	ever	seen	
men	 in	a	prison	walking	up	and	down	 just	doing	 laps?	They	will	 go	 this	way,	 and	
then	they	turn	right,	and	then	go	back	and	then	turn	left	and	go	that	way,	and	you	
see	 them	 pacing	 like	 that,	 and	 they	 won’t	 even	 know	 they’re	 doing	 it.	 They	 are	
conditioned	to	that	sort	of	way	of	communicating	with	one	another.	They’ll	pace	up	
and	 down;	 they’ll	 dress	 like	 they	 are	 still	 in	 prison.	 They’ll	 carry	 themselves	 like	
they’re	still	in	prison.		
	
Evoked	 is	 a	 robotic	 return	 to	 the	way	physical	 space	 is	 navigated	 and	 traversed	 in	 prison,	 as	
though	 its	 spatial	 patterns	 are	 –	 like	 a	 tobacco	 habit	 –	 ingrained	 through	 repetition.	 Though	
these	physical	cultural	imprints	are	subtle,	minor,	they	nevertheless	signify	the	degree	to	which	
prison	ways	of	being	leak	out	into	the	post‐prison	world.	Other	ways	are	more	extreme	in	their	
intensity	of	experience	and	destructive	potential.	
	
Years	spent	in	and	out	of	prison	are	shown	to	limit	men’s	cultural	resources	to	those	available	
within	 the	prison	setting.	Violence	 is	normalised,	 indeed	honed	as	a	 skill.	 ‘Friends’	 are	prison	
‘associates’,	 ‘jailbirds’	 and	 ‘druggies’.	 Adapting	 to	 prison	 life	 clearly	 involves	 the	 forging	 of	 a	
prison	identity	–	‘you're	a	prisoner	and	you're	one	of	the	boys’	(SW12)	–	and	the	destabilising	of	
men’s	 pre‐prison	 identity,	 their	 social	 place.	 While	 different	 prison‐selves	 manifest	 –	 arising	
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from	individual	circumstances,	causes	and	conditions	–	a	common	thread	links	their	emergence	
into	 post‐prison	 light:	 ‘when	 they	 get	 out	 they	 don’t	 have	 a	 [social]	 place	 …	 and	 they	 lose	
whatever	 sense	of	 self	 they	had	…	which	 can	 cause	 that	out	of	 control	 spiral’	 (SW09).	This	 is	
conceived	by	workers	as	relating	to	the	 length	of	 time	spent	 in	prison:	 ‘probably	up	to	twelve	
months	is	not	so	bad,	but	when	it	gets	into	two,	three	years,	it	becomes	a	little	more	freaky	for	
them’	(SW13);	yet	the	men’s	pre‐prison	sense	of	self	appears	to	shape	the	degree	to	which	their	
prison	identity	becomes	‘ingrained’	(RP07).		
	
RP07,	 for	 example,	 has	 a	 clearly	 demarcated	 prison	 identity	 and	 describes	 the	 choosing	 and	
crafting	of	implements	his	prison	role	entails:	
	
I	prefer	…	[to]	snap	open	a	razor	blade	and	melt	the	blades	into	a	toothbrush,	shave	
the	toothbrush	bit	off	and	melt	the	blades	into	it,	melt	about	three	or	four	blades	in,	
all	 different	ways,	 so	no	matter	which	way	you	get	 them	…	 it	will	 open	up	 in	 two	
spots	so	it’s	harder	for	 ’em	to	sew	back	together,	and	leaves	a	bigger	scar,	and	you	
get	 ’em	straight	down	the	face	and	that	way	everyday	they	look	in	the	mirror	they	
know	that	it	was	you	who	done	it.	
	
RP07	conveys	a	sense	of	asserting	his	prison	identity	through	his	attack	strategy,	as	though	by	
leaving	his	mark	on	his	victim,	so	‘they	know	it	was	you	who	done	it’,	his	reputation	of	being	‘a	
bit	fucked	in	the	head’,	and	hence	not	to	be	messed	with,	is	underscored.		
	
Notwithstanding	the	matter‐of‐fact	way	RP07	relates	this	experience,	implying	its	normality,	he	
also	 recognises	 that	 –	 while	 functional	 in	 prison	 –	 such	 behaviour	 is	 dysfunctional	 and	
unacceptable	outside:	 ‘that’s	the	type	of	thing	that	I	bring	outside	with	me,	and	then	I’ve	gotta	
try	and	not	be	like	that	out	here,	you	know?’	He	describes	how	being	‘like	that’	is	‘just	ingrained	
in	me	now’,	implying	that	violence	is	an	automatic	response:		
	
...	it’s	like	…	over	twenty	bucks	the	other	day	I	was	gonna	go	to	my	mate’s	place	and	
kick	his	 front	door	 in,	with	 three	other	people,	 and	…	 just	wreck	 him	over	 twenty	
bucks,	man,	you	know?	(RP07)		
	
His	sense	of	dismay	at	being	‘like	that’	is	palpable.	Yet	the	costs	of	‘cultural	retooling’	(Swidler,	
1986)	for	RP07	are	high,	possibly	too	high	to	contemplate.	Without	any	‘straight	friends’,	with	
limited	family	support,	and	only	a	case	worker	to	rely	on,	his	social	and	cultural	resources	are	
limited.	And	 in	his	 ‘unsettled’	post‐release	 life,	where	cultural	models	compete	 in	a	 ‘contested	
cultural	arena’,	the	familiarity	of	his	 ‘old	life’	and	his	 ‘druggie	mates’	vie	for	 ‘authority	of	habit	
[and]	normality’	(Swidler,	1986:	279).	A	battle	is	evoked	for	‘crims’	like	RP07,	who:	
	
...	have	had	their	whole	life	destroyed	when	they	were	kids,	…	they’ve	been	trained	
into	this	is	what	your	life	will	be	more	or	less	and	then	having	to	battle	every	time	
they	turn	around,	battle	and	battle	and	battle…	(RP18)	
	
Conclusion	
These	 themes	 illustrate	how	meanings	and	behaviours	which	 function	 in	a	prison	context	can	
shape	and	 inflect	men’s	post‐prison	experience,	 their	 identity	and	 interactions.	 In	this	way,	as	
Sampson	and	Bean	 (2006)	contend,	 culture	can	 constitute	 social	 structure,	manifesting	 in	 the	
constraints	 which	militate	 against	 ex‐prisoners’	 post‐release	 integration.	Whether	 these	 take	
the	 form	of	 subtle	 cultural	 imprints	 that	are	hard	habits	 to	break,	and	which	shadow	a	man’s	
sense	of	self.	Or	habits,	skills	and	styles	–	such	as	prison	cultural	norms	of	violence	–	 learned,	
honed,	 incorporated	 and	 which	 mark	 out	 a	 prisoner	 identity.	 Clearly,	 ‘there	 is	 continuity	
between	what	occurs	within	the	prison	environment	and	what	occurs	outside	of	it’	(Arrigo	and	
Milovanovic	2009:	39).	A	cultural	perspective	provides	a	way	of	understanding	this	continuity	
and	its	impact	on	men’s	experience	of	getting	out	and	staying	out	of	prison.		
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1  This	 PhD	 was	 undertaken	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Australian	 Prisons	 Project	 (www.app.unsw.edu.au),	 supported	 by	 an	
Australian	Research	Council	Discovery	Program	grant	(DP0877331).	
2		 The	speakers	are	designated	‘RP’	(‘released	prisoner’)	or	‘SW’	(‘support	worker’)	with	a	numeric	tag.	
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Abstract	
The	concept	of	environmental	 justice	 is	well	developed	 in	North	America,	but	 is	 still	at	 the	
evolutionary	stage	in	most	other	jurisdictions	around	the	globe.	This	paper	seeks	to	explore	
two	jurisdictions	where	incidents	of	environmental	justice	are	likely	to	be	seen	in	the	future	
as	a	result	of	manufacturing	and	mining	practices.	The	discussion	will	centre	upon	avenues	to	
environmental	 justice	for	both	private	citizens	and	the	public	at	 large.	The	first	 jurisdiction	
considered	 is	China,	where	environmental	 liability	claims	brought	by	Chinese	citizens	have	
increased	 at	 an	 annual	 average	 of	 25%	 (Yang	 2011).	 Manufacturing	 is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	
Chinese	economy	and	is	responsible	for	some	of	the	unprecedented	economic	growth	in	the	
region.	 Less	 discussed	 are	 the	 industry	 impacts	 on	 water	 and	 air	 pollution	 levels	 and	 the	
associated	implications	of	these	pollutants	on	local	communities.	China	introduced	the	Tort	
Liability	 Law	 (TLL)	 in	 2010,	 which	may	 provide	 avenues	 to	 justice	 for	 private	 citizens.	 In	
terms	of	public	at	large,	public	interest	litigation	in	China	is	developing,	though	at	a	restricted	
level.	The	other	jurisdiction	considered	by	the	paper	is	Australia,	where	the	mining	boom	has	
buffered	the	Australian	economy	from	the	global	financial	crisis.	There	is	some	limited	case	
law	 in	 Australia	 where	 private	 citizens	 have	 made	 a	 claim	 in	 toxic	 torts.	 However,	 the	
framework	is	under‐developed	in	contrast	to	the	risk	presented	to	many	communities	by,	for	
example,	toxic	chemical	leakage	from	unconventional	gas	extraction.	Public	interest	litigation	
in	 Australia	 is	 supported	 by	 expansive	 legislative	 provisions,	 but	 systemic	 barriers	 are	
proving	 challenging.	 This	 paper	 traces	 the	 regulatory	 responses	 to	 the	 affects	 of	 major	
industries	 on	 communities	 in	 China	 and	 Australia.	 From	 this	 it	 examines	 the	 need	 for	
environmental	justice	avenues	that	align	with	rule	of	law	principles.		
	
	
Background	
Primarily,	this	paper	is	about	unequal	exposure	to	environmental	pollution	impacts	in	Australia	
and	China	experienced	by	vulnerable	people	or	communities.	It	examines	methods	of	pursuing	
environmental	justice	by	affected	parties.	The	following	will	 introduce	the	goal	and	concept	of	
environmental	 justice	as	a	 frame	 for	distributional	 justice	 issues.	From	this	starting	point,	 the	
paper	 will	 compare	 and	 consider	 the	 Chinese	 and	 Australian	 legal	 responses	 to	 situations	
involving	 environmental	 justice	 issues.	 This	work	 concludes	 by	 advocating	 for	 environmental	
justice	 avenues	 that	provide	 clear,	 enforceable	 rights,	which	 approach	 aligns	with	 rule	of	 law	
principles.		
	
Environmental	justice	
Environmental	justice	focuses	on	the	equitable	distribution	amongst	people	of	natural	resources	
and	environmental	harms	(Low	and	Gleeson	1998:	2).	Yet	what	defines	environmental	 justice	
has	escaped	uniformity	and	instead	been	left	open	for	interpretation	depending	on	the	context	
(e.g.	 Walker	 2012:	 11).	 It	 is	 clear	 though	 that	 environmental	 justice	 has	 the	 objective	 of	 ‘...	
equitable	treatment	of	people	of	all	races,	incomes	and	cultures	with	respect	to	environmental	
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law,	 regulations,	 policies	 and	 decisions’	 (Slater	 and	 Pedersen	 2008).	 Consequently,	
environmental	 justice	 stems	 from	 the	 right	 to	 live	 in	 a	 healthy	 environment	 with	 access	 to	
adequate	natural	resources	(Bullard	2005:	43).		
	
A	large	body	of	research	consistently	illustrates	that	environmental	and	social	inequalities	are	
linked	(e.g.	Bullard	1990:	23).	Research	contends	that	disadvantaged	groups	are	more	likely	to	
be	 located	 in	 polluted	 neighbourhoods	 or	 in	 risk	 areas,	 and	 so	 these	 communities	 are	more	
likely	 to	 have	 health	 issues	 related	 to	 toxins	 exposure	 (e.g.	 Banzhaf	 2012:	 14).	 For	 instance,	
Burningham	and	Walker	 (2011:	220),	using	a	 geographical	 information	 system	and	 statistical	
methods,	determined	that,	‘...	if	you	are	highly	deprived	you	are	more	likely	to	live	in	a	flood	risk	
area,	than	others	who	are	much	less	deprived’.	 In	addition,	studies	reveal	that	vulnerability	to	
environmental	hazards	increases	in	marginalised	communities	due	to	social	conditions	such	as	
inability	to	access	health	care	(e.g.	Cutter	2012:	126‐127).	In	line	with	this,	Walker	(2012:	46)	
acknowledges	the	role	of	vulnerability	and	explains	that	‘...	not	all	people	are	necessarily	equally	
affected	 by	 an	 environmental	 burden’.	 For	 instance,	 studies	 suggest	 children	 in	 low‐income	
communities	are	often	more	vulnerable	to	air	pollution,	as	 illustrated	through	the	numbers	of	
asthma	attacks	 (Brown	 	 et	 al.2003).	 Importantly	 though,	 some	 scholars	 have	highlighted	 that	
much	 empirical	 uncertainty	 still	 surrounds	 geographic	 patterns	 of	 unequal	 distributions	 and	
their	health	effects	on	disadvantaged	groups	(e.g.	Bowen	2002).	
	
Role	of	the	law	in	achieving	environmental	justice	
The	rule	of	law	is	an	ideal	that	requires	clear,	enforceable	rights	and	the	supremacy	of	law	over	
all	 other	 institutions	 (e.g.	 Flores	 and	Himma	2012:	 23).	 It	 is	 acknowledged	 that,	while	 law	 at	
national	 and	 international	 levels	 can	 foster	 environmental	 justice,	 it	 has	 not	 reached	 its	 full	
potential	(UNEP	2013).		
	
Public	 law	 creates	 environmental	 protection	 legislation	 that	 is	 vital	 for	 addressing	
environmental	justice	objectives,	for	example,	through	requiring	by	law	pollution	control	tools.	
Arguably	 though,	 these	 legislative	 tools	have	not	been	designed	 to	meet	 distributional	 justice	
issues,	such	as	the	unequal	distribution	of	environmental	harms	(e.g.	Lazarus	1993:	787).		
	
Private	 law,	 such	 as	 litigation,	 provides	 a	 critical	medium	 for	 compensating	 victims,	 pursuing	
environmental	 justice	and	deterring	 future	environmental	harms	 (Kroll‐Smith	and	Westervelt	
2004:	183).	However,	private	 law	can	pose	difficulties	 for	vulnerable	people	and	communities	
as,	for	example,	legal	costs	and	evidentiary	burdens	often	create	insurmountable	barriers.		
	
This	paper	explores	the	ability	of	current	laws	in	China	and	Australia	to	pursue	environmental	
justice	 objectives.	 It	 suggests	 that	 precisely	 drafted,	 legally	 binding	 rules	 and	 institutional	
enforcement	of	the	rules	in	practice	is	required	in	both	Australia	and	China.	This	response	aligns	
with	rule	of	law	principles	and	remains	just	one	facet	of	working	towards	environmental	justice.	
	
Aims		
1. What	are	the	legal	avenues	to	environmental	justice	in	China?	
2. What	are	the	legal	avenues	to	environmental	justice	in	Australia?	
3. How	do	the	legal	responses	to	environmental	justice	issues	in	China	and	Australia	
compare?	
4. What	is	needed	for	Australia	and	China	to	effectively	work	towards	environmental	
justice	objectives?	
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China	
What	environment	related	issues	are	evident?		
Since	large‐scale	economic	reforms	in	the	late	1970s,	China	has	experienced	breakneck	growth	
towards	 a	 highly	 competitive	market	 economy.	 Over	 the	 past	 30	 years,	 China’s	 economy	 has	
doubled	in	size	every	seven	to	eight	years	and	accounts	for	15%	of	global	GDP	(The	Australian	
Treasury	2012).	Chinese	citizens	have	benefited	from	the	economic	growth	through	improved	
standards	 of	 living,	 for	 example,	 on	 average	 increases	 in	 food	 consumption	 and	 access	 to	
education	 (Nolan	 2007:	 5).	 It	 is	 estimated	 that	 this	 economic	 growth	 resulted	 in	 250	million	
Chinese	people	no	longer	living	in	poverty	(Stalley	2010:	1).		
	
But	 this	 accelerated	 rate	 of	 economic	 growth	 has	 also	 resulted	 in	 significant	 challenges	with	
regard	 to	 pollution.	 China’s	 industrialisation	 is	 a	 causal	 factor	 in	 a	 range	 of	 severe	
environmental	 damages	 to	 air,	 water	 and	 soil	 quality.	 It	 is	 also	 contributed	 to	 losses	 of	
biodiversity,	 wet	 lands	 and	 agricultural	 land.	 As	 an	 example,	 it	 has	 been	 estimated	 by	 the	
Chinese	ministry	that	industries	cause	40%	of	water	pollution	and	80%	of	air	pollution	in	China	
(Wang	Hua	et	al.	2004).		
	
The	 adverse	 impacts	 on	 health	 of	 Chinese	 citizens	 from	 environmental	 damage	 profoundly	
reveal	 the	 connection	 between	 humans	 and	 the	 natural	 world.	 The	 World	 Bank	 placed	 the	
number	 of	 Chinese	people	dying	prematurely	due	 to	 air	 and	water	pollution	 at	 760,000	 each	
year,	yet	some	scholars	have	estimated	that	the	figure	is	actually	two	million	(The	World	Bank	
2007;	Orts	2002:	555).	China’s	State	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(SEPA)	has	revealed	that	
70%	 of	 the	 water	 in	 five	 of	 the	 seven	 major	 river	 systems	 is	 unsuitable	 for	 human	 contact	
(Briggs	2006).	Additionally,	a	government	report	found	that	10%	of	China’s	farm	soil	has	been	
contaminated	with	toxins,	including	lead,	arsenic	and	mercury	(Phillips	2013).		
	
What	is	the	legal	framework	for	environmental	regulation	in	China?	
China’s	 Government	 has	 a	 constitutional	 obligation	 to	 improve	 the	 living	 environment	 and	
control	 pollution	 (Article	 26).	 This	 commitment,	 coupled	 with	 international	 pressure,	 have	
resulted	 in	a	variety	of	measures	being	 taken,	which	aim	to	reduce	the	 impact	of	pollution	on	
health	 and	 environment.	 These	 measures	 are	 largely	 based	 on	 Five‐Year	 plans	 that	 involve	
environmental	 and	 resource	 conservation	 targets;	 improved	 pollution	 monitoring,	 and	
increased	 investment	 in	 green	 technology	 (e.g.	 Shen	 2013;	 National	 People’s	 Congress	 of	 the	
People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	 2013).	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 there	 remains	 a	 significant	 gap	
between	environmental	regulations	and	the	quality	of	the	environment	(Francesh‐Huidobro	et	
al.	2012).	This	gap	is	perhaps	illustrative	of	the	limited	rule	of	law	in	China.		
	
A	 key	 regulator	 of	 Government	 initiatives	 is	 the	 SEPA,	 which	 was	 established	 in	 2008	 as	 a	
ministry	 (Li	 2012:	 29).	 SEPA	 are	 involved	 with	 policy	 drafting	 and	 implementation	 and	
compliance	 activities	 (Briggs	 2006).	 Another	 main	 enforcement	 body	 are	 the	 specialised	
environmental	courts	of	which	a	hundred	such	courts	were	setup	in	2011	(Zhang	2012).		
	
In	terms	of	sources	of	law,	China	has	a	broad	range	of	regulations,	law	and	policy	instruments	
that	 has	 been	 largely	 developed	 over	 the	 last	 thirty	 years.	 It	 is	 observed	 that,	 ‘China's	
environmental	 protection	 regime	 ...	 is	 comprised	 of	 approximately	 twenty	 laws,	 forty	
regulations,	 five	 hundred	 standards,	 and	 six	 hundred	 other	 legal	 norm‐creating	 documents	
related	to	environmental	protection	and	pollution	control’	(Stalley	2010:	23).	
	
What	are	the	legal	avenues	to	environmental	justice	in	China?		
Imposing	liability	for	environmental	harm	forms	part	of	China’s	multifaceted	legal	approach	to	
environmental	 issues.	 A	 claim	 can	 be	 brought	 against	 a	 polluter	 either	 by	 a	 person	 directly	
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impacted	or	by	an	organisation	seeking	to	promote	environmental	 law.	These	two	avenues	to	
environmental	justice	will	now	be	addressed.		
	
Environmental	Justice	for	Chinese	Pollution‐victims:	Private	Interest	Litigation	
Before	 the	 TLL,	 provisions	 in	 Chinese	 law	 potentially	 allowed	 citizens	 to	 seek	 compensation	
from	polluting	companies.	However,	 the	law	was	applied	inconsistently	and	created	confusion	
for	 both	 judiciary	 and	 those	 involved	 in	 a	 claim	 (Yang	 and	 Moster,	 2011).	 Main	 struggles	
experienced	 by	 pollution‐victims	 included	 meeting	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 required	 and	
overcoming	 ambiguous	 provisions	 (Faure	 and	 Weiqiang	 2011).	 These	 struggles	 were	
aggravated	 by	 the	 power	 imbalance	 between	 the	 polluter’s	 resources,	 such	 as,	 money	 and	
political	favour,	and	the	pollution‐victim’s	relative	poverty	and	poor	health.		
	
The	TLL	was	a	response	to	these	issues	and	the	consistently	growing	number	of	environmental	
lawsuits.	The	legislation	explicitly	outlines	environmental	liability,	rights	and	obligations.	In	this	
way,	as	will	be	discussed,	China’s	approach	to	environmental	justice	is	far	more	developed	than	
in	Australia.		
	
Strengths	of	the	TLL		
For	China,	 the	TLL	is	the	first	comprehensive	 legal	avenue	for	victims	of	harm	suffered	by	the	
actions	of	another.	The	legislation	provides	a	range	of	rights	and	remedies	for	victims	of	not	just	
environmental	harm,	but	also,	 for	example,	 those	damaged	by	 traffic	accidents.	 It	 is	explained	
that,	‘Torts	law	adoption	is	acclaimed	in	China	as	a	significant	modern	legislative	achievement	in	
civil	 rights	 protection’	 (Zhang	 2011:	 418).	 Consequently,	 its	 introduction	 may	 reflect	 the	
increasingly	significant	role	of	rights‐defending	litigation	and	the	rule	of	law	in	China.		
	
The	TLL	has	three	main	attributes	that	work	towards	environmental	justice	objectives.		
The	first	attribute,	contained	in	Article	1	of	the	TLL,	provides	that	its	purpose	is	to	‘prevent	and	
punish’.	 By	 including	 punishment	 as	 an	 objective,	 the	 TLL	 is	 potentially	 creating	 a	 strong	
deterrence	effect,	and	this	 is	particularly	so	when	compared	with	Australian	 law	 in	which	 the	
focus	remains	on	compensating	victims.	
	
The	second	attribute,	contained	in	Article	65,	creates	strict	liability,	that	is,	the	polluter	will	be	
liable	 for	 pollution‐damage	 even	 if	 it	 does	 not	 breach	 an	 environmental	 standard.	 While	
negligence	imposes	liability	 for	a	 failure	to	exercise	reasonable	care,	strict	 liability	means	that	
the	 polluter	 defendant	 would	 have	 to	 pay	 the	 victim	 for	 any	 harm	 (Coman	 2012:	 145).	 This	
approach	 contrasts	with	 Australian	 law	where	 a	 pollution‐victim	may	 need	 to	 prove	 that	 the	
polluter	had	intention	or	was	careless	before	they	could	potentially	access	a	remedy.		
	
The	third	attribute,	contained	in	Article	66,	shifts	the	burden	of	proof	from	the	pollution‐victim	
to	the	polluter.	After	a	victim	plaintiff	has	proved	that	they	have	incurred	damage	by	pollution,	
then	 it	 falls	 on	 the	 defendant	 polluter	 to	 disprove	 that	 their	 project	 caused	 the	 harm	 to	 the	
victim	 plaintiff	 (Peel	 2009:	 23).	 In	 some	ways,	 this	 helps	 address	 the	 inequality	 between	 the	
polluter	and	pollution	victim,	as	it	is	easier	to	prove	harm	suffered	by	providing,	for	example,	a	
Doctor’s	certificate,	than	it	 is	to	prove	the	cause	of	the	harm.	This	point	will	now	be	expanded	
upon.		
	
It	has	been	found	that	the	lower‐socioeconomic	groups	and	rural	communities	of	China	are	the	
most	likely	to	experience	severe	harm	from	pollution	(The	World	Bank	2007).	A	victim	plaintiff	
is	 very	 unlikely	 to	 be	 anywhere	 near	 as	 informed,	 influential	 or	 wealthy	 as	 the	 polluter	
defendant.	 By	 requiring	 the	 polluter	 defendant	 to	 produce	 evidence,	 the	 pressure	 and	
responsibility	is	placed	on	the	party	who	has	better	access	to	information	and	other	resources	
(Crannor	 1999:	 81).	 Accordingly,	 the	 pollution	 victim	 no	 longer	 has	 to	 prove	 complex	 legal	
causation	elements	and	this	may	enhance	their	ability	to	bring	an	action.	As	an	example,	in	April	
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2009,	a	textile	mill	was	ordered	to	pay	compensation	to	a	fish	farm	for	harm	that	occurred	over	
15	years	previously,	as	the	textile	mill	could	not	disprove	the	allegations	(Percival	2010:	44).		
	
Additionally,	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 shift	 reflects	 the	 use	 of	 international	 environmental	 law	
principles	being	adopted	in	China	(Kelly	2012:	544).	The	precautionary	principle	is	a	method	of	
decision‐making	first	recommended	at	the	Rio	Conference	in	1992.	In	the	following	declaration,	
Principle	15	described	that,	‘Where	there	are	threats	of	serious	or	irreversible	damage,	lack	of	full	
scientific	certainty	shall	not	be	used	as	a	reason	for	postponing	cost‐effective	measures	to	prevent	
environmental	degradation’.	Given	the	difficulties	with	establishing	that	an	environmental	harm	
caused	damage,	the	shift	in	burden	of	proof	can	help	prevent	uncertainty	being	used	as	a	tool	for	
polluters	seeking	to	be	unaccountable	(Whiteside	2006).	Moreover,	it	has	been	suggested	that	if	
a	 defendant	 polluter	 has	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 they	 are	more	motivated	 to	 reduce	 the	 threats	
posed	by	their	activities	(Crannor	1999:	81).		
	
Australia	 places	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 on	 the	 alleged	 pollution‐victim	 to	 prove	 complex	 legal	
causation	 matters.	 In	 this	 way,	 Australia	 can	 learn	 from	 China’s	 legislative	 response	 to	 the	
power	imbalances	between	polluters	and	pollution‐victims.		
	
Alleged	defects	for	TLL		
While	 the	 TLL	 in	 theory	 provides	 effective	 justice	 for	 pollution‐victims,	 in	 practice	 China’s	
systemic	barriers	to	justice	continue	to	hinder	progress.	A	key	barrier	is	that	enforcement	of	the	
TLL.	 This	 issue	 reflects	 the	 overall	 weakness	 in	 China’s	 governance	 system,	 in	 which	
enforceability	 is	 limited	 by	 corruption	 and	 an	 overriding	 desire	 for	 economic	 growth	 (Gang	
2009).	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 discussion,	 these	 issues	 can	 be	 divided	 up	 into	 lack	 of	
independent	court	systems,	local	protectionism,	mediation	and	transparency.	
	
Lack	of	an	Independent	Court	System	
Various	factors	result	in	China	lacking	an	independent	court	system	to	enforce	the	TLL.		
Due	to	a	historical	and	cultural	focus	on	social	values,	collectivism	and	moral	persuasion,	China	
only	relatively	recently	began	to	implement	laws	(e.g.	Feng	2009).	As	a	result,	there	is	a	lack	of	
trained	 judges	 and	 legal	 professionals	 to	 assist	 in	 resolving	disputes.	 For	 example,	 it	was	not	
until	mid‐2005	that	50%	of	judges	in	China	held	Bachelor	Degrees	(Liebman	2007:	625).		
	
In	 addition,	 corruption	 is	 generally	 regarded	 as	 influential	 in	 civil	 court	 decisions.	 Courts	 are	
accountable	to	the	section	of	government	that	created	them,	and	are	thus	subject	to	supervision	
by	 Party	 Committee	 and	 Party	 organisations	 (Peerenboom	 2002:	 280).	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 the	
funding	 system	 impacts	 on	 the	 independence	 of	 courts.	 Local	 courts	 are	 funded	 by	 and	
dependent	 on	 local	 governments	 for	 all	 expenses,	 including	 salaries	 and	 insurance	 for	 judges	
(Peerenboom	 2002:	 281;	 Kelley	 2012:	 539).	 This	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 judges	 being	
influenced	by	the	desires	of	others.		
	
Moreover,	 lack	 of	 enforcement	 of	 court	 decisions	 is	 a	 major,	 persisting	 issue	 due	 to	 the	 ‘...	
continued	intervention	by	party‐state	officials	and	administrative	departments,	an	undeveloped	
credit	 system,	 and	 weak	 punishment	 for	 non‐compliance	 with	 court	 orders’	 (Liebman	 2007:	
625).	Importantly,	the	Chinese	government	has	made	recent,	critical	improvements	to	judiciary	
by,	for	example,	requiring	new	judges	to	sit	a	bar	exam	(Ding	2010).		
	
Local	protectionism	
Environmental	rights,	such	as	those	contained	in	the	TLL,	are	often	not	enforced	due	to	a	desire	
to	 protect	 local	 economic	 growth	 and	 to	 provide	 favouritism	 to	 enterprises	with	 government	
connections	 (e.g.	 Wang	 2011:	 10895).	 Local	 leader’s	 job	 performance	 and	 future	 promotion	
potential	 is	 measured	 according	 to	 economic	 growth	 of	 the	 region,	 and	 this	 creates	 a	
disincentive	 for	 promoting	 environmental	 protections	 that	 may	 interfere	 with	 industry	 (e.g.	
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Gang	2009;	Li	2012).	Further,	the	local	governments	provide	the	funding	for	the	environmental	
protection	agency	specific	to	their	area,	 thus	increasingly	the	 likelihood	that	 local	government	
agendas	will	take	priority	(e.g.	Gang	2009:	22;	Francesh‐Huidobro	et	al.	2012).	Recent	research	
in	the	Kunming	region	revealed	that,	while	the	local	government	purports	to	support	strict	law	
enforcement,	it	will	continue	to	allow	industries	to	operate	even	though	they	are	not	complying	
with	 the	 law,	 as	 the	 industries	present	 an	 important	 source	of	 local	 income	 (Van	Rooij	 2009:	
27).		
	
Preferences	for	mediation		
A	cultural	and	historical	focus	on	mediation	for	resolving	disputes	exists	in	China	(Jieren	2011:	
1068).	This	preference	can	present	a	barrier	to	justice	for	pollution‐victims.	Mediation	does	not	
have	 a	 binding	 outcome.	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 unequal	 bargaining	 power	 between	 a	 highly‐
resourced	industry	and	an	individual,	 likely	disadvantaged	victim.	It	has	been	noted	that	often	
‘...	the	stronger	party	may	offer	some	money	in	exchange	for	the	victims’	acceptance	of	pollution’	
and	that	this	settlement	tends	to	be	‘...	far	less	than	proper	compensation’	(Zhao	2004:	160).	In	
contrast	to	confidential	mediation,	litigation	in	the	Chinese	environmental	law	arena,	can	serve	
an	 important	 public	 awareness	 raising	 role,	 pressure	 administrative	 response,	 enhance	
deterrence	effect	on	industries	and	expose	legal	gaps	and	injustices	(Zhao	2004:	174‐175;	Wang	
2011).		
	
Transparency		
Access	to	information	about	pollution	and	the	encouragement	of	public	participation	is	largely	
restricted	in	China,	which	in	turn	affects	the	enforceability	of	the	TLL	(e.g.	Martin	2011:	160).	It	
was	not	until	1996	that	environmental	issues	entered	mainstream	discourse	in	China	(Li	2012:	
29).	Nevertheless,	issues	in	relation	to	transparency	are	improving	due	to	internet	access	as,	for	
example,	 local	 environmental	 protection	 agencies	 have	 websites	 that	 contain	 information	
relating	 to	 the	 relevant	 region.	 Additionally,	 mainstream	 media	 and	 activist	 groups	 are	
increasingly	 drawing	 attention	 to	 climate	 change	 and	 the	 need	 for	 environmental	 protection	
(Gang	 2009:	 158).	 However,	 there	 are	widespread	 instances	 of	 environmental	 activists	 being	
arrested	 for	 reasons	 such	 as,	 being	 a	 threat	 to	 national	 security	 (e.g.	 Watts	 2010).	 As	 an	
example,	 Chinese	 activist	 Liu	 Futang	 was	 arrested	 last	 October	 for	 publishing	 information	
without	a	license	when	he	distributed	books	about	environmental	protection	(Richburg	2012).	
Additionally,	transparency	and	accountability	is	severely	hampered	by	the	de‐centralised	nature	
of	 China’s	 system	 of	 governance.	 A	 small,	 central	 government	 creates	 policy,	 and	 the	
implementation	 is	 left	 to	 the	 discretion	 of	 provinces	 and	 local	 governments	 (Rong	 2011).	
Consequently,	the	local	resistance	to	environmental	justice	claims	may	prevent	progress.		
	
It	seems	then	that	environmental	justice	requires	rule	of	law	ideals	such	as	law	as	the	supreme	
power	over	government.	For	the	TLL	to	be	an	effective	avenue	to	environmental	justice,	China’s	
institutional	and	regulatory	 framework	needs	to	be	significantly	acknowledged	and	improved.	
These	changes	may	gradually	unfold	with	 the	help	of	 the	emerging	 legal	 culture	 in	China	 that	
emphasises	rule	of	law	principles	(Delmas‐Marty	2003:	28).		
	
Environmental	Justice	in	Public	Interest	Litigation		
Public	interest	litigation	is	defined	as	a	‘...	lawsuit	which	is	brought	to	the	court	by	an	individual,	
organisation	or	agency	 to	prevent	harmful	behaviour	which	may	unreasonably	damage	public	
social	 or	 personal	 interests’	 (Mingde	 2011:	 218).	 It	 differs	 from	 cases	 that	 involve	 a	 specific	
victim,	 for	example,	a	person	who	 is	 ill.	Accordingly,	Tang	and	Sun	(2012:	186)	comment	that	
this	 avenue	 provides	 the	 ‘...	 means	 of	 achieving	 environmental	 justice	 and	 environmental	
democracy,	 this	 litigation	 inspires	public	participation,	giving	opportunity,	means	and	ways	to	
public	participation	in	environmental	affairs’.	
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A	 number	 of	 China’s	 environmental	 courts	 have	 allowed	 organisations	 and	 government	
agencies	 to	bring	a	 claim	 in	 the	public	 interest	 (Wang	 	et	al.2011:	10899).	Non‐governmental	
organisations	(‘NGO’s’)	in	China	have	a	particular	advantage	over	pollution‐victims	in	terms	of	
their	 finance	and	knowledge.	However,	unlike	provisions	 for	government	bodies,	 there	are	no	
provisions	granting	NGOs	or	concerned	citizens	 the	right	 to	bring	an	action	against	a	polluter	
(Mingde	 and	Fengyuan	et	 al.	 2011:	 230).	Accordingly,	 in	2010,	 of	 the	 very	 limited	number	of	
public	 interest	 cases	 brought	 to	 the	 environmental	 courts,	 all	 were	 brought	 by	 agencies	
affiliated	 with	 the	 government	 as	 opposed	 to	 independent	 bodies	 (Yang	 and	 Moser	 2011:	
10900).	As	an	example,	members	of	the	Law	School	of	Peking	University	filed	a	lawsuit	when	a	
factory	 explosion	 resulted	 in	 large	 quantities	 of	 carcinogenic	 materials	 leaking	 into	 a	 river;	
however,	 their	 claim	was	 rejected	 by	 the	 court’s	 clerk	 as	 they	were	 not	 considered	 to	 be	 an	
aggrieved	party	(Wang	2007).		
	
Progress	in	China’s	public	interest	litigation	has	been	restricted.	Yet,	significant	potential	exists	
for	positive	developments	due	to	the	increasing	awareness	of	pollution	impacts,	along	with	rises	
in	rights‐based	litigation	(Dai	2003).	These	trends	continue	to	fuel	Chinese	scholars,	the	media	
and	NGO’s	demands	for	expanding	public	interest	litigation.	
	
Australia	
What	environment	related	issues	are	evident	in	Australia?	
In	contrast	to	China’s	manufacturing	focus,	Australia’s	economic	growth	is	largely	due	to	export	
revenue	 from	 mineral	 and	 energy	 sources.	 Mining	 contributes	 11%	 of	 Australia’s	 GDP	 and	
employs	over	220,000	Australians	(DFAT	2012).		
	
In	recent	years,	unconventional	gas	extraction	has	become	a	large	focus	of	the	mining	industry,	
particularly	 in	 Queensland	 where	 40,000	 new	 wells	 are	 forecasted	 for	 the	 next	 30	 years.	
Unconventional	gas	includes	coal	seam	gas	(CSG)	and	shale	gas.	To	extract	unconventional	gas,	
drilling	 into	 the	 ground	 to	 loosen	 pressure	 and	 release	 gas	 is	 required,	 and	 stimulation	
techniques,	 like	 hydraulic	 fracturing	 (fraccing)	 can	 be	 used.	 Fraccing,	 a	 process	 increasingly	
used	 in	Queensland,	 involves	pumping	a	mix	of	water,	 sand	and	chemicals	 into	 the	ground	 to	
form	cracks	in	rock	formations	which	helps	release	gas	and	water.		
	
Generally,	impoverished	people	in	Australia	are	the	most	exposed	to	and	harmed	by,	pollutant	
qualities.	Millner	 (2011:192)	 outlined	 that,	 in	 Victoria,	 often	 toxic	 and	 hazardous	waste	 sites	
have	populations	of	lower	socio‐economic	status	and	high	unemployment.		
	
In	terms	of	environmental	liability,	public	health	concerns	tend	to	focus	on	the	chemicals	used	
in	 the	 extraction	 process	 that	 can	 contaminate	water	 used	 for	 both	 drinking	 and	 agriculture	
(Hunter	2011:	10).	 In	 fact,	 there	has	been	a	string	of	contaminations	 in	Queensland	 from	CSG	
industries.	As	an	example,	in	2010	the	Queensland	Government	gave	environmental	approval	to	
a	 CSG	 company	 operating	 near	 Chinchilla	 to	 discharge	 the	 equivalent	 of	 eight	 Olympic	 sized	
swimming	pools	of	‘treated	water’	into	the	nearby	Condamine	River.	It	has	been	established	that	
this	 ‘treated	 water’	 breaches	 EPA	 standards,	 as	 it	 is	 potentially	 toxic	 to	 aquatic	 organisms	
(Carlisle	2012).	Moreover,	in	2011,	the	Queensland	Government	investigated	a	gas	field	west	of	
Brisbane	after	cancer‐causing	chemical	traces	were	found	at	fives	bores	(Agius	2011).	
	
The	 impact	 of	 unconventional	 gas	 extraction	 on	 air	 quality	 is	 also	 becoming	 a	 concern,	
particularly	after	the	findings	of	a	Colarado	School	of	Public	Health	Study	(McKenzie	2012).	The	
data,	 based	 on	 three	 years	 of	 examinations,	 revealed	 that	 fraccing	 released	 potentially	 toxic	
hydrocarbons	 into	 the	 air,	 which	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 cause	 health	 problems	 ranging	 from	
headaches	to	acute	childhood	leukaemia	to	nearby	residents	(Kirkeleit	et	al.	2008).		
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What	is	Australia’s	approach	to	environmental	justice?		
In	 contrast	 to	 China,	 Australia	 does	 not	 have	 a	 constitutional	 right	 for	 state	 protection	 of	
environment;	 nor	 do	 Australian	 pollution‐victims	 have	 a	 legislative	 avenue	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	
against	 a	 polluting	 company	 causing	 harm.	 Moreover,	 no	 common	 law	 action	 exists	 for	 a	
concerned	 citizen	 or	 NGO	 to	 prevent	 or	 remedy	 actions	 from	 a	 polluter	 that	 harm	 the	
environment.	It	seems	then	that	Australian	laws	may	lack	clarity,	uniformity	and	participation	
in	 decision‐making,	 which	 are	 all	 components	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (e.g.	 UN	 Secretary‐General	
2004).	
	
Environmental	Justice	for	Australian	Pollution‐victims:	Private	Interest	Litigation	
Toxic	 torts	 are	 the	 only	 legal	 avenue	 private	 Australian	 citizens	 have	 to	 prevent	 or	 remedy	
pollution	caused	harm.	The	term	‘toxic	torts’	is	used	to	describe	a	variety	of	actions	created	by	
the	courts	to	protect	a	private	citizen’s	rights	or	interests	and	the	protection	of	the	environment	
is	an	unintended	benefit	(Mahncke	2013).	Unlike	China,	Australia	does	not	have	a	specific	cause	
of	 action	 or	 particular	 evidentiary	 rules	 that	 provide	 for	 pollution‐plaintiffs.	 As	 a	 result,	
pollution‐plaintiffs	are	forced	to	manipulate	their	claim	into	one	of	the	following	actions:	torts	of	
private	or	public	nuisance,	trespass	to	person	or	property	and	negligence.		
	
An	 often	 undefeatable	 issue	 pollution‐plaintiffs	 face	 across	 these	 torts	 is	 establishing	 legal	
causation	 (Rychlak	 1989:	 681).	 As	 a	 result,	 Lindgren	 (2010:	 24)	 points	 out	 that	 pollution‐
victims	 ‘may	 be	 denied	 judicial	 redress	 due	 to	 the	 complex	 and	 controversial	 nature	 of	 their	
claims’.	Proving	causation	can	be	problematic	both	 in	making	out	an	action	and	 in	calculating	
sufficient	 compensation.	 Collins	 (2008:	133)	 explains	 that,	 ‘Because	of	 the	profound	 scientific	
uncertainty	associated	with	toxic	substances	in	the	environment,	it	is	frequently	impossible	for	
plaintiffs	 in	 toxic	tort	actions	to	prove	causation	of	harm	on	a	balance	of	probabilities’.	This	is	
particularly	so	where	damage	by	disease	is	being	claimed.		
	
With	 this	 in	 mind,	 let’s	 consider	 the	 industrial	 town	 of	 Gladstone,	 where	 CSG	 projects	 are	
underway	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 leukaemia	 is	 108%	 higher	 than	 the	 whole	 of	 Queensland	 (Moran	
2010).	Could	a	person	with	leukaemia	seek	redress	from	the	nearby	industries?	The	answer	is:	
probably	 not.	 Due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 scientific	 evidence,	 a	 Gladstone	 resident	 would	 struggle	 to	
establish	that	a	toxin	caused	their	leukaemia	(Moon	2012).	Even	if	the	Gladstone	resident	were	
able	to	identify	a	toxin	as	capable	of	causing	leukaemia,	the	fact	that	the	polluter’s	release	of	that	
toxin	had	caused	leukaemia	in	that	particular	resident	would	still	have	to	be	established.	It	has	
been	 observed	 that,	 while	 medical	 science	 can	 confirm	 that	 exposure	 to	 particular	 toxins	
increase	 the	 risk	of	disease,	 it	 cannot	 confirm	whether	 a	 toxin	 caused	a	person’s	disease	 in	 a	
particular	case	or	even	confirm	whether	the	polluter’s	actions	materially	caused	an	illness	(e.g.	
Adeney	1993).	
	
Finally,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	Gladstone	 resident	would	have	been	 exposed	 to	 other	 intervening	
factors,	such	as,	living	with	a	partner	who	smoked	or	having	a	family	history	of	cancer.	Collins	
(2008)	outlined	difficulties	of	proof	experienced	 in	toxic	 tort	and	these	 included	that	sickness	
often	 has	 multiple	 factors	 and	 there	 is	 potential	 for	 a	 long	 period	 between	 exposure	 and	
symptoms.	Moreover,	 it	can	be	difficult	 for	a	pollution‐plaintiff	 to	 identify	which	polluter	 is	to	
blame,	and	this	is	particularly	so	where	a	number	of	polluters	could	have	contributed,	as	is	the	
case	of	industrial	towns	or	climate	change	incurred	damage	(Preston	2009).		
	
Pollution‐plaintiffs	will	experience	particular	difficulties	when	trying	to	mould	their	pollution‐
caused	harm	into	one	of	 the	specific	 toxic	 torts.	For	example,	 the	elements	of	 trespass	to	 land	
require	an	interference	with	an	owner’s	rights;	however,	the	quality	of	groundwater	or	air	has	
been	 held	 to	 not	 interfere	with	 exclusive	possession	 of	 property	 (Moon,	 2012:	 126).	 Another	
example	is	the	tort	of	battery,	where	it	must	be	shown	that	the	polluter	intended	to	release	the	
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toxins	 or	 had	 failed	 to	 exercise	 due	 care.	 This	 can	 be	 a	 difficult	 element	 to	 prove,	 and	
particularly	where	legislative	requirements	have	not	been	breached.		
	
In	addition	to	these	issues,	as	torts	law	is	shaped	by	common	law,	it	often	takes	a	long	time	for	
the	courts	to	adapt	 forms	of	 liability.	Moreover,	unless	decided	by	the	High	Court	of	Australia,	
any	 judicial	 decision	 that	 evolves	 toxic	 torts	 will	 only	 be	 of	 persuasive	 value	 outside	 its	
jurisdiction.		
	
It	seems	then	that	improving	access	to	justice	for	Australian	pollution‐victims	largely	relies	not	
in	tort	law	but	in	novel	legislative	reforms.	In	this	regard,	China’s	TLL,	particularly	in	relation	to	
the	burden	of	proof	and	strict	liability,	may	provide	an	effective	model.	Australia	should	look	to	
adopting	a	comprehensive	liability	system	clarified	in	legislation	that	extends	both	private	and	
public	 legal	mechanisms	 (e.g.	Lee	2002;	Rosenberg	1984).	This	approach	would	provide	 legal	
certainty	 and	address	 the	unequal	 application	of	 current	 environmental	 protection	 laws,	 thus	
moving	Australia	towards	environmental	justice	aligned	with	rule	of	law	principles.		
	
Environmental	Justice	in	Public	Interest	Litigation		
Australia	has	removed	significant	barriers	to	public	interest	environmental	groups	who	want	to	
bring	 legal	 challenges	 against	 polluting	 companies.	 The	 types	 of	 plaintiffs	 who	 can	 bring	 an	
action	 have	 been	 broadened.	 As	 an	 example,	 a	 decision	 of	 the	 High	 Court	 allowed	 an	
Environment	 Council	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 against	 developers.	 Additionally,	 specific	 legislative	
provisions	 allow	 environmental	 groups	 or	 concerned	 citizens	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 against	
polluters	for	breaches	of	the	legislation	(Douglas	2006).		
	
As	an	example,	the	Environmental	Protection	Act	1994	(Qld)	(‘EPA’)	allows	a	Court	to	grant	leave	
to	 a	 person	 seeking	 to	 remedy	 or	 restrain	 an	 offence	 or	 anticipated	 offence	 against	 the	 EPA.	
Importantly,	it	is	an	offence	under	the	EPA	to	cause	environmental	harm,	but	the	polluter	need	
not	be	the	sole	cause.	On	this	basis,	Green	and	Ruddock	(2008:	6)	have	suggested	that	Torres	
Strait	 Islanders	 affected	 by	 climate	 change	may	 be	 able	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 against	 companies	
emitting	greenhouse	gases.	This	contrasts	with	China	then,	as	Australian	NGOs	can	potentially	
bring	an	action	to	prevent	or	remedy	environmental	harm.	
	
However,	 significant	 barriers	 exist	 for	 NGOs	 or	 concerned	 citizens	 seeking	 to	 implement	
environmental	 laws	 (e.g.	 Marseille	 and	 Jan	 2010).	 A	 key	 barrier	 is	 the	 cost	 of	 litigation,	 and	
particularly	 the	 risk	 of	 having	 to	 also	 pay	 the	 polluter’s	 legal	 fees	 if	 the	 NGO	 loses	 the	 case.	
Recently,	an	environmental	organisation,	Blue	Wedges	lost	a	case	they	brought	to	obtain	judicial	
review	 of	 a	 Minister’s	 decision	 to	 allowing	 dredging	 in	 Port	 Phillip	 Bay.	 The	 Government	
pursued	a	substantial	cost	order	against	Blue	Wedges,	even	though	the	community	group	had	
only	$2700	in	its	bank	account	(Gregory,	2008).	Godden	et	al.	(2008:199)	commented	that,	 ‘In	
view	 of	 the	 necessity	 of	 engaging	 the	 public	 in	 a	 more	 meaningful	 way	 in	 an	 era	 of	 strong	
environmental	 concern,	 and	 given	 the	 importance	 of	 public	 interest	 litigation	 to	 a	 viable	
democracy,	a	more	holistic	and	systematic	approach	to	costs	awards	should	pertain’.		
	
Conclusion		
The	 major	 industries	 in	 Australia	 and	 China	 are	 impacting	 on	 the	 health	 and	 well‐being	 of	
citizens.	As	a	result,	environmental	justice	issues	are	likely	to	become	a	focus	of	both	countries	
in	the	future.	In	terms	of	clear	legal	rules	and	addressing	power	imbalances,	China	has	a	highly	
developed	 legal	 response	 to	 environmental	 justice	 issues.	 However,	 this	 progress	 is	 perhaps	
limited	 by	 systemic	 issues	 in	 China’s	 governance	 that	 reflect	 a	 weakness	 in	 rule	 of	 law	
principles.	The	failing	in	Australia’s	legal	response	lies	not	so	much	in	enforcement,	but	more	so	
in	the	clarity	of	 laws	and	accessibility	to	courts.	These	problems	emphasise	the	 importance	of	
the	rule	of	 law	in	achieving	environmental	 justice.	To	pursue	environmental	 justice	then	clear	
legal	rules	and	enforceable	rights	are	vital.		
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Abstract	
The	 Oceania	 region	 is	 an	 area	 particularly	 prone	 to	 natural	 disasters	 such	 as	 cyclones,	
tsunamis,	 floods,	 droughts,	 earthquakes	and	volcanic	eruptions.	Many	of	 the	nations	 in	 the	
region	 are	 Small	 Island	 Developing	 States	 (SIDS),	 yet	 even	 within	 wealthy	 states	 such	 as	
Australia	and	New	Zealand	there	are	groups	which	are	vulnerable	to	disaster.	Vulnerability	to	
natural	disaster	can	be	understood	in	human	rights	terms,	as	natural	disasters	threaten	the	
enjoyment	 of	 a	 number	 of	 rights	which	 are	 guaranteed	 under	 international	 law,	 including	
rights	to	health,	housing,	food,	water	and	even	the	right	to	life	itself.	The	impacts	of	climate	
change	threaten	to	exacerbate	these	vulnerabilities,	yet,	despite	the	foreseeability	of	further	
natural	 disasters	 as	 a	 result	 of	 climate	 change,	 there	 currently	 exists	 no	 comprehensive	
international	 framework	 for	 disaster	 response	 offering	 practical	 and/or	 legally	 reliable	
mechanisms	 to	 assist	 at‐risk	 states	 and	 communities.	 This	 paper	 sets	 out	 to	 explore	 the	
human	rights	 issues	presented	by	natural	disasters	and	examine	 the	extent	 to	which	 these	
issues	can	be	addressed	by	disaster	response	frameworks	at	the	international,	regional	and	
national	levels.	
	
	
Introduction	
The	Oceania	region	is	an	area	particularly	prone	to	natural	disasters	such	as	cyclones,	tsunamis,	
floods,	 droughts,	 earthquakes	 and	 volcanic	 eruptions.	 Many	 of	 the	 nations	 in	 the	 region	 are	
Small	Island	Developing	States	(SIDS),	which	are	geographically	vulnerable	to	natural	disasters,	
being	 low‐lying	 and	 often	 reliant	 on	 the	 natural	 environment	 for	 subsistence.	 Even	 within	
wealthy	 states	 such	 as	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 there	 are	 groups	 which	 are	 vulnerable	 to	
disaster,	 including	indigenous	peoples	and	communities	which	lack	the	economic	resources	to	
prepare	 for	 or	 respond	 adequately	 to	 such	 disasters.	 Further,	 there	 are	 often	 strong	 cultural	
links	 between	 communities	 and	 their	 natural	 environment,	 meaning	 that	 natural	 disasters	
threaten	cultural	and	social,	as	well	as	economic	harm.		
	
Vulnerability	to	natural	disaster	can	be	understood	in	human	rights	terms,	as	natural	disasters	
threaten	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 a	 number	 of	 rights	which	 are	 guaranteed	 under	 international	 law,	
including	rights	 to	health,	housing,	 food,	water	and	even	the	right	 to	 life	 itself.	The	 impacts	of	
climate	 change	 threaten	 to	 exacerbate	 these	 vulnerabilities,	 yet,	 despite	 the	 foreseeability	 of	
further	natural	disasters	as	a	result	of	climate	change,	there	currently	exists	no	comprehensive	
international	 framework	 for	 disaster	 response	 offering	 practical	 and/or	 legally	 reliable	
mechanisms	to	assist	at‐risk	states	and	communities.	
	
This	 paper	 sets	 out	 to	 explore	 the	 human	 rights	 issues	 presented	 by	 natural	 disasters	 and	
examine	the	extent	to	which	these	issues	can	be	addressed	by	disaster	response	frameworks	at	
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the	 international,	 regional	and	national	 levels.	The	paper	will	begin	by	outlining	 the	extent	of	
vulnerability	 to	 natural	 disaster	 in	 the	 Oceania	 region,	 including	 the	 predicted	 influence	 of	
climate	change.	 It	will	 then	seek	 to	elaborate	on	 the	human	 rights	 issues	associated	with	 this	
vulnerability,	 noting	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 climate	 change	 also	 raise	 issues	 of	 justice,	 given	 the	
comparatively	low	contribution	to	global	greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	many	states	in	the	region	
and	their	relative	lack	of	adaptive	capacity.	
	
The	paper	will	then	evaluate	the	current	regulatory	frameworks	which	are	in	place	to	respond	
to	natural	disaster	 in	terms	of	their	ability	to	address	these	 issues	of	vulnerability	and	human	
rights.	It	will	consider	the	international,	regional	and	national	mechanisms	which	are	in	place	to	
assist	 in	 responding	 to	natural	 disaster	 in	 the	 region,	 including	 the	 roles	 of	 various	 state	 and	
non‐state	 actors,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 gaps,	 overlaps	 and	 ambiguities	 within	 the	 current	
framework.	 It	will	also	assess	various	response	mechanisms	in	terms	of	their	potential	impact	
on	 human	 rights,	 noting	 that	 human	 rights	 issues	 can	 arise	 in	 the	 deployment	 of	 disaster	
responses	 as	 well	 as	 during	 the	 disaster	 itself.	 The	 paper	 will	 conclude	 by	 making	 some	
recommendations	 as	 to	 how	 disaster	 policy	 can	 be	 improved	 to	 better	 meet	 the	 needs	 of	
vulnerable	communities	and	to	ensure	the	protection	of	human	rights.		
	
Vulnerability	to	Natural	Disaster	in	Oceania	
The	 Oceania	 region1	 is	 susceptible	 to	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 natural	 disasters	 including	 tropical	
cyclones,	 floods,	 landslides,	droughts,	bushfires,	volcanic	eruptions,	earthquakes	and	tsunamis	
(Gero,	Meheux	and	Dominey‐Howes	2011a;	Gero,	Meheux	and	Dominey‐Howes	2011b;	Chung	
1995).	It	has	been	reported	that	in	the	period	from	1980‐2008	around	4500	people	were	killed	
in	380	different	disasters	 in	 the	Oceania	 region,	while	nearly	20	million	people	were	affected	
(Prevention	 Web	 2013).	 The	 most	 common	 forms	 of	 disaster	 in	 the	 region	 are	 storms	 and	
floods,	followed	by	earthquakes	and	bushfires.		
	
The	 United	 Nations	 Development	 Program	 Pacific	 Centre	 reports	 that	 more	 than	 3.4	 million	
people	have	been	affected	by	natural	disasters	in	the	Pacific	since	1950,	including	nearly	2000	
fatalities.	While	the	number	of	individuals	affected	is	relatively	small	compared	to	other	regions,	
the	scale	of	social	and	economic	impacts	is	significant	(UNDPPC).	
	
Recent	 examples	which	highlight	 the	particularly	destructive	 character	 of	 natural	 disasters	 in	
the	 Pacific	 include	 tropical	 cyclones	 Ofa	 and	 Val	 which	 struck	 Samoa	 in	 1990	 and	 1991	
respectively,	resulting	in	damage	equivalent	to	four	times	GDP.	The	Samoan	earthquake	in	2009	
led	 to	 a	 tsunami	which	devastated	 Samoa,	 Tonga	 and	American	 Samoa,	 causing	 the	deaths	of	
over	200	people	and	widespread	damage	to	infrastructure.	Widespread	flooding	in	Fiji	 in2009	
and	 2012	 caused	 a	 number	 of	 deaths	 and	 cost	millions	 in	 damage	 and	 lost	 tourism	 revenue	
(Gero,	Meheux	and	Dominey‐Howes	2011a).	 In	Australia,	 floods,	 droughts	 and	bushfires	have	
caused	extensive	damage	and	economic	loss	(Prevention	Web	2013).	
	
While	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	 environmental	 hazards,	 their	 frequency	 and	 seasonality	may	 differ	
from	one	country	to	the	next,	all	countries	in	the	region	are	impacted	to	some	extent	(Mearns	
2007).	The	regional	climate	generally	exhibits	tropical	characteristics,	with	countries	vulnerable	
to	 tropical	 cyclones,	high	 swell	 events,	 floods	and	droughts,	 often	driven	by	El	Nino	Southern	
Oscillation	patterns	(Gero,	Meheux	and	Dominey‐Howes	2011a).	Many	countries	 in	the	region	
are	 island	 states,	 which	 range	 in	 geography	 from	 high	 volcanic	 islands	 to	 low‐lying	 atolls,	
although	populations	are	typically	located	around	the	coastline,	meaning	that	most	islands	are	
vulnerable	to	some	extent	(Gero,	Meheux	and	Dominey‐Howes	2011a).	
	
A	 number	 of	 factors	 determine	 the	 degree	 of	 vulnerability	 for	 each	 state.	 These	 include	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 island	 economies	 are	 dependent	 on	 environmental	 assets	 or	 are	 resilient	 to	
environmental	 hazards.	 Other	 factors	 include	 the	 condition	 of	 infrastructure,	 awareness	 of	
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hazards	and	disaster	risk	management	systems	(Mearns	2007),	insularity	and	remoteness	and	
demographic	factors	(Gero,	Meheux	and	Dominey‐Howes	2011a).	
	
Many	of	the	island	states	in	the	Oceania	region	are	classified	as	Small	Island	Developing	States	
(SIDS),2	 in	 consideration	 of	 the	 constraints	 they	 confront	 in	 pursuing	 their	 development,	
including:	
	
...	a	narrow	resource	base	depriving	them	of	the	benefits	of	economies	of	scale;	small	
domestic	markets	 and	 heavy	 dependence	 on	 a	 few	 external	 and	 remote	markets;	
high	costs	 for	energy,	 infrastructure,	 transportation,	communication	and	servicing;	
long	 distances	 from	 export	 markets	 and	 import	 resources;	 low	 and	 irregular	
international	 traffic	 volumes;	 little	 resilience	 to	 natural	 disasters;	 growing	
populations;	 high	 volatility	 of	 economic	 growth;	 limited	 opportunities	 for	 the	
private	 sector	 and	 a	 proportionately	 large	 reliance	 of	 their	 economies	 on	 their	
public	sector;	and	fragile	natural	resources	(UNOHRLLS).	
	
Further,	 a	 number	 of	 these	 states	 are	 also	 listed	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 as	 Least	 Developed	
Countries	(LDCs),	such	as	Kiribati,	Samoa,	Solomon	Islands,	Tuvalu	and	Vanuatu.	
	
The	 dependence	 of	many	 nations	 in	 the	 region	 on	 highly	 vulnerable	 primary	 resources	 from	
land	 and	 seas	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 economies	 means	 that	 natural	 disasters	 can	 impact	 on	
societies	 at	 a	 very	basic	 level	 and	 cause	 damage	 to	 a	 range	of	 sectors.	 The	 financial	 costs	 for	
these	nations	 of	 dealing	with	natural	 disasters	 amounts	 to	 a	waste	 of	 development	 efforts	 as	
well	as	human	resources,	compounding	existing	social	and	economic	problems	and	setting	back	
disaster	planning	and	relief	activities	even	further	(Chung	1995).		
	
As	well	 as	 assessing	 vulnerability	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 the	 particular	
vulnerabilities	 of	 sub‐groups	 within	 these	 populations,	 including	 indigenous	 communities,	
children,	and	people	from	lower	socio‐economic	areas.	
	
Climate	Change	and	Justice	Impacts	
The	vulnerability	to	natural	disasters	and	the	economic	impacts	they	can	have	are	exacerbated	
by	 the	 effects	 of	 climate	 change.	 Already	prone	 to	natural	 disasters	 due	 to	 their	 geographical	
and	meteorological	profiles,	many	countries	in	Oceania	also	possess	characteristics	which	make	
them	 especially	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 climate.	 These	 characteristics	 include	 their	 small	
size,	low	adaptive	capacity	and	high	adaptation	cost‐to‐GDP	ratio.	There	are	a	number	of	effects	
of	 climate	 change	 which	 threaten	 to	 expose	 these	 countries	 to	 greater	 harm	 from	 natural	
disasters.	 Most	 obviously,	 climate	 change	 is	 predicted	 to	 result	 in	more	 frequent	 and	 severe	
extreme	weather	events,	including	cyclones	and	storms.	A	number	of	other	factors	are	projected	
to	impact	on	small	islands	like	those	in	the	Pacific,	compounding	the	effects	of	extreme	weather	
and	further	hindering	their	adaptive	capacity.		
	
Sea‐levels	are	likely	to	continue	to	rise	on	average	during	the	century	around	the	small	islands	
of	the	Northern	and	Southern	Pacific	Ocean	(IPCC	2007;	Mimura	et	al.	2007).	Sea‐level	rise	and	
increased	sea‐water	temperature	are	projected	to	accelerate	beach	erosion	and	degradation	of	
natural	 coastal	 defences	 such	 as	 mangroves	 and	 coral	 reefs	 (IPCC	 2007;	 Mearns	 2007).	
Depletion	 of	 natural	 coast	 defences	 exacerbates	 effect	 of	 storm	 surges	 and	 threatens	 human	
settlements	 (Mearns	 2007).	 The	 Inter‐Governmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 has	 predicted	
that	‘port	facilities	at	Suva,	Fiji	and	Apia,	Samoa,	are	likely	to	experience	overtopping,	damage	to	
wharves	and	flooding	of	the	hinterland	following	a	0.5m	rise	in	sea‐level	combined	with	waves	
associated	 with	 a	 1	 in	 50‐year	 cyclone’	 (Mimura	 et	 al.	 2007:	 6.4.7).	 They	 have	 also	 forecast	
significant	 impacts	 on	 transportation,	 as	 international	 airports	 and	 road	networks	 tend	 to	 be	
located	 close	 to	 the	 coast.	 ‘Under	 sea‐level	 rise	 scenarios,	 many	 of	 them	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 at	
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serious	risk	from	inundation,	flooding	and	physical	damage	associated	with	coastal	inundation	
and	erosion’	(Mimura	et	al.	2007:	6.4.7).		
	
Rising	 sea‐levels	 combined	with	 increased	 storm	 surges	 are	 likely	 to	 cause	 contamination	 of	
freshwater	 supplies,	 while	 reduction	 in	 average	 rainfall	 is	 likely	 to	 reduce	 the	 size	 of	 the	
freshwater	lens.	Many	small	islands	in	the	Pacific	are	likely	to	experience	increased	water	stress	
as	a	result	of	climate	change	(IPCC	2007).	
	
A	range	of	economic	impacts	is	also	anticipated,	with	impacts	on	agriculture	and	fisheries	(IPCC	
2007;	Mimura	et	al.	2007).	Damage	to	beaches	and	reefs	is	predicted	to	have	a	negative	impact	
on	 tourism	 (IPCC	 2007).	 These	 economic	 impacts	 will	 exacerbate	 states’	 vulnerabilities	 to	
natural	 disasters,	 hampering	 efforts	 to	 prepare	 for	 or	 respond	 to	 disasters.	 Other	 forms	 of	
environmental	 degradation,	 including	 deforestation	 or	 erosion	 can	 aggravate	 the	 effects	 of	 a	
natural	 hazard.	 As	 Mearns	 has	 identified,	 environmental	 degradation	 ‘can	 be	 the	 factor	 that	
transforms	a	climate	extreme,	such	as	a	heavy	downpour,	into	a	disaster’	(2007:	30).	
	
The	high	vulnerability	of	states	 in	the	Oceania	region	to	the	effects	of	climate	change	must	be	
considered	in	the	context	of	their	generally	low	comparative	contribution	to	global	greenhouse	
gas	emissions.	With	the	exception	of	Australia,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	New	Zealand,	countries	in	
the	Oceania	 region	contribute	among	 the	 lowest	 levels	of	 greenhouse	gas	emissions	 (UNFCCC	
2005).	 This	 discrepancy	 between	 cause	 and	 effect	 raises	 concerning	 questions	 of	 justice,	 as	
states	with	 low	 levels	 of	 responsibility	 for	 climate	 change	 take	 an	 unfairly	 large	 share	 of	 the	
burden,	yet	benefit	little	from	the	industrialisation	and	development	outcomes	which	generally	
flow	from	the	burning	of	fossil	fuels.	The	international	community	is	currently	seeking	to	create	
a	legally	binding	instrument	that	will	limit	emissions	with	the	aim	of	agreeing	on	the	substance	
of	this	instrument	by	2015,	and	commitments	being	undertaken	from	2020	onwards	(UNFCCC	
2012).	One	of	the	most	contentious	aspects	in	the	negotiation	of	this	instrument	is	determining	
the	 application	 of	 the	 international	 environmental	 principle	 of	 ‘common	 but	 differentiated	
responsibilities’	and	how	this	principle	should	inform	emission	reduction	commitments.	While	
there	 is	 some	 general	 acceptance	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 LDCs	 and	 SIDS	 should	 not	 bear	 onerous	
emission	reduction	commitments,	it	is	essential	that	the	2015	instrument	recognise	the	minimal	
contribution	of	SIDS	to	current	emission	sources,	their	current	vulnerability	to	climate	change	
impacts	and	set	reasonable	emission	reduction	goals	in	light	of	these	circumstances	as	a	matter	
of	justice.		
	
Human	Rights	Implications	of	Natural	Disasters	
The	environmental	and	economic	impacts	of	natural	disasters	described	above	can	be	analysed	
in	terms	of	their	impact	on	the	enjoyment	of	human	rights.	The	rights	which	may	be	affected	by	
a	natural	disaster	are	included	in	the	major	United	Nations	human	rights	conventions,	such	as	
the	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	 (ICCPR)	and	the	 International	Covenant	
on	Economic	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	(ICESCR).	They	include	the	right	to	an	adequate	standard	
of	 living,	 including	 the	 rights	 to	 food	 and	 water,	 (ICESCR	 art	 11);	 the	 right	 to	 a	 livelihood	
(ICESCR	art	6;	Lewis	2006);	the	right	to	housing	(ICCPR	art	11;	Barber	2008;	Lewis	2006),	and	
the	right	 to	 the	highest	attainable	standard	of	health	(including	mental	and	emotional	health)	
(ICESCR	art	12).	They	also	include	the	right	to	liberty	and	security	of	the	person	(ICCPR	art	9),	
freedom	of	movement	(ICCPR	art	12)	and	the	right	to	political	participation	(ICCPR	art	25).	Also	
relevant	 are	 rights	 to	 non‐discrimination	 (ICCPR	 art	 2)	 and	 the	 right	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
planning	and	management	of	return	or	resettlement	after	displacement	(Lewis	2006).	
	
Human	rights	obligations	under	international	law	are	generally	understood	to	encompass	three	
levels	 of	 obligation:	 the	 duties	 to	 respect,	 protect	 and	 fulfil	 human	 rights.	 While	 national	
governments	 are	 generally	 not	 responsible	 for	 causing	 the	 natural	 disasters	 and	 consequent	
human	rights	impacts,	they	nonetheless	bear	a	responsibility	for	protecting	their	citizens	from	
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negative	human	rights	impacts	and	ensuring	that	their	human	rights	can	be	fully	enjoyed	(Lewis	
2006).		
	
Human	 rights	 considerations	 are	 not	 only	 relevant	 in	 examining	 the	 impacts	 of	 natural	
disasters.	 They	 are	 also	 crucial	 in	 the	 development	 of	 appropriate	 responses	 to	 disaster.	
Fundamental	is	the	recognition	that	even	in	the	worst	case	of	disaster	or	displacement,	people	
remain	 entitled	 to	 the	 fundamental	 human	 rights	 which	 are	 guaranteed	 to	 them	 under	
international	law	(Ferris	2010).	Furthermore,	in	the	fulfilment	of	these	rights	they	are	entitled	
to	 assistance	 which	 does	 not	 discriminate	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 aid,	 sex,	 disability,	 religion,	
ethnicity	 or	 social	 status	 (Inter‐Agency	 Standing	 Committee	 2011;	 Lewis	 2006).	 Non‐
discrimination	 in	 the	 deployment	 of	 post‐disaster	 aid	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	 major	 issues	 of	
concern	in	recent	disasters,	 including	the	2004	Asian	tsunamis,	where	there	were	widespread	
reports	of	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sex,	disability	and	economic	class	(Lewis	2006;	Ferris	
2010).	
	
The	 Inter‐Agency	 Standing	 Committee	 (IASC),	 the	 key	 organisation	 for	 coordination	 of	
humanitarian	 responses	 involving	 both	 UN	 and	 non‐UN	 agencies,	 released	 a	 set	 of	 Guiding	
Principles	 in	 2011	 in	 recognition	 of	 the	 need	 to	 protect	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 a	
natural	disaster	and	in	the	response	and	rebuilding	phase.	It	makes	the	point	that,	while	human	
rights	must	be	protected,	for	practical	reasons	it	may	be	difficult	to	simultaneously	guarantee	all	
rights	 to	 all	 individuals.	 The	 guidelines	 therefore	 divide	 human	 rights	 into	 four	 categories,	
which	may	be	prioritised	in	order	to	ensure	the	fundamental	needs	of	all	persons	are	met	in	the	
immediate	response.	The	four	categories	are:	
	
 Rights	related	to	the	protection	of	life,	security,	physical	integrity	and	family	ties;	
 Rights	related	to	basic	necessities,	such	as	food,	health,	shelter	and	education;	
 Rights	 related	 to	 more	 long‐term	 economic	 and	 social	 needs,	 such	 as	 housing,	 land,	
property	and	livelihoods;	and		
 Rights	 related	 to	 other	 civil	 and	 political	 protection	 needs	 (such	 as	 documentation,	
movement,	 re‐establishment	 of	 family	 ties,	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 opinion	 and	
participation	in	elections).		
	
The	first	two	categories	are	understood	to	be	most	relevant	during	the	initial	emergency	phase,	
but	 the	 Guidelines	 make	 clear	 that	 all	 four	 categories	 are	 essential	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	
human	rights	are	adequately	protected	for	all	those	affected	by	natural	disaster	(IASC	2011:	10).		
	
As	noted	above,	 the	obligation	 for	protecting	and	 fulfilling	human	rights	 rests	with	 the	nation	
state,	pursuant	to	international	treaties	and	customary	international	law.	However,	states	which	
provide	aid	or	assistance,	be	it	economic	or	practical,	should	still	ensure	that	such	assistance	is	
delivered	 in	 a	manner	which	 is	 compatible	with	 human	 rights	 standards.	 This	 is	 particularly	
important	given	that	the	nation	state	with	primary	responsibility	may	be	incapable	of	meeting	
those	obligations	without	international	cooperation	(Venturini	2012:	50).		
	
Evaluation	of	Current	International	Disaster	Response	Framework	
The	 IASC	 Guidelines	 referred	 to	 above	 are	 one	 instrument	 designed	 to	 provide	 practical	
guidance	for	the	implementation	of	disaster	response	in	a	manner	which	ensures	protection	of	
human	 rights.	 There	 are	 however	 no	 comprehensive	 and	 binding	 international	 agreements	
which	 formalise	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 affected	 and	 assisting	 states	 in	 responding	 to	 natural	
disasters.	 Instead,	a	number	of	 international,	regional	and	bi‐lateral	 instruments,	both	treaties	
and	soft‐law,	have	been	developed	by	a	range	of	international	actors	which	attempt	to	address	
what	was	once	described	as	a	 ‘yawning	gap’	 in	 the	disaster	response	 framework	(IFRC	2000).	
These	mechanisms	have	been	developed	in	an	ad	hoc	fashion,	often	in	response	to	a	particular	
typology	of	disaster	or	to	address	a	particular	aspect	of	disaster	response	(de	Guttry	2012:	2).	
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They	propose	various	means	of	defining	and	contextualising	natural	disaster	within	the	context	
of	 international	 law	but	 have	 so	 far	 fallen	 short	 of	 establishing	 a	binding	 and	 comprehensive	
framework	of	international	disaster	response	law	(IDRL).		
	
The	 multitude	 of	 principles,	 frameworks,	 guidelines	 and	 treaties	 can	 be	 taken	 to	 indicate	 a	
general	willingness	to	address	the	problem	of	 international	disaster	response,	but	at	the	same	
time	they	demonstrate	both	a	lack	of	consensus	on	basic	issues	and	the	patchwork	nature	of	the	
current	disaster	response	framework	(Reinecke	2012;	Miller	2012).	De	Guttry	has	described	the	
‘anarchic	 accumulation’	 of	 instruments,	 where	 mechanisms	 have	 been	 drafted	 without	
reference	to	each	other,	resulting	in	many	inconsistencies,	contradictions	and	overlaps	between	
the	various	 instruments	 (2012:	3).	He	points	 to	 instances	where	multilateral,	 regional	and	bi‐
lateral	agreements	purport	to	regulate	identical	issues,	resulting	in	contradictory	rules	relating	
to	matters	 such	 as	 the	 status	of	 personnel,	 sharing	of	 costs,	 access	 to	 affected	 territories	 and	
claims	for	compensation	(2012:	40).	This	inconsistency	and	incoherence	has	been	compounded	
by	 the	 proliferation	 of	 actors	 engaging	 in	 humanitarian	 assistance,	 which	 poses	 challenges	
related	to	the	design,	 implementation	and	coordination	of	disaster	response	field	mechanisms	
(de	Guttry,	Gestri	and	Venturi	2012:	ix;	de	Guttry	2012:	38).	
	
Despite	 the	plethora	of	 instruments,	 two	major	contributions	can	be	 identified	 in	 the	work	of	
the	 International	 Federation	 of	 Red	 Cross	 and	 Red	 Crescent	 Societies	 (IFRC)	 and	 the	 recent	
work	of	 the	International	Law	Commission	(ILC).	 In	2001	the	IFRC	 launched	the	International	
Disaster	 Response	 Laws,	 Rules	 and	 Principles	 Programme,	 investigating	 the	 role	 of	 legal	
frameworks	 in	 improving	 disaster	 response	 (IFRC	 2011).	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 work	 of	 the	
Programme,	 in	 November	 2007	 at	 the	 30th	 International	 Conference	 the	 IFRC	 adopted	 the	
‘Guidelines	 for	 the	 Domestic	 Facilitation	 and	 Regulation	 of	 International	 Disaster	 Relief	 and	
Initial	Recovery	Assistance’	(IFRC	2011).	Subsequently,	the	UN	General	Assembly	passed	three	
resolutions	 encouraging	 States	 to	 incorporate	 and	 adhere	 to	 the	 guidelines	 (UNGA	 2009a,	
2009b,	2009c).	The	guidelines	address	both	response	and	risk	reduction	and	continue	to	serve	
as	a	reference	point	for	responding	to	natural	disaster.	
	
Whilst	 expressly	 non‐binding	 the	 guidelines	 nonetheless	 suggest	 a	 framework	 for	 domestic	
disaster	 relief,	 and	 have	 been	 widely	 incorporated	 into	 regional	 and	 national	 disaster	 relief	
plans	 and	 frameworks.	 The	 guidelines	 address	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 actors	 in	 immediate	
disaster	 response	 (Part	 I)	 and	 suggest	 legal,	 policy	 and	 institutions	 frameworks	 for	 effective	
early‐warning	 and	 preparedness	 (Part	 II)	 (IFRC	 2011).	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 primary	
purpose	of	the	guidelines	is	to	‘contribute	to	legal	preparedness	by	providing	guidance	to	states	
interested	 in	 improving	 domestic	 legal,	 policy	 and	 institutional	 frameworks	 concerning	
international	disaster	relief’	(IFRC	2011:	93).	As	such	the	foremost	concern	of	the	guidelines	is	
on	the	capacity	of	domestic	governments	rather	than	the	international	community	to	respond	to	
disaster.		
	
Another	important	recent	development	has	been	the	work	of	the	ILC	which,	in	the	aftermath	of	
the	2004	Indian	Ocean	tsunami,	began	work	on	a	multi‐year	project	to	develop	rules	governing	
international	disaster	relief	 for	 the	purposes	of	protection	of	persons	 in	the	event	of	disasters	
(Heath	 2010).	 The	 ILC	 handed	 down	 its	 Preliminary	Report	 on	 the	 Protection	 in	 the	Event	 of	
Disasters	 in	 2008,	 thereafter	 reporting	 annually	 on	 the	 development	 of	 draft	 articles	 for	 a	
proposed	 set	 of	 disaster	 response	 laws	 or	 principles	 to	 the	 UN	 General	 Assembly	 (Valencia‐
Ospina	2008).	Notably,	 the	 ILC	made	efforts	 to	distinguish	 its	work	 from	 the	 IFRC	guidelines,	
recognising	 that	 it	 was	 pertinent	 to	 avoid	 encroaching	 upon	 an	 instrument	 that	 had	 already	
proved	 effective	 and	 that	 repetition	 of	 those	 guidelines	 already	 established	 would	 serve	 to	
further	dilute	and	hinder	the	development	of	IDRL	(Valencia‐Ospina	2008).	
	
At	present	the	ILC	has	drafted	15	articles	on	the	protection	of	persons	in	the	event	of	disasters	
(Valencia‐Ospina	2012).	These	draft	articles	are	notable	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First,	Article	2	
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(‘purpose’)	 situates	 IDRL	 within	 a	 human	 rights	 context,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 rights	 of	
individual	 persons	 (ILC	 2009).	 This	 marks	 a	 departure	 from	 traditional	 conceptions	 of	 IDRL	
which	 tend	 to	 avoid	 any	 such	 contextualisation.	 Further,	 Articles	 6,	 7	 and	 8,	 expressly	 bring	
humanitarian	principles	and	human	rights	 into	the	draft.	Second,	 in	defining	 ‘disaster’	 the	ILC	
has	 omitted	 to	 distinguish	 between	 slow‐	 and	 sudden‐	 onset	 disaster	 or	 between	 natural	 or	
manmade	 events.	 The	 ILC	has	 avoided	 limiting	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 articles	 and	 instead	 opted	 to	
focus	on	the	human	rights	implications	(ILC	2010).		
	
Articles	9	and	10	impose	explicit	duties	on	states	to	protect	populations	and	to	seek	assistance	
(ILC	 2011).	 These	 obligations	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 duties	 imposed	 on	 states	 under	
international	 human	 rights	 law,	 and	 their	 articulation	 by	 the	 ILC	 sets	 the	 draft	 articles	 apart	
from	existing	guidelines	(IFRC	2011).	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	work	of	the	ILC	will	be	
adopted	 in	any	 formal	way	by	 the	 international	 community,	but	 it	nonetheless	represents	 the	
contemporary	 position	 on	 IDRL	 and,	 moreover,	 comprehensively	 deals	 with	 the	 complex	
development	of	IDRL.	
	
In	addition	to	the	‘soft‐law’	instruments	developed	by	the	IFRC	and	the	ILC,	a	number	of	treaties	
exist	 which	 have	 some	 application	 to	 disaster	 response,	 although	 none	 which	 provides	
comprehensive	 coverage	 (Valencia‐Ospina	 2008).	 Two	 multilateral	 treaties	 provide	 rules	 for	
international	assistance	in	specific	areas	in	the	event	of	disaster.	The	Framework	Convention	on	
Civil	 Defence	 Assistance	 and	 the	 Tampere	 Convention	 on	 the	 Provision	 of	 Telecommunication	
Resources	 for	Disaster	Mitigation	and	Relief	Operation	 (the	 ‘Tampere	Convention’).	The	 former	
addresses	the	coordination	between	national	civil	defence	entities	and	is	not	largely	considered	
an	 exemplar	 of	 IDRL	 development.	 The	 latter	 is	 a	 comprehensive	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	
provision	of	 telecommunications	assistance	during	disaster	 relief	operations	 (Valencia‐Ospina	
2008).		
	
The	 Tampere	 Convention,	 despite	 having	 limited	 scope,	 is	 regularly	 cited	 as	 an	 example	 of	 a	
working	IDRL‐related	treaty,	despite	having	proved	ineffective	in	the	field	and	having	failed	to	
attract	 wide	 participation.	 The	 Convention	 has	 garnered	 such	 attention	 largely	 because	 it	
provides	a	comprehensive	legal	framework	for	providing	telecommunications	assistance	during	
natural	 disaster,	 focussing	on	 the	 reduction	of	 regulatory	barriers	 including	 those	 regulations	
that	 restrict	 import	 or	 export,	 movement	 of	 personnel,	 and	 delays	 in	 administration	 of	 such	
regulations	 (art	 9).	Whilst	 the	Tampere	 Convention	 certainly	 provides	 an	 example	 of	 how	 an	
IDRL	treaty	could	work,	its	specific	scope	and	unproven	efficacy	undermine	its	applicability.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	multilateral	 treaties,	 a	 number	 of	 regional	 treaties	 exist	which	 have	
some	application	in	the	event	of	natural	disaster.	These	mostly	focus	however	on	planning	and	
disaster	risk	reduction,	rather	than	on	disaster	response.	Further,	there	are	no	regional	treaties	
which	 apply	 in	 the	 Oceania	 region.	 There	 are	 some	 soft‐law	 instruments,	 such	 as	 the	 Pacific	
Disaster	 Risk	 Management	 Partnership	 Network’s	 Framework	 for	 Action	 2005‐2015.	 The	
Association	of	Small	Island	States	has	also	contributed	guidelines	which	are	applicable	to	island	
nations	within	Oceania.	These	instruments	focus	primarily	on	planning,	disaster	risk	reduction	
and	capacity	building,	with	a	particular	 interest	 in	addressing	 the	problems	of	climate	change	
(de	Guttry	 2012:	 26).	 Consequently	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 gap	 of	 legally	 binding	mechanisms	
which	would	address	disaster	response	in	the	Oceania	region.	
	
One	of	the	principal	difficulties	in	identifying	a	comprehensive	disaster	response	mechanism	is	
that	 there	 is	 currently	 no	 accepted	 definition	 of	 what	 a	 natural	 disaster	 is	 or	 how	 natural	
disaster	 should	 be	 contextualised	 within	 international	 law.	 Particularly	 problematic	 is	 the	
distinction	between	slow‐	and	sudden‐onset	disasters.	Given	that	climate	change	will	result	 in	
increasingly	 severe	 effects	 on	 vulnerable	 states,	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 to	 address	 slow‐onset	
disasters	is	becoming	one	of	increasing	visibility	and	urgency	(Schipper	and	Pelling	2006).	This	
challenge	 is	 most	 obviously	 related	 to	 the	 framework	 for	 disaster	 risk	 and	 reduction,	 as	 it	
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involves	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 steps	 states	 should	 take	 in	 preventing	 and	 preparing	 for	
disasters.	 However,	 it	 remains	 germane	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 disaster	 response	 as	 well,	 especially	
when	it	is	considered	that	many	of	the	human	rights	impacts	of	natural	disaster	can	be	present	
even	where	they	occur	more	gradually.		
	
Conclusions	
An	examination	of	the	current	international	framework	for	disaster	response	reveals	a	number	
of	 challenges	 in	 terms	 of	 improving	 our	 ability	 to	 address	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 at‐risk	 States,	
communities	and	individuals	in	the	Oceania	region.	
	
Eburn	(2011)	argues	that	without	a	specific	legal	instrument	relating	to	disaster	response	there	
will	 remain	 questions	 about	 who	 can	 provide	 disaster	 relief.	 The	 primary	 obligation	 for	
providing	assistance	in	the	case	of	natural	disaster	rests	with	the	home	state.	This	is	consistent	
with	 human	 rights	 law,	which	 imposes	 obligations	 on	 States	 to	 respect,	 protect	 and	 fulfil	 the	
human	rights	of	those	persons	within	their	territory	or	under	their	control	(McCorquodale	and	
Simons	 2007:	 601).	 It	 is	 also	 largely	 dictated	 by	 the	 principles	 of	 State	 sovereignty	 which	
requires	that	States	not	intervene	following	a	disaster	unless	their	assistance	is	requested	by	the	
affected	state	(Eburn	2011;	Miller	2012).	These	principles	impose	limitations	on	the	likelihood	
that	 a	 new	 international	 instrument	 could	 be	 developed	 which	 is	 both	 comprehensive	 and	
legally	binding,	as	States	are	typically	unwilling	to	agree	to	any	new	law	which	might	encroach	
upon	their	sovereignty	or	impose	new	obligations	requiring	positive	action.	
	
With	 respect	 to	 addressing	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 affected	 individuals	 and	 communities,	 human	
rights	principles	can	be	useful	 in	highlighting	 the	needs	of	 those	most	affected	and	helping	 to	
establish	priorities	for	the	deployment	of	assistance	(Bizzarri	2012:	389).	This	role	is	explicitly	
noted	in	the	IASC	guidelines	and	the	ILC	report.	Existing	obligations	under	human	rights	law	can	
potentially	be	used	to	plug	a	gap	in	the	absence	of	a	dedicated	international	legal	instrument	for	
disaster	response.	Where	a	State	is	able	to	respond	to	a	disaster	internally,	either	independently	
or	with	the	assistance	of	NGOs	or	IGOS,	they	will	be	obliged	to	comply	with	any	human	rights	
treaties	to	which	they	are	a	party.	Human	rights	obligations	will	also	attach	to	any	foreign	state	
which	is	providing	assistance,	as	its	obligations	will	extend	to	the	activities	which	it	carries	out	
within	the	territory	of	another	state	(McCorquodale	and	Simons	2007).	
	
It	 is	 less	 clear	 however	 that	 human	 rights	 law	 imposes	 any	 obligation	 on	 States	 to	 provide	
assistance	to	another	country	which	is	affected	by	disaster,	especially	where	the	affected	state	
has	not	sought	help	from	the	international	community	(Heath	2010;	Eburn	2011;	Miller	2012).	
It	 is	 also	 unclear	 that	 States	 would	 bear	 any	 international	 responsibility	 for	 human	 rights	
impacts	caused	by	the	actions	of	their	nationals	who	might	be	engaged	in	work	through	NGOs,	
unless	those	actions	can	be	shown	to	be	somehow	attributable	to	the	State	(McCorquodale	and	
Simons	2007).	While	human	rights	principles	are	therefore	important	in	governing	the	way	that	
disaster	assistance	is	deployed,	there	are	some	limitations	to	the	applicability	of	human	rights	
law	in	the	context	of	international	disaster	response.	
	
In	 conclusion,	 and	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 a	 new	 legally	 binding	 and	
comprehensive	international	 instrument	is	required	in	the	area	of	natural	disaster	response,	a	
number	 of	 points	 should	 be	made.	 First,	 natural	 disasters	 are	 largely	 unpredictable,	 and	 the	
extent	of	 their	 impact	 is	determined	by	 a	number	of	 variables,	 as	outlined	above.	 Similarly,	 a	
State’s	capacity	to	respond	to	a	disaster	and	the	nature	of	any	cooperative	assistance	from	other	
States	 will	 also	 depend	 on	 a	 range	 of	 factors,	 including	 the	 financial	 capacity	 of	 the	 States	
concerned,	relevant	regional	agreements	or	relationships	and	domestic	aid	mechanisms.	In	such	
a	 context,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 international	 response	 frameworks	 need	 to	 be	 flexible	 and	
responsive	to	the	circumstances	of	each	situation.	It	is	unsurprising	then	that	the	international	
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framework	for	disaster	response	has	developed	in	an	ad	hoc	fashion	and	has	been	described	as	
being	a	‘patchwork	of	instrument’	(Reinecke	2012).		
	
It	 is	 questionable	whether	 it	would	 be	 possible	 to	 develop	 a	 single	 instrument	which	 is	 both	
comprehensive	and	legally	binding.	States	generally	consider	their	responsibilities	towards	each	
other	in	times	of	disaster	as	being	humanitarian	or	moral	in	nature,	not	legal.	It	is	unlikely	that	
States	 would	 consent	 to	 be	 legally	 bound	 by	 a	 new	 treaty	 which	 would	 impose	 greater	
obligations	to	provide	assistance	in	times	of	disaster	(Eburn	2012).	Further,	Fidler	(2005)	has	
noted	 that	 the	significant	contribution	which	 is	made	by	NGOs	and	 IGOs	 in	providing	disaster	
response	assistance	may	indicate	that	no	international	legal	instrument	is	required.		
	
The	 current	 framework,	 comprised	 of	 instruments	 such	 as	 the	 IASC	 and	 IFRC	 guidelines,	
provides	 detailed	 guidance	 on	 the	 way	 to	 provide	 disaster	 response	 assistance	 in	 a	 manner	
which	is	consistent	with	human	rights	law.	Those	instruments	rely	on	existing	legal	obligations	
to	guarantee	certain	minimum	standards	and	make	clear	 that	whenever	a	State	 is	engaged	 in	
disaster	 response	activities,	 those	activities	are	 subject	 to	 existing	 international	human	rights	
law.	 It	 is	submitted	 that,	while	 there	are	some	limitations	 to	 the	applicability	of	human	rights	
principles,	given	that	a	new	legally	binding	instrument	is	unlikely	to	gain	the	support	of	States,	
utilising	existing	human	rights	law	to	help	address	vulnerability	in	situations	of	natural	disaster	
is	 an	 appropriate	 approach.	 The	 problems	 of	 confusion,	 ambiguity	 and	 inefficiency	 remain	
however,	and	will	persist	so	long	as	the	disaster	response	area	is	governed	by	such	a	wide	range	
of	international	and	regional	instruments.		
	
	
																																																													
	
1  Although	there	are	a	number	of	different	understandings	of	the	extent	of	the	Oceania	region,	this	paper	adopts	the	
definition	 used	 by	 the	 United	 Nations,	 which	 includes	 Australia	 as	 well	 as	 the	 regions	 known	 as	 Micronesia,	
Melanesia	and	Polynesia.	As	such,	it	comprises	the	following	states	and	dependent	territories:	American	Samoa,	
Australia,	Cook	 Islands,	Fiji,	 French	Polynesia,	Guam,	Kiribati,	Marshall	 Islands,	Federated	States	of	Micronesia,	
Nauru,	New	Caledonia,	New	Zealand,	Niue,	Norfolk	Island,	Northern	Mariana	Islands,	Palau,	Papua	New	Guinea,	
Samoa,	Solomon	Islands,	Tokelau,	Tonga,	Tuvalu,	Vanuatu	and	Wallis	and	Futuna	Islands.		
2		 Fiji,	 Kiribati,	 Marshall	 Islands,	 Federated	 States	 of	Micronesia,	 Nauru,	 Niue,	 Palau,	 Papua	 New	 Guinea,	 Samoa,	
Solomon	Islands,	Tonga,	Tuvalu,	Vanuatu	–	www.sidsnet.org		
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Abstract	
Since	the	1970s	the	prevalence	of	child	sexual	assault	has	become	increasingly	recognised	as	
a	widespread	form	of	social	harm.	Alongside	this,	the	category	of	the	paedophile	has	gained	a	
new	 salience.	 One	 consequence	 of	 these	 two	 interrelated	 trends	 is	 the	 now	 apparently	
universal	disgust	for,	and	repudiation	of,	child	sex	offenders.	This	is	evidenced	through	more	
and	more	punitive	responses	to	these	offenders,	as	well	as	new	legislative	regimes	that	seek	
to	 ameliorate	 the	 apparent	 risk	 they	 are	 said	 to	 pose.	 Both	 post‐sentence	 preventative	
detention	and	supervision	regimes	are	now	a	feature	of	several	Australian	states.	This	signals	
an	 increased	 willingness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 legislators	 to	 pre‐emptively	 engage	 with	 possible	
recidivism	 by	 this	 class	 of	 offenders.	 This	 paper	 uses	 such	 legislative	 regimes	 as	 a	
background	 through	 which	 to	 contextualise	 contemporary	 social,	 cultural	 and	 legal	
preoccupations	with	the	category	of	the	paedophile.	This	is	explored	through	a	recent	case	in	
New	South	Wales	 in	which	 the	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	was	required	to	consider	whether	
offences	of	arson	motivated	by	hatred	for,	or	prejudice	against,	paedophiles,	could	give	such	
acts	the	character	of	a	hate	crime.	Exploring	this	case	alongside	scholarly	responses	to	it,	the	
paper	 investigates	 the	 contemporary	 disgust	 for	 paedophilia,	 and	 the	 political	 dimensions	
that	 underpin	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 prejudice‐motivated	 crimes	 against	 paedophiles	
should	be	recognised	as	constituting	a	hate	crime.	
	
	
Introduction	
Between	1979	and	1980,	Brian	Keith	 Jones	–	more	widely	known	as	Mr	Baldy	–	abducted	six	
young	boys.	This	alias	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	Jones	shaved	the	heads	of	his	victims,	dressed	
them	in	girls’	clothing	and	makeup,	before	sexually	assaulting	them.	In	1981,	he	was	sentenced	
to	14	years	imprisonment.	In	1989,	three	weeks	following	his	release	on	parole	he	raped	a	nine‐
year‐old	 boy,	 and	 indecently	 assaulted	 the	 boy’s	 younger	 brother.	 Jones	 was	 subsequently	
sentenced	to	a	maximum	of	14	years	imprisonment	for	these	offences.	In	2005,	the	conclusion	of	
his	sentence	was	imminent.	This	occasion	was	marked	by	several	newspaper	articles	about	his	
release,	coupled	with	an	announcement	by	the	State	Government	of	Victoria	that	it	would	move	
to	 legislate	 a	 new	 regime	 enabling	 the	 supervision	 and	 control	 of	 so‐called	 ‘serious	 sex	
offenders’	beyond	the	period	of	their	sentence.1	Newspapers	devoted	pages	and	columns	to	his	
release,	 citing	 the	 excessive	 risk	 that	 he	 was	 said	 to	 constitute.	 Described	 variously	 as	 a	
‘monster’	 (Buttler	 and	 Anderson	 2005a:	 2),	 a	 ‘sex	 fiend’	 (Hodgson	 2005:	 2),	 a	 ‘pervert’	 (Bolt	
2005:	 23),	 and	 ‘scum’	 (Buttler	 and	 Anderson	 2005b:	 3),	 the	Herald	 Sun’s	 editorial	 asked	 ‘all	
Victorian	parents:	Where	will	your	children	play	now?’	(Editorial	2005:	84).	
	
Twenty‐four	 hours	 after	 his	 release	 from	 prison	 on	 13	 July	 2005,	 the	 address	 nominated	 by	
correctional	staff	 for	him	to	reside	at	was	publicly	identified	(Buttler	and	Anderson	2005c:	1).	
Following	 this,	 he	 was	 moved	 to	 another	 secret	 location,	 leading	 to	 persistent	 rumour	 and	
innuendo.	When	radio	broadcaster	Derryn	Hinch	publicly	named	 the	alleged	street	 that	 Jones	
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had	 been	 moved	 to,	 the	 house	 was	 attacked	 and	 vandalised	 by	 vigilantes.	 Hinch,	 it	 was	
subsequently	revealed,	incorrectly	identified	the	residence	(Buttler	and	Anderson	2005d:	3).2	
	
The	subject	of	widespread	concern	–	or	perhaps,	panic	–	and	ultimately,	misdirected	vigilante	
‘justice’,	 Brian	 Keith	 Jones’	 experience	 is	 in	 many	 respects	 not	 unique.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 this	
episode	 bears	 striking	 similarities	 to	 the	 response	 to	 other	 so‐called	monstrous	 paedophiles	
elsewhere.	Events	 surrounding	 the	United	Kingdom’s	News	of	 the	World	campaign	 in	2000	 in	
which	paedophiles’	names	and	addresses	were	published,	attests	to	this,	as	does	a	burgeoning	
body	of	literature	demonstrating	the	potential	consequences	of	‘naming	and	shaming’	laws.3	On	
one	 level	 this	 demonstrates	 the	 contemporary	 and	 seemingly	 universal	 disgust	 paedophilia	
elicits.	 It	 seems	self‐evident	 that	paedophiles	are	monstrous	and	 that	 there	are	no	alternative	
ways	of	conceiving	of	such	subjects.	However,	this	has	not	always	been	so.	
	
This	paper	explores	the	trajectory	through	which	paedophilia	has	increasingly	become	figured	
as	 monstrous	 and	 disgusting.	 While	 appearing	 to	 be	 universal	 and	 ahistorical,	 child	 sexual	
assault	 has	 previously	 been	 understood	 in	 quite	 distinct	 terms	 to	 today’s	manifestation.	 The	
paper	 uses	 this	 trajectory	 to	 contextualise	 a	 2007	 case	 brought	 before	 the	New	 South	Wales	
Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	where	a	judge	was	required	to	consider	whether	paedophilia	may	give	
an	 act	 the	 character	 of	 a	 hate	 crime.4	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 to	 critically	 examine	 the	
im/possibility	of	understanding	paedophilia	as	a	category	of	hate	crime.	In	doing	so,	the	paper	
explores	the	politics	of	disgust	that	has	come	to	be	associated	with	paedophilia.		
	
A	Trajectory	of	Disgust	
The	assumption	that	paedophilic	monstrosity	is	 inevitable	and	natural	stands	in	contrast	with	
recent	historical	 shifts	 influencing	how	child	 sexual	assault	has	been	conceived.	While	 figures	
such	 as	 ‘Mr	 Baldy’	 tend	 to	 suggest	 the	 innateness	 of	 paedophilia’s	 monstrosity,	 this	
configuration	 has	 not	 always	 occupied	 such	 a	 central	 position	 within	 public	 and	 legal	
consciousness.	Scott	(1998:	65)	writes	that	‘the	appearance	of	a	new	identity	is	not	inevitable	or	
determined,	 not	 something	 that	 was	 always	 there	 simply	 waiting	 to	 be	 expressed’.	 Instead,	
categories	 of	 identity	 (such	 as	 the	 paedophile)	 are	 contingent	 upon	 particular	 political	 or	
historical	movements.	
	
In	 her	 critique	 of	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 child	 pornography,	 Adler	 anchors	 her	 argument	 by	
reference	to	the	‘explosion’	of	child	pornography	in	the	1970s	and	80s.	As	she	demonstrates,	the	
social	 concern	 or	 panic	 about	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 ‘is	 a	 modern	 phenomenon	 that	 has	 grown	
significantly	just	over	the	last	two	decades’	(2001:	217‐8).	Scholars,	child	advocates	and	others	
now	routinely	talk	of	the	‘recent	discovery’	of	child	sexual	assault.	As	Adler	writes,	 ‘declared	a	
“national	emergency”	 in	 [the	United	States]	 in	1990,	 the	crisis	over	child	 sex	abuse	has	 taken	
centre	 stage	 in	 our	 culture	 and	 politics,	 as	 the	worst	 of	 all	 possible	 evils’	 (2001:	 218).	 These	
relatively	 recent	 developments	 substantiate	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ‘problem’	 of	 child	 sexual	 assault	
has	been	malleable	or	contingent	over	time.	Putting	to	one	side	the	fact	that	debates	about	the	
incidence	 of	 this	 problem	 are	 indelibly	 fraught,	 for	Adler	 one	 thing	 remains	 clear:	 ‘There	has	
been	 a	 dramatic	 explosion	 in	discussion	 about	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 in	 the	 last	 [three]	 decades’,	
whereas	 prior	 to	 this,	 ‘it	 was	 barely	 recognised	 as	 a	 problem’	 (Adler	 2001:	 220;	 original	
emphasis).		
	
This	 point	 is	 further	 underscored	 by	 Jenkins’	 account	 of	 evolving	 conceptions	 of	 child	 sexual	
assault	(1998).	Of	import	to	Jenkins’	work	is	the	cyclical	nature	of	public	interest	in	child	sexual	
assault	over	different	historical	contexts	(1998:	2‐3).	He	argues	that	the	current	formulation	of	
child	sexual	exploitation	is	presented	as	an	evolutionary	stage	in	social	development:	whereas	
previously	 it	 has	 been	 conceived	 as	 a	 problem	 of	 overstatement	 or	 infrequency,	 the	 current	
widespread	 acceptance	 of	 child	 sexual	 assault	 as	 a	 problem	 is	 marked	 by	 its	 statistical	
prevalence.	 Specifically,	 the	 contemporary	 orthodoxy	 is	 that	 child	 sexual	 assault	 is	 an	
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overwhelmingly	prevalent	phenomenon,	and	this	orthodoxy	is	a	measure	of	‘reality’.	Further,	to	
the	extent	that	the	‘reality’	of	child	sexual	assault	is	conceived	as	a	prevalent	one,	it	follows	that	
the	fear	or	panic	attached	to	it	is	amplified.	
	
Reading	this	as	a	cyclical	pattern	over	different	historical	periods,	linked	to	an	overstated	fear	or	
panic,	Jenkins	draws	on	Stanley	Cohen’s	authoritative	work	on	moral	panics	(1973).	For	Jenkins,	
this	assists	 in	understanding	how	concern	about	 child	molestation	has	 fluctuated	widely	over	
the	 twentieth	 century.	For	him,	 these	 changes	 reflect	 the	 shifting	 role	of	 interest	 groups	over	
time,	 such	 as	 child	 protection	 movements,	 feminists,	 psychiatrists	 and	 therapists,	 as	 well	 as	
politicians	and	other	officials.	As	he	writes,	 ‘this	 impressive	 range	of	 interest	 groups	 stood	 to	
benefit	from	claims	about	threats	to	children,	and	the	number	of	beneficiaries	increased	as	each	
crisis	developed’	(1998:	219;	see	also	Angelides	2004).	
	
Paedophilia	and	the	Punitive	Turn	
Changing	understandings	and	discussions	of	child	sexual	assault	and	paedophilia	have	occurred	
in	tandem	with	broader	shifts	in	penology	since	roughly	the	1960s	and	70s.	David	Garland,	for	
example,	 historicises	 a	 comparatively	 recent	 movement	 away	 from	 penal	 welfare	 and	
rehabilitation	 towards	 a	 much	 more	 punitive	 response	 to	 crime	 (2001).	 In	 this	 context,	
principles	of	retribution,	 incapacitation	and	risk	management	have	taken	precedence	over	the	
rehabilitative	ideal.	It	is	this	shift	that	marks	the	‘new	punitiveness’,	alongside	the	rise	of	penal	
populism	(Brown	and	Pratt	2000;	Pratt	2000,	2006,	2007,	2008;	Pratt	and	Clark	2005;	Simon	
1995,	 2007).	These	penal	 shifts	 can	be	witnessed	 in	 an	Australian	 context	by	 a	 range	of	 new	
mechanisms	 for	 dealing	 with	 sex	 offenders	 in	 general,	 and	 child	 sex	 offenders	 in	 particular.	
Mechanisms	such	as	 ‘Working	With	Children	Checks’	and	sex	offender	registries	have	become	
standard.5	 In	 a	 custodial	 context,	 several	 Australian	 states	 have	 also	 enacted	 post‐sentence	
preventative	 detention	 and	 supervision	 schemes	 enabling	 the	 continued	 detention	 of	 eligible	
sex	offenders	at	the	conclusion	of	a	custodial	sentence.	
	
Post‐sentence	preventative	 detention	 and	 supervision	 schemes	have	 generally	 been	met	with	
little	political	or	public	resistance.	This	is	 in	spite	of	the	fact	that	they	suspend	long‐held	 legal	
protections	 such	 as	 principles	 of	 double	 jeopardy,	 retrospective	 punishment,	 finality	 of	
sentencing,	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (Douglas	 2008;	 Keyzer	 and	 Blay	 2006;	 Keyzer,	 Pereira	 and	
Southwood	 2004;	 Keyzer	 and	 O’Toole	 2006;	 McSherry	 2005,	 2007).	 In	 the	 context	 of	
community‐based	 initiatives	 such	 as	 sex	 offender	 registries	 and	 the	 move	 toward	 public	
accessibility	of	such	information,	such	measures	exist	in	spite	of	the	risk	of	retributive	violence	
that	 public	 notification	 can	 pose	 (Ashenden	 2002;	 Critcher	 2002;	 Cross	 2005;	 Evans	 2003;	
Lawler	 2002;	 McAlinden	 2005).	 The	 relative	 lack	 of	 concern	 about	 this,	 I	 would	 suggest,	 is	
explained	by	the	trajectory	of	disgust	identified	above.	While	the	‘new	punitiveness’	and	penal	
populism	 have	 more	 generally	 altered	 the	 landscape	 of	 sentencing	 and	 punishment,	 in	 the	
context	of	paedophilia	these	have	occurred	alongside	an	increased	social	and	cultural	aversion	
for	such	offending	behaviour.		
	
Retributive	Violence	and	the	Question	of	Hate	Crime	
Against	this	backdrop,	in	2007	the	New	South	Wales	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	was	required	to	
consider	hate	crime	on	the	basis	of	paedophilia.	In	2005,	Darren	Brian	Dunn	and	Ibrahim	Arja	
were	neighbours	 in	a	complex	of	public	housing	units	 in	the	Sydney	suburb	of	Riverwood.6	 In	
the	early	hours	of	29	August	2005,	while	Arja	was	overseas,	Dunn	set	fire	to	chairs	on	the	porch	
of	Arja’s	unit.	The	fire	destroyed	the	chairs,	as	well	as	the	window	of	the	unit’s	front	room.	On	30	
October	2005,	around	two	months	after	the	initial	fire,	Dunn	again	set	fire	to	Arja’s	unit.	Though	
Arja	 had	 returned	 from	 overseas,	 he	 had	 not	 been	 home	 at	 the	 time.	 This	 fire	 resulted	 in	
significant	damage	to	the	complex	of	units,	subsequently	deemed	uninhabitable.		
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Although	Dunn	did	not	give	evidence	at	trial,	his	sentencing	judge	sought	to	establish	a	motive	
for	his	attacks.	In	doing	so,	the	judge	relied	on	evidence	provided	by	a	police	informant	about	a	
conversation	he	had	with	Dunn,	along	with	a	report	provided	to	the	court	by	a	psychiatrist	for	
the	prisoner.	 The	police	 informant	 gave	 evidence	 that,	 three	days	 after	 the	 second	 fire,	Dunn	
stated	that	he	had	lit	the	fire	because	Arja	was	a	‘rock	spider’.7	This	term	is	used	predominantly	
by	 prisoners	 to	 hierarchically	 distinguish	 paedophiles	 from	 other	 imprisoned	 offenders.	 The	
psychiatrist	further	recorded	a	conversation	in	which	Dunn	stated	that	the	fires	were	intended	
as	a	‘scare	tactic’	because	Arja	was	a	‘rock	spider’.8	
	
While	Dunn’s	 belief	 that	Arja	was	 a	 paedophile	was	 found	 to	 be	wrong,	 the	 sentencing	 judge	
held	 that	 a	 significant	 factor	 motivating	 Dunn	 was	 his	 ‘feelings	 of	 antipathy	 towards	 his	
neighbour	 Mr	 Arja	 who	 he	 believed	 without	 justification	 at	 all,	 was	 a	 paedophile’.9	 These	
findings,	the	judge	ruled,	constituted	a	significant	aggravating	factor	in	line	with	s	21A(2)(h)	of	
the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	(NSW)	1999.	This	section	provides	that	sentencing	judges	
may	 have	 regard	 to	 whether	 an	 offence	 was	 motivated	 by	 hatred	 for	 or	 prejudice	 against	 a	
group	of	people	to	which	the	offender	believed	the	victim	belonged.	Specifically,	 it	constitutes	
the	 means	 by	 which	 New	 South	 Wales	 courts	 distinguish	 hate	 crimes	 from	 other	 forms	 of	
offending	behaviour.		
	
Dunn	 appealed	 against	 this	 sentencing,	 requiring	 the	 Court	 of	 Criminal	 Appeal	 to	 give	
consideration	to	whether	paedophilia	may	constitute	grounds	for	hate	crime.	The	court’s	ruling	
was	unambiguous.	It	found	that:	
	
Applying	s	21	A(2)(h)	it	is	clear	that	the	offences	come	fairly	and	squarely	within	it.	
The	offence	was	motivated	by	a	hatred	or	prejudice	against	Mr	Arja	solely	because	
the	applicant	believed	him	to	be	a	member	of	a	particular	group,	ie	paedophiles.	The	
examples	given	in	parentheses10	are	merely	that,	ie	examples,	they	do	not	comprise	
an	exhaustive	list	of	the	groups	envisaged	by	the	subsection.11	
	
The	consequence	of	this	finding	was	the	recognition	that	a	belief	an	individual	is	a	paedophile	is	
sufficient	to	constitute	an	aggravating	factor	 in	sentencing:	that	 is,	the	belief	an	individual	 is	a	
paedophile	may	give	an	act	the	character	of	a	hate	crime.		
	
For	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	it	is	how	this	judgment	has	been	received	that	is	of	significance.	
Legal	scholar	Gail	Mason	has	written	extensively	on	hate	crime	(2001,	2007,	2009a,	2009b).	In	
response	 to	 this	 case,	Mason	writes	 ‘this	 decision	 appears	 to	 be	 a	world	 first.	 The	protection	
offered	by	hate	crime	laws	has	never	before	been	extended	to	paedophiles	as	a	group’	(2009a:	
254).	 Elsewhere	 she	 describes	 it	 as	 a	 ‘provocative	 and	 unique	 decision’	 (2009b:	 337).	
Considering	 the	 recent	 history	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 hate	 crime,	 Mason	 emphasises	 how	 it	 has	
typically	 been	 deployed	 in	 order	 to	 place	 ‘discriminatory	 violence	 on	 the	 public	 agenda	 as	 a	
recognisable	social	problem’	(2009a:	254).	Hate	crime	 laws,	she	argues,	aim	to	 ‘make	a	broad	
moral	 claim	 that	 prejudice	 is	 wrong	 and	 thereby	 reinforce	 prosocial	 values	 of	 tolerance	 and	
respect	 for	 marginalised	 and	 disadvantaged	 groups’	 (Mason	 2009a:	 254).	 Because	 of	 their	
expressive	 function	 in	 denouncing	 intolerance	 and	 violence	 toward	 traditionally	
underprivileged	groups,	‘hate	crime	laws	have	tended	to	mimic	the	kinds	of	“social	fissure	lines”	
also	protected	under	discrimination	law:	race,	religion,	ethnicity,	colour,	age,	sexuality,	physical	
and	mental	disability	and	so	on’	(2009a:	254‐5).	
	
If	prejudice	is	the	crucial	factor	that	hate	crime	laws	seek	to	address,	then	according	to	Mason,	
this	 prejudice	 must	 be	 irrational	 or	 unjustifiable:	 ‘prejudice	 by	 very	 definition	 denotes	 an	
irrational	 or	 unjustifiably	 negative	 attitude	 towards	 members	 of	 a	 particular	 group’	 (2009a:	
255).	However,	 she	 regards	paedophilia	 as	 something	of	 a	 limit	when	 it	 comes	 to	hate	 crime.	
Whereas	 other	 forms	 of	 prejudice	 are	 irrational	 and	 unjustified,	 the	 attitude	 lacks	 these	
qualities	when	applied	to	the	paedophile.	As	she	writes:	
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Adults	who	 engage	 in	 sex	with	 children	 inflict	 a	 clear	 and	 identifiable	 harm	upon	
others,	 namely	 children.	 Condemnation	 of	 such	 behaviour	 is	 neither	 unwarranted	
nor	unjustified.	Indeed,	many	would	argue	we	have	a	moral	imperative	to	denounce	
exploitative	conduct	of	this	nature.	(2009a:	255).	
	
Elsewhere	Mason	 has	 examined	 the	 political	 dimensions	 that	 can	 underpin	what	 is	 or	 is	 not	
labelled	as	hate	crime.	In	her	compelling	analysis	of	the	Snowtown	case,12	she	highlights	the	way	
hate	crime	can	engender	‘emotional	thinking’,	including	compassion	for	victims	and	disgust	for	
perpetrators	(2007).	As	she	writes,	the	question	of	whether	an	act	is	labelled	a	hate	crime	is	not	
simply	determined	by	whether	 it	meets	a	 requisite	 legal	definition.	Drawing	on	Nils	Christie’s	
‘ideal	victim’,	in	the	context	of	Snowtown	she	demonstrates	how	a	sense	of	moral	failure	on	the	
part	of	victims	precludes	a	broader	public	recognition	of	these	acts	as	constituting	a	hate	crime.	
Her	examination	of	the	legal	case	alongside	public	reportage	reveals	that	while	hatred	towards	
homosexuals	and	paedophiles	was	 the	primary	 (albeit	not	 exclusive)	motive	 for	 these	deaths,	
because	 of	 the	 broader	 moral	 judgment	 that	 is	 socially	 ascribed	 to	 homosexuality	 and	
paedophilia,	this	case	has	rarely	if	ever	been	properly	labelled	as	a	hate	crime.	
	
Returning	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Dunn,	 for	 Mason	 prejudice	 against	 paedophilia	 is	 not	 irrational	 or	
unjustified,	therein	precluding	such	violence	from	being	understood	as	a	category	of	hate	crime.	
While	I	am	broadly	indebted	to	Mason’s	extensive	and	insightful	work	on	hate	crime,	I	take	issue	
with	 two	 particular	 consequences	 of	 her	 argument	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 paedophilia:	 first,	 the	
assumption	that	hatred	of	paedophilia	is	neither	irrational	nor	unjustified;	and	second,	the	need,	
I	 would	 emphasise,	 to	 distinguish	 between	 social	 attitudes	 regarding	 paedophilia	 and	 the	
phenomenon	of	child	sexual	assault	itself.		
	
As	I	have	argued,	the	cultural	aversion	for	paedophilia	is	not	a	direct	correlation	of	the	objective	
reality	of	child	sexual	assault.	While	increased	recognition	of	the	prevalence	of	and	repudiation	
for	 child	 sex	 offending	 is	 to	 be	welcomed,	 this	 should	 not	 preclude	 critique	 of	 the	manner	 in	
which	 paedophilia	 has	 come	 to	 constitute	 monstrosity	 and	 hatred	 par	 excellence.	 Following	
Jenkins’	(1998)	identification	of	a	moral	panic	surrounding	paedophilia,	this	panic	itself	may	be	
misplaced	or	out	of	proportion.	By	delegitimising	 the	potential	 for	paedophilia	 to	constitute	a	
category	 of	 hate	 crime,	 recognition	 of	 the	 irrational	 or	 unjustified	 moral	 panic	 surrounding	
paedophilia	 is	 foreclosed.	 Indeed,	 growing	 vigilantism	 against	 paedophiles	 is	 one	 key	
consequence	 of	 our	 moral	 panic	 surrounding	 the	 category	 of	 the	 paedophile.	 While	 Mason	
recognises	that	such	vigilantism	is	not	warranted,	I	would	nonetheless	maintain	that	vigilantism	
arises	from	the	same	site	of	hate	itself.	It	is	difficult	in	practice	to	decry	vigilantism	at	the	same	
time	that	we	delegitimise	the	potential	for	retributive	violence	on	the	basis	of	paedophilia	to	be	
legally	defined	as	a	hate	crime.		
	
My	 second	 point	 of	 departure	 from	 Mason’s	 argument	 is	 borne	 from	 need	 to	 distinguish	
between	 paedophilia	 and	 child	 sexual	 assault.	 Throughout	 this	 paper	 I	 have	 used	 the	 terms	
‘child	 sexual	 assault’	 and	 ‘paedophilia’	 deliberately.	 One	 consequence	 of	 the	 moral	 panic	
surrounding	 the	 paedophile	 is	 to	 cast	 this	 category	 or	 type	 of	 person	 as	 emblematic	 for,	 and	
synonymous	 with,	 child	 sexual	 assault.	 The	 alarming	 prevalence	 from	 child	 sexual	 assault	
however	 demands	 that	 the	 category	 of	 the	 paedophile	 cannot	 stand	 in	 for	 this	 troubling	
phenomenon.	 Through	 our	 aversion	 for	 the	 paedophile,	 we	 lose	 sight	 of	 the	 more	 routine,	
normative	reality	of	child	sexual	assault.	In	this	respect	my	argument	parallels	Hannah	Arendt’s	
in	the	context	of	Adolph	Eichmann	trial	(1963).	For	Arendt,	what	characterised	Eichmann	was	
not	 monstrosity	 or	 extraordinary	 exceptionality.	 Instead,	 it	 was	 his	 very	 ordinariness,	 his	
banality.	For	her,	this	made	his	crimes	much	more	terrifying.	In	the	same	way,	I	would	suggest	
that	 our	 increased	 fixation	 on	 ‘the	 paedophile’	 functions	 to	 disavow	 the	 routine	 or	 prevalent	
nature	of	 child	 sexual	 assault,	 therein	 losing	 sight	of	 those	 child	 sex	offenders	amongst	us,	 or	
who	indeed	may	be	us.		
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In	 this	 respect,	what	 is	often	 left	unspoken	within	 the	cultural	aversion	 for	paedophilia	 is	 the	
complex	relation	of	self	and	other	that	underpins	this	disgust.	Broadly	speaking	debates	about	
criminal	 justice	 tend	 by	 their	 nature	 to	 construct	 community.	 As	 Young	 observes,	 ‘the	 mere	
existence	 of	 an	 offender	 is	 set	 up	 as	 turning	 everyone	 (else)	 into	 victims.	 Thus	 the	 lines	 are	
rigidly	drawn	between	those	who	belong	to	the	law	(and	the	community)	and	those	who	do	not:	
the	 outlaws’	 (1996:	 9).	 Hate	 crime	 itself	 has	 been	 examined	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 complex	
manifestation	 of	 this	 dichotomy	 between	 self	 and	 other,	 offering	 a	 complex	 insight	 into	 the	
construction	 of	 identity	 (and	 community)	 through	 the	 infliction	 of	 retributive	 violence.	
Specifically,	 it	 reveals	 a	 rather	 novel	 manifestation	 whereby	 prejudice‐motivated	 crimes	
function	to	construct	a	community	of	‘us’	through	the	enactment	of	violence	upon	an	‘other’.	In	
the	context	of,	for	example,	homophobic	violence,	such	acts	can	constitute	a	performative	arena	
through	which	to	construct	oneself	as	heterosexual.	As	Mason	recognises,	 the	naming	of	these	
acts	as	hate	crimes	provides	an	 important	expressive	statement	about	community	that	resists	
this	 sort	 of	 heteronormative	 excision	 of	 sexual	 difference.	 Similarly,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 child	
sexual	assault	demands	 the	recognition	 that	such	offending	cannot	be	reduced	or	collapsed	to	
the	monstrous	and	abject	category	of	the	paedophile.	What	needs	to	be	instead	recognised	is	the	
very	communal	nature	of	such	harm,	alongside	a	rejection	of	the	impulse	to	delegate	this	to	an	
abject	other	(‘the	paedophile’).		
	
By	 foreclosing	 paedophilia	 from	 legal	 definitions	 of	 hate	 crime,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 we	 re‐
entrench	 this	 cultural	 preoccupation	 for	 paedophilia	 and,	 in	 doing	 so,	 obscure	 from	
consideration	that	reality	that	child	sexual	assault	is	not	synonymous	with	paedophilia.	Indeed,	
most	child	sex	offenders	are	not	‘paedophiles’,	as	properly	understood	(Ardill	and	Warlde	2009:	
258).	Naming	an	act	as	a	hate	crime	is,	following	Mason,	an	important	emotional	statement	that	
serves	 to	de‐legitimise	 the	motivation	 that	underpins	such	acts.	 In	 the	case	of	 racism,	sexism,	
homophobia	and	so	on,	the	import	of	this	is	obvious.	However,	in	a	context	in	which	paedophilia	
as	 a	 category	 of	 criminality	 has	 come	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 abject	 par	 excellence,	 there	 are	
dangers	that	arise	from	denying	that	acts	motivated	by	prejudice	against	this	class	of	offenders	
should	meet	the	requirements	of	legal	definitions	of	hate	crime.	This	need	only	be	witnessed	via	
the	array	of	harms	child	sex	offenders	released	back	into	the	community	can	experience.	At	the	
same	time	that	we	repudiate	child	sexual	assault,	I	contend	that	there	remains	a	need	to	resist	
the	urge	to	simultaneously	foreclose	a	capacity	to	understand	retributive	violence	of	the	basis	of	
paedophilia	as	a	legally	recognised	form	of	hate	crime.		
	
Conclusion:	The	Im/Possibility	of	Naming	Paedophilia	as	a	Category	of	Hate	
Earlier	 in	this	paper	 I	quoted	Scott,	who	speaks	of	 the	way	 in	which	 the	appearance	of	a	new	
identity	 is	 neither	 inevitable	 nor	 predetermined.	 By	 chronically	 a	 trajectory	 of	 disgust	
associated	with	paedophilia,	I	have	sought	to	offer	a	context	through	which	to	make	meaningful	
the	 contemporary	 aversion	 for	 paedophilia.	 Since	 the	 1970s,	 during	 which	 time	 child	 sexual	
assault	was	 all	 too	often	 silenced	or	 trivialised,	 the	 child	protection	 lobby	and	 feminists	have	
made	 important	 strides	 in	 bringing	 to	 light	 the	 all‐too‐prevalent	 nature	 of	 this	 form	 of	
victimisation	 (Angelides	 2004).	 One	 consequence	 of	 this	 has	 been	 an	 increased	 aversion	 for	
those	 who	 have	 been	 responsible	 for	 such	 conduct.	 However,	 while	 denunciation	 for	
paedophilia	 is	 both	 important	 and	 necessary,	 a	 growing	moral	 panic	 surrounding	 this	 is	 not	
without	consequence.	This	can	be	witnessed	via	retributive	violence	that	many	convicted	child	
sexual	offenders	experience	upon	their	release	from	prison,	as	with	the	misdirected	actions	by	
people	 such	 as	 Darren	 Brian	Dunn.	 Further,	 increased	 hysteria	 regarding	 convicted	 child	 sex	
offenders	 is	 often	 itself	misplaced,	 instilling	 a	 false	 sense	 of	 security	 to	 the	 public:	 as	 Barnes	
notes,	 this	diverts	attention	 from	 the	 ‘individual	who	presents	 as	a	decent	 law‐abiding	 family	
man’	 (cited	 in	 Ardill	 and	Wardle	 2009:	 258).	My	 argument	 is	 not	 that	 paedophilia	 should	 be	
condoned,	 but	 that	 a	 more	 troubling	 consequence	 arises	 from	 the	 trajectory	 of	 disgust	
chronicled	throughout	the	paper.	Foremost	amongst	these	is	the	risk	of	re‐affirming	a	cultural	
obliviousness	to	this	otherwise	law	abiding	and	‘respectable’	family	man.		
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1  See	McDonald	(2012)	for	an	analysis	of	 the	enactment	of	post‐sentence	preventative	detention	and	supervision	
regimes	relating	to	so‐called	‘serious	sex	offenders’.	
2		 Derryn	Hinch	 has	 become	 renowned	 in	Australia	 for	 his	 campaign	 naming	 and	 shaming	 sex	 offenders.	He	 has	
previously	been	convicted	and	imprisoned	for	breaching	court	orders	prohibiting	the	naming	of	offenders.	
3		 This	led	to	vigilante	attacks	against	both	actual	convicted	sex	offenders,	as	well	as	those	bearing	the	same	name	as	
those	published.	On	the	potentially	injurious	consequences	of	naming	and	shaming	laws,	with	a	particular	focus	
on	the	News	of	the	World’s	campaign,	see	Ashenden	2002;	Critcher	2002;	Cross	2005;	Evans	2003;	Lawler	2002;	
McAlinden	2005.	
4		 See	section	21A(2)	of	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW);	Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312.	
5		 Western	Australia	became	the	 first	Australian	state	 in	2012	to	enable	public	access	to	 information	held	 in	such	
registries.	Reports	suggest	that	Victoria	and	New	South	Wales	are	considering	following	suit.		
6		 See	Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312.	On	this	case,	see	also	Mason	(2009a,	2009b).	
7		 The	term	‘rock	spider’	is	an	epithet	for	paedophiles,	and	is	most	commonly	deployed	by	prisoners	to	refer	to	their	
fellow	 inmates	convicted	of	child	sex	offences.	Dunn	had	previously	been	 imprisoned	for	robbery	offences,	and	
was	on	parole	at	the	time	of	his	malicious	damage	offences.		
8		 Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312	at	para	12.	Dunn	had	reported	to	the	psychiatrist	that	he	was	sexually	assaulted	as	
a	child,	however	this	was	found	to	conflict	with	statements	made	by	Dunn	elsewhere.		
9		 Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312	at	para	17.	
10		 The	examples	provided	in	the	Act	are	as	follows:	people	of	a	particular	religion,	racial	or	ethnic	origin,	language,	
sexual	orientation	or	age,	or	having	a	particular	disability.	
11		 Dunn	v	R	[2007]	NSWCCA	312	at	para	32.	
12		 In	1999	eight	bodies	were	initially	discovered	in	barrels	in	an	unused	bank	vault	in	the	town	of	Snowtown.	John	
Bunting	 and	 Robert	Wagner	were	 convicted	 of	 eleven	 and	 seven	murders	 respectively,	 while	 two	 other	men,	
James	Vlassakis	and	Mark	Heydon,	were	convicted	of	having	accompanied	the	men	in	a	number	of	these	murders.	
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Abstract	
In	 recent	 events,	 notions	 of	 political	 protest,	 civil	 disobedience,	 extremism,	 and	 criminal	
action	have	become	increasingly	blurred.	The	London	Riots,	the	Occupy	movement,	and	the	
actions	 of	 hacking	 group	 Anonymous	 have	 all	 sparked	 heated	 debate	 about	 the	 limits	 of	
legitimate	protest,	and	the	distinction	between	an	acceptable	action	and	a	criminal	offence.	
Long	 before	 these	 events,	 environmental	 activists	 were	 challenging	 convention	 in	 protest	
actions,	with	several	groups	engaging	in	politically	motivated	 law‐breaking.	The	emergence	
of	 the	 term	 ‘eco‐tage’	 (the	 sabotage	 of	 equipment	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 environment)	
signifies	 the	 important	 place	 environmental	 activists	 hold	 in	 challenging	 the	 traditional	
boundaries	between	illegal	action	and	legitimate	protest.		
	
Many	of	these	groups	establish	their	own	boundaries	of	legitimacy,	with	some	justifying	their	
actions	on	the	basis	of	civil	disobedience	or	extensional	self‐defence.	This	paper	examines	the	
statements	of	environmental	activist	organisations	that	have	engaged	in	politically	motivated	
law	breaking.	It	identifies	the	parameters	that	these	groups	set	on	their	illegal	actions,	as	well	
as	the	justifications	that	they	provide,	with	a	view	to	determining	where	these	actions	fit	in	
the	vast	grey	area	between	legal	protest	and	violent	extremism.		
	
	
Introduction	
Politically	motivated	 lawbreaking	 has	 long	 been	 a	 protest	 tactic	 across	many	movements	 for	
social	 justice.	On	a	continuum	between	civil	disobedience	and	 terrorism	exists	many	 forms	of	
action	 that	 defy	 laws,	 and	 labels.	 For	 instance,	 terms	 such	 as	 eco‐tage	 (the	 sabotage	 of	
equipment	 in	order	 to	protect	 the	environment)	have	 emerged	 in	 an	effort	 to	define	 just	one	
form	of	direct	action	favoured	by	radical	environmental	and	animal	rights	activists.	Many	of	the	
actions	favoured	by	these	groups	exist	somewhere	in	the	grey	area	between	legitimate	protest	
and	violent	extremism.	Increasingly,	however,	environmental	protest	actions	that	involve	some	
acts	of	lawbreaking	are	being	tagged	as	ecoterrorism,	resulting	in	significant	attention	from	law	
enforcement,	 as	 well	 as	 condemnation	 from	 the	 public.	 This	 is	 despite	 ongoing	 protest	 from	
many	 activists	 that	 their	 actions,	 while	 illegal,	 are	 justified	 within	 a	 framework	 of	 civil	
disobedience,	and	do	not	amount	to	terrorism.	
	
This	‘grey	area	phenomenon’	(Hoffman	1998:	28)	poses	a	significant	challenge	to	both	scholars	
and	 policy	 makers	 in	 attempts	 to	 define	 terrorist	 acts,	 and	 distinguish	 between	 legitimate	
protest	and	illegitimate	actions.	This	paper	examines	the	ways	in	which	the	lawbreaking	actions	
of	 environmentalist	 and	 animal	 rights	 groups	 are	 positioned	 and	 justified.	 The	 first	 section	
provides	an	examination	of	efforts	 to	 categorise	politically	motivated	 lawbreaking	 in	order	 to	
identify	the	key	factors	that	establish	the	borderlines	between	civil	disobedience,	terrorism,	and	
acts	in	between.	The	second	section	is	an	examination	of	justifications	offered	by	groups	for	acts	
of	 lawbreaking	 via	 a	 content	 analysis	 of	 press	 releases	 from	 five	 activist	 groups.	 These	
justifications	 for	 illegal	 behaviour	 offer	 some	 insight	 into	 how	 activist	 groups	 self‐define	 and	
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categorise	 their	own	behaviour	on	a	 continuum	between	 legal	protest	 and	violent	extremism.	
The	data	analysed	includes	press	statements	put	out	by	Trident	Ploughshares,	Greenpeace,	Sea	
Shepherd	Conservation	Society,	Stop	Huntingdon	Animal	Cruelty	(and	associated	group	Smash	
HLS),	 and	 Rising	 Tide	 between	 January	 2010	 and	December	 2012.	 The	 analysis	 involved	 the	
coding	of	each	statement	to	identify	recurring	themes	in	the	justifications	provided	for	actions.	
This	method	is	informed,	in	part,	by	Liddick’s	(2013)	analysis	of	individual	statements	from	the	
Animal	 Liberation	 Front.	 Liddick	 sought	 to	 identify	 evidence	 of	 neutralisation	 strategies	
employed	by	activists	to	assuage	feelings	of	guilt	for	committing	socially	deviant	acts.	This	study	
uses	 a	 similar	 content	 analysis	 approach	 to	 identify	 thematic	 justifications	 for	 criminal	 acts	
based	 on	 traditional	 justifications	 for	 political	 lawbreaking	 found	 in	 the	 literature,	 as	well	 as	
allowing	 for	 the	 coding	 to	 be	 driven	 by	 the	 data	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 new	 or	 alternative	
justifications.		
	
This	 paper	 argues	 that	 great	 uncertainty	 remains	 over	 where	 the	 lawbreaking	 activities	 of	
radical	environmentalists	and	animal	rights	activists	are	positioned	on	a	spectrum	between	civil	
disobedience	and	terrorism.	The	justifications	offered	by	activists	rely	in	part	on	a	discourse	of	
civil	disobedience,	but	demonstrate	that	activists	are	willing	to	go	beyond	passive	resistance,	or	
non‐violent	protest,	in	a	pursuit	of	immediate	change.		
	
Defining	Acts	of	Politically	Motivated	Lawbreaking	
Much	 of	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 definition	 of	 terrorism	 revolves	 around	 three	 key	 factors:	 the	
actor,	the	target,	and	the	act.	Of	these	categories,	the	actor	appears	to	be	the	least	determinant	
factor	 in	 justifying	a	 label	of	 terrorism.	The	State	Department	of	 the	USA	defines	 terrorism	as	
acts	perpetrated	by	‘sub‐national	groups	or	clandestine	agents’	(US	Department	of	State	1998:	
vi),	 however	 some	 argue	 that	 this	 definition	 is	 too	 limiting,	 and	 does	not	 take	 account	 of	 the	
terrorist	 actions	 of	 nation‐states	 (Jaggar	 2005:	 203).	 The	 presence	 of	 a	 uniform,	 or	 title	 of	
power,	conveys	an	element	of	legitimacy	to	many	acts	such	as	the	destruction	of	infrastructure	
through	targeted	bombings,	and	the	killing	of	civilians	in	drone	strikes	that,	if	perpetrated	by	a	
non‐state	group,	would	be	condemned	as	terrorism	(Jaggar	2005:	204).	Others	suggest	that	the	
focus	on	the	political	motivations	of	actors	may	unfairly	define	their	actions	as	terrorism,	thus	
punishing	them	for	having	a	cause	for	their	crime.	Amster	argues	that,	‘It	appears	to	be	precisely	
the	political	 and	ethical	 rationale	 for	 the	act	 that	 turns	a	 garden‐variety	 crime	 like	vandalism	
into	a	purported	act	of	ecoterrorism’	(Amster	2006:	299).	This	 is	evident	 in	 the	definitions	of	
terrorism	 adopted	 by	 a	 number	 of	 nation‐states,	 particularly	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America,	
which	 has	 imposed	 harsher	 penalties	 for	 crimes	 such	 as	 vandalism	 and	 arson	 through	
‘terrorism	enhancements’	(Gibson	2010:	142).	It	is,	however,	not	the	actor,	but	rather	the	target	
of	 the	 act	 (human	 or	 non‐human),	 and	 the	 act	 itself	 (violent	 or	 non‐violent)	 which	 most	
frequently	 guide	 the	 establishment	 of	 societal	 boundaries	 rendering	 some	 acts	 of	 political	
lawbreaking	as	legitimate	and	others	as	condemned.		
	
The	target	
The	 targets	 of	 terrorist	 acts	 are	 both	primary	 and	 secondary	 (Vanderheiden	 2005:	 428).	 The	
primary	 target	 is	 the	 person,	 or	 object,	 on	 which	 the	 act,	 or	 attack,	 is	 directly	 inflicted.	 The	
secondary	 target	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 more	 important	 target,	 the	 ‘real’	 audience	 for	 the	
attack.	It	is	typically	the	populace,	government	or	institution	intended	to	experience	‘terror’	at	
the	prospect	of	 future	actions.	There	are	several	ways	 in	which	the	selection	of	 these	primary	
and	 secondary	 targets	 can	 serve	 to	 distinguish	 acts	 of	 terrorism	 from	 other	 forms	 of	 illegal	
political	action	for	environmental	reasons.	Firstly,	acts	of	terrorism	are	broadly	considered	to	be	
especially	evil	because	they	do	not	discriminate	between	‘innocent’	and	‘non‐innocent’	victims.	
While	 the	 terrorists	 responsible	 for	 the	 attack	 on	 the	 World	 Trade	 Centre	 in	 2001	 chose	 a	
symbolic	 target	 for	destruction,	 they	killed	 thousands	of	people	 indiscriminately.	By	 contrast,	
environmental	activists	are	very	discriminating	 in	 selecting	 targets	 for	 their	actions,	 choosing	
individuals	 and	 organisations	 that	 they	 believe	 to	 be	 directly	 responsible	 for	 environmental	
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degradation	 such	 as	 SUV	 dealers,	 property	 developers,	 logging	 companies,	 and	 bio‐medical	
companies	utilising	animal	testing	(Liddick	2006:	8).	
	
A	second	way	in	which	illegal	actions	by	environmentalists	may	be	differentiated	from	terrorist	
attacks	 is	 in	 the	 intended	 secondary	 target	 for	 their	 actions.	Radical	 enviromentalists	 tend	 to	
favour	 more	 direct	 tactics,	 with	 actions	 taken	 against	 the	 secondary	 target,	 or	 audience,	
themselves.	For	example,	the	Environmental	Liberation	Front	has	claimed	responsibility	for	acts	
directly	 targeting	 corporations	 they	 believe	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 acts	 of	 environmental	
degradation	or	animal	cruelty.	These	acts	 include	the	burning	of	buildings	and	ski	 lifts	at	Vail,	
Colorado	and	the	vandalism	of	ATMs	and	bank	branches	at	the	Bank	of	New	York	in	protest	of	
their	relationship	with	animal	testing	corporation	Huntingdon	Life	Sciences	(Liddick	2006:	5).	
While	these	acts	may	be	differentiated	from	terrorism	on	the	basis	that	the	primary	target	was	
the	most	 important	 target,	 the	 impact	on	a	secondary	 target	 cannot	be	discounted	altogether.	
Those	responsible	 for	 these	acts	often	publicise	their	activities,	which	 indicates	that	while	 the	
primary	aim	may	be	to	disrupt	environmentally	damaging	activities	such	as	logging,	a	secondary	
aim	may	be	to	dissuade	other	companies	from	engaging	in	such	activities.	This	would	certainly	
be	 true	 of	 several	 of	 the	 actions	 taken	 by	 members	 of	 animal	 rights	 activist	 group	 Stop	
Huntingdon	Animal	Cruelty	 (SHAC).	 Several	 press	 releases	 by	 the	 group	 report	 on	protestors	
visiting	the	neighbourhoods	of	corporate	leaders	or	businesses	associated	with	Hungtindon	Life	
Sciences,	promising	more	appearances	at	people’s	homes	and	workplaces.	One	release	states:	
	
You’ll	 never	 know	what	will	 be	 coming	 next	 –	 but	we’re	 dying	 to	 expose	 the	 sick	
lengths	that	you’re	willing	to	go	to	in	order	to	make	your	blood	money.	The	plague	is	
spreading	but	you	have	the	cure	–	cut	your	ties	with	HLS	or	your	headache	has	only	
just	begun.	(SHAC	22	August	2011)		
	
This	clearly	conveys	a	threat	of	future	action.	
	
The	 vast	majority	 of	 radical	 environmental	 or	 animal	 rights	 groups	 engaging	 in	 direct	 action	
target	 corporations	 as	 both	 their	 primary	 and	 secondary	 targets,	 rather	 than	 governments,	
which	could	preclude	them	from	the	label	of	terrorism	under	some	definitions.	For	instance,	the	
definition	of	 terrorism	under	US	 law	 is	an	act	 ‘calculated	 to	 influence	or	affect	 the	conduct	of	
government	 by	 intimidation	 or	 coercion,	 or	 to	 retaliate	 against	 government	 conduct’	 (Anti‐
Terrorism	and	Effective	Death	Penalty	Act	1996).	Despite	this	guiding	principle	that	an	act	should	
be	directed	at	 the	state	 (whether	as	primary	or	secondary	 target),	perpetrated	by	a	non‐state	
actor	in	order	to	be	classified	as	terrorism,	many	acts	directed	at	corporate	interests	have	been	
declared	to	be	eco‐terrorism.	For	example,	the	burning	of	buildings	and	ski	lifts	at	Vail	Colorado	
in	 1998	 was	 an	 act	 clearly	 directed	 against	 the	 property	 developers	 and	 resort	 owners.	
However,	 in	 2005	 when	 Earth	 Liberation	 Front	 activists	 were	 arrested	 for	 this	 crime,	 then‐
Attorney	General	Alberto	Gonzalez	said,	‘Today’s	indictment	proves	that	we	will	not	tolerate	any	
group	that	terrorises	the	American	people,	no	matter	its	intentions	or	objectives’	(FBI	1006).	
	
It	is	not	the	symbolic	institution,	but	rather	the	actual	object	that	most	dominates	and	influences	
debate	about	what	constitutes	a	terror	attack.	The	mass	killing	of	humans	for	political	ends	by	
non‐state	actors	is	widely	accepted	as	a	terrorist	act,	while	the	destruction	of	inanimate	objects	
muddies	 the	definitional	waters.	 This	 ethical	 boundary	 is	 the	one	most	 frequently	 erected	by	
radical	 environmentalists	 in	 setting	 parameters	 on	 their	 protest	 activities.	 Dave	 Foreman,	
environmentalist	 leader,	 advocates	 the	 use	 of	 ‘monkeywrenching’	 (typically	 the	 sabotage,	 or	
eco‐tage,	of	industrial	equipment	used	in	environmentally	damaging	acts	such	as	bulldozers	or	
timber	 saws)	 as	 a	 form	 of	 ‘non‐violent	 resistance	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 natural	 diversity	 and	
wilderness.	 It	 is	 never	 directed	 against	 human	 beings	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 life.	 It	 is	 aimed	 at	
inanimate	machines	and	tools	that	are	destroying	life’	(Foreman	and	Haywood	1993:	9).	
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In	recent	times,	however,	several	nation‐states	have	expanded	the	definition	of	terrorist	act	to	
include	 actions	 against	 non‐human	 targets.	 Following	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 of	 September	 11	
2001,	the	definition	of	terrorism	was	effectively	expanded	under	the	Patriot	Act	to	include	acts	
that	 destroy	 or	 attempt	 to	 destroy,	 ‘any	 building,	 vehicle,	 or	 other	 real	 or	 personal	 property	
used	 in	 interstate	 or	 foreign	 commerce	 or	 in	 any	 activity	 affecting	 interstate	 or	 foreign	
commerce’	(US	Patriot	Act).	This	definition	therefore	includes	almost	any	action	against	any	for‐
profit	enterprise,	effectively	removing	the	requirement	that	acts	be	directed	against	the	state	as	
a	target.	The	Animal	Enterprise	Terrorism	Act	(AETA)	introduced	in	2006	further	lowered	the	
threshold	 for	 an	 act	 to	 be	 defined	 as	 terrorism	 specifying	 that	 acts	 such	 as	 causing	 ‘physical	
disruption	to	the	functioning	of	an	animal	enterprise’	would	also	be	considered	terroristic,	and	
thus	 subject	 to	 enhancement	 penalties.	 Several	 scholars	 and	 activists	 have	 argued	 that	 these	
expansions	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 terrorism	were	 intended	 to	 capitalise	on	 the	 increased	 fear	of	
terrorism	 in	a	post	9‐11	environment,	and	to	suppress	dissent	 from	activists	 for	social	 justice	
including	environmental	groups,	as	well	as	cyber‐activists,	or	‘hactivists’	(Eddy	2005;Best	2007;	
McCoy	2007;	Potter	2008;	Amster	2006).	
	
The	act	
Definitions	 of	 terrorism	 based	 on	 the	 target	 of	 an	 act	 are	 inherently	 linked	 to	 the	 act	 itself.	
Attempts	 to	 categorise	 the	 illegal	 actions	 of	 environmentalist	 and	 animal	 rights	 activists	 on	 a	
continuum	between	civil	disobedience	and	terrorism	have	centred	on	these	two	main	variables,	
largely	 disregarding	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 actor.	 Miller,	 Rivera	 and	 Yelin	 suggest	 that	 illegal	
actions	by	environmentalist	 groups	 can	 fall	within	 three	 categories.	 Firstly,	 civil	disobedience	
‘would	 encompass	 actions	 of	 peaceful	 protest	 and	 speech’	 and	 would	 be	 distinguished	 from	
other	 acts	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 ‘significant	 security	 threat’	 posed	 by	 the	 protest.	 Secondly	
‘antagonistic	disobedience’	 is	 defined	 as	 ‘actions	 that	 are	 semiviolent	 or	 violent’	 such	 as	 ‘tree	
spiking,	 individual	 acts	 of	 violence	 or	 assault,	 and	 minor	 destruction	 of	 property	 and/or	
resources’.	 Finally,	 ‘terrorism’	 would	 include	 ‘all	 actions	 openly	 violent	 and	 destructive	 to	
people,	property,	and/or	resources’	(Miller,	Rivera	and	Yelin	2008:	118‐119).		
	
These	proposed	categories	distinguish	between	acts	of	civil	disobedience	and	acts	of	terrorism	
primarily	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 use	 of	 violence.	 The	 middle‐ground	 category	 of	 ‘antagonistic	
disobedience’,	 however,	 creates	 significant	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 distinctions	 are	
made.	 In	 this	 casting	 both	 ‘antagonistic	 disobedience’	 and	 ‘terrorism’	 are	 violent	 actions,	 and	
both	result	in	harm	to	people	and	property.	The	distinction	between	the	two,	therefore,	seems	
to	 be	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 action,	with	 the	 authors	 providing	 examples	 of	 terrorism	 including	 the	
Oklahoma	City	bombing,	alongside	‘excessive	violence	against	individuals	or	groups’.	The	point	
at	which	a	violent	act	becomes	‘excessive’	is	implicitly,	rather	than	explicitly	defined.	
	
Liddick	 also	 offers	 a	 way	 of	 categorising	 the	 actions	 of	 environmental	 activists	 through	
distinguishing	between	different	acts.	His	typologies	are:	
	
Type	I:	Minor	crimes	involving	little	or	no	property	damage	(less	than	$10,000,	the	limit	
to	invoke	federal	law)	and	no	threat	of	human	injury	
	
Type	 II:	 Significant	 acts	 of	 property	 damage,	 including	 arson	 and	 bombings,	 whose	
damages	exceed	$10,000,	no	intended	violence	against	humans	but	with	an	indirect	threat	
of	physical	harm	
	
Type	III:	Threatening	behaviour	directed	against	people,	including	minor	physical	assaults	
producing	no	injuries	
	
Type	 IV:	Physical	 attacks	 against	persons	 in	which	 injury	 actually	 occurs	or	 is	 intended	
(Liddick	2006:	72).	
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Similar	to	Miller	et	al.’s	categories,	Liddick’s	typologies	rely	on	a	distinction	between	targeting	
humans	versus	property,	and	the	degree	of	violence,	or	scale,	of	the	activities.	However,	Liddick	
rejects	 the	 idea	implicit	 in	Miller	et	al.’s	categories	that	targeting	humans	always	causes	more	
harm	than	targeting	property.	He	argues	that,	‘Legal	statutes,	and	most	persons	with	an	opinion	
on	 the	 topic,	would	not	consider	 throwing	a	 tofu	pie	 in	someone’s	 face’	 (Type	 III)	 to	be	more	
serious	 than	 a	 multi‐million	 dollar	 arson	 (Type	 II)	 (Liddick	 2006:	 72).	 As	 such,	 the	 Liddick	
typologies	distinguish	actions	on	the	basis	of	both	the	target	and	the	act,	establishing	two	sub‐
groups	of	action.	Type	I	and	Type	II	describe	acts	against	non‐human	targets,	while	Type	III	and	
Type	IV	refer	to	acts	against	individuals	and	groups	of	people.	While	Type	I	actions	are	clearly	
not	terrorism,	and	Type	IV	actions	clearly	are,	there	is	significant	debate	about	the	appropriate	
label	for	many	of	the	acts	falling	under	the	categories	of	Type	II	and	III.		
	
Justifications	for	Political	Lawbreaking	
So	far	this	paper	has	examined	the	key	variables	that	influence	definitions	of	terrorism,	in	order	
to	 identify	 where	 actions	 by	 radical	 environmental	 and	 animal	 rights	 activists	may	 fit	 in	 the	
spectrum	 between	 civil	 disobedience	 and	 terrorism.	 In	 so	 doing,	 more	 questions	 have	 been	
found	 than	 answers,	 indicating	 that	 while	 some	 acts	 are	 easily	 identified	 as	 terrorism	 (for	
example,	physical	violence	against	humans),	other	actions	are	 less	easily	categorised.	We	now	
turn	to	an	examination	of	the	ways	in	which	these	groups	position	their	own	actions,	based	on	
the	justifications	they	offer	for	lawbreaking.	An	analysis	of	the	statements	of	five	organisations	
that	 engage	 in	 illegal	 actions	 as	 part	 of	 their	 protest	 indicated	 that	 there	 are	 three	 primary	
justifications	offered	for	their	actions:	necessity;	a	higher	moral	principle;	protection	of	others	
or	‘extensional	self‐defence’.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	statements	analysed	are	not	the	guiding	
principles	or	mission	statements	released	by	these	organisations	about	their	overall	campaigns	
or	tactics.	Rather,	they	are	the	press	releases	about	the	individual	acts,	which	primarily	describe	
the	 target	 of	 the	 groups,	 and	 the	 impact	 the	 action	 had	 (i.e.	 the	 success,	 or	 achievement).	 As	
such,	 the	 justifications	provided	 for	actions	rarely	explicitly	appeal	 to	 traditional	 justifications	
for	 civil	 disobedience,	 but	 provide	 an	 important	 insight	 into	 the	 perceived	 or	 implied	
justification	for	day	to	day	actions.		
	
Necessity	
The	first	justification	frequently	offered	by	organisations	for	their	actions	is	one	of	necessity	on	
the	basis	that	all	other	legal	avenues	for	change	have	been	exhausted.	The	exhaustion	of	all	legal	
avenues	also	assumes	that	the	activists	in	question	are	able	to	work	within	the	existing	power	
structures	 to	 achieve	 change.	Martin	Luther	King	 Jr.,	 in	his	 landmark	Letter	 from	Birmingham	
Jail	 justifies	 the	 breaking	 of	 laws	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 ‘the	 city’s	 white	 power	 structure	 left	 the	
Negro	 community	 with	 little	 alternative’	 (King	 1964:	 77‐99).	 While	 the	 challenge	 for	
environmental	and	animal	rights	activists	is	distinctly	different	to	the	civil	rights	movement	of	
the	 1960s,	 Gibson	 argues	 that	 some	 activists	 have	 rejected	 institutionalised	 structures	 for	
change	 due	 to	 a	 belief	 that	 ‘questions	 of	 environmental	 degradation	 could	 no	 longer	 be	
separated	from	critiques	of	state	power,	corporate	overreach	and	neoliberal	capitalism’	(Gibson	
2010:	 136).	 This	may	 be	 compounded	 by	 the	 diminishing	 traditional	 avenues	 through	which	
dissent	 can	 be	 expressed,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 restrictive	 permit	 regimes	 governing	mass	public	
protests,	 and	 the	 dominance	 of	 corporate	 interests	 in	 government	 decision‐making	 (White	
2009:	56).	
	
Statements	 by	 Rising	 Tide	 position	 the	 organisation	 as	 acting	 on	 behalf	 of	 those	 ignored	 or	
suppressed	by	those	in	power.	One	release	states:	
	
‘TransCanada	didn’t	bother	to	ask	the	people	of	this	neighbourhood	if	they	wanted	
to	have	millions	of	gallons	of	poisonous	tar	sands	pumped	through	their	backyards’,	
said	 Almonte,	 one	 of	 the	 protestors	 now	 inside	 the	 pipeline.	 ‘This	 multinational	
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corporation	 has	 bullied	 landowners	 and	 expropriated	 homes	 to	 fatten	 its	 bottom	
line’.	(Rising	Tide	3	December	2012)		
	
A	 Rising	 Tide	 activist	 declared	 in	 one	 statement,	 ‘I	 climbed	 this	 tree	 in	 honor	 of	 all	 the	
landowners	who	have	been	bullied	mercilessly	 into	signing	easement	contracts	and	who	were	
then	 silenced	 through	 fear	 by	 TransCanada’s	 threat	 of	 endless	 litigation’	 (Rising	 Tide	 19	
November	2012).		
	
Greenpeace	also	argues	that	their	action	is	upholding	democratic	principles,	while	government	
structures	ignore	the	wishes	of	the	public.	They	criticise	Brazil’s	President	Dilma,	arguing	that,	
‘In	 failing	 to	 completely	 block	 new	 “forest	 code”	 legislation	 yesterday,	 President	 Dilma	 has	
turned	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	 Amazon	 and	 a	 deaf	 ear	 to	 the	 people	 of	 Brazil’	
(Greenpeace	26	May	2012).		
	
Trident	 Ploughshares	 also	 invokes	 democratic	 principles	 as	 justification	 for	 their	 trespassing	
and	blockading	activities	at	the	nuclear	weapons	base	at	Faslane,	Scotland.	 In	a	release	issued	
on	13	May	2011	activist	Janet	Fenton	is	quoted	as	saying:	
	
Our	actions	here	are	not	illegal,	and	are	in	support	of	the	new	Scottish	Government.	
Once	again	the	Scottish	people	have	voted	overwhelmingly	in	opposition	to	nuclear	
weapons.	This	time,	there	is	a	clear	parliamentary	majority	for	a	single	party	with	a	
manifesto	promise	to	put	pressure	[on]	the	UK	Government	to	remove	these	illegal	
weapons	from	Scotland.	(Trident	Ploughshares	13	May	2011)		
	
A	justification	for	illegal	action	on	the	basis	of	necessity	is	also	drawn	from	a	belief	not	only	in	
the	 failing	of	established	processes	 for	 change,	but	also	 in	 the	 lack	of	 ability	or	willingness	of	
those	in	power	to	fulfil	their	roles.	For	instance,	Vanderheiden	(2005)	poses	several	case	studies	
of	 ecotage	 questioning	whether	 illegal	 action	might	 be	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 failure	 of	
governments	 to	 enforce	 laws	 against	 illegal	 logging	 and	 development,	 thus	 making	 them	
complicit	 with	 environmental	 degradation	 (Vanderheiden	 2005:	 442‐443).	 Nagtzaam	 and	
Lentini	 (2008)	 also	 consider	 a	 version	 of	 this	 justification	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 actions	 by	 the	 Sea	
Shepherd	Conservation	Society,	 labelling	 them	as	 ‘vigilantes’	 acting	 to	enforce	a	 law	 that	 they	
believe	should	be	enacted	(Nagtzaam	and	Lentini	2008).		
	
Captain	Paul	Watson	 from	 the	 Sea	 Shepherd	Conservation	 Society	has	 said	 they	 are	 acting	 to	
prevent	 ‘illegal	whaling	 activities’	 (SSCS	 5	 July	 2012).	 Trident	 Ploughshares	 also	 declare	 that	
they	are	acting	 to	prevent	 illegal	 action.	 In	many	of	 their	press	 releases	 they	characterise	 the	
existence	 of	 the	 Trident	 nuclear	weapons	 programme	 as	 illegal	 and	 in	 breach	 of	 the	Nuclear	
Non‐Proliferation	 Treaty.	 They	 say,	 ‘As	 long	 as	 the	 UK	 government	 threatens	 the	 peace	with	
weapons	 of	mass	 destruction	members	 of	 Trident	 Ploughshares	 and	Faslane	Peace	 Camp	 are	
committed	to	non‐violent	direct	action	to	disrupt	the	deployment	of	these	 illegal	and	immoral	
weapons’	(Trident	Ploughshares	2	July	2012).		
	
A	higher	moral	principle	
A	second	 justification	offered	for	 illegal	acts	by	organisations	 is	on	 the	basis	of	morality	–	 the	
moral	 justification	 for	 action	 being	 that	 to	 fail	 to	 act	 is	 immoral.	 Liddick’s	 recent	 study	 of	
statements	 by	 the	 Animal	 Liberation	 Front	 also	 found	 that	 an	 ‘appeal	 to	 a	 higher	 moral	
principle’	 was	 frequently	 invoked	 to	 justify	 illegal	 actions.	 Statements	 from	 Trident	
Ploughshares	activists	regularly	reflected	 this	 theme.	A	press	release	 from	2011	declared	that	
‘As	 long	as	 the	government	 fails	 to	 fulfil	 their	 responsibilities	under	 international	 law	citizens	
have	right	and	duty	to	intervene	in	order	to	prevent	crimes	against	humanity	and	war	crimes’	
(Trident	Ploughshares	13	May	2011).	Daniel	Viesnik,	a	Trident	Ploughshares	activist,	defended	
his	actions	which	resulted	in	a	stay	in	prison	saying,	‘I	feel	it	is	my	civic,	moral	and	legal	duty	to	
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help	stop	the	next	generation	of	nuclear	weapons	and	prevent	nuclear	crimes	against	humanity	
and	the	planet’	(Rising	Tide	12	February	2010).		
	
Activists	 from	 Rising	 Tide	 also	 explained	 their	 lawbreaking	 activists	 as	 an	 exercise	 of	 moral	
responsibility.	Activist	Benjamin	Franklin	said:	
	
As	 someone	who	has	a	 religious	dedication	 to	nonviolence,	 I	 have	 a	duty	 to	 assist	
nonviolent	 tactics.	 This	 is	 a	 path	 to	 change	 that	 works.	 Despite	 everything	 that	
happened	 at	 the	 direction	 of	 TransCanada,	 I	 don’t	 regret	my	 involvement	 at	 all.	 I	
encourage	everyone	to	persevere	in	the	fact	of	this	type	of	sheer	brutality.	To	follow	
one’s	moral	 compass	 in	 spite	 of	 extreme	 challenges	 is	 the	way	we	move	 forward	
towards	a	more	humane,	tar	sands‐free	planet.	(Rising	Tide	September	2012)		
	
R.C.	Saldana‐Flores,	also	from	Rising	Tide,	said,	‘As	a	mother	and	step‐grandmother,	I	want	to	be	
able	 to	 tell	my	children	 that	 I	did	 something	when	 the	 time	 came’	 (19	September	2012).	One	
statement	 from	 the	 group	 Smash	 HLS	 (associated	 with	 the	 Stop	 Huntingdon	 Animal	 Cruelty	
group)	made	 reference	 to	 their	 conscience	 in	 explaining	 their	 actions.	 They	 declared,	 ‘people	
with	a	conscience	will	always	be	there	to	speak	for	the	defenceless	animals	enslaved	in	places	
such	as	Primate	Products’	(October	23	2011).	This	statement	also	hints	at	a	further	justification	
offered	by	several	groups	–	that	their	actions	are	in	defence	of	those	who	are	defenceless.	
	
Protection	or	‘extensional	self‐defence’	
Environmentalist	 leader	Steven	Best	coined	the	term	‘extensional	self‐defence’	 to	describe	 the	
justification	for	illegal	actions	such	as	sabotage	and	violence.	He	argued	that:	
	
If	 animals	 are	 under	 violent	 attack	 and	 cannot	 defend	 themselves,	 if	 the	 state	
protects	only	their	oppressors,	and	if	animal	rights	activists	are	the	only	ones	who	
can	defend	animals,	 do	 they	not	have	 the	 right	 to	use	 sabotage	 and	 even	violence	
against	exploiters	as	proxy	agents	adhering	 to	 the	principle	 I	call	 ‘extensional	self‐
defence’.	(Best)	
	
Such	direct	action	would	seem,	on	face	value,	to	be	contrary	to	the	more	traditional	aims	of	civil	
disobedience.	 Rawls	 (1971:	 383)	 argues	 that	 the	 primary	 aim	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 is	 not	 to	
effect	change	in	and	of	itself,	but	to	mobilise	mass	support	as	a	catalyst	for	change.	Generating	
public	 support	 is	 certainly	 one	 priority	 of	 the	 organisations	 examined	 here	 (especially	
Greenpeace	which	 engages	 in	many	 legal	protests	 as	well	 as	public	 theatre	designed	 to	bring	
attention	 to	 environmental	 issues),	 but	 this	 justification	 for	 illegal	 acts	 serves	 to	 circumvent	
processes	of	legal	change	in	favour	of	more	immediate	change.		
	
The	 justification	 for	 illegal	 actions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 protection	 of	 others,	 and	 extensional	 self‐
defence	 of	 animals,	 is	 a	 frequently	 used	 elements	 in	 several	 of	 the	 organisations’	 statements	
about	their	actions.	None	of	the	statements	explicitly	invoke	a	right	to	extensional	self‐defence.	
They	do,	however,	 imply	 this	 justification	 through	declarations	 that	 they	are	breaking	 laws	 in	
order	to	protect	animals	or	the	environment.		
	
Protection	 of	 animal	 life	 was	 a	 frequent	 feature	 of	 statements	 from	 the	 Sea	 Shepherd	
Conservation	Society	about	their	anti‐whaling	activities.	For	example,	Captain	Paul	Watson	said,	
‘It	 has	 been	 a	 successful	 campaign.	 There	 are	 hundreds	 of	 whales	 swimming	 free	 in	 the	
Southern	Ocean	Whale	Sanctuary	that	would	now	be	dead	if	we	had	not	been	down	there	for	the	
last	three	months’	(8	March	2012).	In	the	same	press	release	Watson	declared,	‘If	the	Japanese	
whalers	 return,	 Sea	 Shepherd	 will	 return.	We	 are	 committed	 to	 the	 defense	 of	 the	 Southern	
Ocean	 Whale	 Sanctuary’	 (8	 March	 2012).	 Greenpeace	 also	 declared	 that	 some	 lawbreaking	
activities	by	their	activists	were	in	an	effort	to	prevent	harm	to	the	environment:	‘In	an	effort	to	
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prevent	 destructive	 oil	 drilling	 in	 the	 Arctic,	 dozens	 of	 Greenpeace	 Nordic	 activists	 have	
boarded	and	occupied	a	Shell‐contracted	icebreaker	in	Helsinki	harbour	as	it	prepared	to	leave	
for	the	Alaskan	Arctic’	(1	May	2012).	
	
Activists	 from	 Rising	 Tide,	 and	 Stop	 Huntingdon	 Animal	 Cruelty	 also	 spoke	 of	 their	 role	 as	
defenders	of	others.	Rising	Tide	activist	Diane	Wilson	said,	 ‘Me?	 I’m	healthy.	They’re	the	ones	
I’m	fighting	for.	We	have	to	be	prepared	to	fight	for	those	who	can’t	fight	for	themselves	or	who	
are	too	afraid	to	fight	for	themselves.	That’s	why	I’m	here’	(28	November	2012).	SHAC	declared	
in	many	statements	that	they	were	acting	to	prevent	the	torture	and	death	of	animals,	with	one	
Smash	HLS	release	declaring,	 ‘It	 is	our	right	to	make	our	voices	heard	for	all	 those	who	suffer	
inside.	Their	lives	depend	on	us.	This	corrupt	“justice”	system	will	not	protect	them’	(26	January	
2012).	 These	 statements	 move	 beyond	 the	 idea	 of	 passive	 resistance,	 and	 seek	 to	 justify	
organisations	taking	direct,	and	illegal,	action.	
	
Conclusion	
The	 justifications	offered	by	 the	environmental	 rights	 groups	 analysed	here	demonstrate	 that	
while	 there	 is	 some	 adherence	 to	 the	 parameters	 in	 which	 civil	 disobedience	 is	 acceptable,	
activists	 are	 going	 beyond	 political	 performance	 aimed	 at	 garnering	 public	 support.	 This	
positions	 them	 clearly	 within	 the	 grey	 area	 of	 political	 lawbreaking.	 This	 paper	 has	
demonstrated	that	despite	efforts	to	categorise	acts	of	political	lawbreaking	that	exist	between	
civil	disobedience	and	terrorism,	little	progress	has	been	made.	While	some	activists	continue	to	
establish	their	own	ethical	parameters	in	relation	to	targets,	and	the	act	(such	as	being	highly	
discriminate	in	selecting	targets,	and	refraining	from	committing	violence	against	humans),	the	
definition	 of	 terrorism	 has	 expanded	 to	 cover	 much	 activity	 that,	 while	 illegal,	 may	 not	
intuitively	seem	to	deserve	the	label	of	terrorism.	Radical	environmentalists	and	animal	rights	
activists	seek	to	define	themselves	out	of	the	category	of	terrorism	by	appealing	to	a	tradition	of	
civil	disobedience	in	which	illegal	actions	are	sometimes	justifiable,	but	in	their	own	statements	
clearly	stray	from	the	boundaries	of	civil	disobedience	by	offering	justifications	for	direct	action	
and	extensional	self‐defence.		
	
In	 moving	 forward,	 the	 challenge	 is	 to	 attempt	 to	 understand	 why	 the	 label	 of	 terrorism	 is	
applied	to	some	actions	and	not	others.	Is	the	actor,	act,	or	target	the	most	important	variable?	
Do	the	 justifications	offered	by	activists	mitigate	 the	seriousness	of	their	 illegal	actions?	What	
are	the	preconditions	for	social	acceptance	of	some	politically	motivated	lawbreaking	activities	
and	 not	 others?	 In	 asking	 these	 questions,	 perhaps	 the	 boundaries	 of	 terrorism	 can	 be	 re‐
established,	 disrupting	 a	 binary	 between	 legal	 and	 illegal	 protest	 that	 is	 beginning	 to	 render	
nearly	all	acts	of	politically	motivated	lawbreaking	as	terrorism.	
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Abstract	
Mainstream	opinion	writers	and	policy	makers	have	always	had	a	difficult	relationship	with	
criminal	justice.	Much	commentary	discusses	the	issues	in	a	manner	which	conflates	several	
objectives	 of	 criminal	 justice,	when	 each	warrants	 separate	 consideration.	 This	 confluence	
has	 come	 to	a	head	particularly	 in	 recent	debates	about	violence	against	women.	Recently,	
sex	discrimination	Commissioner	Elizabeth	Broderick	has	called	 for	 tougher	sentencing	 for	
people	 convicted	 of	 intimate	 partner	 violence.	 Commissioner	 Broderick	 argues	 that	 these	
incidents	should	not	be	treated	as	 ‘just	a	domestic’,	but	should	attract	 ‘a	premium	penalty.’	
This	 call	 has	 been	 echoed	 simultaneously	 by	 other	mainstream	 feminist	writers	who	 have	
expressed	 frustration	 over	 the	 apparent	 failure	 of	 the	 judiciary	 to	 address	 this	 problem	
seriously,	 using	 key	 high	 profile	 examples.	 These	 are	 dangerous	 trends	which	 are	 gaining	
momentum	in	mainstream	discourse.	Calls	for	tougher	sentencing	gloss	over	the	complexities	
of	this	criminal	behaviour	and	ignore	the	rigidity	of	the	process	established	to	address	it.	 It	
belies	 a	 simplistic	 attitude	 to	 the	 law	 that	 does	 little	 to	 advance	 the	 cause	 of	 the	
disempowered	and	oppressed.	It	also	resets	mainstream	opinion	about	criminal	conduct	and	
contributes	 to	 a	 culture	 of	 pre‐emptive	 guilt	 and	 minimal	 sympathy	 for	 the	 accused.	
Commentary	which	demonises	offenders	leaves	little	room	for	analysis	of	the	social	causes	of	
crime	 and	 fails	 to	 recognise	 the	 role	 of	 prison	 in	 marginalising	 certain	 sections	 of	 the	
population.	These	attitudes	add	feminist	fuel	to	the	fire	of	contempt	for	criminals;	an	inferno	
which	 hardly	 needs	 stoking.	 There	 are	 plenty	 of	 useful	 alternative	 theoretical	 frameworks	
that	 are	worth	 considering	 in	 this	 context.	 Restorative	 justice	 and	 therapeutic	 justice	 both	
have	much	to	offer;	both	in	respect	of	returning	the	victim	to	the	centre	of	the	process	and	
providing	 flexibility	 that	has	 the	potential	 to	provide	better	outcomes	 for	 the	accused.	The	
process	 is	 not	 right	 for	 all	 cases,	 but	 policy	 makers	 should	 be	 encouraged	 to	 provide	
alternative	processes,	with	appropriate	safeguards.		
	
	
Introduction:	Feminist	Punitive	Justice	
Mainstream	 opinion	writers	 have	 always	had	 a	 difficult	 relationship	with	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system.	Much	commentary	discusses	the	social	and	political	issues	raised	by	crime	in	a	manner	
which	 conflates	 several	 objectives	 of	 criminal	 justice,	 including	 deterrence,	 public	 safety	 and	
punishment.	 Each	 of	 these	 objectives	 warrant	 separate	 consideration,	 particularly	 with	 an	
understanding	 of	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 to	 deliver	 them.	 This	 is	 not	 a	
quandary	 unique	 to	 commentators;	 judges	 also	 contend	 with	 complex	 and	 sometimes	
competing	 objectives.	 But	 the	 judiciary	 does	 this	 in	 a	 structured	 and	 transparent	way,	 using	
methods	established	by	statute	and	common	law.	The	mainstream	media	is	not	similarly	bound	
by	such	authorities;	 it	 represents	an	alternative	set	of	 interests	 in	the	discussion	about	public	
policy	in	respect	of	crime.	As	the	traditional	interface	between	the	justice	system	and	the	public,	
it	plays	a	profoundly	 important	and	 influential	 role.	To	 that	end,	 this	 type	of	commentary	has	
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traditionally	had	dangerous	political	consequences	for	mainstream	understandings	of	crime	and	
its	causes.		
	
This	 confluence	 has	 come	 to	 a	 head	 particularly	 in	 recent	 debates	 about	 violence	 against	
women,	particularly	intimate	partner	violence.	The	contemporary	manifestation	of	feminism	in	
recent	years	has	sharpened	the	focus	on	this	social	problem.	Rightly	so:	male	intimate	partner	
violence	is	found	to	be	the	leading	contributor	to	death,	disability	and	illness	for	women	aged	15	
to	44	years	(VicHealth	2011:	8).	There	is	a	growing	sense	that	this	is	a	problem	that	has	been	
seriously	neglected	by	policy	makers	and	is	significantly	widespread	and	insidious.	To	that	end,	
the	 Federal	 Sex	 Discrimination	 Commissioner	 Elizabeth	 Broderick	 has	 recently	 called	 for	
tougher	sentencing	for	people	convicted	of	intimate	partner	violence.	Commissioner	Broderick	
argues	 that	 these	 incidents	 should	 not	 be	 treated	 as	 ‘just	 a	 domestic’,	 but	 should	 attract	 ‘a	
premium	penalty’	(Hansen	2013).	Though	this	was	only	one	of	many	policy	initiatives	suggested	
by	the	Commissioner,	it	has	attracted	considerable	attention	from	the	mainstream	press.		
	
This	 call	 for	 punitive	 justice	 has	 been	 echoed	 simultaneously	 by	 other	 mainstream	 feminist	
writers.	 In	 Australia,	 writers	 have	 expressed	 frustration	 over	 the	 apparent	 failure	 of	 the	
judiciary	 to	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 violence	 against	women	 seriously,	 using	 key	 high	 profile	
examples	 (Ford	 2013b).	 There	 is	 a	 basis	 in	 truth	 for	 these	 concerns:	 in	 Australia,	 it	 is	
statistically	 easier	 to	 be	 acquitted	 of	 rape	 than	 other	 violent	 offences	 (ABS	 2004).	 These	
commentators	 see	 criminal	 justice	 as	 squarely	 about	punishment	 and	deterrence.	That	 is,	 the	
punishment	of	individual	offenders	is	necessary	to	send	a	message	that	violence	against	women	
will	not	be	tolerated.	
	
This	particular	trend	is	reflective	of	a	 larger	movement	amongst	many	Western	feminists.	The	
treatment	of	Oscar	Pistorius	provides	an	instructive	example;	particularly	as	the	circumstances	
of	the	alleged	crime	remain	far	from	clear.	Prominent	feminist	Jessica	Valenti,	in	discussing	the	
killing	of	Reeva	Steenkamp	by	her	partner	Pistorius,	referred	to	‘the	misogynist	response	to	the	
crime	[which]	has	become	a	familiar	theme	here	in	the	United	States’	(Valenti	2013).	Trying	to	
make	an	example	of	Pistorius	for	feminist	purposes,	particularly	in	a	context	where	much	of	the	
circumstances	 are	 unknown,	 is	 fraught.	 Valenti	 clearly	 assumes	 that	 Pistorius	 is	 guilty	 (or	
perhaps	she	simply	harbours	an	indifference	to	the	matter)	–	so	much	so	that	if	he	is	acquitted,	
the	result	will	be	perceived	as	the	yet	another	example	of	society’s	tolerance	for	violence	against	
women.	 The	 allegations	 of	 lenient	 sentencing	 and	 selective	 justice	 are	 cited	 as	 yet	 further	
examples	 of	 public	 institutions	 failing	 women	 by	 allowing	 their	 misogynistic	 tendencies	 to	
remain	unchecked.	What	 these	 trends	 illustrate	 is	a	 troubling	 tendency	 to	do	away	with	 legal	
principles	such	as	innocence	until	proven	guilty	in	order	to	promote	a	separate	social	cause	–	in	
this	case	violence	against	women.		
	
The	Troubling	Nature	of	These	Trends	
These	 are	 particularly	 dangerous	 trends	 which	 are	 gaining	 momentum	 in	 mainstream	
discourse.	Such	deficiencies	in	public	commentary	are	hardly	new;	but	significantly,	these	calls	
are	coming	 from	 traditionally	progressive	voices.	These	are	 individuals	who	have	a	history	of	
setting	 trends	 in	public	 discourse	 in	 favour	 of	 the	oppressed	or,	 in	 the	 case	of	 Commissioner	
Broderick,	 are	 the	 regulator	 of	 human	 rights	 legislation	 designed	 to	 protect	 the	 vulnerable.	
Their	 appeals	 to	 law	 and	 order	 policy	 are	 becoming	 infused	with	 progressive	 politics,	 which	
poses	a	new	and	distinct	problem	for	policy	makers	and	critical	thinkers	alike.	
	
There	are	basic	fallacies	which	underpin	these	calls	for	tougher	penalties	for	crimes	which	are	
easily	contradicted	with	readily	available	evidence.	Most	obviously,	the	idea	that	sentencing	is	
too	 lenient	 is	 illusory.	 Research	 indicates	 that	 the	 more	 people	 know	 about	 the	 facts	 of	 a	
criminal	 trial,	 the	more	 likely	 they	 are	 to	 agree	with	 the	 sentence	 given	 (Warner	 et	 al.	 2011;	
Gelb	2006:	2‐5).	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	judiciary	always	get	it	right	or	deal	with	such	matters	
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sensitively.	But	research	such	as	this	makes	it	difficult	to	sustain	the	argument	that	sentencing	
frameworks	 or	 judges	 decisions	 are	 out	 of	 line	 with	 community	 expectations.	 These	 false	
assumptions	are	no	doubt	easier	to	maintain	given	the	treatment	of	these	crimes	by	journalists.	
The	sound	bite	nature	of	 this	reporting	and	 its	reflection	of	 traditional	gender	stereotypes	do	
little	 to	 ameliorate	 this	problem	(VicHealth	2012).	The	complexity	of	 the	problem	of	 intimate	
partner	violence	in	a	context	of	a	simplistic	public	debate	makes	unpicking	these	issues	difficult.	
But	conflating	the	desire	to	treat	the	problem	seriously	with	assumptions	about	the	failures	of	
the	 judicial	 process	 add	 feminist	 fuel	 to	 the	 fire	 of	 contempt	 for	 criminals;	 an	 inferno	which	
hardly	needs	stoking.	
	
Moreover,	 this	 kind	 of	 feminist	 approach	 to	 criminal	 justice	 ignores	 the	 very	 significant	
problems	presented	by	the	legal	processes	set	up	to	deal	with	intimate	partner	violence	which	
affect	 all	 parties.	 Feminist	 legal	 critiques	 of	 the	 treatment	 of	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 have	
traditionally	 focused	 on	 the	 failure	 to	 prioritise	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 victim.	 But	 on	 further	
examination,	 this	objective	 is	 sidelined	 in	 the	politics	of	 law	and	order:	 the	 inflexibility	of	 the	
legal	process	 is	 likely	 to	give	 little	comfort	 to	victims,	who	often	 find	adversarial	 treatment	of	
these	crimes	confronting,	or	may	have	specific	needs,	like	maintaining	an	ongoing	relationship	
with	 the	 accused	 (Gentleman	 2013).	 Ford	 does	 seem	 to	 accept	 this,	 albeit	 somewhat	
superficially,	saying:	 ‘perhaps	a	rehabilitation	of	 the	system	itself	 is	 in	order,	one	 in	which	we	
remind	 legal	 practitioners	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 victims’	 (Ford	 2013b).	 But	 this	 in	 turn	 seems	 to	
misunderstand	 the	 role	of	 lawyers	 in	 the	current	system,	which	 is	 to	advocate	 for	 their	 client	
against	the	full	might	of	the	state	apparatus	seeking	to	punish	them.	Tellingly,	Ford	also	claims	
that:	‘[incarceration]	may	do	nothing	to	eradicate	the	pain	caused	to	the	victims	–	but	I'd	wager	
it	 wouldn't	 hurt’	 (Ford	 2013b).	 This	 represents	 a	 classic	 conflation	 of	 deterrence	 and	
punishment,	belying	a	dangerous	ignorance	of	some	of	the	basic	social	features	of	the	criminal	
justice	system.	If	policy	makers	are	to	consider	ways	to	prioritise	the	interests	of	the	victim,	it	is	
impossible	to	ignore	the	inflexibility	of	the	process.		
	
This	 commentary	 is	 obviously	 the	 product	 of	 a	 laudable	 desire	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 problem	 of	
intimate	 partner	 violence	 and	 restructure	 public	 attitudes	 symbolically	 about	 victims	 of	
domestic	 violence.	 But	 it	 is	 also	 marked	 by	 logical	 laziness	 and	 procedural	 ignorance;	 with	
rhetorical	flourish	that	is	difficult	to	pin	down.	Though	this	is	hardly	novel,	it	warrants	careful	
consideration:	the	regeneration	of	conservative	political	tropes	from	the	moral	high	ground	has	
the	potential	to	recalibrate	progressive	attitudes	to	the	criminal	 justice	system	and	the	people	
caught	within	it.		
	
The	key	feature	of	these	current	trends	is	the	power	of	such	commentary	to	reset	mainstream	
progressive	opinion	about	the	social	causes	of	crime	and	our	response	to	criminal	conduct.	As	
has	 been	 well	 documentary,	 prison	 acts	 as	 a	 gateway	 to	 further	 social	 marginalisation	 and	
disenfranchisement	of	 the	offender	and	can	 lead	 to	 recidivism	rather	 than	 rehabilitation.	 In	 a	
piece	discussing	a	recent	criminal	trial,	Ford	describes	frustration	at	reporting	which	focused	on	
the	 ‘effect	 the	 judicial	 outcome	would	have	 on	 the	perpetrators’	 lives’,	 something	 she	 sees	 as	
‘the	least	relevant	part	of	any	case	involving	rape	and	sexual	abuse’	(Ford	2013a).	While	Ford	
acknowledges	 that	 this	effect	 is	 ‘devastating’,	 there	 is	arguably	a	hint	of	sarcasm	in	 this:	 ‘CNN	
and	its	concerned	commentators	can	cry	me	a	fu*king	river.’	As	one	commentator	has	pointed	
out,	her	criticism	is	more	of	the	media	than	the	legal	system	itself,	even	if	Ford	herself	may	not	
see	it	in	those	terms	(Kelsey‐Sugg	2013).		
	
While	these	may	be	valid	critiques	of	journalistic	reporting	of	sexual	offences,	these	approaches	
contribute	 to	 a	 culture	 of	 pre‐emptive	 guilt	 and	 minimal	 sympathy	 for	 the	 accused,	 with	
problematic	results.	The	attitude	of	zero	sympathy	for	the	accused	ignores	a	key	potential	of	the	
criminal	 justice	 system:	 to	 operate	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 social	 control.	 Michelle	 Alexander	 eloquently	
describes	 how	mass	 incarceration	 is	 a	 practical	 contradiction	 of	 the	 American	myth	 of	 social	
mobility	 (Alexander	2010).	Alexander	suggests	we	 imagine	 the	criminal	 justice	system	 ‘not	as	
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an	 independent	 system	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 gateway	 into	 a	 much	 larger	 system	 of	 racial	
stigmatisation	 and	 permanent	marginalisation’	 (Alexander	 2010:	 12).	 Alexander’s	 research	 is	
focused	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 African	 Americans,	 but	 her	 conclusions	 arguably	 extend	 to	 the	
poor	 in	 general.	There	 is	 little	doubt	 that	 grinding	poverty	and	 ceaseless	oppression	 can	give	
rise	 to	 reprehensible	behaviour.	But	 to	 suggest	 that	an	efficient	 criminal	 justice	 system	and	a	
growing	prison	population	 is	a	reflection	of	a	 just	society	 ignores	the	broader,	more	 insidious	
aspects	of	these	social	processes.		
	
This	trend	in	modern	feminist	discourse	to	focus	on	punitive	justice	belies	a	simplistic	attitude	
to	 the	 law	 and	 does	 little	 to	 advance	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 disempowered	 and	 oppressed.	 The	
attention	directed	at	the	problem	of	 intimate	partner	violence	may	be	welcome,	but	there	is	a	
clear	 lack	 of	 theoretical	 analysis	 behind	 both	 the	 critique	 and	 the	 solutions	 posed.	 Equally,	
simply	 dismissing	 the	 court	 system	 as	 a	 patriarchal	 mess	 promotes	 cynicism	 and	 risks	
encouraging	vigilantism.	So	doing	dispenses	with	some	of	 the	 fundamentals	of	 the	rule	of	 law	
and	due	process.		
	
Alternatives:	Theoretical	and	Practical	
Calls	 for	 tougher	sentencing	gloss	over	 the	complexities	of	 this	criminal	behaviour	and	 ignore	
the	 rigidity	 of	 the	 process	 established	 to	 address	 it.	 There	 are	 obvious	 structural	 reasons	 for	
why	 the	 legal	 system	 is	not	 always	 the	best	 structure	 for	 addressing	 the	problem	of	 intimate	
partner	 violence.	 Legal	 processes	 are	 often	 awkward	 and	 inappropriate	 in	 such	 situations.	
Probability	suggests	that	the	two	people	at	the	centre	of	this	violence	will	share	a	life,	a	home,	or	
relatives	 and	 sometimes	 children	 (VicHealth	 2007:10;	 VicHealth	 2011:	 3).	 Even	 law	
enforcement	with	the	best	of	intentions	(a	rare	beast	to	say	the	least)	cannot	create	respectful	
ongoing	domestic	relationships.	
	
Nonetheless,	 there	 are	 plenty	 of	 useful	 alternative	 theoretical	 frameworks	 that	 are	 worth	
considering	 in	 this	 context	 and	 deserve	 consideration.	 Restorative	 justice	 and	 therapeutic	
justice	 both	 have	much	 to	 offer;	 both	 in	 respect	 of	 returning	 the	 victim	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
process	 and	 providing	 flexibility	 that	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 provide	 better	 outcomes	 for	 the	
accused.	 The	 process	 is	 not	 right	 for	 all	 cases,	 but	 policy	 makers	 should	 be	 encouraged	 to	
provide	alternative	processes,	with	appropriate	safeguards.	
	
There	 are	more	 imaginative	 and	 logical	ways	 for	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 to	play	 a	 role	 in	
ending	violence	against	women.	Bronwyn	Naylor,	from	Monash	University	explains	the	problem	
succinctly:	 ‘the	 key	 to	 making	 the	 trial	 process	 meaningful	 to	 victims	 is	 the	 early	
acknowledgement	of	guilt	by	defendants	who	are	in	fact	guilty.	All	of	the	current	features	of	the	
trial	militate	against	this’	(Naylor	2010).	As	an	alternative,	Naylor	advocates	a	therapeutic	and	
restorative	 approach	 to	 justice,	 which	 involves	 conferencing	 with	 support	 people,	 with	 a	
prerequisite	 being	 an	 admission	 of	 guilt.	 A	 facilitator	 then	 assists	 the	 parties	 to	 come	 to	 an	
agreement	about	reparations	for	the	victim.	The	sacrifice	of	this	reform	would	be	an	absence	of	
a	public	and	transparent	declaration	of	guilt	which	would	ordinarily	take	place	in	a	court	of	law.	
The	benefits	are	that	it	puts	control	in	the	hands	of	the	victim	and	invites	a	flexible	response	to	
crime,	rather	than	the	rigidity	of	a	court	process.		
	
Restorative	justice	initiatives	also	focus	on	processes	like	conferencing,	with	a	motivation	is	to	
identify	and	redress	harm	through	a	process	that	is	more	attentive	to	the	needs	and	experiences	
of	 both	 parties.	 In	 appropriate	 situations,	 according	 to	 expert	 criminologist	 Professor	 John	
Braithwaite,	a	 restorative	 justice	approach	 tends	 to	achieve	much	higher	 levels	of	 satisfaction	
for	all	parties	involved	(Braithwaite	2008).	It	sits	in	stark	contrast	to	the	adversarial	system,	in	
which	alleged	victims	are	pitched	against	alleged	perpetrators	in	a	battle	for	a	binary,	zero‐sum‐
game	verdict.	Restorative	justice	processes,	in	contrast	to	that	of	punitive	justice,	accommodate	
interests	 beyond	 simply	 vengeance.	While	 harm	may	 have	 occurred	 and	must	 be	 addressed,	
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restorative	 justice	 approaches	 appreciate	 that	 this	 may	 not	 always	 have	 been	 intended	 or	
understood.	 As	 Professor	 Braithwaite	 notes,	 this	 process	 is	 ‘exactly	 the	 opposite	 of	 that	 of	 a	
criminal	trial’	(2008).		
	
Beyond	Law	and	Order	
Taking	a	step	back,	it	is	clear	that	focusing	on	the	criminal	justice	system	to	address	gendered	
violence	approaches	issue	from	too	narrow	a	perspective.	The	assumption,	of	course,	 is	that	 if	
these	offenders	are	treated	with	an	iron	fist,	it	will	send	a	message	to	others	that	this	conduct	is	
unacceptable.	Rigid	approaches	to	deterrence	or	criminalisation	have	not	worked	in	relation	to	
drugs,	prostitution	or	countless	other	 forms	of	criminal	behaviour.	But	when	all	you	have	is	a	
hammer,	everything	starts	to	look	like	a	nail.		
	
In	many	ways,	looking	to	legal	processes	to	address	intimate	partner	violence	fails	to	recognise	
their	historical	role	in	reinforcing	privilege	and	disempowerment.	This	has	been	the	subject	of	
feminist	 legal	 theory	 for	decades.	Placing	 too	much	emphasis	 on	 law	and	 its	 ability	 to	punish	
reinforces	 the	 very	 structures	 of	 power	 we	 should	 be	 seeking	 to	 challenge.	 It	 is	 at	 best	
unimaginative,	it	is	at	worst,	socially	regressive.	It	is	an	issue	where	social	and	punitive	justice	
intersect	and	it	is	all	too	easy	to	confuse	one	with	the	other	(Mason	2009).		
	
There	 are	 plenty	 of	 other	 ways	 to	 send	 a	 message	 to	 the	 community	 that	 intimate	 partner	
violence	 is	 unacceptable.	 A	 primary	 objective	 should	 be	 to	 empower	 the	 victims	 of	 such	
violence.	 Therefore,	 the	 policy	 response	 to	 this	 issue	 should	 focus	 on	 early	 intervention	
strategies	 that	 are	 consistent	 with	 an	 evidence	 based	 approach	 to	 the	 problem	 (VicHealth	
2007).	This	means	more	funding	for	women’s	refuges,	so	they	can	escape	abuse	immediately.	It	
also	means	better	funding	of	legal	aid.	Recent	reductions	to	eligibility	guidelines	in	Victoria	have	
meant,	by	Victoria	Legal	Aid’s	own	admission,	that	people	with	family	law	disputes	will	be	‘the	
most	affected,’	therefore	disproportionately	affecting	women	(Victoria	Legal	Aid	2013).	People	
with	 family	 disputes	 will	 no	 longer	 be	 represented	 at	 hearings,	 unless	 the	 other	 side	 has	 a	
lawyer.	 If	 there	 is	a	history	of	 family	violence,	 this	can	mean	alleged	perpetrators	of	domestic	
violence	cross‐examining	the	alleged	victims	(and	vice	versa)	(Sara	2013).		
	
Strategies	to	end	intimate	partner	violence	must	also	challenge	the	traditionally	‘private’	nature	
of	this	harm.	This	means	linking	accessible	and	affordable	childcare	to	the	problem	of	domestic	
violence.	Such	assistance	can	help	women	to	escape	violence,	seek	employment	or	relocate.	For	
example,	over	300,000	workers	are	currently	covered	by	workplace	agreements	or	awards	with	
domestic	violence	entitlements	(Domestic	Violence	Workplace	Rights	and	Entitlements	Project	
2011:	 3).	 These	 protections	 should	 be	 available	 to	 all	 Australian	 workers	 as	 standard.	 This	
recognition	 of	 the	 problem,	 without	 judgment,	 provides	 dignity	 for	 victims	 and	 practical	
support.	Finally,	we	need	 to	 talk	about	more	systemic	changes,	 such	as	equal	pay	 for	work	of	
equal	value,	so	when	women	try	to	build	a	new	life	separate	from	their	partner,	 there	are	not	
economically	disadvantaged	purely	because	of	their	gender.	Making	the	problem	public	in	these	
ways	also	contributes	to	breaking	down	cultural	norms	generally	and	challenges	the	conditions	
that	have	historically	helped	entrench	this	violence.		
	
Moreover,	the	problem	of	intimate	partner	violence	invariably	demands	a	broader	questioning	
of	 social	 values.	 VicHealth	 has	 identified	 ‘a	 cultural	 ethos	 condoning	 violence	 as	 a	 means	 of	
settling	disputes’	as	one	key	social	or	structural	contributing	factors	to	violence	against	women	
(VicHealth	 2011:	 8).	 Violence	 that	 is	 punitive	 or	 vengeful	 is	 not	 something	 that	 is	 just	
experienced	on	an	 individual	 level,	 it	 is	often	practiced	 in	the	highest	political	echelons	of	our	
society.	 If	 a	 collective	message	 is	 sent	 that	 violence	 solves	 problems	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 this	 is	
replicated	on	an	individual	level.		
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Importantly,	 however,	 VicHealth	 also	 found	 that	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	
Australians	do	not	condone	violence	against	women,	do	not	think	it	should	be	dealt	with	
privately	 and	 would	 intervene	 to	 stop	 it	 (VicHealth	 2011:	 10).	 This	 is	 an	 important	
social	foundation	for	progressive,	considered	policy,	unafraid	to	tackle	the	complexity	of	
the	problem.		
	
This	 not	 to	 suggest	 there	 is	 a	 simple	 guide	 to	 ‘solve’	 these	 problems.	 The	 causes	 and	
effects	 of	 gendered	 violence	 are	 multiple	 and	 complex;	 but	 the	 problem	 itself	 is	 a	
symptom	 of	 entrenched	 oppression.	 To	 that	 end,	 we	 should	 be	 looking	 to	 material	
strategies	to	relieve	the	poverty	imposed	on	women.		
	
A	Way	Forward:	Meaningful	Informed	Debate	
The	 law	has	 traditionally	done	 a	poor	 job	 of	 protecting	 vulnerable	 sections	of	 society;	 in	 this	
case,	 women	 who	 are	 subject	 of	 domestic	 violence.	 This	 has	 generated	 a	 call	 from	 modern	
feminism	 for	 more	 muscular	 protection	 for	 these	 women	 by	 the	 law.1	 But	 the	 call	 for	 the	
criminal	justice	system	to	treat	intimate	partner	violence	with	the	same	seriousness	as	the	other	
crimes	 in	 the	 system	measures	 justice	with	 the	wrong	yardstick.	 It	 relies	on	 the	progressives	
adopting	the	politics	of	law	and	order:	a	high	stakes,	toxic	political	game,	which	is	rarely	focused	
on	 the	needs	of	 the	victims	and	 is	 indifferent	 to	 the	effect	on	 the	offender.	 It	glosses	over	 the	
problems	 inherent	 in	 the	 system	 and	 ignores	 other	 more	 compelling	 and	 creative	 ways	 of	
achieving	 justice	 for	 the	 vulnerable.	 The	 scale	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 intimate	 partner	 violence	
demands	 a	 serious	 response,	 and	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 general	 public	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 an	
opportunity	to	craft	this.		
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 I	use	the	term	muscular	deliberately,	in	reference	to	the	work	of	Professor	Anne	Orford	and	her	term	‘muscular	
humanitarianism.’	 See	 Orford	 A	 (1999)	 Muscular	 humanitarianism:	 reading	 the	 narratives	 of	 the	 new	
interventionism.	European	Journal	of	International	Law	10(4):	679‐711.	
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Abstract	
The	 available	 research	 literature	 on	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 is	 often	 centred	 around	 a	
heteronormative	 understanding	 of	 gender,	 relationships	 and	 violence.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	
intimate	 partner	 violence	 in	 the	 transgender	 community,	 the	 research	 is	 limited	 or	 non‐
existent	due	in	part	to	the	methodological	issues	of	visibility	and	access	by	those	outside	this	
community.	 Drawing	 from	 Renzetti	 (1992,	 1995),	 McClennen	 (2003),	 and	 the	 feminist	
participatory	 research	 model,	 this	 paper	 examines	 the	 techniques	 for	 overcoming	 the	
methodological	barriers	 as	 a	 cisgender	or	 'normatively	 gendered'	woman	 in	 a	 transgender	
community.	 Throughout	 the	 research	 with	 the	 transgender	 community,	 five	 strategies	 for	
overcoming	methodological	barriers	were	developed:	Cultural	Immersion,	Commitment	and	
Visibility,	Sensitivity	and	Acceptance,	Honesty,	and	Communication.	This	paper	explores	how	
utilising	 these	strategies	enabled	access	 to	 the	 transgender	community	 in	order	 to	conduct	
effective	research.	
	
	
Introduction	
Research	 into	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 (also	 called	 domestic	 violence)	 is	 often	 focused	 on	
heteronormative	 understandings	 of	 violence,	 whereby	 women	 are	 victims	 and	 men	 are	
perpetrators	 (Ball	 and	 Hayes	 2010:	 163).	 	 These	 commonsense	 understandings	 of	 intimate	
partner	violence	often	exclude	or	deny	the	experiences	of	others.	Violence	does	not	discriminate	
and	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 can	 be	 experienced	 irrespective	 of	 sexuality	 or	 gender.	 Most	
research	 literature	 focuses	 on	 the	 experiences	 of	 cisgender	 women	 (Carrington	 and	 Phillips	
2003);	however	research	regarding	intimate	partner	violence	within	GLBTI1	relationships	treats	
these	 respondents	 as	 a	homogenous	 group	 (Pitts	 et	 al.	 2006;	 Leonard	 et	 al.	 2008).	Very	 little	
research	to	date	has	sought	to	unpack	the	experiences	of	 intimate	partner	violence	within	the	
context	of	transgender	relationships.	
	
The	 term	 transgender	 refers	 to	 a	 diverse	 group	 of	 individuals	whose	 biological	 sex	 does	 not	
match	 their	 gender.	The	meaning	of	 the	 term	 transgender	 has	developed	over	 time	 and	 is	 an	
umbrella	 term	 that	 refers	 to	 a	wide	 range	 of	 sex	 and	 gender	 diverse	 groups	 and	 individuals.	
Transgender	can	refer	to	an	individual	who	is	at	any	stage	of	a	transition;	however	also	includes	
many	different	groups	including	cross‐dressers,	 transsexuals,	 intersex	individuals,	androgynes	
and	 genderqueers	 (Tauches	 2009;	 Papoulias,	 2006).	 The	 term	 cisgender	 (sometimes	 called	
cissexual)	 is	 used	 when	 a	 person’s	 biological	 sex	 matches	 or	 is	 aligned	 with	 their	 gender	
identity.	 People	 who	 are	 not	 transgender	 may	 identify	 as	 cisgender,	 as	 the	 sex	 they	 were	
assigned	 at	 birth	 (male	 or	 female)	 is	 aligned	 with	 their	 gender	 portrayal	 (masculine	 or	
feminine)	(Queensland	Association	for	Healthy	Communities	Inc	2008).	
	
Although	there	have	been	few	studies	on	transgender	intimate	partner	violence	and	estimates	
on	 the	 prevalence	 vary,	 it	 is	 thought	 that	 the	 levels	 of	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 within	 the	
transgender	community	are	high	(Pitts,	et	al.	2006:	13;	Couch	et	al.	2007;	Courvant	and	Cook‐
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Daniels	2000;	Xavier	2000).		As	I	felt	that	transgender	intimate	partner	violence	was	worthy	of	
further	investigation,	I	faced	various	methodological	challenges	as	I	am	neither	transgender	nor	
part	of	 the	 transgender	community.	The	purpose	of	 this	article	 is	 to	discuss	my	strategies	 for	
overcoming	the	methodological	challenges	in	accessing	the	transgender	community	for	research	
purposes.	Drawing	from	Renzetti	(1992,	1995)	and	McClennen	(2003)	and	utilising	the	feminist	
participatory	 research	 model,	 I	 developed	 five	 strategies	 to	 conduct	 effective	 research	 as	 a	
cisgender	woman	in	the	transgender	community.	
	
Methodological	Challenges	
Transgender	communities	are	often	perceived	as	private	and	closed	communities.	There	is	little	
research	 available	 on	 transgender	 communities	 and	 even	 less	 on	 intimate	 partner	 violence	
within	transgender	communities.	The	existing	literature	and	quantitative	research	available	on	
the	topic	of	intimate	partner	violence	within	same‐sex	relationships	briefly	reports	on	intimate	
partner	 violence	 within	 transgender	 relationships.	 However,	 major	 limitations	 include	 an	
amalgamation	of	results	with	those	who	identify	as	gay,	lesbian	and	bisexual	(Pitts	et	al.	2006;	
Leonard	 et	 al.	 2008).	 These	 studies	 focus	on	 sexual	orientation	and	not	 gender	 identification,	
which	is	another	flaw	within	the	available	literature.	To	date,	no	in‐depth	qualitative	interviews	
have	 taken	 place	 in	Australia	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 experiences	 of	 violence	 among	 those	
who	identify	as	transgender.		
	
At	 first	 I	 was	 apprehensive	 about	 research	 in	 this	 area	 as	 I	 am	 not	 transgender,	 nor	 have	 I	
experienced	 intimate	 partner	 violence.	 I	 feared	 I	 would	 be	 rejected	 because	 of	 my	 gender	
identity	(cisgender).	I	had	assumed	I	would	not	be	accepted	by	the	community	and	I	would	not	
be	able	to	research	this	topic.	Accessing	the	community	was	my	first	challenge,	in	which	I	had	no	
previous	 connections	 or	 networks.	 Due	 to	 limited	 visibility	 of	 the	 community	 and	 societal	
transphobia,	 creating	 a	means	 to	 access	 the	 community	was	 vital.	 Another	 challenge	was	 the	
assumption	 that	 transgender	 people	 may	 not	 want	 to	 discuss	 transgender	 intimate	 partner	
violence.	 As	 a	 way	 of	 navigating	 these	 challenges	 I	 chose	 a	 feminist	 participatory	 research	
model,	as	this	methodology	allows	for	an	‘outsider’	to	gain	access	to	the	community	and	provide	
a	voice	to	the	people	(McClennen	2003).	
	
Participatory	Research 
Participatory	research	follows	an	ethnographic	approach	and	seeks	to	learn	from	people	rather	
than	 ‘study’	 them	 (Rice	 and	 Ezzy	 1999:	 157).	 Participatory	 research	 (also	 referred	 to	 as	
participatory	 action	 research)	 differs	 from	 other	 research	 methods	 in	 that	 I	 participate	 and	
involve	 myself	 in	 the	 community	 (Jones	 2006:	 318).	 Participatory	 research	 ‘challenges	 a	
scientific	 method	 of	 inquiry	 based	 on	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 outside	 “observer”	 and	 the	
“independent”	 experimenter,	 and	 it	 claims	 to	 reconstruct	 both	 the	 practical	 expertise	 and	
theoretical	 insights	on	 a	different	basis	of	 its	own	 inquiry	procedures’	 (Winter	1989:	2).	This	
research	model	 through	 its	participatory	nature	moves	 away	 from	 the	notion	of	 an	 ‘outsider’	
coming	 in	 to	 examine	 and	 theorise	 (Jones	 2006:	 320).	 Where	 a	 research	 project	 presents	
various	methodological	challenges	(such	as	access,	ethics	and	theories),	participatory	research	
models	 have	 demonstrated	 effective	 results	 in	 qualitative	 research	 by	 breaking	 down	 the	
barriers	between	the	researcher	and	the	minority	or	oppressed	population	(Denzin	and	Lincoln	
1998;	Stoecker	and	Bonacich	1992).	
	
The	feminist	participatory	research	model	allows	members	of	an	invisible	or	oppressed	group	
(such	 as	 the	 transgender	 community)	 to	 voice	 their	 experiences.	 This	 method	 allows	 the	
researcher	 to	 share	 their	 professional	 skills	 and	 also	 learn	 during	 the	 research	 process,	
improving	 the	quality	 of	 the	 research	 (Renzetti	 1995:	29).	 In	 contrast	 to	 traditional	positivist	
social	science	research,	 the	 feminist	participatory	research	model	allows	researchers	to	reject	
the	 dichotomy	 of	 researcher/subject	 and	 see	 the	 research	 process	 as	 a	 collaborative	 effort	
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between	 humans.	 This	 relationship	 is	 reciprocal	 rather	 than	 hierarchical	 (Renzetti	 1995:	 32‐
33).		
	
As	Renzetti	 (1992,	1995)	was	one	of	 the	 first	 researchers	 to	utilise	 the	 feminist	participatory	
research	model	within	 the	 context	 of	 lesbian	 intimate	partner	 violence,	my	 research	 adopted	
her	 guiding	 principles.	 These	 principles	 include:	 (1)	 a	 critical	 examination	 of	 cultural	
insensitivity	within	the	research	process;	(2)	giving	voice	to	the	members	of	 the	marginalised	
population;	 (3)	 rejecting	 the	 hierarchical	 relationship	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	
researched	 in	 favour	 of	 acting	 in	 mutual	 relationship;	 (4)	 making	 a	 political	 and	 moral	
commitment	to	reducing	social	 inequality;	and	(5)	 taking	action	on	this	commitment	(Cancian	
1992	as	 cited	 in	Renzetti	1995).	Drawing	upon	Renzetti’s	 (1992,	1995)	guiding	principles	 (as	
defined	above)	and	the	 feminist	participatory	research	model,	 I	developed	 five	strategies	 that	
were	 effective	 when	 accessing	 and	 researching	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 within	 the	
transgender	community.	
	
Strategies	
In	 her	 essay	 Researching	 Gay	 and	 Lesbian	 Domestic	 Violence:	 The	 Journey	 of	 a	 Non‐LGBT	
Researcher,	McClennen	 (2003)	 discusses	 her	 experiences	 as	 a	 cisgender	 heterosexual	woman	
and	 as	 an	 ‘outsider’.	 McClennen	 (2003)	 details	 eight	 strategies	 to	 overcome	 methodological	
barriers	when	 researching	GLBTI	 issues:	 (1)	 becoming	 educated	 about	 the	 culture	 (including	
forming	 an	 advisory	 committee);	 (2)	 preparing	 for	 objections;	 (3)	 incorporating	 instruments	
designed	 by	 those	 being	 researched;	 (4)	 implementing	 various	 sampling	 techniques;	 (5)	
engaging	 affiliated	 members	 for	 assistance;	 (6)	 becoming	 immersed	 in	 the	 culture;	 (7)	
collaborating	 with	 scholars	 and	 other	 professionals;	 and	 (8)	 triangulation	 in	 data	 collection	
(McClennen	 2003:	 36).	 These	 strategies	 suggested	 by	 McClennen	 (2003)	 were	 adopted	 and	
adapted	appropriately	in	my	research	project.	
	
Drawing	from	both	Renzetti	(1992,	1995)	and	McClennen	(2003),	I	developed	and	implemented	
five	 strategies	 in	 order	 to	 access	 the	 transgender	 community	 and	 overcome	 methodological	
barriers.	 These	 five	 strategies	 were	 effective	 in	 accessing	 the	 transgender	 community	 and	
obtaining	 a	 sample	 and	 collecting	 data.	 These	 strategies	 include:	 (1)	 cultural	 immersion;	 (2)	
commitment	and	visibility;	(3)	sensitivity	and	acceptance;	(4)	honesty;	and	(5)	communication.	
These	five	strategies	are	discussed	in	detail	below.	
	
Cultural	immersion	
Cultural	 immersion	 first	 began	with	 education.	 For	my	 research,	 this	meant	 educating	myself	
about	 transgender	 culture.	 Definitions,	 historical	 context	 and	 appropriate	 language	 were	 all	
vital	parts	of	cultural	 immersion.	Without	educating	myself	on	 issues	regarding	or	concerning	
the	 transgender	 community,	 the	 cultural	 immersion	 would	 fail.	 Education	 started	 with	
researching	the	issues	that	were	important	to	the	transgender	community.	However,	education	
was	not	only	self‐taught.	It	was	vital	when	educating	myself	that	I	engaged	with	members	of	the	
community,	as	they	had	a	wealth	of	knowledge.	The	transgender	community	are	often	teaching	
people	about	their	lives.	Transgender	people	not	only	have	to	educate	members	of	the	public	on	
a	 regular	basis,	 they	 also	have	 to	 educate	medical	 professionals	 and	 service	providers,	which	
can	be	a	frustrating	but	necessary	process	to	avoid	future	prejudice	and	transphobia.	Education	
is	an	ongoing	process	and	a	long	term	commitment.	Following	the	education	phase,	there	were	
various	ways	in	which	my	cultural	immersion	took	place	(Cancian	1992;	Renzetti	1995).	
	
Becoming	 known	 and	 subsequently	 trusted	 within	 the	 transgender	 community	 was	 of	 great	
importance.	Renowned	for	being	very	closed	and	private,	becoming	known	in	the	transgender	
community	was	 the	 next	 step	 in	my	 cultural	 immersion.	 	 Cultural	 immersion	 began	with	my	
affiliation	with	agencies	that	offer	support	to	transgender	people,	such	as	Healthy	Communities	
(previously	 known	 as	 QAHC2),	 PFLAG3	 and	 ATSAQ.4	 I	 associated	 myself	 with	 these	 leading	
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GLBTI	organisations	and	through	Healthy	Communities	I	became	a	member	of	the	health	action	
group	 Many	 Genders	 One	 Voice,	 a	 collective	 of	 people	 who	 identify	 as	 transgender,	 sex	 and	
gender	diverse	or	their	allies.	I	began	to	network	with	people	via	this	group	and	also	volunteer	
for	 various	 events,	 such	 as	Brisbane	 Pride	 Festival	 and	Big	 Gay	Day.	 At	 these	 events	 I	would	
fundraise	for	the	organisation	and	also	spread	awareness	of	the	support	groups	available.	Being	
affiliated	 with	 other	 groups	 such	 as	 PFLAG	 was	 also	 beneficial	 in	 the	 cultural	 immersion.	
Launches,	 conferences,	 equal	 rights	 marches	 were	 all	 part	 of	 cultural	 immersion.	 Here	 my	
research	 differs	 from	McClennen’s	 (2003)	 research,	 in	 that	 her	 cultural	 immersion	was	 done	
whilst	collecting	her	data.	It	is	likely	that	her	cultural	immersion	was	a	by‐product	of	her	data	
collection,	whereas	my	cultural	immersion	began	more	than	a	year	prior	to	collecting	data.	Once	
data	collection	started	I	was	already	known	within	the	community	and	I	had	built	a	rapport	with	
the	community	and	key	organisations.		
	
Commitment	and	visibility	
Commitment	and	visibility	 follow	on	 from	cultural	 immersion.	Commitment	refers	 to	 the	 long	
term	 dedication	 it	 takes	 when	 participating	 in	 the	 transgender	 community	 (Cancian	 1992;	
Renzetti	1995).	Cultural	immersion	is	a	role	that	is	carried	out	over	a	long	period	of	time	and	it	
was	 necessary	 to	 follow	 through	with	 these	 commitments.	 Attending	 events,	 fundraising	 and	
volunteering	were	obligations	that	must	be	tended	to.	Showing	commitment	to	these	activities	
is	a	means	of	proving	that	you	are	willing	to	work	with	the	community.	I	continued	to	show	my	
commitment	 through	 regularly	 volunteering	 via	 fundraising	 and	 safe‐sex	 outreach	within	 the	
transgender	community.	
	
Visibility	 refers	 to	 having	 and	 maintaining	 a	 visible	 presence	 within	 the	 community.	 This	
visibility	 included	 talking	 to	 new	 people,	 maintaining	 friendships	 and	 actively	 participating	
within	 the	 community	 (Cancian	1992;	Renzetti	1995).	This	 strategy	 is	about	establishing	 that	
you	are	trustworthy,	reliable	and	a	committed	ally	to	the	transgender	community.	I	maintained	
my	visibility	 through	attending	various	GLBTI	 social	 events	 such	as	 social	dinners,	bake	 sales	
and	picnics.		
	
Sensitivity	and	acceptance	
It	 is	 of	 great	 importance	 in	 the	 transgender	 community	 that	 those	 who	 are	 considered	
‘outsiders’	are	educated	on	transgender	 issues	and	more	 importantly,	 respectful	of	 the	people	
within	the	community.	It	is	expected	that	you	will	make	mistakes	and	the	appropriate	course	of	
action	 is	 to	acknowledge	your	mistakes,	apologise	and	move	on.	Making	an	active	effort	 to	be	
respectful	and	sensitive	of	preferred	pronouns	was	one	key	area	of	importance.	I	would	never	
assume	 someone’s	 pronoun	 and	 if	 I	 was	 unsure	 of	 their	 preferred	 pronoun,	 I	 would	 ask.	
Sensitivity	also	refers	to	respecting	the	boundaries	of	others	and	ensuring	that	their	consent	is	
obtained	before	engaging	in	various	activities	(such	as	body	contact	or	hugging).		
	
Acceptance	 refers	 to	 being	 accountable	 of	 social	 privileges	 (such	 as	 white	 and	 cisgender	
privilege)	 (Cancian	 1992;	 Renzetti	 1995).	 I	 acknowledge	 that	 I	 am	 aware	 of	 these	 social	
privileges	 and	 that	 I	 cannot	 truly	 empathise	 with	 transgender	 experiences,	 however	 I	
endeavour	 to	be	a	supportive	ally.	Some	people	 in	 the	transgender	community	may	not	agree	
with	my	research	or	research	methods	and	an	open	dialog	is	 important.	People	are	entitled	to	
express	 their	 opinions	 and	having	 these	opinions	 voiced	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	my	 research	
process	 (McClennen	2003).	 It	 is	 important	 that	 I	 am	open	 to	other	 ideas	 and	 suggestions	 are	
welcome.	As	 a	means	 of	 keeping	myself	 ‘in	 check’,	 I	 have	 support	 from	a	 group	of	 academics	
who	identify	as	transgender,	who	I	can	engage	and	consult	with	regarding	my	research.	
	
Honesty	
The	fourth	strategy	implemented	in	accessing	the	transgender	community	was	honesty.	If	I	was	
not	honest	in	my	beliefs	and	intentions,	I	would	not	be	successful	in	conducting	research	within	
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the	transgender	community.	Honesty	began	with	being	open	about	who	I	am	and	what	I	hoped	
to	achieve	in	my	research.	Being	open	about	my	position	as	a	cisgender,	heterosexual	researcher	
and	 being	 honest	 about	 my	 research	 aims	 ensured	 that	 no	 one	 was	 misled	 about	 my	
involvement	 within	 the	 community	 (McClennen	 2003).	 My	 research	 served	 the	 purpose	 of	
achieving	 mutual	 goals,	 not	 selfish	 desires	 to	 exploit	 and	 ‘study’	 the	 community	 through	 a	
pathological	lens.	Honesty	also	refers	to	being	honest	with	myself.	As	the	feminist	participatory	
research	model	 can	 span	across	many	years,	 I	 had	 to	 genuinely	hold	 a	passion	 in	 the	 area	 of	
research,	 otherwise	 I	 would	 not	 be	 effective	 in	 recruiting	 participants	 or	 collecting	 data	
(McClennen	2003).		
	
Communication	
Communication	was	a	multifaceted	strategy	and	 involved	communicating	with	various	groups	
(McClennen	2003).	 Firstly,	 I	 openly	 communicated	with	 those	around	me,	whether	 they	were	
members	 of	 the	 community,	 colleagues	 or	 supervisors.	 Communication	 with	 the	 community	
helped	in	the	snowball	sampling	of	participants,	as	the	people	I	spoke	with	may	not	have	been	
eligible	to	participate	in	my	research,	but	may	have	known	someone	who	was.	It	was	beneficial	
to	also	consult	people	within	the	community	(including	transgender	academics),	who	acted	as	
advisors	to	my	research	(McClennen	2003;	Cancian	1992;	Renzetti	1995).	
	
Speaking	with	other	academics	was	also	beneficial,	as	they	shared	similar	research	interests	and	
had	networks	 that	were	 useful	 to	my	 research.	 Communicating	with	my	 supervisors	 ensured	
that	my	 research	was	 on	 track	 and	 had	 focus	 and	 direction.	 Finally,	 communicating	with	my	
close	 friends	 (while	 maintaining	 the	 privacy	 and	 confidentiality	 of	 my	 research	 and	
participants)	assisted	with	my	mental	well‐being.	As	the	feminist	participatory	research	model	
is	so	in‐depth,	it	can	be	mentally	exhausting	and	speaking	about	this	relieved	any	pressure	felt	
by	this	research	method.	
	
Overcoming	the	Barriers	and	Benefits	of	Being	a	Non‐affiliated	Member	
To	date,	the	above	strategies	have	been	effective	in	overcoming	my	methodological	barriers	in	
accessing	 the	 transgender	 community.	 So	 far	my	 fears	of	 rejection	have	been	unfounded.	The	
transgender	community	are	kind,	welcoming	and	accepted	me	as	part	of	 the	community.	This	
acceptance	stemmed	from	collectively	serving	in	the	mutual	goal	of	bringing	transgender	issues	
to	light	and	promoting	visibility	of	a	community	that	is	often	left	in	the	shadows.		
	
There	are	various	benefits	of	being	a	non‐affiliated	member	of	the	transgender	community.	The	
first	 is	that	I	can	utilise	my	social	privileges	(white	and	cisgender	privilege)	to	highlight	social	
injustices	 and	 bring	 visibility	 to	 issues	 concerning	 the	 transgender	 community.	 Often	 the	
transgender	community	is	invisible	and	not	given	sufficient	attention	and	using	what	little	social	
power	I	have	may	benefit	the	transgender	community	in	the	future.	Another	benefit	of	being	a	
non‐affiliated	 member	 is	 that	 I	 can	 distance	 myself	 from	 personal	 conflicts	 within	 the	
community,	 be	 objective	 and	 provide	 non‐bias	 opinions.	 I	 am	 able	 to	 connect	 with	 various	
different	people	and	groups	without	intruding	on	personal	relations.	Being	an	‘outsider’	is	also	
advantageous	 in	 that	 I	 can	 make	 observations	 that	 insiders	 may	 not	 be	 aware	 of,	 such	 as	
relationships	and	correlations	between	variables.		
	
Conclusion		
These	 five	 strategies	were	 effective	 in	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	 transgender	 community.	To	date,	
there	 is	 no	 literature	 that	 specifically	 discusses	 successful	 strategies	 to	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	
transgender	community	or	the	methodologies	they	have	employed.		Due	to	the	lack	of	visibility	
of	 the	 transgender	 community,	 it	was	necessary	 to	 develop	 and	 implement	 strategies	 to	 gain	
access	 to	 the	 transgender	community	as	a	cisgender	woman	or	 ‘outsider’.	Cultural	 immersion	
ensured	that	I	was	educated	about	the	community	and	involved	myself	in	events,	activities	and	
organisations	that	support	the	transgender	community.	Commitment	and	visibility	refer	to	the	
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long	 term	 presence	 I	 must	 maintain	 within	 the	 transgender	 community.	 Sensitivity	 and	
acceptance	 includes	 an	 overall	 respect	 for	 transgender	 people	 and	 their	 preferences	 and	
boundaries.	 Honesty	 refers	 to	 being	 truthful	 about	 my	 aims,	 intentions	 and	 my	 research.	
Honesty	 is	 also	 about	 being	 truthful	 with	 myself,	 my	 beliefs	 and	 objectives.	 Finally,	
communication	 involves	 an	 open	 dialogue	 with	 community	 members,	 colleagues	 and	
supervisors	 as	 a	 means	 of	 increasing	 productivity.	 Communication	 also	 refers	 to	 discussing	
personal	 pressures	 as	 a	 way	 to	 alleviate	 personal	 mental	 health	 issues.	 Overall,	 these	 five	
strategies	 for	 accessing	 the	 transgender	 community	 and	 overcoming	methodological	 barriers	
were	effective	in	my	quest	to	produce	meaningful	research	on	intimate	partner	violence	in	the	
transgender	community.	
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 Gay,	Lesbian,	Bisexual,	Transgender,	Intersex.	
2		 Queensland	Association	for	Healthy	Communities.	
3		 Parents,	Families	and	friends	of	Lesbians	And	Gays.	
4		 The	Australian	Transgender	Support	Association	of	Queensland.	
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This	study	investigated	the	prevalence	of	fear	of	crime	and	its	impact	on	avoidance	behaviour
of	older	people	living	in	urban	China.	A	total	of	453	older	adults	aged	60	or	above,	recruited	
from	 urban	 communities	 of	 Kunming,	 Yunnan	 using	 stratified	 sampling	 methods,	 were	
individually	 interviewed.	 In	 the	 sample,	 more	 than	 half	 of	 participants	 (57.0%,	 n	 =	 258)	
reported	 fear	 of	 crime	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 them	 (87.6%,	 n	 =	 397)	 reported	 avoidance	
behaviours.	The	results	of	path	analysis	showed	that	fear	of	crime	predicted	more	avoidance	
behaviours	 (β	 =	 .168,	p	 <	 .001)	when	gender,	 age,	 education,	 household	 finance,	perceived	
neighbourhood	disorder	 and	direct	 and	 indirect	 victimisation	 by	 crime	were	 controlled	 as	
covariates.	Fear	of	crime	mediated	the	effect	on	avoidance	behaviour	of	gender	(β	=	.031,	p	=	
.007),	age	(β	=	‐.021,	p	=	.028),	direct	victimisation	by	crime	(β	=.019,	p	=	.039)	and	indirect	
victimisation	 by	 crime	 (β	 =	 .020,	 p	 =	 .037).	 It	 was	 concluded	 that	 fear	 of	 crime	 provoked	
avoidance	 behaviour	 among	 older	 Chinese	which	might	 have	 detrimental	 impacts	 on	 their	
physical	and	social	functioning.	This	study	provided	a	rational	basis	for	service	planning	and	
policy	making	 to	 improve	 the	wellbeing	 of	 older	 Chinese	 through	 addressing	 their	 fear	 of	
crime.		
	
	
Introduction		
Fear	of	crime	has	been	recognised	as	a	major	social	problem	in	the	West	since	the	mid‐1960s.	
Research	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 older	 people	 report	 disproportionately	 high	 levels	 of	 fear	 of	
crime	 (Oh	 and	 Kim	 2009;	 Powell	 and	 Wahidin	 2008;	 Quann	 and	 Hung	 2002).	 As	 a	 coping	
strategy,	 old	 people	 tend	 to	 constrain	 their	 daily	 activity,	 keep	 housebound,	 avoid	 places	
(Yodanis	2002),	withdraw	from	social	activities	(Abbott	and	Sapsford	2005),	refuse	home	visits	
and	reduced	community	 involvement	 (Moore	and	Trojanowicz	1988).	Though	helpful	 to	keep	
criminals	at	bay	to	some	extent,	this	lifestyle	is	especially	detrimental	for	older	persons	which	
could	 impair	 their	 physical	 health	 due	 to	 lessened	 outdoor	 physical	 activities	 (Lorenc	 et	 al.	
2012;	Jackson	and	Stafford	2009),	impaired	mental	health	(Abbott	and	Sapsford,	2005,	Beaulieu	
et	al.,	2002),	decrease	social	support	because	of	reduced	interpersonal	 interaction	(Estina	and	
Neal	 1998;	 Ditton	 and	 Innes	 2005;	 Jackson	 and	 Stafford	 2009)	 and	 ultimately	 intensify	 their	
social	isolation	(Warr	2000).		
	
China	 has	 been	 experiencing	 the	 rapid	 population	 ageing.	 In	 2010,	 there	 were	 0.178	 billion	
people	aged	60	years	or	above	in	Mainland	China	accounting	for	13.26	per	cent	of	the	country’s	
total	population	(National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	China	2011).	According	to	Population	Division	
of	 the	Department	of	Economic	and	Social	Affairs	of	the	United	Nations	Secretariat	(2009),	by	
the	mid‐21st	century,	China	will	have	the	oldest	population	around	the	world.	
	
Since	the	reform	and	opening‐up	policies	were	launched	in	the	late	1970s,	China	has	witnessed	
a	sharp	rise	 in	crime,	especially	 in	 its	urban	regions	(Liu	and	Messner	2001).	The	unbalanced	
economic	 development	 leads	 a	 large	 number	 of	 rural	 populations	 to	 migrate	 into	 cities	 for	
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better	 income.	 However,	 the	 institutional	 barriers	 of	 the	 hukou	 registration	 system	 have	
obstructed	them	from	integrating	into	the	city	and	getting	reasonable	income	and	social	welfare.	
Under	the	pressure	of	survival	and	dissatisfaction	with	inequality	compared	to	urban	residents,	
some	migrant	workers	turn	to	a	life	of	crime.	Stereotyped	as	 ‘trouble	maker’	or	even	‘motived	
criminal’,	migrant	workers	have	been	perceived	as	the	primary	concern	of	the	government	and	
urbanites	 about	 public	 security	 (Nielsen	 and	 Smyth	 2009).	 Along	 with	 this	 change	 in	
demographic	 composition	 of	 urban	 population,	 the	 social	 disorganisation	 caused	 by	
urbanisation	 (De	 Donder	 et	 al.,	 2005)	 and	 the	 decline	 of	 informal	 social	 control	 of	 tradition	
culture	 with	 modernisation	 (Nielsen	 and	 Smyth	 2009)	 have	 constituted	 the	 major	 social	
transition	 which	 breeds	 increasing	 crime,	 social	 instability	 and	 perceptions	 of	 insecurity	 in	
urban	China.	A	recent	survey	sampling	25,000	urban	residents	in	38	cities	of	China	showed	that	
39.9%	of	 respondents	were	afraid	 to	go	out	at	night	and	38.7%	were	worried	about	burglary	
when	they	were	away	from	home	for	a	long	time	(Hou	et	al.	2011).	Perceived	as	vulnerable	and	
‘suitable	target’	of	crime	(Nielsen	and	Smyth,	2009)	and	apt	to	social	isolation	and	withdrawal	
(Warr	 2000),	 old	 population	 fast	 expanding	 in	 China	 deserve	 special	 attention	 of	 academia,	
practitioner	 and	 policy	 maker	 for	 their	 fear	 of	 crime	 and	 the	 subsequent	 impact	 on	 their	
physical	and	social	functioning.		
	
The	 present	 study	 defined	 fear	 of	 crime	 as	 a	 daily	 non‐pathological	 emotional	 state	 (Ferraro	
1995)	 and	 aimed	 to	 investigate	 the	 prevalence	 of	 fear	 of	 crime	 and	 the	 resulting	 avoidance	
behaviour	 among	 older	 Chinese	 and	 examine	 the	 association	 between	 fear	 of	 crime	 and	
avoidance	behaviour.		
	
Methodology	
Sampling		
Kunming,	the	capital	city	of	Yunnan	province	was	chosen	as	the	sampling	site.	According	to	the	
Sixth	National	Population	Census	Data	Gazette	(Kunming	Municipal	Bureau	of	Statistics	2010),	
by	the	end	of	2010,	Kunming	had	0.78	million	residents	aged	60	years	or	older,	accounting	for	
12.1%	of	 its	 total	resident	population	(6.43	million).	At	 the	end	of	2009,	Kunming	ranked	 the	
9th	 in	 population	 ageing	 rate	 among	 all	 31	 capital	 cities	 in	 Mainland	 China	 (Min	 2010).	 A	
representative	sample	of	453	older	Chinese	aged	60	years	or	over	were	recruited	 from	urban	
communities	of	Kunming	during	 June	 to	August,	2011	using	 the	multi‐stage	 sampling	method	
from	the	district,	city‐street	office	and	neighbourhood	committee.	The	total	response	rate	was	
74.0%.	 After	 giving	 written	 consent,	 participants	 were	 interviewed	 individually	 in	 their	
dwelling	for	about	half	an	hour.		
	
Instruments		
Participants	 provided	 information	 on	 socio‐demographic	 characteristics,	 neighbourhood	
disorder	perception,	direct	and	indirect	victimisation	experiences,	fear	of	crime	and	avoidance	
behaviour.	
	
Socio‐demographics	
Four	demographic	variables	were	 included.	Age	was	a	continuous	variable	measured	 in	years.	
Gender	was	a	dummy	variable	coded	in	the	direction	of	female	(=	1).	Education	was	an	ordinal	
measure	 ranging	 from	 1	 (nil	 or	minimum	 education)	 to	 4	 (college	 or	 above	 level	 education).	
Household	finance	was	an	ordinal‐scaled	variable	with	three	categories:	‘well‐off’	(1);	‘average’	
(2);	and	‘poor‐off’	(3).		
	
Perceived	neighbourhood	disorder	
The	disorder	participants	observed	in	the	local	neighbourhood	was	measured	by	the	Perceived	
Neighborhood	 Disorder	 Scale	 (Ross	 and	 Mirowsky	 1999).	 This	 15‐item	 scale	 measures	 four	
domains,	 namely	 physical	 order	 and	 disorder,	 social	 order	 and	 disorder.	 The	 internal	
consistency	was	 very	 high	 in	 past	 research	with	 an	 alpha	 of	 .92	 (Ross	 and	Mirowsky	 1999).	
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Participants	indicated	on	a	4‐point	scale	the	degree	to	which	they	agreed	with	each	statement,	
with	higher	scores	indicating	more	perceived	disorder.	For	this	study,	the	internal	consistency	
coefficient	of	this	scale	was	.77.		
	
Direct	and	indirect	victimisation	by	crime	
Eight	 types	 of	 crimes	 were	 included,	 i.e.	 cheat,	 theft,	 burglary,	 snatching,	 robbery,	 attack,	
rape/sexual	assault	and	murder.	For	direct	victimisation	by	crime,	participants	were	asked	to	
report	 whether	 they	 had	 experienced	 any	 one	 of	 these	 crimes	 in	 the	 past.	 For	 indirect	
victimisation	by	crime,	participants	were	asked	whether	they	had	seen,	heard	of,	or	personally	
known	someone	who	was	a	victim	of	these	crimes.	The	internal	reliability	of	this	scale	was	.60	
and	.83	for	the	two	components,	respectively.	
	
Fear	of	crime	
Fear	for	crime	was	assessed	by	the	culturally‐adapted	fear	of	crime	scale	which	was	originally	
developed	by	Ferraro	(1995).	Participants	were	asked	to	rate	their	fear	for	10	types	of	crimes	
i.e.,	cheat,	theft,	burglary	while	away,	burglary	while	home,	vandalism,	snatch,	robbery,	attack,	
rape	or	sexual	assault	and	murder.	Their	response	categories	ranged	from	1	(not	afraid	at	all)	to	
10	(very	afraid).	The	responses	for	each	item	were	recoded	into	mean	to	serve	as	the	scale	score	
in	the	present	study,	with	higher	scores	representing	stronger	fear	of	crime	(Cronbach’s	alpha	=	
.94).	
	
Avoidance	behaviour	
Participants	were	asked	whether	 they	had	adopted	avoidance	behaviour	due	 to	 fear	of	 crime.	
The	culturally‐adapted	Ferraro’s	(1995)	avoidance	behaviour	index	was	used,	which	consisted	
of	nine	items.	The	response	was	dummy‐coded	(1	=	yes,	0	=	no).	The	total	score	on	this	scale	was	
generated	by	synthesising	each	item	score.	Higher	scores	revealed	more	constrained	behaviour	
(Cronbach’s	alpha	=	.87).		
	
Results	
Participants’	profile	
The	final	sample	consists	of	198	males	(43.7%)	and	255	females	(56.3%)	and	ranged	from	60	to	
100	years	of	age,	with	a	mean	of	72.29	(SD	=	8.27).	About	three	 in	every	10	(n	=	134,	29.6%)	
participants	had	received	no	or	minimal	education,	30.4%	(n	=	138)	primary	education,	30.5%	
(n	=	138)	secondary	or	vocational	education	and	approximately	one	 tenth	 (n	=	43)	college	or	
above	level	education.	Majority	of	them	(n	=	338,	74.6%)	rated	their	financial	status	at	average	
level	compared	with	12.6%	(n	=	57)	well‐off	(sufficient	or	very	sufficient)	and	12.8%	(n	=	58)	
poor‐off	(insufficient	or	very	insufficient).	
	
Prevalence	of	fear	of	crime	
More	 than	half	 of	 participants	 (n	 =	258,	 57.0%)	 reported	 fear	of	 crime	at	 the	 total	 level,	 that	
means	they	 felt	 fearful	 for	one	or	more	types	of	crime.	Concerning	the	specific	type,	theft	(n	=	
234,	51.7%),	cheat	(n	=	221,	48.8%)	and	burglary	when	away	from	home	(n	=	215,	47.5%)	were	
the	most	prevalent	crime	invoking	fear	while	attack	(n	=	126,	27.8%),	murder	(n	=	62,	13.7%)	
and	rape	or	sexual	assault	(n	=	57,	12.6%)	were	the	least	prevalent.		
	
Prevalence	of	avoidance	behaviour	
The	majority	of	participants	(n	=	395,	87.2%)	employed	avoidance	behaviours	to	ensure	their	
safety.	 The	 prevalence	 of	 specific	 avoidance	 behaviour	 ranged	 from	 77.9%	 to	 42.2%	 with	
avoiding	 opening	door	 to	 strangers	 (n	 =	 353,	 77.9%),	 avoiding	 talking	 to	 strangers	 (n	 =	 349,	
77.0%)	and	avoiding	offering	help	to	strangers	(n	=	341,	75.3%)	as	the	most	prevalent	ones.	
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Path	analysis	for	the	effects	of	fear	of	crime	on	avoidance	behaviour	
Presented	 in	Figure	1	 is	 the	path	model	proposed	 in	 this	 study	which	 reflects	 the	hypotheses	
that	 1)	 the	 exogenous	 variables,	 gender,	 age,	 education,	 household	 finance,	 neighbourhood	
disorder,	direct	and	indirect	victimisation	experience	of	crime	are	associated	with	fear	of	crime;	
2)	Higher	 levels	of	 fear	of	 crime	along	with	older	age	and	more	perception	of	neighbourhood	
disorder	 would	 provoke	 avoidance	 behaviour;	 and	 3)	 the	 exogenous	 variables	 have	 indirect	
effects	on	avoidance	behaviour	through	fear	of	crime.		
Figure	 1:	 Standardised	 maximum	 likelihood	 parameter	 estimates	 for	 a	 recursive	 path	 model	 of	 the	
impacts	 of	 fear	 of	 crime	 on	 avoidance	 behaviour	 and	 physical	 health.	 The	 standardised	 estimates	 and	
standard	 error	 (enclosed	 in	 parentheses)	 of	 the	 parameters	 are	 presented.	 The	 disturbance	 variances	
indicate	the	percentage	of	unexplained	variance.		
Edu:	education;	HFinan:	household	finance;	Dorder:	neighbourhood	disorder;	DirVic:	direct	victimisation;	
IndVic:	indirect	victimisation;	FearC:	fear	of	crime;	AvoidB:	avoidance	behaviour.		
	
The	 recursive	 model	 is	 identified	 with	 degrees	 of	 freedom	 greater	 than	 zero	 (dfM	 =	 5).	 A	
correlation	matrix	is	shown	in	Table	1.	The	ML	estimation	of	Mplus	7	was	used	to	fit	the	model.	
The	analysis	converged	to	an	admissible	solution.	The	values	of	the	model	fit	statistics	indicate	
the	 data	 provided	 an	 acceptable	 overall	 fit.	 Selected	 fit	 statistics	 is	 reported	 as	 follows.	 The	
lower	 and	 upper	 bounds	 of	 the	 90%	 confidence	 interval	 based	 on	 RMSEA	 is	 presented	 in	
parentheses:		
χ2	M	(5)	=	7.268,	p	=	.202,	RMSEA	=	.032	(0‐.078),	pclose‐fit	H0	=	.688,CFI	=	.976;	SRMR	=	.017	
	
Table	1:	Bivariate	correlation	among	major	variables		
Variable	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
Gender		 ─	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Age	 ‐.08	 ─	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Education		 ‐.29***	 ‐.10*	 ─	 	 	 	 	 	
Household	finance		 .03	 ‐.08	 ‐.09	 ─	 	 	 	 	
Neighbourhood	disorder		 ‐.02	 ‐.19**	 ‐.04	 .16***	 ─	 	 	 	
Direct	victimisation	by	crime	 .00	 ‐.02	 .01	 .01	 .13**	 ─	 	 	
Indirect	victimisation	by	crime		 ‐.02	 ‐.14**	 ‐.03	 .01	 .20***	 .32***	 ─	 	
Fear	of	crime	 .17***	 ‐.19***	 .02	 .09*	 .16***	 .17***	 .19***	 ─	
Avoidance	behaviours	 .11*	 ‐.08	 ‐.08	 ‐.02	 .23***	 .11*	 .14**	 .22***	
Note.	N	=	451.		
*	p	<	05.	**	p	<	.01.	***	p	<	.001.	
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As	shown	in	Table	2,	12.1%	of	variance	in	fear	of	crime	was	explained	by	exogenous	variables	
among	which	female	gender,	younger	age,	greater	perception	of	neighbourhood	disorder,	more	
experience	 of	 crime	 either	 direct	 or	 indirect	 were	 found	 to	 be	 significant	 but	 education	 and	
household	finance	were	not.	Fear	of	crime,	gender	and	neighbourhood	disorder	accounted	for	
9.3%	 of	 variance	 in	 avoidance	 behaviours	 but	 the	 effect	 of	 gender	 was	 not	 significant	 as	
hypothesised.	Fear	of	 crime	mediated	 the	 effects	 of	 gender,	 age,	 direct	 victimisation	by	 crime	
and	indirect	victimisation	by	crime	on	avoidance	behaviour.		
	
Table	2:	Maximum	 likelihood	estimates	 for	a	path	model	of	 the	effects	of	 fear	of	
crime	on	avoidance	behaviour	
Parameter	 Unst.	 SE	 p	 St.	
	 Direct	effect	
On	fear	of	crime	 	 	 	 	
Gender		 0.779	 0.198	 <.001	 .183	
Age		 ‐0.032	 0.012	 .006	 ‐.125	
Education		 0.157	 0.102	 .125	 .072	
Household	finance	 0.283	 0.188	 .134	 .067	
Neighorhood	disorder	 0.693	 0.325	 .033	 .099	
Direct	victimisation	by	crime	 0.195	 0.079	 .013	 .116	
Indirect	victimisation	by	crime	 0.110	 0.044	 .012	 .120	
On	Avoidance	behaviour	 	 	 	 	
Gender		 0.535	 0.278	 .055	 .087	
Neighbourhood	disorder	 2.049	 0.465	 <.001	 .204	
Fear	of	crime	 0.242	 0.066	 <.001	 .168	
	 Disturbance	variances	
Fear	of	crime	 3.940	 0.262	 <.001	 .879	
Avoidance	behaviour	 8.362	 0.556	 <.001	 .907	
	 Indirect	effect	
On	avoidance	behaviour	through	fear	of	crime	 	 	 	
Gender		 0.188	 0.070	 .007	 .031	
Age		 ‐0.008	 0.004	 .029	 ‐.021	
Education	 0.038	 0.027	 .157	 .012	
Household	finance	 0.068	 0.049	 .165	 .011	
Neighbourhood	disorder	 0.168	 0.091	 .065	 .017	
Direct	victimistion	by	crime		 0.047	 0.023	 .040	 .019	
Indirect	victimistion	by	crime	 0.027	 0.013	 .038	 .020	
Note.	N	=	450.	Unst:	unstandardised;	St:	standardised.	
	
Discussion	
The	 crime‐specific	 prevalence	 rates	 revealed	 that	 property	 crime	 such	 as	 theft,	 cheat	 or	
burglary	was	more	prevalent	among	respondents	than	personal	crime	such	as	attack,	murder	or	
rape/sexual	assault.	It	was	noted	that	the	ranking	pattern	of	these	crimes	in	the	prevalence	for	
fear	 was	 analogous	 to	 that	 for	 direct	 victimisation	 and	 indirect	 victimisation.	 This	 study	
confirmed	 Hentig’s	 (1948)	 argument	 that	 old	 people	 were	 easy	 victims	 of	 property	 crimes	
rather	than	personal	crimes.	Their	 fear	was	actually	based	on	the	real	risk	of	victimisation.	 In	
other	words,	the	crimes	they	felt	 fearful	of	were	the	ones	more	risky	for	them	in	reality	while	
those	crimes	seldom	targeting	at	them	did	not	make	them	fearful	correspondingly.	
	
This	 study	 further	 evidenced	 that	 fear	 of	 crime	 was	 a	 gendered	 phenomenon	 with	 females	
expressing	higher	levels	of	fear	than	males.	Disadvantage	in	physical	strength	(Killias	and	Clerici	
2000)	 and	 social	 power	 (Yodanis	 2002)	 increased	 women’s	 perception	 of	 likelihood	 to	 be	
targeted	by	perpetrators	and	incompetence	to	defend	themselves	and	hence	fear	of	crime.	The	
situation	aggravates	for	old	females	who	tend	to	rate	their	vulnerability	higher.	
	
Nan	Qin,	Elsie	CW	Yan	
160	 Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013	
Contradictory	to	the	hypothesis,	older	age	was	associated	with	lower	levels	of	fear	of	crime.	The	
reason	might	be	 that	 the	declined	mobility	with	 advancing	 age	 reduced	 their	 exposure	 to	 the	
threats	outside	their	dwelling	place	and	thus	decreased	their	fear	for	crime	to	victimise	them.		
	
The	non‐emergence	of	a	significant	relationship	between	lower	levels	of	education	and	higher	
levels	 of	 fear	 of	 crime	 might	 be	 because	 that	 the	 higher	 vulnerability	 old	 people	 with	 less	
education	attainment	perceived	were	counteracted	by	the	lower	odds	for	them	to	be	indirectly	
victimised.	Consequently,	there	was	no	significant	difference	in	fear	of	crime	between	them	and	
their	counterparts	with	higher	education.	
	
The	hypothesis	that	old	people	from	a	poor‐off	household	would	report	more	fear	of	crime	was	
not	supported.	In	spite	of	a	higher	chance	for	them	to	expose	to	neighbourhood	disorder	(Hope	
1995;	Covington	and	Taylor	1991;	Hale	1996)	and	a	lower	resilience	from	the	damage	caused	
by	either	physical	injury	or	property	loss	(Pantazis	and	Gordon,	1997),	poor	people	might	think	
they	are	less	 ‘attractive’	to	potential	offenders	who	were	more	driven	by	high	reward	and	low	
risk	(Ferraro,	1995).	
	
As	established	in	previous	work	(Covington	and	Taylor	1991;	De	Donder	et	al.	2005;	LaGrange	
and	Ferraro	1987;	Lewis	and	Salem	1986;	Skogan	1990;	Skogan	1999;	Taylor	2001),	physical	
and	 social	 disorder	 signs	 as	 the	 graffiti,	 noise,	 vandalism,	 abandoned	 properties,	 loitering	
people,	drug	use,	alcohol	use	or	crime	in	the	neighbourhood	revealing	lack	of	formal	or	informal	
control	or	regulation,	induced	greater	risk	perception	of	victimisation	and	fear	of	crime.		
	
This	study	provided	evidence	 for	 the	assumption	that	direct	or	 indirect	victimisation	of	crime	
has	a	positive	impact	on	higher	levels	of	fear	of	crime.	As	prior	research	demonstrated,	personal	
experience	of	victimisation	 increases	one’s	 feeling	of	vulnerability,	 lack	of	 confidence	 for	 self‐
protection,	risk	perception	of	victimisation	and	consequent	fear	of	crime	(Dull	and	Wint	1997;	
Lawton	 and	 Yaffe	 1980;	 Skogan	 and	Maxfield	 1981;	Wittebrood	 2002;	Weinrath	 and	Gartrell	
1996).	Vicarious	experience	of	victimisation	is	deemed	to	intensify	one’s	sense	of	vulnerability	
and	 negative	 appraisal	 of	 living	 environment	 which	 heighten	 the	 degree	 of	 fear	 of	 crime	
(Covington	and	Taylor	1991;	Salmi	et	al.	2004;	Stafford	and	Galle	1984).		
	
The	fearful	emotion	had	an	impact	on	participants’	 life	through	shaping	their	behaviour	into	a	
more	constrained	manner.	They	tend	to	think	if	they	stay	at	home	and	avoid	interactions	with	
strangers,	the	possibility	for	theft,	deception,	burglary	or	other	more	severe	crimes	to	occur	to	
them	will	be	minimised.	The	marked	effect	of	gender	on	fear	of	crime	did	not	exert	to	avoidance	
behaviour	at	a	 total	 level	 though	 females	were	more	vigilant	as	 for	opening	door	 for,	 chatting	
with	 or	 offering	 help	 to	 strangers	 than	 males.	 Considering	 outdoor	 activities,	 physical	
vulnerability	 to	deal	with	 the	 complicated	 situations	 and	possible	 threats	 in	 the	 environment	
might	worry	 both	 genders	 equally.	 The	 disorder	 clues	 in	 the	 neighbourhood	 could	 cause	 old	
people	 to	 perceive	 higher	 risk	 of	 being	 victimised	 so	 as	 to	 reduce	 their	 mobility	 and	
interpersonal	 interaction.	Females	at	a	younger	age	and	having	experienced	direct	or	 indirect	
victimisation	 by	 crime	 were	 inclined	 to	 conduct	 avoidance	 behaviour	 if	 they	 feel	 fearful	 for	
crime.	
	
Conclusion	
This	 study	 was	 among	 the	 first	 attempts	 to	 explore	 the	 fear	 of	 crime	 experienced	 by	 older	
Chinese	and	examine	its	impacts	on	their	daily	life	through	addressing	avoidance	behaviour.	It	is	
suggested	that	if	old	people	internalise	this	behavioural	pattern	as	a	life	style,	it	will	have	long‐
run	negative	 impacts	 on	 their	wellbeing	 through	 impairing	physical	 health,	 social	 functioning	
and	finally	mental	health.	For	the	purpose	of	prevention,	efforts	should	be	made	to	improve	the	
neighbourhood	 environment	 by	 reducing	 physical	 and	 social	 disorder	 signs	 and	 crime	
incidence.	 Females,	 the	 ‘young	 old’	 and	 victims	 who	 have	 experienced	 crime	 directly	 or	
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indirectly	 should	 be	 the	 special	 targets	 for	 the	 intervention	 on	 fear	 of	 crime.	More	 proactive	
strategies	 and	 skills	 for	 self‐defence	 should	 be	 advocated	 among	 them	 to	 replace	 the	 passive	
avoidance	 behaviour.	 The	 current	 study	 limited	 in	 neglecting	 participants’	 worries	 about	
financial	 security	 and	 physical	 health	 which	might	 be	 of	 greater	 importance	 for	 most	 of	 old	
Chinese.	 It	 is	recommended	for	 future	study	to	pinpoint	 the	 interaction	between	fear	of	crime	
and	these	two	concepts	and	examine	their	joint	impacts	on	the	quality	of	life	of	old	Chinese.	
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Abstract	
It	 is	well	 established	 that	 there	 are	 inherent	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 communicating	 across	
cultural	 boundaries.	When	 these	 difficulties	 are	 encountered	within	 the	 justice	 system	 the	
innocent	can	be	convicted	and	witnesses	undermined.	A	large	amount	of	research	has	been	
undertaken	 regarding	 the	 implications	 of	miscommunication	within	 the	 courtroom	but	 far	
less	 has	 been	 carried	 out	 on	 language	 and	 interactions	 between	 police	 and	 Indigenous	
Australians.	 It	 is	 necessary	 that	 officers	 of	 the	 law	 be	 made	 aware	 of	 linguistic	 issues	 to	
ensure	they	conduct	their	investigations	in	a	fair,	effective	and	therefore	ethical	manner.	This	
paper	draws	on	Cultural	Schema	Theory	to	illustrate	how	this	could	be	achieved.	The	justice	
system	is	reliant	upon	the	skills	and	knowledge	of	the	police,	therefore,	this	paper	highlights	
the	 need	 for	 research	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 linguistic	 and	 non‐verbal	 differences	 between	
Australian	Aboriginal	English	and	Australian	Standard	English	in	order	to	develop	techniques	
to	facilitate	effective	communication.	
	
	
Introduction	
This	paper	attempts	to	determine	if	cultural	difference	in	language	could	be	negatively	affecting	
communication	between	Aboriginal	people	and	 the	police	of	 South	East	Queensland.	 Findings	
from	this	research	are	significant	in	determining	if	miscommunication	is	adding	to	the	already	
unequal	standing	of	Aboriginal	people	within	the	criminal	 justice	system,	and	encouraging	the	
volatile	relationship	between	Aboriginal	people	and	police.		
	
Communication	between	cultures	that	do	not	share	similar	values,	beliefs	and	experiences	has	
long	 proven	 to	 be	 a	 difficult	 exercise	 (Balsmeier	 and	Heck	 1994).	 These	 difficulties	 can	 have	
serious	consequences	when	the	miscommunication	happens	in	the	justice	system;	the	innocent	
can	be	convicted	and	witnesses	undermined.	Much	work	has	been	carried	out	on	the	need	for	
better	 communication	 in	 the	 courtroom	 (Eades	 1993;	 Lauchs	 2010;	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
Queensland	 2010;	 Supreme	 Court	 of	Western	 Australia	 2008),	 including	 the	 development	 of	
educational	packages	to	promote	cultural	awareness	within	the	courts	(Lauchs	2010).	Far	less	
work	 has	 been	 conducted	 on	 language	 and	 interaction	 between	 police	 and	 Indigenous	
Australians	 (Powell	2000).	 It	 is	necessary	 that	officers	of	 the	 law	be	made	aware	of	 linguistic	
issues	 to	 ensure	 they	 conduct	 their	 investigations	 in	 a	 fair,	 effective	 and	 therefore	 ethical	
manner.	Despite	years	of	awareness	raising,	clashes	between	police	and	Indigenous	peoples	are	
still	 prevalent	 (Heath	 2012;	 Remeikis	 2012).	 This	 paper	 will	 attempt	 to	 explain	 a	 possible	
reason	for	this	volatile	relationship	and,	in	doing	so,	suggest	possible	solutions.		
	
Background	
Within	 each	 culture	 there	 are	 established	 values	 and	 behavioural	 patterns.	 Learning	 to	
understand	these,	and,	in	the	process,	accepting	that	one’s	own	culture	may	differ	from	another,	
is	 a	 vital	 ingredient	 in	 effective	 cross‐cultural	 communication.	 An	 important	 aspect	 of	 cross‐
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cultural	 communication	 is	 the	 understanding	 that	 there	 may	 be	 barriers	 to	 effective	
communication	due	to	cultural	difference	(Balsmeier	and	Heck	1994).	Keeping	an	open	mind	in	
regards	to	these	differences	is	an	important	step	in	preventing	the	development	of	stereotypical	
attitudes	 and	 prejudiced	 opinions.	 Basic	 awareness	 of	 difference	 may	 not	 make	 the	 cross‐
cultural	communication	process	easy,	but	it	has	the	potential	to	reduce	conflict.		
	
The	multi‐cultural	 nature	of	Australian	 society	brings	 to	 the	 fore	 issues	 surrounding	 effective	
cross‐cultural	 communication	 (Balsmeier	 and	 Heck	 1994).	 Miscommunication	 between	 the	
speakers	 of	 Australian	 Aboriginal	 English	 (AAE)	 and	 Australian	 Standard	 English	 (ASE)	
(Sharifian	 2009)	 has	 been	 given	 less	 attention.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 majority	 of	
Australia’s	Aboriginal	 population,	 numbering	 some	450,000	 people,	 speak	 some	 form	of	AAE,	
and	it	is	probable	that	it	is	the	first	and	only	language	of	a	large	number	of	Aboriginal	children	
(Butcher	2008).		
	
Indigenous	languages	developed	in	isolation	for	50,000	years.	At	least	200	separate	Indigenous	
languages	were	spoken	on	the	Australian	continent	at	the	time	of	settlement	in	1788	(Butcher	
2008),	including	more	than	100	Indigenous	languages	in	the	area	covered	by	the	current	state	of	
Queensland	 (McConvell	 and	 Thieberger	 2001).	 For	 the	 50,000	 years	 prior	 to	 colonisation,	
Aboriginal	people	developed	highly	 sophisticated	conceptual	 systems;	 and	although	 there	has	
been	a	widespread	language	shift	from	traditional	language	to	English,	the	distinctive	dialect	of	
AAE	has	been	maintained	(Malcolm	and	Sharifian	2002;	Sharifian	2009).	 In	2006,	Queensland	
had	146,429	Indigenous	residents	–	28%	of	the	Australian	Indigenous	population,	but	only	3.6%	
of	the	Queensland	population.	Of	these,	77%	identified	as	Aboriginal,	14%	identified	as	Torres	
Strait	 Islander	 and	 the	 remainder	 identified	 as	 both	 of	 Aboriginal	 and	 Torres	 Strait	 Islander	
origin	 (ABS	2006:	16).	Almost	one	quarter	(22%)	of	 Indigenous	Queenslanders	were	 living	 in	
remote	 or	 very	 remote	 locations	 in	 2006	 (ABS	 2006:	 19).	 These	 are	 the	 target	 group	 for	
traditional	language	interpreters	and	Aboriginal	English	services.	
	
AAE	is	the	term	given	to	the	dialects	of	English	spoken	by	Aboriginal	people;	this	dialect	differs	
from	ASE	in	ways	such	as:	phonology,	lexicon,	and	pragmatics	(Eades	2004;	Malcolm	and	Kaldor	
1991).	 Although	 there	 are	 variations	 in	 the	 varieties	 of	 AAE,	with	 ‘heavier’	 varieties	 drawing	
strongly	on	native	 language	and	meaning	spoken	 in	remote	areas,	and	 ‘lighter’	varieties	more	
similar	to	ASE	in	suburban	areas;	AAE	should	not	be	mistaken	as	a	form	of	Pidgin	English	(Eades	
2004).	 Pidgin	 languages	 combine	 words	 from	 two	 different	 languages,	 with	 the	 speakers	 of	
pidgin	retaining	the	ability	to	speak	 their	native	 tongue	(McConvell	and	Thieberger	2001).	On	
the	other	hand,	AAE	is	considered	by	linguists	to	be	a	distinctive	dialect	in	its	own	right	which	
‘reflects,	maintains	and	continually	creates	Aboriginal	culture	and	identity’	(Eades	1991:	57).	In	
fact,	Harkins	(1994)	refers	to	AAE	as	the	most	truly	Australian	form	of	English.	
	
Issues	 with	 miscommunication	 arise	 due	 to	 the	 similarities	 between	 AAE	 and	 ASE	 (Eades,	
1988).	 Even	 when	 grammatical	 differences	 are	 not	 great	 between	 AAE	 and	 ASE,	 pragmatic	
differences	 have	 implications	 for	miscommunication	 (Eades	 1984,	 1988,	 1991,	 1993).	 Due	 to	
these	perceived	similarities,	it	is	not	uncommon	for	speakers	of	AAE	to	be	unaware	that	they	are	
in	fact	not	speaking	ASE	(DJAG,2000).	Miscommunication	between	an	uniformed	listener	and	a	
speaker	of	AAE	can	occur	due	to	unfamiliarity	with	the	cultural	conceptualisations	AAE	strongly	
draws	upon	(Sharifian	2009).		
	
Linguistic	 research	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 AAE	 has	 used	 the	 term	 ‘cultural	 conceptualisations’	 as	 a	
collective	term	to	describe	‘schemas’	and	‘categories’	which	embody	one’s	cultural	experiences	
(Sharifian	 2008).	 These	 cultural	 conceptualisations	 are	 not	 static,	 but	 are	 ‘negotiated’	 and	
‘renegotiated’	by	members	of	a	culture	through	their	 interpersonal	experiences.	 In	the	case	of	
Aboriginal	 culture,	 these	 cultural	 conceptualisations	 are	 not	 only	 found	 in	 language,	 but	 also	
through	 cultural	 practices	 such	 as	 dance,	 painting	 and	 rituals	 (Sharifian	 2010).	 AAE	 is	
influenced	 by	 all	 of	 these	 cultural	 conceptualisations	 that	 are	 derived	 from	 the	 beliefs	 and	
Australian	Aboriginal	English	and	Cultural	Conceptions	–	Can	They	Affect	Policing?	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013							165	
experiences	 specific	 to	 Aboriginal	 people	 (Malcolm	 and	 Rochecouste	 2000;	 Malcolm	 and	
Sharifian	 2002;	 Sharifian	 2010).	 For	 example,	 the	 complexity	 of	 Aboriginal	 kinship	 could	
influence	 the	meanings	of	words	such	as	 family,	home	 and	brother	 to	 include	meanings	which	
reach	far	beyond	the	simplistic	meanings	which	ASE	would	credit	them	with	(Sharifian	2006).	
For	example,	to	an	AAE	speaker	‘family’	could	encompass	a	wide	variety	of	people,	who	may	or	
may	 not	 be	 biologically	 related	 to	 each	 other,	 whereas	 to	 an	 ASE	 speaker	 ‘family’	 would	
generally	refer	to	a	nuclear‐like	family.	It	is	the	lack	of	awareness	of	these	potential	differences	
in	meaning	and	application	that	can	lead	to	breakdowns	in	the	communication	process.		
	
Cultural	Schema	Theory		
Cultural	 Schema	 Theory	 draws	 on	 cultural	 conceptualisations	 and	 schemas	 to	 explain	 the	
factors	which	may	either	facilitate	or	debilitate	cross‐cultural	communication	(Sharifian	2001).	
Schemas	are	described	as	cognitive	blocks	used	for	the	organisation	of	information	(Rumelhart	
1980).	Schema	theory	suggests	that	humans	make	sense	of	their	personal	experience	based	on	
these	cognitive	blocks	(Sharifian,	Rochecouste	and	Malcolm	2004).	Therefore,	schemas	are	used	
to	 interpret,	 predict	 and	 organise	 experience	 (Rumelhart	 1980).	 Many	 disciplines	 have	 used	
schema	 theory	 to	 explain	 human	 cognition.	 These	 include	 psychology,	 artificial	 intelligence,	
linguistics	 and	 anthropology	 (Sharifian	 2001).	 Palmer	 (1996:	 63)	 applies	 this	 theory	 in	 a	
cultural	 context	 by	 suggesting	 ‘it	 is	 likely	 that	 all	 native	 knowledge	 of	 language	 and	 culture	
belongs	 to	 cultural	 schemas	 and	 the	 living	 of	 culture	 and	 the	 speaking	 of	 language	 consist	 of	
schemas	 in	 action’.	 Cultural	 Schema	 Theory	 regards	 schemas	 as	 largely	 dwelling	 in	 cultural	
experience,	 influenced	 by	 such	 factors	 as	 innately	 programmed	 behaviour	 or	 people’s	 own	
distinct	worldview	 (Sharifian	 et	 al.	 2004).	 Put	 simply,	 personal	 experience	 and	 knowledge	 of	
culture	 form	 cultural	 schemas	 which	 are	 consequently	 organised	 and	 employed	 to	 interpret	
future	 interactions.	 In	 regards	 to	 Aboriginal	 English,	 this	 involves	 Aboriginal	 people	 taking	
traditionally	English	words	and	applying	their	own	culturally	influenced	schemas	to	them.	This	
process	 was	 exemplified	 with	 the	 word	 family	 earlier.	 Therefore,	 cultural	 schema	 theory	
provides	an	explanation	for	the	link	between	culture,	cognition	and	language	in	AAE	(Sharifian	
2001).		
	
In	 this	 model,	 cultural	 schemas	 are	 not	 equally	 shared	 between	 cultural	 groups	 but	 are	
distributed	 across	 the	 group	 depending	 on	 each	 individual’s	 personal	 experience	 (Sharifian	
2003).	 This	 model	 supports	 findings	 from	 a	 study	 of	 Aboriginal	 words	 and	 concepts	 in	
Australian	 English,	 conducted	 by	 Leitner	 and	 Sieloff	 (1998)	 which	 found	 that	 younger	
Aboriginal	people	were	 less	aware	of	meanings	of	such	terms	as	 land	rights,	woman’s	business	
and	dreaming	 than	 their	 older	 counterparts.	 Therefore,	 cultural	 schemas	 are	 said	 to	 exist	 on	
somewhat	of	a	continuum,	rather	than	on	an	‘all	or	none’	basis	with	factors	such	as	age,	gender	
and	 education	 responsible	 for	 such	 knowledge	 distribution	 (Sharifian	 2003).	 Although	
originally	 an	 anthropological	 theory,	 the	 relevance	 of	 Cultural	 Schema	 Theory	 to	 the	
understanding	 of	 AAE	 has	 been	 a	 dominant	 theory	 in	 recent	 research.	 Studies	 conducted	 by	
Malcolm	and	Rochecouste	(2000),	Malcolm	and	Sharifian	(2002)	and	Sharifian	(2001,	2002)	all	
emphasise	that	understanding	the	cultural	conceptions	which	make	up	AAE	is	a	vital	ingredient	
in	facilitating	effective	cross‐cultural	communication.		
	
Research	Approaches		
Trends	 in	 sociolinguistics,	 discourse	 analysis,	 applied	 linguistics	 and	 pragmatics	 dominated	
research	 on	 Australian	 Aboriginal	 English	 prior	 to	 the	 1990s	 (Harkins	 1994;	 Malcolm	 2000;	
Sharifian	2006).	 Early	 research	 into	 AAE	 conducted	by	 Eagleson,	Kaldor	 and	Malcolm	 (1982)	
and	 Malcolm	 (1977)	 explored	 AAE	 in	 a	 descriptive	 sense	 as	 well	 as	 drawing	 on	 trends	 in	
sociolinguistics.	More	 recently,	 Aboriginal	 English	 studies	 have	 looked	 at	 discourse	 strategies	
employed	 by	 its	 speakers	 (Malcolm	 1994)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 pragmatic	 norms	 which	 govern	
communication	in	AAE	(Eades	1982,	1992,	1993,	1994,	1995,	1996).	Two	dominant	applications	
have	 emerged	 from	 previous	 research	 into	 AAE,	 one	 being	 the	 practical	 implications	 in	 the	
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classroom,	 which	 predominately	 draws	 on	 schema‐based	 theory	 (Lowell	 and	 Devlin	 1998;	
Malcolm	1994;	Oliver,	Rochecouste,	Vanderford,	and	Grote	2011;	Sharifian	2001,	2008)	and	the	
second	 being	 implications	 of	 miscommunication	 in	 a	 legal	 setting,	 which	 draws	 more	 on	
criminological	 theories	 of	 power	 and	post‐colonialism	 (Cooke	1995,	 1996,	 2002;	Eades	1993,	
1994,	1996).	Research	exploring	the	implications	of	linguistic	difference	between	AAE	and	ASE	
predominately	involves	the	collection	and	analysis	of	oral	narratives	from	Aboriginal	people	to	
determine	 the	 linguistic	 features	 and	 underlying	 cultural	 conceptualisations,	 all	 finding	 that	
understanding	cultural	conceptions	is	key	to	effective	communication	(Lowell	and	Devlin	1998;	
Malcolm	1994;	Malcolm	and	Sharifian	2002;	Sharifian	2001,	2006,	2010).		
	
All	 research	 which	 explores	 the	 implications	 of	 Aboriginal	 English	 in	 the	 classroom	
acknowledges	that	Aboriginal	students	are	at	a	disadvantage	(Lowell	and	Devlin	1998;	Malcolm	
1994;	Oliver	et	al.	2011;	Sharifian	2001).	Communicative	difficulties	exist	between	Aboriginal	
students	 and	 their	 non‐Indigenous	 teachers	 arising	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 shared	 communicative	
assumptions,	 cultural	discontinuity	between	 the	home	environment	and	school,	differences	 in	
perspectives,	 expectations,	 understandings	 and	 interpretations,	 differences	 in	 pragmatics,	
differences	 in	 length	 of	 pause	 time	 and	 listening	 and	 attention	 patterns	 (Christie	 and	 Harris	
1985;	Harris	1977;	McConvell	1991).	Lowell	and	Devlin	(1998),	Oliver	et	al.	(2011),	Sharifian	et	
al.	 (2004)	 and	 Sharifian	 (2008)	 all	 highlight	 that	 effective,	 culturally	 competent	 educational	
programs	should	rely	on	understanding	Aboriginal	cultural	schemas.		
	
Malcolm	 (1994:	150)	 found	 that	 speech	 is	 ‘always	associated	with	 the	presence	of	Aboriginal	
communicators	 in	 a	 setting	 or	 speech	 event	which	 is	 defined	 by	 non‐Aboriginals.	 The	 key,	 if	
there	 is	 a	key,	 to	 how	Aboriginal	people	 communicate,	 seems	 to	me	 to	 lie	 in	who	defines	 the	
setting	 and	 determines	 the	 discourse	 pattern’.	 Lowell	 and	 Devlin	 (1998)	 recommend	 that	
Aboriginal	perspectives	be	privileged,	in	the	hope	of	creating	a	dominant	framework	which	will	
inform	the	educational	needs	of	Aboriginal	children	in	the	future.	Most	studies	involving	AAE	in	
the	 classroom	 conclude	 that	 awareness	 of	 cultural	 and	 linguistic	 difference	 is	 the	 most	
important	 ingredient	 in	 ‘developing	 and	 implementing	 more	 inclusive	 and	 accommodating	
educational	 programmes’	 (Sharifian	2001:	132).	 Teachers	 in	 urban	areas	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	
aware	of	the	dialect	of	AAE	as	opposed	to	teachers	in	rural	areas,	which	demonstrates	the	need	
for	ongoing	professional	development	about	AAE	(Oliver	et	al.	2011).	This	could	be	applicable	to	
not	 only	 the	 classroom,	 but	 law	 courts,	 government	 offices,	 or	 in	 fact	 anywhere	 which	
communication	 takes	 place	 in	 which	 the	 non‐Aboriginal	 participant	 defines	 the	 terms	 of	
communication	(Malcolm	1994).	
	
Eades	 studies	 of	 Indigenous	 experiences	 in	 the	 courtroom	 have	 shown	 that	 ‘even	where	 the	
grammatical	 differences	 between	 ASE	 and	 AAE	 are	 not	 great,	 there	 are	 significant	 pragmatic	
differences	 which	 have	 implications	 for	 intercultural	 communication’	 (D	 Eades	 2004:	 492).	
Specific	implications	for	the	legal	setting	include	the	different	ways	in	which	Aboriginal	people	
seek	 information,	 usually	 avoiding	 direct	 questioning,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 positive	 value	 which	
Aboriginal	 people	 place	 on	 silence;	 silence	 being	 found	 as	 an	 important	 contribution	 to	
conversation,	 rather	 than	 failure	 to	 communicate	 (Eades	 2004).	 Although	 communication	
difficulties	 involving	 Aboriginal	 people	 in	 the	 legal	 setting	 has	 been	 noted	 for	many	 decades	
(Elkin	1947;	 Strehlow	1936),	 Eades	 has	 addressed	 the	widespread	 ignorance	 to	 the	 language	
variety	used	by	Aboriginal	people	and	shown	how	this	linguistic	diversity	has	an	overflow	affect	
on	 to	 Indigenous	 over‐representation	 (Eades	 2004).	 Similarly,	 Cooke	 explores	 the	 use	 of	
traditional	 Aboriginal	 languages	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 linguistic	 power	 can	 affect	 Aboriginal	
people	in	situations	like	the	police	interview,	the	courtroom	examination	and	cross	examination	
(Cooke	1995,	1996,	2002).	Although	Cooke’s	work	presents	a	convincing	analysis	of	the	ways	in	
which	language	can	influence	power	in	the	legal	context,	Eades	(2002,	2003)	highlights	that	an	
analyses	of	 the	 social	 and	political	processes,	 such	as	police	 interaction,	 the	 judiciary	 and	 the	
history	of	police	intervention	into	the	lives	of	Aboriginal	people	needs	to	occur	to	gain	a	broader	
understanding	of	the	power	discourse.	
Australian	Aboriginal	English	and	Cultural	Conceptions	–	Can	They	Affect	Policing?	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013							167	
	
Communication	issues	are	likely	to	play	a	part	in	Indigenous	over‐representation.	Despite	only	
being	 2.5%	 of	 the	 Australian	 population	 in	 2008,	 Indigenous	 people	 represented	 24%	 of	 the	
prison	 population,	 meaning	 Indigenous	 people	 are	 currently	 13	 times	more	 likely	 than	 non‐
Indigenous	people	 to	be	 imprisoned	(HREOC	2008).	The	majority	of	explanations	 for	 the	vast	
over‐representation	 of	 Indigenous	 people	within	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 and	 the	 volatile	
relationship	which	exists	between	Indigenous	people	and	police	draw	on	explanations	rooted	in	
the	historical	context	of	colonisation	(Behrendt,	Cunneen,	and	Libesman	2008;	Cunneen	2001;	
Eades	 2009;	 Jennett	 1999;	 Kamira	 1999).	 Conversely,	 language	 difficulties	 can	 also	 have	
significant	 consequences	 for	 Indigenous	 victims	 of	 crime.	 Most	 of	 Eades’	 work	 shows	 that	
Indigenous	 witnesses	 can	 be	 discredited	 in	 court	 through	manipulation	 of	 the	 ASE	 speaking	
jury’s	perception	of	an	AAE	speaking	witness	(Eades	2009).		
	
AAE	 has	 been	 recognised	 by	 the	 courts	 and	 positive	 steps	 have	 been	 taken	 to	 address	 and	
prevent	communication	issues	(DJAG	2000;	Supreme	Court	of	Queensland	2005,	2010;	Supreme	
Court	 of	 Western	 Australia	 2008,	 2009).	 There	 have	 also	 been	 attempts	 to	 improve	 the	
recognition	of	Aboriginal	English	 in	non‐criminal	matters	 such	as	native	 title	hearings	 (Byrne	
2003).	Awareness	has	 increased	but	 communication	 issues	 still	 remain.	No	studies	have	been	
undertaken	 of	 the	 prevalence	 of	 Indigenous	 language	 use	 –	 Aboriginal	 English	 or	 traditional	
languages	 –	 in	 Queensland	 courts,	 or	 in	 other	 Australian	 jurisdictions;	 thus	 there	 are	 no	
indicators	of	whether	the	raising	of	awareness	has	produced	more	 just	outcomes.	Also,	courts	
have	 discovered	 procedural	 difficulties	 when	 trying	 to	 acknowledge	 AAE	 (Lauchs	 2010);	 for	
example,	 judges	 not	 being	 able	 to	 advise	 a	 jury	 on	 possible	 language	 differences	 due	 to	 the	
possibility	of	unfairly	 influencing	the	 jury,	and	 lack	of	 interest	 in	programs	developed	to	train	
AAE	speakers	to	assist	in	court	proceedings.		
	
Language:	An	Issue		
One	of	the	most	publicised	cases	focusing	on	issues	of	cultural	difference	and	Aboriginal	English	
is	 that	of	 the	Pinkenba	Six	 (Eades	2006).	 In	 this	case,	 the	defence	council	set	out	 to	show	that	
three	Aboriginal	boys	aged	12,	13	and	14,	after	being	approached	by	six	armed	police	officers,	
voluntarily	got	into	three	separate	police	vehicles,	which	were	then	driven	14	kilometres	out	of	
town	 to	an	 industrial	 area	at	Pinkenba	 (Eades	1995).	The	police	officers	 abandoned	 the	boys	
there	(Eades	2006).	The	case	centred	on	whether	or	not	the	boys	had	got	into	the	police	vehicles	
of	 their	 own	will,	with	 the	 defence’s	 case	 being	 that	 the	 boys	 ‘gave	 up	 their	 liberty’	 and	 that	
‘there’s	no	offence	of	allowing	a	person	to	give	up	his	liberty’	(Eades	2006).	Therefore,	the	legal	
strategy	of	the	defence	was	to	attempt	to	transform	the	boys’	experience	of	being	‘abducted’	into	
one	of	a	voluntary	car	ride	(Eades	2006).	Dianna	Eades	has	extensively	explored	how	aspects	of	
Aboriginal	 English	 such	 as	 gratuitous	 concurrence,	 the	 role	 of	 silence	 and	 eye	 contact	 in	 fact	
helped	the	defence	to	culturally	disadvantage	the	Aboriginal	boys	and	to	position	their	accounts	
as	unreliable	and	inaccurate	(Eades	1995,	1996,	2004,	2006,	2009).	There	is	often	a	focus	on	the	
exploitation	 of	 aspects	 of	Aboriginal	English	by	defence	 counsels	within	 literature	 centred	on	
Aboriginal	English	in	the	legal	context.	This	alleged	presence	of	malice	is	not	always	the	cause	of	
ineffective	 communication	 between	 speakers	 of	 ASE	 and	 AAE	 in	 the	 legal	 context.	 The	 same	
results	 can	 arise	 through	 ignorance,	 even	with	 the	 best	 of	 intentions,	 as	 is	 the	 1993	 case	 of	
Robyn	Kina.		
	
In	 1988,	 an	 Aboriginal	 woman	 by	 the	 name	 of	 Robyn	 Kina	 was	 found	 guilty	 of	 the	 stabbing	
murder	of	her	de	 facto	husband	and	was	sentenced	 to	 life	 imprisonment	 (Eades	2004).	At	no	
point	during	the	trial	did	Kina	have	the	opportunity	to	give	any	evidence	of	the	circumstances	
which	led	up	to	her	stabbing	her	husband	(Eades	2004).	Evidence	from	Kina’s	appeal	 in	1993	
revealed	 that	her	husband	had	a	history	of	extreme	violence	and	on	the	morning	of	his	death	
had	threatened	to	rape	Kina’s	14	year	old	niece,	therefore	the	stabbing	occurred	in	self	defence	
as	 a	 result	 of	 provocation	 (Eades	 1996).	 Eades	 (1996)	 highlights	 that	 the	 lawyers	 who	
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interviewed	 Kina	 originally	 were	 not	 aware	 that	 the	 difficulties	 they	 were	 experiencing	
communicating	 with	 Kina	 were	 due	 to	 serious	 cultural	 differences.	 Not	 being	 able	 to	 gather	
critical	 evidence	 lead	 to	one	of	 the	 shortest	 trials	 in	Queensland	history,	with	 less	 than	 three	
hours	 of	 evidence	 and	 the	 jury	 only	 requiring	 50	 minutes	 to	 return	 a	 guilty	 verdict	 (Eades	
1996).	A	few	years	later,	public	interest	in	the	case	resulted	in	the	Queensland	Attorney	General	
contacting	Kina	and	an	appeal	was	 initiated	 (Eades	1996).	Kina	 successfully	 appealed	against	
the	 conviction	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 her	 lawyers	 did	 not	 gather	 from	 her	 the	 information	
necessary	 to	defend	her	effectively	(Pringle	1994).	The	conviction	was	quashed	and	Kina	was	
subsequently	released	from	prison	(Eades	2004).	Unlike	Pinkenba,	Kina	was	failed	by	her	own	
lawyers;	 therefore	 highlighting	 that	 cultural	 difference	 in	 communication	 can	 lead	 to	 gross	
miscarriages	of	justice,	even	when	the	best	of	intentions	are	present.	Thus,	as	shown	by	Eades	
(1996),	the	communication	difficulties	present	were	not	about	personalities	but	about	cultural	
difference	 in	 language	 usage.	 The	 case	 of	 Robyn	 Kina	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	
understanding	 cultural	 difference	when	 communicating	 in	 the	 courtroom	 setting;	 therefore	 it	
would	be	logical	to	assume	that	this	cultural	awareness	would	also	be	beneficial	in	other	legal	
settings,	such	as	policing.		
	
Aboriginal	English	and	Policing		
So	far	the	literature	has	demonstrated	that	the	dialect	of	Australian	Aboriginal	English	not	only	
exists,	but	it	is	spoken	by	the	majority	of	Aboriginal	people	(Butcher	2008),	and	shows	that	the	
lack	 of	 awareness	 and	 acknowledgement	 of	 this	 dialect	 has	 far	 reaching	 detrimental	
consequences	 for	 its	 speakers.	 As	 Eades	 (2002,	 2003)	 points	 out,	 how	 linguistic	 differences	
affect	 the	 broader	 social	 and	 political	 discourses	 needs	 to	 be	 analysed	 in	 order	 to	 fully	
understand	its	consequences	on	AAE	speakers.	These	issues	are	just	as	relevant	for	Indigenous‐
police	 interactions.	 If	 the	majority	of	Aboriginal	people	speak	some	 form	of	AAE,	and	 that	 the	
communicative	 patterns	 of	 Aboriginal	 people	 are	 influenced	 by	 cultural	 schemas	 and	 who	
defines	the	setting	of	the	interaction,	it	would	not	be	unreasonable	to	draw	the	conclusion	that	
AAE	could	 in	 fact	have	an	effect	on	 the	relationship	between	Aboriginal	people	and	the	police	
(Butcher	2008;	Malcolm	1994).		
	
Police	 are	 at	 the	 frontline	 of	 the	 justice	 system.	 They	 have	 the	 discretion	 to	 charge	 and	 the	
responsibility	to	investigate	criminal	offences.	The	courts	and	correctional	stages	of	the	justice	
system	play	no	part	until	the	police	have	concluded	their	engagement	with	an	accused.	Thus	the	
system	 is	 reliant	 upon	 the	 skills	 and	 knowledge	 of	 the	 police	 in	 its	 interactions	 with	 the	
Indigenous	community.	Given	the	predominantly	minor	nature	of	Indigenous	offending,	mainly	
encompassing	public	order‐related	offences,	an	AAE	speaker	is	most	likely	to	have	contact	with	
a	uniformed	beat	officer	–	the	least	experienced,	skilled	and	knowledgeable	of	the	service.	It	is	
extremely	unlikely	that	they	are	aware	of	AAE	let	alone	skilled	in	the	techniques	of	recognising	
and	addressing	communication	breakdowns.		
	
Literature	 which	 draws	 on	 post‐colonial	 theory	 argues	 that	 the	 role	 which	 police	 played	
throughout	colonisation,	from	violence	towards	Aboriginal	clans	to	enforcing	the	state	policies	
of	 protectionism	 and	 assimilation,	 is	 the	 driver	 behind	 the	 continuing	 volatile	 relationship	
between	Aboriginal	people	and	the	police	today	(Kamira	1999).	This	role,	which	often	involved	
control	over	the	social	and	familial	relationships,	has	enforced	the	superiority	of	the	colonising	
power	and	the	inferiority	of	the	colonised	culture	(Cunneen	2001).	Neo‐colonial	theorists	would	
argue	that	these	beliefs	have	been	used	to	 justify	the	creation	of	current	policy	which	extends	
the	power	of	the	Western	culture	over	Indigenous	culture	(Eades	2009).		
	
Racism	 and	 racial	 prejudice	 are	 often	 put	 forward,	 particularly	 in	 regards	 to	 policing,	 as	
explanations	 for	 the	 continuing	 Indigenous	 disadvantage.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 events	 of	
colonisation	 have	 created	 a	 power	 structure	 which	 disadvantages	 Aboriginal	 people;	 and	
further,	this	disadvantage	is	continuing,	in	particular	within	the	police	service,	due	to	ingrained	
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racist,	 prejudiced	 beliefs	 (Cunneen	 2001).	 Racism	 clearly	 existed	 in	 the	 Queensland	 Police	
Service.	 The	 Royal	 Commission	 into	 Aboriginal	 Deaths	 in	 Custody	 produced	 some	 damning	
findings	in	regards	to	the	policing	of	Aboriginal	people	(RCADIC	1990),	including	that	the	abuse	
of	police	discretionary	powers	was	a	major	contributor	to	the	overrepresentation	of	Aboriginal	
people	in	custody.	Problems	continued,	despite	the	work	that	was	done	to	address	these	issues	
in	the	1990s.	Recognising	an	increase	in	tension	between	the	Queensland	Police	Service	(QPS)	
and	Aboriginal	peoples	 following	 the	death	of	Cameron	Doomadgee	and	riots	 in	Aurukun,	 the	
Queensland	Government	requested	the	Crime	and	Misconduct	Commission	(CMC)	to	conduct	an	
independent	 inquiry	 into	 policing	 and	 Aboriginal	 peoples	 (CMC	 2009).	 The	 CMC’s	 report	
recognises	the	importance	of	effective	cross‐cultural	communication	between	Aboriginal	people	
and	 the	police,	highlighting	 that	 ‘we	are	all	 culturally	programmed	 throughout	our	 lives	 –	we	
learn	ways	of	seeing	the	world	through	our	own	culture,	therefore	cross‐cultural	encounters	can	
be	difficult’	(CMC	2009:	181).	The	report	goes	on	to	state	that	cultural	training	can	lead	to	more	
effective	relationships,	and	most	importantly	acknowledges	that:	
	
...	 in	 the	 area	 of	 policing,	 law,	 crime	 and	 justice,	 there	 is	 much	 at	 stake	 in	 cross	
cultural	 encounters	 –	 breakdowns	 in	 communication	 can	 lead	 to	 injustice	 ...	 in	
Queensland’s	 indigenous	communities	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	police	effectively	without	
some	 knowledge	 of	 the	 complex	 cultures	 and	 social	 relationships	 within	 a	
community.	(CMC,	2009:	182)		
	
Interestingly,	the	report	goes	on	to	mention	AAE,	but	does	not	mention	the	different	linguistic	
issues	between	ASE	and	AAE.	Although	 the	QPS	are	 taking	 steps	 to	 address	 issues	of	 cultural	
competency	 by	 encouraging	 cultural	 training,	 Indigenous	 recruitment	 and	 establishing	 the	
Cultural	Advisory	Unit,	the	report	concluded	that	the	‘QPS	must	step	up	its	efforts’	(CMC	2009:	
189)	to	address	cultural	competency.		
	
Application	of	Cultural	Schema	Theory	to	prevent	Racism	
Ridley	 et	 al.	 have	 shown	 that	 CST	 can	 be	 used	 to	 prevent	 racism	 (Ridley,	 Chih,	 and	 Olivera,	
2000).	They	use	a	specific	definition	of	racism	that	covers	both	antagonistic	and	‘unintentional	
racism’:	
	
…	any	behavior	or	pattern	of	 behavior	 that	 tends	 to	 systematically	deny	 access	 to	
opportunities	 or	 privileges	 to	 members	 of	 one	 racial	 group	 while	 perpetuating	
access	to	opportunities	and	privileges	to	members	of	another	racial	group.	(Ridley	et	
al.	2000:	66)	
	
They	define	unintentional	racism	as	that	which	allows	 ‘racism	when	the	perpetrator	has	good	
intentions’	(Ridley	et	al.	2000:	66).	Thus,	a	police	officer	who	acts	in	the	indigenous	offender’s	
‘own	 good’,	 but	proceeds	 from	a	position	of	 ignorance	 can	produce	 an	unjust	 outcome	which	
harms	the	Indigenous	person.	Assumptions	can	also	be	made	through	miscommunication	that	
misidentifies	offenders,	thus	multiplying	harm	by	charging	the	innocent	and	not	protecting	the	
victim.		
	
To	put	this	problem	into	perspective,	any	clinician,	regardless	of	race,	background,	
or	 motives,	 can	 engage	 in	 unintentional	 racism.	 Clinicians	 may	 inadvertently	
sabotage	 their	 own	well‐intended	 actions	 and	 perpetuate	 the	 very	 problems	 they	
endeavour	to	overcome.	To	eliminate	their	unintentional	racism,	clinicians	need	to	
gain	 insight	 into	 their	 operational	 practices	 and	 change	 behaviour	 that	 interferes	
with	a	helpful	intervention.	(Ridley	et	al.	2000:	66)		
	
Antonia	Randles,	Mark	Lauchs	
170	 Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013	
In	 other	words,	 a	 person	 needs	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 his	 or	 her	 own	 cultural	 schemas	 and	 remain	
receptive	to	any	stimuli.	The	only	way	to	do	this	is	through	awareness	of	the	cultural	schemas	at	
play.		
	
Conclusion	
We	have	 shown	 that	 the	 communication	 difficulties	 between	AAE	 and	ASE	 speakers	 not	 only	
lead	 to	 misunderstanding	 but	 have	 contributed	 to	 unjust	 outcomes	 for	 Indigenous	
Queenslanders.	 Cultural	 Schema	 Theory	 has	 been	 used	 to	 show	 how	 the	 different	 cultural	
histories	 of	 both	 Indigenous	 and	 migrant	 populations	 have	 guided	 how	 each	 group	 sees	 the	
world.	These	differences	both	produce	the	problem	and	have	played	a	part	in	how	each	group	
has	responded	to	the	outcomes	of	that	difference.	That	is,	the	language	spoken	by	each	group	is	
a	product	of	their	cultural	schema.	But	the	social	response	to	this	linguistic	difference	has	also	
been	produced	by	 the	 same	 schema.	Historically,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 presently,	 racism	has	
been	a	common	reaction.	This	has	been	recognised	in	both	RCADIC	and	CMC	reviews.	But	laying	
the	blame	at	 the	 feet	 of	 racism	does	not	produce	a	 solution.	 Similarly,	Ridley	 et	 al.	 show	 that	
simply	acknowledging	difference	will	not	bring	an	answer,	as	ignorance	of	the	nature	and	means	
of	difference	will	still	lead	to	unjust	outcomes.	We	need	to	discover	the	specifics	of	difference	so	
that	they	can	be	recognised	and	worked	around.	Eades	and	Cooke	have	already	commenced	this	
work	 in	 the	 courts	but	no	one	has	undergone	 similar	 research	 in	 the	policing	context.	Future	
research	 has	 to	 discover	 the	 linguistic	 and	 non‐verbal	 differences	 in	 communication	 to	
contribute	greater	understanding	and	development	of	techniques,	such	as	those	developed	for	
courtroom	communication.	
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Abstract	
Immigration	 to	 Australia	 has	 long	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 negative	 political	 interest.	 In	 recent	
times,	 the	 proposal	 of	 exclusionary	 policies	 such	 as	 the	Malaysia	 Deal	 in	 2011	 has	 fuelled	
further	 debate.	 In	 these	 debates,	 Federal	 politicians	 often	 describe	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees	 as	 ‘illegal’,	 ‘queue	 jumpers’,	 and	 ‘boat	 people’.	 This	 paper	 investigates	 how	 the	
political	discourse	constructs	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	during	debates	surrounding	 the	
Malaysia	Deal	in	the	Federal	Parliament	of	Australia	in	2011.	Hansard	Parliamentary	debates	
were	analysed	 to	 identify	 the	underlying	 themes	and	constructions	 that	 permeate	political	
discourse	 about	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees.	 This	 paper	 argues	 that	 a	 dichotomous	
characterisation	of	legitimacy	pervades	their	construction	with	this	group	constructed	either	
as	 legitimate	 humanitarian	 refugees	 or	 as	 illegitimate	 ‘boat	 arrivals’.	 These	 constructions	
result	in	the	misrepresentation	of	asylum	seekers	as	illegitimate,	undermining	their	right	to	
protection	 under	 Australia’s	 laws	 and	 international	 obligations.	 This	 construction	 also	
represents	a	shift	in	federal	political	discourse	from	constructing	asylum	seekers	as	a	border	
or	security	threat,	towards	an	increasing	preoccupation	with	this	categorisation	of	people	as	
legitimate,	or	illegitimate.	
	
	
Introduction	
In	May	2011,	the	Australian	Prime	Minister	Julia	Gillard	announced	that	the	Australian	Federal	
Government	 had	 plans	 to	 strike	 a	 deal	 with	 the	Malaysian	 Government	 to	 swap	 800	 asylum	
seekers	 for	 4000	 refugees.	 The	 proposed	 ‘Malaysia	 Deal’	 was	 the	 latest	 in	 a	 long	 history	 of	
policies	designed	to	manage	the	arrival	of	‘irregular’	migrants	to	Australia.	The	White	Australia	
Policy1	saw	the	restriction	of	non‐European	migration	for	more	than	70	years	until	 the	1970s	
when	 the	 policy	 was	 formally	 abandoned	 (Crock	 and	 Berg	 2011:	 113;	 Grewcock	 2009).	
Following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Vietnam	 War,	 the	 arrival	 of	 more	 than	 50	 boats	 carrying	 asylum	
seekers	 from	 South	 East	 Asia	 prompted	 an	 increase	 in	 concern	 regarding	 people	 arriving	 by	
boat	and	as	a	result	the	term	‘boat	people’	emerged	in	the	media,	public	and	political	discourse	
(Grewcock	2009;	Phillips	and	Spinks	2011).	This	concern	and	anxiety	has	captured	the	attention	
of	 successive	 governments	 and	 resulted	 in	 the	 Federal	 Government’s	 introduction	 of	
restrictions	 and	 exclusionary	 measures	 towards	 unauthorised	 arrivals,	 most	 notably	 the	
establishment	 of	 mandatory	 detention	 for	 all	 unauthorised	 arrivals	 introduced	 under	 Prime	
Minister	Paul	Keating	in	1992	(Grewcock	2009;	Phillips	and	Spinks	2011).	The	last	two	decades	
have	 increasingly	 been	 characterised	 by	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 asylum	 seekers,	
crystallising	 around	 major	 events	 such	 as	 the	 Tampa	 Crisis2,	 and	 resulting	 in	 exclusionary	
political	 agendas	 and	 policies	 such	 as	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Pacific	 Solution3	 under	 former	
Prime	Minister	John	Howard	(Every	2006:	10).	
	
The	 proposed	 Malaysia	 Deal	 emerged	 within	 an	 ongoing	 maelstrom	 of	 public	 debate	 about	
asylum	 seekers,	 and	 sparked	 significant	 discussion	 in	 Federal	 Parliament.	While	 the	Malaysia	
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Deal	was	ultimately	declared	unconstitutional	by	the	High	Court	in	August	2011,	and	the	policy	
largely	 abandoned	 by	 the	 Labour	 Government,	 the	 parliamentary	 discourse	 surrounding	 this	
recent	 event	 offers	 significant	 insights	 into	 the	 social	 construction	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees	 in	 Australian	 politics.	 This	 paper	 examines	 Hansard	 transcripts	 of	 the	 Federal	
Parliamentary	 debates	 about	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal	 in	 both	 the	 Senate	 and	 House	 of	
Representatives.	 Specifically,	 the	 data	 collection	 was	 limited	 to	 the	 time	 period	 from	 1	 May	
2011,	 until	 1	October	 2011,	which	 included	 several	months	 of	 negotiation,	 the	 signing	 of	 the	
agreement	 on	 25	 July	 2011,	 and	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 High	 Court	 ruling	 declaring	 the	 swap	
invalid	and	unlawful.		
	
Previous	research	examining	the	constructions	of	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	in	Australia	has	
identified	that	notions	of	legitimacy,	illegality,	threats	to	national	identity	and	threats	to	border	
security	are	the	themes	dominating	public	discourse	(Grewcock	2009;	Klocker	and	Dunn	2003;	
O’Doherty	and	Augoustinos	2008;	Gale	2004).	In	particular,	politicians’	statements	in	the	media	
have	 previously	 been	 found	 to	 focus	 on	 these	 themes,	 and	 represent	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees	 as	 either	 legitimate	 or	 illegitimate	 (Pedersen,	 Attwell	 and	Heveli	 2005;	 Klocker	 and	
Dunn	2003;	Pedersen	et.	al.	2006).	
	
Questioning	whether	certain	groups	of	asylum	seekers	deserve	protection	and	resettlement	 is	
often	at	 the	 centre	of	 the	construction	of	 legitimacy,	while	nationalism	and	border	protection	
themes	are	evoked	in	order	to	construct	this	group	as	threatening	to	society.	While	all	of	these	
themes	 are	 evident	 in	 the	 parliamentary	 debates	 around	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal,	 we	 argue	 that	
notions	of	legitimacy	and	genuineness	have	come	to	dominate	the	discourse.	In	the	past,	debates	
on	issues	such	as	the	Tampa	focused	more	heavily	on	the	need	for	border	security,	which	may	
have	been	particularly	 resonant	with	 the	public	 in	an	 immediate	post	9/11	environment.	The	
discourse	 around	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal	 indicates	 that	 while	 concerns	 about	 national	 interest,	
identity,	and	border	protection	are	still	evident,	the	focus	has	begun	to	shift.		
	
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 argue	 that	 Parliament’s	 preoccupation	 with	 legitimacy	 has	 led	 to	 the	
construction	 of	 implicit	 criteria	 through	 which	 legitimacy	 is	 determined.	 This	 results	 in	 the	
establishment	of	a	dichotomy	of	asylum	seekers	as	either	 legitimate	humanitarian	refugees	or	
illegitimate	‘boat	arrivals’,	based	on	their	mode	of	arrival,	their	respect	for	the	‘queue’,	and	their	
ability	to	pay	to	secure	a	new	life	in	Australia.		
	
Labelling	‘Legitimate’	Asylum	Seekers	and	Refugees	
The	 issue	 of	 asylum	 claims	 and	 resettlement	 is	 an	 intensely	 political	 issue	 in	 the	 Australian	
context,	 with	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 consistently	 labelled	 using	 stereotypical	 and	
deceptive	 language	 by	 the	media	 and	 politics,	 particularly	 since	 the	Tampa	 incident	 in	 2001	
(Klocker	2004:	3;	Mares	2002a;	Klocker	and	Dunn	2003;	Pickering	2001).	Political	and	public	
concerns	 about	 immigration	 have	 centred	 on	 who	 is	 coming	 to	 this	 country,	 how	 they	 are	
arriving,	and	for	what	reasons	(Crock	and	Berg	2011:	3).	There	is	also	an	overt	focus	on	their	
religion,	ethnicity,	and	reasons	for	seeking	asylum	leading	to	misrepresentations	(Mares	2002a;	
Klocker	2004).		
	
Pickering	 (2001)	 argues	 that	 the	 language	 used	 in	 relation	 to	 asylum	 seeker	 and	 refugees	 is	
most	 often	 binary	 in	 nature.	 The	 use	 of	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘genuine’	 versus	 ‘non‐genuine’,	 ‘legal’	
versus	 ‘illegal’,	 and	 ‘refugees’	 versus	 ‘boat	 people’	 contribute	 to	 a	 delineation	 between	 two	
groups	of	people.	The	use	of	 such	 language	polarises	 the	 issue	of	asylum	seeking	and	 refugee	
determination	(Pickering	2001:	172).	The	choice	of	these	terms	over	more	accurate	terms	such	
as	 ‘asylum	 seeker’	 and	 ‘refugee’,	 can	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 depictions	 as	 they	 are	
misleading	and	hostile	(Klocker	2004:	3).		
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The	1951	United	Nations	(UN)	Convention	relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees	defines	‘refugees’	
as	a	person	who	 ‘owing	to	well‐founded	fear	of	being	persecuted	 for	reasons	of	race,	 religion,	
nationality,	membership	of	a	particular	social	group	or	political	opinion,	is	outside	the	country	
of	his	nationality’	and	is	unwilling	or	unable	to	‘avail	himself	of	the	protection	of	that	country’,	
or	return	to	this	country	for	fear	of	persecution	(UNHCR	2010;	Karlsen	2011:	3;	Phillips	2011:	
2).	An	asylum	seeker	is	an	individual	who	is	seeking	protection	and	their	refugee	status	is	yet	to	
be	determined	(Phillips	2011:	2).	Asylum	seekers	may	enter	Australia	without	a	valid	visa	and	
the	Refugee	Convention	prohibits	states	from	penalising	and	criminalising	those	who	are	fleeing	
persecution.	Most	notably,	in	the	Australian	context	there	is	no	law	that	criminalises	the	act	of	
arriving	without	a	valid	visa	for	the	purposes	of	seeking	asylum	(ASRC	2011;	Phillips	2011:	3).	
Irregular	maritime	arrival	(IMA)	is	the	most	accurate	term	when	referring	to	those	travelling	to	
Australia	by	boat,	due	to	the	clandestine	nature	of	their	transit.	Conversely,	offshore	arrivals	or	
applicants	are	those	who	reside	in	overseas	refugees	camps	pending	relocation	to	Australia.		
	
The	 analysis	 of	 the	 Parliamentary	 debates	 on	 matters	 related	 to	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal	 revealed	
considerable	 inconsistency	 and	 variety	 in	 the	 terms	 and	 language	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 asylum	
seekers	 and	 refugees	 in	 Federal	 Parliament.	 The	 most	 frequent	 misleading	 and	
misrepresentative	terms	used	in	the	political	debate	were	‘illegal	arrivals’,	 ‘genuine	refugee/s’,	
‘boat	people’,	 and	 ‘queue	 jumper/s’	or	 simply	 ‘queue’.	The	analysis	 revealed	a	construction	of	
two	distinct	groups	of	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	emerging	through	the	use	of	terms	such	as	
‘genuine’	 and	 ‘illegal’,	 perpetuating	 the	 dichotomous	 construction	 of	 legitimacy.	 The	 term	
‘genuine’	was	 consistently	 used	 in	 order	 to	make	 the	 distinction	 between	 irregular	maritime	
arrivals	 (IMAs)	and	offshore	applicants,	ultimately	constructing	two	distinct	groups	of	asylum	
seekers	 and	 refugees.	 Similarly,	 politicians	 in	 Federal	 Parliament	 used	 the	 term	 ‘illegal’	 in	
reference	to	irregular	maritime	arrivals	to	contrast	this	group	against	offshore	applicants.	This	
consistent	 depiction	 of	 two	 separate	 and	 distinct	 groups	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 theme	 of	
legitimacy,	 such	 that	 those	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘non‐genuine’	 and	 ‘illegal’	 asylum	 seekers	 are	
constructed	as	illegitimate.		
	
Despite	it	not	being	illegal	to	arrive	in	Australia	without	a	valid	visa	and	subsequently	apply	for	
asylum	(Pedersen	et	al.	2006),	IMAs	were	continuously	depicted	as	‘illegal’	in	the	Parliamentary	
debates	in	2011;	for	example	Leader	of	the	Opposition,	the	Honourable	Tony	Abbott	MP	stated:		
	
…	we	have	had	241	boats	and	12,000	 illegal	 arrivals.	…	Since	 the	Malaysia	people	
swap	 was	 announced	 we	 have	 had	 more	 than	 1,000	 illegal	 arrivals.	 Since	 it	 was	
signed	we	have	had	400	illegal	arrivals.	(House	September	22,	2011)4	
	
Prime	Minister	Gillard	also	demonstrates	this	dichotomous	construction	by	evoking	an	image	of	
a	 ‘non‐genuine’	 refugee	 with	 the	 use	 of	 binary	 language	 constructing	 offshore	 applicants	 as	
more	‘genuine’:	
	
As	 part	 of	 that	 transfer	 agreement,	 we	 would	 bring	 to	 Australia	 people	 who	 are	
genuine	 refugees,	who	 are	 processed	 in	Malaysia	 and	who	 are	 already	 there	 now	
and	are	waiting	a	resettlement	opportunity.	(House	May	23,	2011)	
	
The	 Australian	 Government	 has	 a	 history	 of	 constructing	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 as	
illegitimate	and	unlawful,	with	policy	responses	endorsing	 the	notion	of	 ‘illegitimate	refugees’	
(Grewcock	2009:	9).	Between	1989	and	1998	the	official	representations	of	‘legitimate’	asylum	
seekers	and	refugees	were	narrowed	when	the	Government	introduced	offshore	processing	and	
mandatory	detention	of	 ‘unlawful	non‐citizens’	 (Grewcock	2009:	120).	The	Australian	Federal	
Government	detained	those	considered	‘unlawful’	(without	a	valid	visa)	in	detention	centres	in	
excised	Australian	territory	or	even	in	other	countries	(Mares	2002a:	5).	Contrastingly,	asylum	
seekers	who	entered	Australia	‘lawfully’,	usually	via	tourist	or	student	visas,	were	not	detained	
and	were	able	to	live	in	the	community	(Mares	2002a:	5).	
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The	 construction	 of	 a	 particular	 group	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 as	 ‘illegal’	 and	 ‘non‐
genuine’	 found	 during	 this	 current	 analysis	 is	 consistent	 with	 past	 research	 (Saxton	 2003;	
Klocker	and	Dunn	2003;	Pedersen	et	al.	2006).	The	political	construction	of	asylum	seekers	as	
‘non‐genuine’	and	‘illegal’	disconnects	the	asylum	seekers	from	the	reasons	for	seeking	asylum.	
Instead	of	 highlighting	 the	need	 for	protection	of	 asylum	seekers,	 the	 ‘illegal’	 label	 applied	 to	
them	 criminalises	 their	 actions	 and	 positions	 them	 as	 a	 threat.	 Furthermore,	 this	 distinction	
between	IMAs	and	those	processed	in	overseas	refugees’	camps	informs	the	significant	negative	
attitudes	towards	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	in	the	Australian	public	and	politics	(Pedersen	et	
al.	 2006:	 106).	 The	 need	 to	 seek	 asylum	 from	 persecution	 and	 threat,	 as	 the	motivation	 for	
irregular	migration,	is	no	longer	associated	with	those	constructed	as	‘illegal’	and	‘illegitimate’.	
Rather,	 Federal	 politicians	 construct	 this	 group	 as	 a	 threat	 due	 to	 their	 perceived	 illegality	
(Every	 2006:	 24)	 as	well	 as	 threatening	 to	 the	 interests	 and	 livelihood	 of	 ‘genuine’	 refugees.	
Such	 negative	 connotations	 toward	 IMA’s	 further	 enhance	 offshore	 applicants’	 perceived	
legitimacy	(Lynn	and	Lea	2003:	432).	
	
The	 Parliamentary	 discourse	 constructed	 two	 separate	 categories	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 through	
the	positioning	of	IMAs	as	‘illegal’	and	a	threat	to	‘genuine’	refugees.	Moreover,	these	categories	
seemed	 to	 be	 determined	 through	 discussions	 on	 the	mode	 of	 arrival	 of	 asylum	 seekers,	 the	
notion	 of	 a	 ‘queue’,	 and	 the	wealth	 of	 irregular	 arrivals,	 thus	 creating	 implicit	 criteria,	which	
were	used	to	delineate	some	asylum	seekers	as	legitimate,	and	others	as	illegitimate.	
	
Mode	of	Arrival	
‘Boat	 people’	 is	 a	 term	 often	 used	 to	 describe	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 who	 arrive	 in	
Australia	 by	 boat.	 Throughout	 the	 Parliamentary	 discussions	 held	 during	 2011,	 Federal	
politicians	 frequently	 used	 the	 term	 ‘boat	 people’	 to	 distinguish	 between	 IMAs	 and	 offshore	
applicants.	 Comparable	 to	 the	 use	 of	 ‘genuine’	 and	 ‘illegal’,	 the	 term	 ‘boat	 people’	 creates	 an	
image	of	two	distinct	groups	of	people	seeking	resettlement	in	Australia	and	demonstrates	the	
overwhelming	focus	on	this	mode	of	arrival.	An	example	of	this	occurred	throughout	a	speech	
by	Abbott	debating	the	Malaysia	Deal.	Abbott	did	not	use	the	terms	‘asylum	seeker’	and	‘refugee’	
once,	 with	 ‘boat	 people’	 the	 dominant	 term	 used	 to	 describe	 asylums	 seekers	 and	 refugees	
travelling	by	boat:	
	
When	it	comes	to	border	protection,	the	Prime	Minister	firstly	announced	that	she	
would	be	 sending	boat	people	 to	East	Timor.	She	made	 this	announcement	before	
the	 East	 Timorese	 government	 even	 knew	 about	 it.	 Then	 the	 Prime	 Minister	
announced	that	she	would	be	sending	boat	people	 to	Manus	 Island.	She	made	this	
announcement	before	the	PNG	government	had	agreed	to	it.	Finally,	on	the	Saturday	
before	the	budget	and	in	a	state	of	desperation	over	the	constant	flow	of	boats	to	our	
borders,	she	rushed	out	–	gazumping	the	Treasurer's	own	budget	–	and	announced	
that	boat	people	would	be	sent	to	Malaysia.	(House	June	14,	2011)	
	
The	term	‘boat	people’	delegitimises	the	legal	entitlements	and	rights	to	asylum	of	this	group	of	
people	and	depicts	this	group	solely	through	their	association	with	boat	travel	(O’Doherty	and	
Augoustinos	 2008:	 581).	 In	 addition,	 this	 language	 challenges	 the	 status	 and	 legitimacy	 of	
asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 who	 arrive	 by	 boat	 (Pickering	 2001:	 183).	 Coalition	 Senator	
Mathias	Cormann	further	demonstrates	this	fixation	on	an	individual’s	mode	of	arrival:	
	
The	 Prime	Minister	 used	 to	 say	 that	 detaining	 boat	 people	 on	 Pacific	 islands	was	
‘costly,	unsustainable’	and	wrong	in	principle.	…	She	used	to	insist	that	boat	people	
couldn't	be	sent	to	Nauru	because	Nauru	wasn't	a	signatory	to	the	UN	convention	on	
refugees.	 Last	 Saturday	 she	 announced	 that	 800	 boat	 people	 would	 be	 sent	 to	
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Malaysia,	which	isn't	a	signatory	either,	and	that	4000	of	Malaysia's	arrivals	would	
come	here.	(Senate	May	12,	2011)	
	
Research	 done	 by	 O’Doherty	 and	 Lecouteur	 (2007)	 has	 suggested	 that	 the	 inconsistency	 in	
language	and	terms	used	to	describe	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	will	cause	blurring	between	
these	various	terms.	Subsequently,	this	blurring	may	result	in	the	political	and	social	acceptance	
of	 the	 various	 misleading	 terms	 describing	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 (O’Doherty	 and	
Lecouteur	2007:	10).	Additionally,	the	hostile	political	rhetoric	emerging	during	the	discussion	
and	 debates	 of	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal	 in	 2011	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 create	 negative	 and	 deviant	
images	of	a	group	of	people	who	are	seeking	help	and	protection	in	Australia	(Gatt	2011:	215).	
	
	
Jumping	the	Queue	
Delineating	 legitimacy	according	to	the	mode	of	arrival	of	asylum	seekers	 is	directly	 linked	to	
the	idea	of	a	‘queue’	in	the	application	and	acceptance	process	for	refugees.	In	public	debate,	the	
political	 discourse	 often	 constructs	 the	 ‘queue’	 as	 a	 concrete	 entity	 that	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees	should	join	in	order	to	be	resettled	to	another	country	(Grewcock	2009;	Mares	2002b).	
The	 current	 analysis	 revealed	 that	 the	 image	 of	 the	 ‘queue’	 is	 connected	 with	 notions	 of	
genuineness,	 such	 that	 those	who	 join	 the	 ‘queue’	 are	 ‘genuine’	 asylum	seekers	 and	 refugees.	
Alternatively,	 IMAs	are	depicted	as	 ‘non‐genuine’	because	they	acted	 in	the	wrong	way	by	not	
joining	the	‘queue’.	By	using	this	language	Federal	Parliamentarians	are	constructing	‘good’	and	
‘bad’	asylum	seekers	and	refugees:	
	
The	message	 to	people	smugglers	and	 to	asylum	seekers	would	be	 that	 if	you	 risk	
your	life	and	spend	your	money	on	getting	on	a	boat	trying	to	come	to	Australia,	you	
risk	being	 taken	 to	Malaysia	and	being	put	 to	 the	back	of	 the	queue.	Malaysia	 is	a	
country	 with	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	 refugees	who	 have	 genuine	 claims	which	 have	
been	processed	and	with	no	prospect	of	resettlement.	(Gillard,	House	May	10,	2011)	
	
These	depictions	were	prevalent	in	the	Parliamentary	discourse,	with	politicians	from	both	the	
governing	 Labour	 Party	 and	 Opposition	 Liberal	 National	 Coalition	 Party	 consistently	
emphasising	 the	 importance	of	 the	 ‘queue’,	 ‘waiting’	 and	orderliness	of	 the	migration	 system.	
The	analysis	revealed	that	the	political	discourse	constructed	offshore	applicants	as	adhering	to	
the	 ‘organised	 and	 balanced	 system	 of	 migration’	 and	 appropriately	 ‘waiting’	 in	 the	 ‘queue’	
(Marles,	 House	 September	 22,	 2011).	 Contrastingly,	 IMAs	 are	 constructed	 as	 bypassing	 this	
proper	process	and	seeking	asylum	through	 inappropriate	channels.	Federal	Parliamentarians	
often	 contrasted	 these	 two	 groups	 of	 people	 against	 each	 other	 during	 the	discussions	of	 the	
Malaysia	 Deal.	 Coalition	 Senator	 Back	 demonstrates	 the	 delegitimisation	 of	 those	 considered	
‘queue	jumpers’:	
	
…	 people	who	 have	 been	 through	 the	 UNHCR	 process,	 the	 very	 people	who	 have	
been	 accepted	 as	 humanitarian	 refugees	 to	 come	 to	 Australia,	 are	 languishing	 in	
refugee	 camps	 in	Africa,	Asia	and	elsewhere,	whilst	others	 jump	 the	queue.	 In	 the	
event	that	these	people	are	genuine,	let	them	be	processed	in	the	genuine	way	and	
let	them	join	the	queue	–	but	at	the	end	of	the	queue.	(Senate	June	16,	2011)	
	
In	 this	 statement,	 Back	 constructs	 an	 image	 of	 two	 distinct	 groups	 of	 people,	 ‘legitimate’	
offshore	applicants	and	‘illegitimate’	IMAs.	‘Waiting’	in	refugee	a	camp	overseas	is	consistently	
constructed	as	the	only	legitimate	way	of	seeking	asylum	and	resettlement	in	Australia	(Mares	
2002a;	Phillips	2011;	Grewcock	2009:	119).	
	
The	 concept	 of	 a	 ‘queue’	 is	 used	 constantly	 in	 discussions	 on	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees,	
designed	to	represent	a	tangible	and	orderly	entity	that	is	joined	by	‘legitimate’	asylum	seekers	
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and	refugees	(Grewcock	2009:	130;	Every	2006:	173).	The	‘queue’	is	constructed	as	an	impartial	
decision	 making	 process	 which	 is	 unaffected	 by	 social	 and	 economic	 characteristics	 of	
individuals	 (Every	 2006:	 173;	 Gelber	 2003:	 25).	 As	 was	 found	 in	 this	 analysis	 of	 the	
Parliamentary	discourse,	an	individual’s	deservedness	of	resettlement	to	Australia	is	dependent	
on	their	place	and	preparedness	to	wait	in	the	‘queue’,	and	not	on	their	ethnicity,	class,	gender,	
health	or	level	of	fear	(Gelber	2003:	25).	The	consistent	emphasis	on	‘waiting’	and	the	‘queue’	in	
Australian	 political	 discourse	 during	 discussions	 of	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	
wider	body	of	 literature	suggesting	that	 IMAs	are	often	constructed	as	different	from	offshore	
applicants	in	terms	of	their	status	as	‘legitimate	asylum	seekers’	(Grewcock	2009;	Gelber	2003;	
Every	2006;	Pedersen	et	al.	2006;	Every	and	Augoustinos	2008).		
	
Ability	to	Pay	
A	 third	 implicit	 criterion	 for	 legitimacy	established	 in	 the	construction	of	asylum	seekers	and	
refugees	concerned	the	wealth	of	arrivals,	resting	on	the	assumption	that	only	those	considered	
to	 be	 poor	 were	 ‘genuine’	 refugees.	 Federal	 parliamentarians	 from	 the	 two	 major	 parties	
consistently	questioned	whether	IMAs	were	‘legitimate’	refugees	by	depicting	them	as	‘wealthy’	
individuals,	 highlighting	 their	 ability	 to	 pay	 people	 smugglers	 for	 passage	 to	 Australia,	 while	
asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 who	 cannot	 afford	 to	 pay	 were	 constructed	 as	 ‘legitimate’	 and	
more	 deserving	 of	 protection.	 For	 example,	 the	 Leader	 of	 the	 Opposition	 in	 the	 Senate,	 the	
Honourable	 Eric	 Abetz	 uses	 the	 notion	 of	 payment	 to	 delegitimise	 IMAs	 and	 increase	 the	
legitimacy	of	those	in	refugee	camps	overseas:	
	
We	heard	 from	 the	Greens	 that	we	are	dealing	with	allegedly	 the	most	vulnerable	
people,	those	who	are	paying	literally	thousands	and	thousands	of	dollars	to	people‐
smugglers	to	come	to	Australia.	They	freely	enter	Indonesia,	they	travel	there	freely	
with	 no	 problems	 at	 all	 and	 then	 pay	 a	 criminal	 people‐smuggler	 to	 get	 them	 to	
Australia,	having	thousands	of	dollars	at	their	disposal.	(Senate	September	21,	2011)	
	
By	using	the	words	‘allegedly’,	‘freely’,	‘rich’,	and	‘force’,	Abetz	is	questioning	the	vulnerability	of	
IMAs	 because	 they	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 pay	 people	 smugglers	 to	 facilitate	 their	 journey	 to	
Australia.	Abetz	 simultaneously	 constructs	 offshore	 applicants	 as	 ‘legitimate’	 because	 they	do	
not	 pay	 for	 passage.	 Labor	MP	Chris	Bowen	 again	demonstrates	 the	delegitimisation	 of	 IMAs	
through	the	distinction	between	those	who	pay	people	smugglers	and	those	who	do	not:		
	
Five	to	one	is	a	very	good	outcome	because	it	means	that	Australia	is	resettling	more	
people	who	have	been	waiting	a	very	 long	time	in	difficult	circumstances	and	who	
do	 not	 have	 the	 money	 or	 the	 inclination	 to	 get	 on	 a	 boat.	 They	 should	 not	 be	
forgotten	in	this	debate.	These	are	the	forgotten	people	of	this	debate…	(House	May	
15,	2011)	
	
What	 is	 occurring	 in	 the	 Federal	 political	 discourse,	 through	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 supposed	
wealth	 of	 IMAs,	 is	 the	 construction	 of	 two	 distinct	 groups	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees:	
legitimate	 and	 illegitimate.	 ‘Legitimate’	 asylum	 seekers	 are	 those	 who	 cannot	 afford	 to	 pay	
people	smugglers	 to	 facilitate	their	 journey	 to	Australia	and	 languish	 in	horrible	conditions	 in	
overseas	refugees	camps.	 ‘Illegitimate’	asylum	seekers	are	wealthy	individuals	who	use	this	to	
their	advantage	to	travel	to	Australia	 ‘unlawfully’.	Notably,	this	focus	on	wealth	was	limited	to	
discussions	on	irregular	maritime	arrivals,	attaching	another	layer	of	illegitimacy	to	this	group.	
Federal	parliamentarians	never	discussed	the	wealth	of	offshore	applicants	and	other	types	of	
onshore	arrivals,	for	example,	those	arriving	by	plane.		
	
The	 implication	of	 this	construction	 is	 that	 IMAs	are	perceived	as	acting	unfairly,	 and	gaining	
unwarranted	 advantage	 (Every	 and	 Augoustinos	 2008:	 574).	 Those	 who	 have	 the	 ability	 to	
approach	people	smugglers	may	be	more	 fortunate	 in	some	ways	 than	those	who	cannot	pay,	
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but	 this	does	not	necessarily	 increase	 their	 sense	of	 safety,	 reduce	 their	vulnerability	or	 their	
legitimacy	as	an	asylum	seeker	(Mares	2002a).	Through	emphasising	an	individual’s	ability	to	
pay	 their	 way	 to	 Australia	 via	 people	 smugglers,	 Federal	 parliamentarians	 from	 the	 major	
political	parties	are	creating	an	image	of	wealthy	asylum	seekers.	This	perception	of	wealth	is	
juxtaposed	against	 the	widely	held	 image	of	poverty,	persecution	and	suffering	that	causes	an	
individual	to	originally	seek	asylum	(Crisp	2003:	75).	A	dichotomy	is	thus	created	where	‘good’	
asylum	seekers	and	refugees	are	those	that	are	resettled	from	overseas	and	did	not	bypass	the	
formal	system,	and	‘bad’	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	are	those	that	travel	to	Australia	“under	
their	own	steam”	(Mares	2002a:	25).	
	
Conclusion	
Throughout	 discussions	 on	 asylum	 seeking	 and	 refugees	 held	 in	 Federal	 Parliament	
surrounding	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal,	 their	 categorisation	 as	 belonging	 to	 two	 distinct	 groups,	
legitimate	 or	 illegitimate,	 dominated	 the	 political	 discourse.	 The	 use	 of	 inaccurate	 and	
misleading	 language	 labelling	 some	 asylum	 seekers	 as	 ‘illegal’,	 and	 others	 as	 ‘genuine’,	
perpetuated	this	construction.	The	application	of	these	 labels	was	determined	according	to	an	
implicit	criteria	based	on	 the	mode	of	arrival	of	asylum	seekers,	 their	place	 in	 the	queue,	and	
their	ability	to	pay	for	their	passage	to	Australia.		
	
Through	 Parliamentary	 debates,	 the	 Australian	 Federal	 Government	 has	 conveyed	 a	message	
that	the	only	‘good’	and	‘genuine’	asylum	seeker	or	refugee	is	one	that	is	rescued	from	a	UNHCR	
camp,	while	 ignoring	the	 legitimacy	of	those	who	flee	persecution	and	seek	asylum	and	arrive	
onshore	irregularly	(Green	2003:	9).	The	term	‘illegal’	was	most	often	linked	with	boats,	further	
delegitimising	 this	 mode	 of	 arrival	 and	 the	 people	 who	 travel	 this	 way	 but	 Federal	
parliamentarians	 also	 used	 this	 term	 to	 represent	 ‘queue	 jumpers’	 and	 those	 who	 have	 the	
ability	to	pay	people	smugglers	to	facilitate	their	journey	to	Australia	by	boat.	By	depicting	IMAs	
as	 illegal,	 Federal	 parliamentarians	 are	 also	 creating	 an	 image	 of	 an	 alternative	 and	 distinct	
group	of	people	who	are	portrayed	as	‘legal’.		
	
These	 informal	 criteria	 for	 determining	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 bears	
little	 relation	 to	 the	 actual	 criteria	 by	 which	 refugee	 status	 are	 granted.	 While	 it	 is	 widely	
acknowledged	that	it	is	not	illegal	to	seek	asylum,	nor	is	it	illegal	to	travel	to	this	country	in	an	
irregular	manner	to	do	so,	Australian	Federal	politicians	continue	to	create	a	perception	to	the	
contrary.	 Through	 repeated	 references	 to	 ‘queue	 jumpers’,	 and	 the	 suggestion	 that	 only	 poor	
people	can	be	victims	of	political	persecution,	Federal	politicians	further	delegitimise	those	who	
arrive	by	boat.	 In	 this	discourse,	politicians	are	guilty	of	applying	their	own	exclusionary	pre‐
conditions	for	legitimacy,	and	establishing	a	false	dichotomy	in	which	only	some	people	fleeing	
persecution	deserve	protection.		
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 The	 ‘White	 Australia’	 policy	 refers	 to	 historical	 immigration	 policies	 that	 favoured	 immigrants	 from	 certain	
countries.	 Under	 this	 policy	 only	 Europeans	 and	 more	 specifically,	 northern	 Europeans	 could	 immigrate	 to	
Australia,	with	the	intention	of	promoting	a	homogenous	population	(Crock	and	Berg	2011;	DIAC	2009).		
2		 In	August	2001	the	Howard	Government	refused	a	Norwegian	freighter,	the	MS	Tampa	carrying	over	400	rescued	
asylum	seekers,	entry	 to	Australian	waters	 (Phillips	and	Spinks	2011).	This	 resulted	 in	a	 standoff	between	 the	
Norwegian	 freighter,	 the	 Norwegian	 Government	 and	 the	 Australian	 Government,	 ending	 with	 Australian	 SAS	
troops	boarding	the	Tampa	and	taking	control	of	the	ship	(Phillips	and	Spinks	2011;	O’Doherty	and	Augoustinos	
2008,	577)	
3		 The	Pacific	solution	allowed	some	of	Australia’s	territory	to	be	excised	from	the	migration	zone	to	deter	asylum	
seekers	and	refugees	 from	arriving	on‐shore	unlawfully,	and	 implemented	offshore	processing	 in	 these	excised	
nations	(Phillips	and	Spinks	2011,	13)	
4		 Australian	Federal	Parliament	House	of	Representatives	Hansard,	September	22,	2011.	
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Abstract	
In	the	last	decade	there	have	been	great	strides	taken	in	making	courts	and	judicial	processes	
less	intimidating	for	those	who	come	into	them,	principally	through	the	provision	of	CCTV	(to	
enable	 evidence‐giving	 from	 remote	 rooms),	 volunteer	 court	 visitor	 information	 services,	
victim	assistance	programs,	duty	solicitors	offering	legal	aid,	and	training	of	court	staff.	Good	
security	 science,	 too,	 has	 made	 courts	 more	 secure,	 physically,	 for	 those	 who	 visit	 them.	
Whether	 security	 services	 have	 been	 drawn	 from	 a	 sheriff’s	 department	 or	 have	 been	
contracted	 ‘in’,	 the	 end	 result	 has	 been	 a	 strong	 (and	 growing)	 emphasis	 upon	 risk	
management	of	 courts	 and	 the	 safety	 of	 those	who	enter	 them.	After	 all,	 governments	 and	
courts	have	a	 responsibility	 to	protect	 those	who	work	 in,	 or	who	visit,	 court	precincts,	 as	
visitors,	as	clients	or	as	administrative	or	legal	professionals.	But	the	upshot	of	this	is	to	paint	
a	general	picture	of	defendants	as	security	risks.	The	question	thus	arises:	to	what	extent	is	it	
possible	 to	 secure	 courtrooms	 to	 an	 optimal	 degree	 without	 jeopardising	 the	 important	
feature	of	 curial	 ‘openness’?	By	examining	 the	way	 in	which	courts	now	operate	on	a	daily	
basis	 around	 Australia,	 and	 by	 looking	 at	 some	 new	 ideas	 regarding	 court	 structure	 and	
processes,	this	paper	seeks	to	answer	this	enduring	question.	
	
	
Introduction	
Developments	in	security	awareness,	risk	assessment	and	safety	preparedness	have	come	about	
in	 response	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 courtrooms	 and	 their	 environs	 are	 dangerous	 places	 (Sarre	 and	
Prenzler	 2012).	 For	 example,	 there	 are	 each	 month,	 on	 average,	 three	 hundred	 ‘security	
incidents’	in	NSW	courts	(NSW	Attorney‐General	2009).	There	is,	thus,	in	Australian	courts,	an	
ever‐present	threat	to	the	safety	of	judicial	officers,	court	staff,	litigants,	legal	aid	officers,	court	
volunteers,	 the	 public	 and	 accused	 persons	 on	 trial.	 There	 is,	 concomitantly,	 a	 moral	 duty	
resting	on	 the	state	 to	ensure	 that	 the	courts	are	operated	 in	such	a	manner	as	 to	prevent	or	
forestall	harm	to	anyone	in	or	around	them.	Indeed,	there	are	legal	risks	associated	with	poor	
security,	 namely	 potential	 civil	 liabilities	 attached	 to	 any	 government	 that	 does	 not	 secure	
persons	adequately	while	they	are	in	courtrooms	or	court	precincts	(Sarre	and	Prenzler	2012).		
	
There	 are	 three	 discernible	 ways	 that	 courts’	 departments	 (and	 the	 government	 ministers	
responsible	for	them)	have	undertaken	the	task	of	assessing	and	alleviating	risk.		
	
The	 first	 is	 improving	 the	 process	 of	 collecting	 data	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 information	 used	 in	
decision‐making,	whether	that	involves	a	focus	upon	security	levels,	processes	(such	as	prisoner	
transfer	 and	 security	 screening),	 placement	 of	 witnesses	 and	 families,	 judicial	 officers,	 and	
prosecutors.	This	can	be	referred	to	as	‘intelligence’.	
	
The	second	 is	 the	organisation	of	court	spaces,	which	become	the	 focus	of	attention	after	any	
security	breakdown.	This	 involves	 separating	warring	 factions,	having	 suitable	 entrances	 and	
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exits,	having	a	flexible	range	of	rooms	available,	and	protecting	magistrates	or	jurors	from	being	
spat	at	or	insulted.	There	is	growing	evidence	that	particular	layouts	of	courts	improve	comfort,	
access,	and	feelings	of	protection	and	safety.	This	can	be	referred	to	under	the	rubric	‘design’.	
	
The	third	is	a	focus	upon	staff	training	and	management,	detailing,	for	example,	how	court	users	
move	 through	 a	 building	 and	 into	 and	 out	 of	 courts	 or	 what	 they	 may	 require	 to	 feel	 less	
anxious.	This	can	be	referred	to	as	‘process’.	
	
Each	of	these	issues	was	examined	in	a	qualitative	study	that	was	completed	by	a	research	team	
in	2012.	The	authors	have	been	a	part	of	this	research	project	investigating	how	court	safety	in	
Australia	could	be	enhanced	by	managing	people,	processes	and	places.1		
	
Methodology	
Several	 methods	 were	 used	 in	 this	 study,	 including	 activity	 maps	 (tracing	 flows	 of	 people	
through	 court	 spaces	 across	 the	 day),	 analysis	 of	 incident	 reports,	 interviews	 with	 key	
informants	 and	 user	 juries	 (groups	 of	 advocates	 walked	 around	 courts,	 recording	 their	
impressions	and	comparing	notes	in	a	debrief).	This	paper	draws	on	the	third	of	these	sources,	
interviews	with	 registry	staff,	 security	officers	and	victim	support	officers	 in	 the	participating	
jurisdictions.	
	
The	data	collected	from	these	interviews	provided	information	from	those	who	have	knowledge	
and	experience	of	the	court	environment,	its	historical	and	cultural	contexts,	specific	encounters	
and	 different	 types	 of	 court	 users	 and	 personnel.	 It	 provides	 a	 useful	 insight	 into	 the	 way	
security	and	safety	issues	are	understood	by	those	at	the	front	line	of	service	delivery.	
	
Findings:	Intelligence	
Four	safety	and	security	aspects	were	identified	as	most	important	to	addressing	and	managing	
risk:	i)	improving	the	communication	and	the	sharing	of	information	across	security	personnel	
within	courts	and	across	jurisdictions	and	states;	ii)	security	personnel	working	collaboratively	
and	cooperatively	with	court	staff	and	the	judiciary	on	‘safety	planning’;	iii)	encouraging	more	
thorough	 reporting	 of	 critical	 incidents;	 and	 iv)	 implementing	 proactive	 (not	 just	 reactive)	
approaches	to	reducing	or	avoiding	incidents	in	or	around	the	courts.		
	
The	 aim	 of	 improving	 communication	 and	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 across	 security	
personnel	 involve	 developing	 better	 technologies	 and	 systems	 for	 data	 collection	 and	
dissemination,	 employing	 specialised	 security	 analysts	 to	 assess	 the	data	 collected,	 as	well	 as	
establishing	strategic	and	coordinated	security	across	all	court	jurisdictions.	In	Victoria,	this	last	
objective	has	required	the	formation	of	a	court	security	operations	committee	with	operations	
managers	 from	 each	 jurisdiction	 represented,	 along	 with	 representatives	 from	 the	 police,	
corrections,	the	Judicial	College	of	Australia	and	others	deemed	appropriate	to	discuss	security	
strategies.	Similar	meetings	among	state	representatives	was	said	 to	be	 important	not	only	to	
establish	Australian	standards	for	court	safety	and	security	but	to	also	share	information	about	
how	each	security	unit	responds	to	or	prevent	incidents	and	risks.		
	
One	of	the	reasons	given	for	the	importance	of	developing	better	communication	methods	and	
security	 strategies	 arises	 from	 the	 fundamental	 differences	 between	 state	 and	 criminal	 and	
family	or	federal	 law	courts	(Security	officer	2012).	A	one	policy	or	 ‘one	size	fits	all’	approach	
was	said	to	be	inappropriate	and	ignore	the	complexity	of	the	justice	system	and	the	different	
degree	or	type	of	security	required:	
	
Security	–	it’s	multi‐jurisdictional	…	there's	a	lot	of	spread	there	in	terms	of	security	
issues	and	safety	issues	…	along	with	the	resources.	There	are	flagship	buildings	like	
this	[the	Federal	Family	Court]	at	the	higher	end	and	then	a	circuit	in	a	country	town	
Rick	Sarre,	Alikki	Vernon	
184	 Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013	
where	 there's	 no	 security	 guarding	 presence	 at	 all,	 so	 that's	 quite	 a	 challenge	 to	
cater	 for	 all	 of	 these	 issues	 and	 responsibilities	 across	 the	board.	 (Security	 officer	
2012)	
	
This	 perspective	 ties	 in	 with	 security	 personnel	 wanting	 to	 work	 collaboratively	 and	
cooperatively	with	 court	 staff	 and	 the	 judiciary	 on	 ‘safety	 planning’.	 This	 involves	 court	 staff	
providing	 information	to	security,	reporting	on	 incidents	or	possible	risks,	and	understanding	
the	role	security	can	have	in	improving	the	operations	of	the	court.		
Related	themes	emerged	from	interviews	with	court	staff.	They	also	expressed	the	relevance	of	
working	with	 security	 personnel	 and	managing	 information	 appropriately	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	
court	users’	security	and	safety:	
	
From	there	we	developed	our	security	database,	so	when	we	make	a	security	plan,	
we	 then	sent	a	copy	of	 that	plan	 to	security.	So	 if	we’d	gotten	 [a	 client]	coming	 in	
tomorrow	 and	 she	needs	 a	 secure	 escort	 and	we’re	 putting	 her	 in	 a	 secure	 room,	
they	have	all	of	 that	notification	sent	 to	 them	as	 soon	as	we’ve	made	a	plan.	…We	
also	 sent	 it	 to	 what	 we’d	 call	 the	 event	 owners.	 An	 event	 owner	 is	 a	 court	 staff	
member	 who	 could	 be	 dealing	 with	 that	 issue.	 It	 could	 be	 one	 of	 our	 family	
consultants,	 if	 it	was	 a	 children’s	matter	 or	 it	 could	 be	 a	 post	 coordinator	who	 is	
assisting	in	the	management	of	the	matter	that’s	going	before	a	judicial	officer.	…	A	
copy	of	that	plan	goes	to	anybody	and	everybody	involved	in	that,	so	that	they’re	all	
aware	of	what’s	going	on.	(Registry	officer	2011)	
	
Interviewees	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	written	notifications:	
	
We’ve	 got	 our	 case	 track	 database	 on	 which	 you	 can	 make	 what	 are	 called	
operational	 task	notes.	Anybody	can	do	 it.	And	 that	would	alert	anyone	 looking	at	
that	case	that	particular	attention	needs	to	be	given	to	security	planning.	We	might	
notify	our	security	staff	of	the	case	when	it’s	next	 listed.	We	might	actually	ask	for	
additional	resources,	as	in	guards.	We	might	post	a	photo	of	a	particular	person	in	
the	security	control	room	so	they	know	to	look	out	for	that	face.	(Registry	2012)	
	
Court	staff	also	said	that	they	are	more	able	to	concentrate	on	their	work	and	to	better	address	
issues	that	arise	with	court	users	once	they	know	their	personal	security	is	guaranteed:	
	
So	from	that	perspective	I	think	it	makes	us	more	calm,	as	staff	members	knowing	
that	you’d	be	very	unlucky	for	something	to	get	through	to	harm	us.	And	I	think	that	
helps	us	get	on	with	the	business	of	what	we	need	to	do,	rather	than	worrying	about	
our	personal	security.	(Registry	officer	2011)	
	
To	implement	a	proactive	approach	to	security	and	safety	required	personnel	and	court	staff	to	
consider	 similar	 types	 of	 training	 in	 customs	 type	 profiling,	 the	 reporting	 of	 incidents	 and	
dealing	with	confrontational	behaviour.	In	this	way,	fostering	a	shared	knowledge	of	protocols	
(not	 only	 the	 sharing	 of	 information)	 could	 support	 a	 concierge	 or	 a	 very	 implicit	 security	
approach	by	all	personnel	within	the	court	system.	The	other	significant	feature	of	a	proactive	
approach	was	 the	 collection	of	 information	 that	 could	 enable	 the	development	of	 a	 profile	 or	
picture	 of	 what	 is	 happening	 over	 time	 that	 could	 aid	 in	minimising	 or	 preventing	 incidents	
occurring:	
	
	…	we	 can	be	proactive	not	 just	 in	bringing	 in	personnel	 to	 address	 the	 issues	but	
also	being	proactive	in	treating	the	individuals	who	are	copping	the	abuse	…	We	can	
also	 proactively	 minimise	 the	 number	 of	 incidences	 likely	 to	 occur	 at	 court	 [by	
developing]	 solutions	 to	 [identified]	 problems	 by	 consulting	 with	 the	 CEO	 of	 the	
court,	the	police,	and	court	staff	…	(Security	officer	2012)		
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Planning	ahead	and	developing	methods	to	improve	the	courts	operations	were	directly	linked	
to	 improving	how	all	 personnel	 reported	 incidents.	 Although	 there	was	 confidence	 that	most	
‘aggravated	 serious	 incidents’	 were	 being	 reported,	 it	 was	 ‘difficult’	 to	 get	 people	 to	 report	
[general]	 security	 incidents.	These	 incidents	were	 those	 related	 to	 subtle	 intimidation	actions	
by	 polarised	 groups	 of	 people	 (such	 as	 hand	 gestures,	 menacing	 stares,	 walking	 or	 standing	
close	to	the	‘other	side’).		
	
Some	of	 the	 examples	given	by	security	 to	minimise	or	prevent	 risks	were	 to	 i)	 change	court	
listings	or	times	to	reduce	the	numbers	of	court	users	coming	to	the	court	at	one	time	and	ii)	to	
consider	specific	jurisdictional	problems	and	the	use	of	the	most	appropriate	court	in	terms	of	
facilities	and	personnel.	A	marshal	of	a	 federal	court	strongly	expressed	that,	 if	a	matter	to	be	
heard	involved	heightened	emotions,	then	secure	state	courts	should	be	available	and	utilised	if	
no	secure	federal	courts	are	available	in	a	particular	jurisdiction:	
	
In	many	cases,	we	have	arrangements	behind	the	scenes	where	we	make	a	note	of	
problem	 people	 and	 proactively	make	 sure	 there's	 a	 guard	 in	 the	 presence	when	
they	come	before	a	court	the	next	time.	And,	most	often,	the	vast	majority	of	cases,	
that’s	all	we	need	to	do.	(Security	officer	2012)	
	
Other	important	considerations	that	emerged	from	the	interviews	related	to	the	nomenclature	
used	by	security	personnel	and	risk	management	specialist	which	signal	some	of	the	changes	in	
approach	discussed	above.	There	is	a	greater	focus	on	the	use	of	the	word	‘safety’	rather	than	
‘security’.	 The	 former	 can	 be	 the	 preferred	 term	 because	 it	 was	 determined	 that	 people	 are	
more	likely	to	respond	affirmatively	and	to	accept	advice	in	relation	to	their	safety	rather	than	
their	security.	There	is	also	a	greater	emphasis	given	to	the	psychological	safety	of	court	users	
and	staff.	If	not	preferred,	the	addition	of	safety	in	defining	the	operations	of	security	personnel	
has	occurred.	For	instance,	the	new	position	of	a	Safety	and	Security	Manager	for	all	courts	and	
tribunals	 in	 Victorian	 was	 created	 in	 2010.	 Both	 security	 and	 safety	 components	 are	 to	 be	
considered	 by	 this	 manager	 which	 involves	 not	 only	 attending	 any	 security	 incident	 that	
impacts	 (or	may	 impact)	on	 the	good	order	and	 running	of	a	 court	or	on	court	 staff,	 but	also	
being	attentive	to	anything	including	anyone	else	coming	into	the	court	environment:	
	
…	In	relation	to	[our]	duty	of	care	 ...	 I	 think	[there	has	been]	a	subtle	shift	 in	court	
thinking	 in	 that,	 once	 upon	 a	 time,	 we	 primarily	 thought	 about	 staff	 security	 and	
safety,	but	now	we	increasingly	think	about	safety	and	security	for	everyone	coming	
on	to	the	premises.	So	that's	a	subtle	but	significant	shift.	(Security	officer	2012)		
	
Findings:	Design	
Today,	in	and	around	Australian	courts,	security	systems	and	other	security	tools	such	as	duress	
alarms,	 CCTV	 monitoring,	 hand	 held	 scanners	 and	 metal	 detectors	 are	 now	 commonplace.	
Courts	 administrators	 have	 taken	 extraordinary	 (and	 expensive)	 steps	 to	 ensure	 that	 those	
entering	their	courts	pass	through	a	secure	point	of	entry,	and	that	corridors,	conference	rooms,	
meeting	places	and	bathrooms	in	and	around	courtrooms	are	designed	with	safety	and	security	
in	mind.	To	do	 this	effectively,	 they	have	engaged	the	assistance	of	design	experts,	and	newer	
courts	 have	 reaped	 the	 benefits	 of	modern	 design	 expertise.	 This	work	 has	 been	 designed	 to	
ensure	that	those	who	enter	courts	are	not	intimidated	by	the	process.	Given	that	the	security	
screens	may	 quell	 some	 concerns	 about	 physical	 security,	 the	 redesigning	 of	 how	people	 are	
located	 in	 space	and	 the	 type	of	 encounters	 they	have	with	 staff,	 can	enhance	 their	 feeling	of	
psychological	 safety.	 Passive	 surveillance	 in	 the	 waiting	 area	 alongside	 accessible	 staff	 are	
methods	to	enhance	having	court	matters	dealt	with	more	effectively.	
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It	was	revealed	that,	somewhat	counter‐intuitively,	court	registry	counter	staff	were	less	likely	
to	 be	 harassed	 or	 vilified	 by	 visitors	when	 (glass)	 barriers	were	 removed	 from	 and	 replaced	
with	interview	desks,	where	clients	could	be	seated	to	discuss	matters:	
	
…	We	found	that	here,	that	clients	are	far	better	behaved	when	we’re	more	open	and	
accessible.	(Registry	officer	2011)	
	
A	similar	view	was	expressed	by	a	security	officer:	
	
We	used	to	have	four	to	five	counters	here	where	we	had	constant	security	incidents	
at	 the	counter.	 If	you	 look	outside	now,	 the	counters	have	gone	and	we	don’t	have	
security	incidents.	(Security	officer	2012)	
	
When	we	had	the	bank	teller‐style	counters	with	the	plate	glass,	…	the	behaviour	of	
the	staff	member,	the	demeanour	of	the	client,	is	profoundly	affected	by	standing	up	
and	 talking	 through	 a	 slot	 in	 plate	 glass	 as	 compared	 to	 sitting	 down	…	 as	 equal	
partners,	getting	the	transaction	done,	sharing	the	screen	when	necessary,	and	the	
papers.	I	think	the	effect	is	not	only	[improved]	security	and	risk	management,	but	
just	 the	 dignity	 that	 that	 affords	 the	 public	 is	 quite	 profound.	 (Registry	 Manager	
2012)	
	
The	 change	 from	 the	 ‘bank‐teller	 counter’	 to	 new	 arrangement	 is	 described	 as	 a	 ‘sit‐down	
counter	service’.	From	the	perspective	of	security,	this	arrangement	has	been	‘highly	effective’,	
but	only	in	courts	where	roving	security	are	present	along	with	competent	trained	court	staff	at	
the	desk.	The	other	elements	that	contribute	to	this	type	of	arrangement	feeling	safe	for	court	
staff	is	the	inclusion	of	a	duress	button	(situated	under	the	desk,	if	required)	and	knowing	that	
court	 users	 are	 screened	 for	 weapons.	 It	 was	 also	 stated	 that	 the	 sit‐down	 counter	 service	
generally	 requires	 an	 improved	understanding	 of	 the	 respective	 roles	 played	 by	 security	 and	
court	staff,	and	the	importance	of	the	sharing	of	intelligence	between	them.		
	
This	cooperation	and	consideration	also	extends	to	court	staff	and	security	being	consulted	by	
court	designers	 in	 regards	 to	 the	use	of	space,	and	the	 furniture,	 interior	colours	and	 finishes	
chosen.	 The	 Dandenong	 Court	 in	 Victoria	 was	 mentioned	 as	 a	 good	 example	 of	 a	 new	
refurbishment	 and	 one	 that	 was	 based	 on	 a	 consultation	 between	 court	 staff,	 security	 and	
designers:	
	
[The	 waiting	 area]	 is	 a	 relaxing	 place	 visually	 [with]	 a	 combination	 of	 leather	
furniture	 that	 can	be	moved,	bucket	 chairs,	 ottomans	 and	 sofas,	with	 low	wooden	
screening,	and	it	sort	of	stays	in	all	its	constellations,	but	during	the	day,	people	will	
actually	move	it	slightly	in	order	to	speak	to	each	other	or	confer	with	their	lawyer.	
It’s	 carpeted.	 The	 colours	 were	 chosen	 with	 a	 high	 level	 of	 thought.	 There	 were	
psychological	considerations	given	to	the	colours	chosen.	(Registry	staff	2012)	
	
There	has	been	a	view	long	held	that	furniture	should	not	be	of	the	type	that	can	be	employed	as	
a	weapon.	That	view	is	now	being	challenged:	
	
People	say,	‘You	can't	have	moveable	chairs.	Someone	might	pick	it	up	and	hit	each	
other	 with	 it’.	 They	 won't.	 If	 you	 create	 a	 dignified,	 respectful	 environment,	
complemented	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 roving	 security	 officers	 and	 capable	 staff,	 the	
likelihood	of	someone	picking	up	a	chair	is	so	low,	and	the	advantages	of	having	that	
flexibility	and	the	amenity	of	 that	sort	of	seating	 is	overwhelming	 to	me.	 (Registry	
staff	2012)		
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We	want	access	to	justice	for	all	of	our	clients	so	to	give	them	proper	access	and	to	
get	 those	 court	 matters	 dealt	 with	 efficiently	 and	 effectively,	 clients	 should	 feel	
comfortable	 and	 feel	 safe	 coming	 into	 our	 building,	 and	 we	 should	 be	 doing	 our	
utmost	to	make	sure	that	happens.	(Registry	officer	2011)	
	
However,	there	was	concern	from	a	security	perspective	that	architects	believe	that	they	know	
how	a	court	 can	 function,	 ‘without	 consultation	or	due	diligence’	 and	 that	 their	approach	can	
have	an	‘impact	on	the	safety	of	a	victim	or	court	users’	generally	(Security	officer	2012).	This	
security	 officer	 questioned	 whether	 you	 can	 have	 ‘court	 design	 101’	 that	 will	 work	 in	 all	
locations	and	for	all	purposes	considering	the	variety	of	court	buildings	that	exist.	It	was	states	
that	there	is	a	tendency	to	miss	the	point	‘that	security	does	have	to	stand	alone	sometimes	and	
can	 impact	 [on	 the]	 final	 design’.	 Getting	 the	 architecture	 right	 and	 the	 security	 concern	was	
said	 to	be	very	delicate.	 It	was	very	 important	 to	consult	and	engage	a	whole	range	of	people	
from	‘Heads	of	the	Jurisdiction,	to	the	police’.		
	
It’s	 a	 real	 balancing	 act	 …	 [because]	 we	 have	 [different]	 demands	 and	 we	 have	
what’s	 not	 negotiable	 and	 what’s	 going	 to	 compound	 the	 security	 risk	 exposure.	
(Security	officer	2012)	
	
The	example	of	where	to	place	security	screening	either	before	or	after	the	registry	illustrates	
this	tension	of	different	demands.	For	security,	to	have	the	screens	after	the	registry	all	the	time	
would	 require	a	 concierge	 type	 service	 that	may	not	be	 available	 in	 all	 courts	 (mainly	due	 to	
resource	difficulties).	There	is	also	a	concern	that	there	can	still	be	security	incidents	with	this	
type	of	 service.	The	 other	 factor	 is	 the	 volume	of	 people	of	 the	 court	 and	 this	was	 said	 to	be	
‘something	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 factored	 into	 all	 of	 this’	 (Security	 officer	 2012).	 For	 registry,	 the	
positioning	of	 the	 screens	 can	make	a	big	difference	 to	 the	 court	user’s	 experience	as	well	 as	
how	they	navigate	the	court	building:	
	
The	building	wasn’t	designed	to	accommodate	that	infrastructure.	We	are	a	flagship	
building	but	the	whole	setup	is	quite	bad;	 it’s	squashy,	we	get	bottlenecks,	and	the	
noise	 is	 appalling	 when	 people	 come	 through.	 [This]	 affects	 people’s	 sort	 of	
psychological	status	as	they	move	into	the	buildings.	(Registry	officer	2012)	
	
The	desirability	of	a	concierge	desk	or	 reception	desk	 is	an	 interesting	one.	We’ve	
just	systematically	gone	around,	taking	funding	away	from	that,	or	re‐allocating	that	
resource	 in	 our	 security	 staffing,	 and	 then	 some	 of	 us	 more	 recently	 have	 been	
persuaded,	 maybe	 that	 was	 counter‐productive	 [because	 there	 is	 no	 staff	 to	 help	
people	navigate	the	court	building].	(Registry	officer	2012)	
	
With	the	variety	of	court	buildings	that	exist,	it	was	acknowledged	that	the	older	court	precincts	
were	 generally	 designed	 more	 for	 functionality	 than	 safety	 and	 continued	 to	 give	 rise	 to	
concerns:	
	
On	this	floor,	the	men’s	[toilets]	are	over	here	and	the	ladies’	are	over	there	…	you	
have	to	go	down	a	dead	end	to	get	to	the	toilet.	So	you	get	cornered	in	that	area	–	
and	that’s	one	of	the	things	that	the	previous	registry	manager	had	a	real	issue	with	
…	And	a	lot	of	 it	 isn’t	about	what	is	going	to	happen,	 it’s	what	may	happen.	And	in	
your	mind	–	 if	you’re	 fearful	of	 that	person	because	something’s	happened	before,	
just	 the	 possibility	 of	 something	 happening	 is	 enough.	 It	 doesn’t	 have	 to	manifest	
itself	 in	 anything.	 You’d	 be	 pretty	 silly	 to	 start	 anything	 physical	 in	 this	 place,	
because	 there’s	 a	 million	 people	 around.	 But	 …	 the	 possibility	 of	 that	 is	 enough.	
(Victim	support	officer)	
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With	heritage	buildings	and	addressing	 security	 issues,	 changes	 in	 technology	 is	 said	 to	be	of	
assistance	 such	 as	 installing	wireless	 CCTV	 cameras	 in	 courts	 or	 investigating	 hardware	 that	
allows	 swipe	 access	 for	 staff	 which	 has	 improved	 their	 everyday	 work	 environment	 and	
security.		
	
Newer	courts	have	been	able	 to	use	 the	research	 into	design	 that	has	been	undertaken	 in	 the	
past	decade.	With	court	design	there	was	said	to	be	an	‘interesting	dichotomy’	between	creating	
open	spaces	(like	larger	foyers,	using	glass	walls	for	transparency)	and	turning	our	courthouses	
into	 fortresses.	Although	 for	 some,	 the	court	design	should	 ‘communicate	 the	authority	of	 the	
jurisdiction’	(Registry	2011)	and	contribute	to	the	‘respect	for	the	jurisdiction’	(Judicial	officer	
2012).	 For	 others,	 this	 did	 not	 have	 to	 be	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 court	 users’	 feeling	 a	 sense	 of	
‘confidence	and	dignity’	whilst	in	the	courtroom,	feelings	that	were	said	to	enhance	their	sense	
of	safety	(Registry	2011).		
	
Findings:	Process	
Generally	 speaking,	 the	 last	 decade	 has	 seen	 the	 development	 of	 significant	 policies	 and	
procedures	 manuals	 concerning	 safety	 and	 security	 in	 and	 around	 courts.	 These	 procedures	
attempt	 to	 reconcile	 the	 need	 for	 risk	 amelioration	 and	 appropriate	 security	 with	 curial	
openness.	It	is	simply	not	appropriate	to	turn	any	courtroom	or	court	building	into	a	fortress.	In	
dealing	with	 the	 strains	 that	will	 emerge	 from	 a	 state	 taking	 this	 stance,	 courts	 departments	
have	 determined,	 accurately,	 that	 staff	 recruitment	 and	 training	 is	 vital.	 The	 key	 areas	 of	
training	have	been	 identified	as	 the	development	of	a	strong	culture,	matching	the	security	to	
the	environment,	and	reminding	all	staff	to	be	constantly	security	aware.	It	is,	according	to	the	
court	employees	with	whom	the	researchers	spoke,	not	simply	a	question	of	force	or	power,	but	
an	 appropriate	 and	 intelligent	 use	 of	 that	 power,	 and	 careful	 selection	 of	 staff	 and	 staff	
attributes:	
	
When	 I	 first	 started	 about	 ten	 years	 ago,	 the	 sheriff’s	 officers	 were	 mostly	 ex‐
military	men,	usually	just	before	retirement.	They	were	in	their	50s,	or	60s.	They’d	
come	out	of	the	military	with	a	bit	of	power	but	didn’t	want	to	retire	and	they	were	
very	 firm.	 They	 …	 were	 very	 brusque	 and	 they	 were	 very	 militarised.	 And	 then	
slowly	…	the	entry	qualifications	changed	…	and	a	lot	of	quite	small	…	women	and	
small	much	older	men	were	hired	and	I	asked	somebody	one	day	about	this	and	he	
said,	 ‘It’s	 a	 psychological	 thing’.	He	 said,	 ‘the	more	 these	 big	 bruiser	 guys	 tried	 to	
intervene	in	brawls	the	more	they	brawled	…You	send	in	a	little	guy	with	white	hair	
and	about	five	foot	five	...	No	problems,	the	little	fragile	women	were	going	to	go	‘oh,	
this	 is	 disgraceful,	 stop	 immediately’’	 and	 they	 go,	 ‘Oh,	well,	 sorry	madam’…	They	
also	have	a	sixth	sense	about	when	trouble’s	brewing.	(Victim	support	worker	2012)	
	
The	 implementation	of	 the	 ‘management	of	difficult	people’	 in	 the	court	 environment	has	not	
occurred	 due	 to	 a	 singular	 policy	 document	 per	 se.	 According	 to	 many	 security	 personnel	
interviewed,	progress	in	security	and	safety	have	come	about	by	recognising	the	significance	of	
attitude	and	on‐going	training:	
	
We	 can	 rely	 on	 technology	 and	 practices	 and	 procedures	 all	 you	 like,	 and	 it’s	
certainly	very	helpful.	But	at	the	end	of	the	day,	if	we’ve	got	staff	who	are	working	as	
a	team,	 looking	after	each	other	and	professionally	trying	to	do	what's	expected	of	
them,	 they	do	wonders.	And	 I	can	remember	coming	 to	 the	court	many	years	ago,	
before	we	 had	 guards	 in	 a	 lot	 of	 places,	 and	 you'd	 often	 have	 a	 staff	member	 do	
courageous	things.	You'd	have	Grizzly	Adams	walk	in	and	threaten	everyone,	and	in	
a	 loud,	booming	voice	 say	he’s	 going	 to	blow	up	 the	 court.	And	 a	petite	 little	 staff	
member	would	walk	out	and	say,	‘Listen,	mate,	just	calm	down.	Do	you	want	a	cup	of	
tea	and	I'll	give	you	a	hand	with	the	forms?’.	(Security	manager	2012)		
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There	 is	 an	 expectation	 of	 the	 guards	 that	 they	 will	 de‐escalate	 heated	 situations	 as	 distinct	
from	being	authoritarian	and	‘showing	people	the	door’	or	too	quickly	resorting	to	a	phone	call	
to	the	police.	There	is	a	greater	focus	on	employing	a	security	company	with	the	right	attitude	
and	to	have	 them	undertake	in‐house	training.	This	training	may	 involve	all	security	staff	and	
court	 staff.	 The	 type	of	 training	 identified	 ranged	 from	reporting	on	 incidents	 to	dealing	with	
confrontational	 behaviour	 and	 mental	 health	 issues.	 Other	 training	 involved	 detecting	
behaviour	and	being	aware	of	possible	risks:		
	
Customs	 type	 of	 profiling	 (which	 is	 different	 to	 ‘social	 profiling’)	 and	 is	 about	
understanding	a	range	of	body	language,	how	[a	person]	 is	presenting	…	how	they	
carry	 themselves	 …	 their	 nervousness,	 [observing]	 their	 type	 of	 attire,	 whether	
things	 could	 be	 hidden	 [like	 a	 glass	 knife	 that	 cannot	 be	 detected	 by	 screening].	
(Security	manager	2012)	
	
There	was	 also	 a	 greater	 appreciation	 of	 the	 distress	 that	 attending	 court	 can	 have	 on	 court	
users	and	that	security	staff	needed	to	be	attentive	to	what	could	cause	or	exacerbate	anxiety,	
aggression	and	abuse:	
	
If	 anger,	 aggression	 and	 abuse	 aren't	 treated,	 [the	 court	 user	 will]	 end	 up	 in	 a	
threatening	 situation	 which	may,	 if	 it’s	 not	 treated,	 result	 in	 an	 act	 of	 violence.	 I	
think	it’s	inculcating	the	staff	with	the	spirit	that	people	come	to	us	under	times	of	
great	 personal	 stress	 getting	 staff	 to	 appreciate	 that	 people	 are	 walking	 in	 under	
already	 heavy	 personal	 pressure	 and	 may	 have	 difficulty	 with	 quite	 convoluted	
forms	and	processes	and	terminology.	(Security	manager	2012)	
	
Some	 of	 our	 best	 staff	 are	 the	 staff	 that	 simply	 operate	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 person	
walking	 in	 the	 door	 and	 communicating	 with	 them	 and	 who	 assist	 cooperatively	
with	the	person	to	try	and	get	through	whatever	the	task	is	at	the	time.	And	you	see	
that	in	country	courthouses	all	the	time	with	appalling	security.	There's	no	barriers.	
(Security	officer	2011)	
	
The	emphasis	on	 training	has	also	been	designed	 to	decrease	any	 inappropriate	 comments	at	
entry	screening.	Staff,	it	was	said,	need	to	be	professional	and	speak	in	a	courteous	manner	and	
not	 belittle	 a	 person.	 It	 was	 acknowledged	 that	 not	 having	 these	 skills	 could	 cause	 a	 major	
incident.	The	importance	of	communicating	well	was	also	due	to	security	personnel	needing	to	
be	able	to	work	with	all	types	of	people	at	the	court	including	the	administrators,	the	judiciary,	
the	Attorney‐General	 (who	attends	 the	 courts	 regularly	 for	meetings	with	ministers),	 and	 the	
Executive	Directors.		
Training	in	being	respectful	provides	another	level	of	safety	beyond	physical	barriers	and	metal	
detectors:	
	
Look	 at	 [the	 way]	 some	 of	 our	 horror	 clients	 [have	 been	 managed].	 When	 they	
started	 they	were	 really	 stormy	and	horrid.	And	as	we	 got	 to	know	 them,	 and	we	
built	up	a	–	 I’ll	 say	a	 level	of	 respect	with	each	other.	They’re	not	 so	horrid	when	
they	come	in.	They’re	actually	quite	approachable,	they’re	angry	at	the	decisions	that	
have	been	made	in	court,	but	they’re	not	blaming	us.	In	the	early	days	of	coming	in,	
it	was	all	our	fault.	No	matter	what	happened	in	life	it	was	our	fault.	Whereas	now	
they	 come	 in,	 and	 they’ll	 be	 a	 bit	 huffy	 but	 –	 I’m	 going	 to	 say	 we	 got	 used	 to	 it	
because	it’s	not	a	nasty	narky‐ness,	it’s	just	they’re	fed	up	with	the	process,	they’re	
here	to	follow	something	else.	But	we	can	deal	with	it.	And	they’re	quite	polite	with	
us	now,	in	their	own	way.	(Registry	officer	2011)	
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With	 the	 advent	 of	 courts	 hiring	 private	 security	 guards,	 the	 court	 administrators,	 security	
managers	and	marshals	commented	on	how	this	arrangement	is	continuing	to	evolve	and	that	
this	requires	further	discussion	about	practices,	processes	and	results:	
	
We’re	 a	 very	 interesting	 outfit	 in	 terms	 of	 contract	 security	 guards	 because	
increasingly	 the	 guards	 are	 being	 used	 in	more	 and	more	ways	 that	 they	weren’t	
used	 in	the	past.	The	police	won't	do	anything	about	 those	 lower‐level	matters	 [in	
the	 courts],	 which	 may	 very	 well	 amount	 or	 escalate	 to	 a	 more	 serious	 security	
incident.	 We	 deal	 with	 a	 variety	 of	 incidents	 through	 in‐house	 treatment	
management	options.	(Security	manager	2012)	
	
Having	some	uniformity	across	all	the	courts	despite	the	different	security	providers	was	also	
said	 to	be	 important.	One	way	that	 this	may	occur	 is	 to	have	 ‘the	same	standards,	same	KPIs,	
same	contract	requirements	and	standard	training’.	Such	an	approach	could	also	contribute	to	
security	 personnel	 having	 ‘clearer	 career	 paths’	 which	 may	 assist	 security	 companies	 in	
‘retaining	their	staff’	(Security	officer,2012).	
	
In	 sum,	 and	generally	 speaking,	 there	has	been	a	 commitment	by	governments	 in	 the	 field	of	
training	 to	 embrace	 performance	 measurement	 and	 evaluation	 with	 a	 view	 to	 continuous	
improvement.		
	
Aside	from	recruitment	and	training,	there	are	also	strict	procedures	in	relation	to	emergencies.	
For	example,	there	may	be	a	notification	of	a	siege,	a	hold‐up,	an	evacuation,	a	power	failure	or	
in	 the	 event	 that	 someone	with	 a	 disability	 needs	 entry	 screening.	 This	 also	 extends	 to	what	
arrangements	are	not	appropriate	for	staff	in	their	interactions	with	clients:	
	
And	he	said	‘I	want	to	go	into	a	room	with	you.	I	want	to	discuss	this	in	a	room’.	And	
he’s	a	big,	big	man.	And	I	just	said	to	him	‘No,	we’re	going	to	talk	at	one	of	the	other	
counters.	We’ll	sit	down,	face	to	face	and	we’ll	talk’.	And	I	think	he	must	have	sensed	
that	I	was	a	bit	frightened	of	him,	because	I	didn’t	want	to	go	into	a	room	alone	with	
him.	Just	in	case	it	got	a	bit	out	hand,	how	would	I	get	myself	out?	And	when	we	sat	
down,	he	goes	‘I	apologise,	if	 I’ve	intimidated	you	in	any	way	I’m	sorry’.	And	I	said	
‘It’s	okay,	I’m	a	big	girl,	I	can	handle	it’.	…	We	don’t	have	to	be	that	private	that	my	
security	is	compromised.	[So	we	stayed	at	the	counter]	And	so	he	understood	that,	
and	he	accepted	it.	And	I	think	he	was	very	sorry	that	he’d	frightened	me	a	little	bit,	
because	he	–	just	physically,	he	had	that	physical	presence	and	I	didn’t	like	it,	but	…	I	
could	say	‘no’	without	it	being	a	‘no’.	(Registry	officer	2011)	
	
Over	 the	 last	 quarter	 century	 many	 of	 these	 security	 processes	 have	 shifted	 from	 public	 to	
private	hands.	This	has	been	part	of	a	wider	and	broader	trend	towards	privatisation	of	security	
functions	generally	(Sarre	2005;	van	Steden	and	Sarre	2007)	and	is	a	consequence	of	continuing	
pressure	 by	 governments	 to	 involve	 non‐state	 actors	 in	 their	 own	 security	 (Prenzler	 2000;	
Johnston	2003;	Button	and	George,	2006;	Stenning	2009).		
	
While	 the	employment	of	private	staff	 to	undertake	security	measures	used	to	be	 referred	 to,	
colloquially,	as	contracting	‘out’	of	such	services,	the	more	favoured	term	is	now	contracting	‘in’.	
The	importance	of	this	distinction	cannot	be	overstated.	When	some	function	is	contracted	out,	
there	 is	 usually	 a	 corresponding	 outsourcing	 of	 legal	 responsibility.	 When	 a	 function	 is	
contracted	 in,	 the	 legal	 responsibility	 rests	 firmly	with	 the	 principal,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 various	
courts	authorities.	The	debate	over	legal	authority,	responsibility	and	liability	in	this	process	is	
not	 an	 unimportant	 one	 (Sarre	 and	Prenzler	 2009)	 but	 it	 falls	 outside	 the	parameters	 of	 this	
paper.	
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The	handing	over	to	the	private	sector	of	responsibility	for	court	security,	however,	does	have	
the	potential	for	risk:	
	
The	 delegation	 of	 powers	 and	 duties	 to	 private	 interests	 to	meet	 particular	 social	
needs	 does	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 series	 of	 potential	 management,	 cooperation	 and	
accountability	 problems,	 especially	 when	 private	 correctional	 and	 custodial	 and	
related	 services	 operate	 without	 adequate	 inspection	 and	 proper	 democratic	
oversight.	(Baldino,	Drum	and	Wyatt	2010:	418)		
	
How	does	one	ensure	that	those	who	are	contracted	‘in’	to	undertake	such	tasks	do	so	with	the	
care,	attention	and	responsibility	that	befits	the	role?	The	Inspector	of	Custodial	Services,	who	
reviewed	 this	 issue	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	Western	 Australian	 correctional	 contracts	 in	 2007,	
concluded	that	the	shift	to	private	operators	had	been	without	difficulty:	
	
It	is	now	justifiable	to	say	that	the	court	custodial	services	aspect	of	the	contract	is	
working	 reasonably	well.	 The	 judiciary	 by	 and	 large	 accept	 the	 privatised	 service	
model;	 persons	 in	 custody	 though	 not	 universally	 laudatory	 are	 on	 the	 whole	
appreciative	of	the	considerate	way	in	which	they	are	treated;	AIMS	personnel	have	
good	working	relationships	with	both	Corrective	Services	and	Police;	and	the	costs	
to	 the	State	 for	 the	provision	of	 these	 services	 is	 almost	 certainly	markedly	 lower	
than	if	they	were	being	provided	in	the	previous	ways	…	(Office	of	the	Inspector	of	
Custodial	Services	2007:	iii)	
	
Indeed,	 the	 security	 model	 developed	 in	Western	 Australia	 was	 perceived	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	
strategic	 approach	 designed	 to	 assess	 risk	 and	 avert	 incident	 by	 gathering	 and	 sharing	 of	
intelligence.	It	involved	a	roving	workforce	(which	included	plain‐clothed	officers)	who	worked	
in	concert	with	the	formally	placed	authorities.		
	
Conclusion	
Reflecting	upon	 three	decades	 of	 security	 developments	 in	 the	United	 States	 in	 2007,	Cooper	
wrote	as	follows:	
	
No	 longer	 is	 ‘court	 security’	 a	 function	 to	 be	 delegated	 primarily	 to	 the	 sheriff’s	
department	or	other	law	enforcement	agency,	but	it	is	rather	a	critical	responsibility	
of	 judges	 and	 court	 administrative	 staff,	who	must	work	 in	 partnership	with	 law‐
enforcement	and	other	professionals	to	ensure	the	safety,	security,	and	integrity	of	
the	 judicial	 process	 and	 the	 full	 range	 of	 personnel,	 facilities,	 systems,	 and	 other	
components	 upon	 which	 it	 relies.	 The	 implications	 of	 this	 shift	 in	 definition	 for	
judicial	administration	are	also	significant.	Court	security	is	now	an	integral	part	of	
the	 responsibilities	 of	 court	 administration,	 reflecting	 the	 increasing	 recognition	
that	 the	 issue	 of	 ‘court	 security’	 and	 the	 responsibility	 for	 ensuring	 ‘continuity	 of	
court	operations’	are	inextricably	intertwined.	(Cooper	2007:	45)	
	
In	other	words,	in	the	last	three	decades	especially,	there	has	grown	a	heightened	awareness	of	
the	risks	in	and	around	court	buildings,	and	security	has	been	addressed	accordingly,	not	just	by	
means	of	barriers	and	officers’	presence,	but	by	 intelligence	gathering,	 informed	design	work,	
appropriate	training	of	staff,	and	the	development	of	manuals	and	protocols	in	line	with	optimal	
practice	models.		
	
There	 are	 competing	 interests	 here.	 The	 security	 arrangements	 that	 are	 in	 place	 should	 not	
threaten	nor	jeopardise	the	openness	of	the	courts,	for	to	do	so	strikes	at	the	heart	of	the	notion	
of	the	fair	trial.	The	principles	of	open	court,	and	a	fair	trial	have	been	a	hallmark	of	our	 legal	
tradition	for	centuries.	By	the	same	token,	people	who	use	the	courts	should	not	be	exposed	to	
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unreasonable	risks.	Finding	the	most	appropriate	balance	between	these	two	aims	is	a	crucial	
issue	facing	legislators,	administrators	and	policy‐makers	alike.		
	
At	the	end	of	the	day,	what	should	be	our	goal?	
	
To	 me,	 if	 I	 was	 a	 client	 –	 I	 look	 at	 it	 from	 a	 client’s	 perspective	 –	 I	 should	 feel	
comfortable	and	confident	knowing	I	can	come	into	a	court	building,	no	matter	how	
bad	my	life	has	been	outside	of	this	place,	I	should	be	able	to	come	in	here	and	know	
that	I	can	put	my	case	before	the	court	and	have	it	heard,	and	not	feel	intimidated	or	
have	 anything	 restraining	 or	 threatening	 me	 from	 doing	 that	 …	 to	 come	 in	 here	
knowing	 that	 I’m	 going	 to	 get	 my	 matter	 heard	 and	 it’s	 going	 to	 be	 heard	 with	
nobody	interfering	with	me	or	how	I	feel	or	what	I’m	doing.	(Federal	court	registry	
officer)		
	
With	 the	 appropriate	 intelligence‐gathering	 done,	 the	 right	 design	 work	 completed	 and	
processes	in	place,	this	task	should	be	straightforward	and	productive.	
	
It	 is	clear	that	not	all	risks	of	harm	can	be	prevented,	but	good	governance	strategies	 identify	
possible	risks	and	minimise	their	impact.	Identifying	reasonably	foreseeable	risks	is	a	duty	that	
remains	constantly	with	administrators.	These	tasks	are	to	get	up‐to‐date	information,	training	
staff	to	act	on	it,	and	monitoring	the	impact	of	any	staff	action	or	inaction.	We	should	safely	be	
able	to	demand	these	responsibilities	from	those	to	whom	they	have	been	given.	
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Abstract	
This	study	of	English	Coronial	practice	raises	a	number	of	questions,	not	only	regarding	state	
investigations	of	suicide,	but	also	of	the	role	of	the	Coroner	itself.	Following	observations	at	
over	 20	 inquests	 into	 possible	 suicides,	 and	 in‐depth	 interviews	 with	 six	 Coroners,	 three	
main	issue	emerged:	first,	there	exists	considerable	slippage	between	different	Coroners	over	
which	 deaths	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 classified	 as	 suicide;	 second,	 the	 high	 standard	 of	 proof	
required,	and	immense	pressure	faced	by	Coroners	from	family	members	at	inquest	to	reach	
any	 verdict	 other	 than	 suicide,	 can	 significantly	 depress	 likely	 suicide	 rates;	 and	 finally,	
Coroners	 feel	no	professional	obligation,	either	 individually	or	collectively,	 to	contribute	 to	
the	 production	 of	 consistent	 and	 useful	 social	 data	 regarding	 suicide—arguably	 rendering	
comparative	 suicide	 statistics	 relatively	worthless.	 These	 issues	 lead,	 ultimately,	 to	 a	more	
important	question	about	the	role	we	expect	Coroners	to	play	within	social	governance,	and	
within	an	effective,	contemporary	democracy.	
	
	
Introduction	–	the	Coronial	Gate‐keeping	of	Suicide	Statistics	
Much	 is	often	made	of	 changes	 in	our	 suicide	 rates.	As	a	 society,	we	are	 relieve	when	we	are	
informed	 that	 fewer	people	are	ending	 their	own	 lives	 (Australian	Bureau	of	 Statistics	2012),	
confused	when	we	are	told	exactly	the	opposite	(Haesler	2010),	and	concerned	when	our	own	
rates	are	compared	unfavourably	with	other	nations	and	peoples	(Georgatos	2013).	It	 is	often	
difficult	 to	 ascertain	 the	 precise	 trajectory	 of	 our	 suicide	 rates,	 let	 alone	where	 we	 stand	 in	
relation	to	anyone	else.		
	
The	difficulty	here	is	that	suicide	statistics	are	notoriously	unreliable.	Most	research	in	the	area	
estimates	 that	 suicide	 is	 significantly	more	common	 than	our	 statistics	would	have	us	believe	
(Harrison,	Abou	Elnour	and	Pointer	2009).	This	systemic	under‐counting	may	be	for	a	range	of	
reasons.	Walker,	 Chen	 and	 Madden	 (2008)	 contend	 that	 factors	 such	 as	 disparities	 between	
jurisdictions,	lack	of	standardisation	in	the	reporting	of	Coronial	deaths,	and	issues	over	forms	
for	police	 reports	 contribute	 to	 inaccuracies	 in	 the	 coding	of	our	 data.	 They	 also	point	 to	 the	
reluctance	of	some	Coroners	to	reach	a	finding	of	suicide	in	the	first	place.	It	is	this	final	factor	
which	forms	the	focus	of	this	paper.	
	
The	 central	 role	 of	 the	 Coroner	 has	 always	 been	 to	 investigate	 deaths	 ‘considered	worthy	 of	
inquiry’	 (Burney	 2000;	 3).	 This	would	 include	 deaths	 such	 as	 those	 by	 accident,	where	 there	
was	 some	 suspicion	 of	 wrongdoing,	 and	 those	 by	 suicide.	 This	 became	 seen	 as	 a	 largely	
administrative	 task,	 conducted	 in	 a	 non‐adversarial	 environment,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 effective	
administration	 of	 the	 populace.	 However,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 recording,	 assessing	 and	
categorising	of	death,	the	Coroner’s	role	has	more	recently	expanded	to	incorporate	elements	of	
social	 management	 and	 prevention	 of	 harm	 (The	 Victorian	 Institute	 of	 Forensic	 Medicine,	
2013):	
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Much	of	 the	operation	of	 the	 office	 of	 Coroner	or	Coroners	 courts	 in	Australia	 is	 centered	on	
injury	 and	 death	 prevention,	 with	 the	 Coroner	 empowered	 to	 make	 recommendations	 on	
matters	of	public	health	and	safety	and	judicial	administration.	
	
Consequently,	the	Coroner	is	not	only	an	essential	part	of	our	legal	system—in	that	they	manage	
the	relationship	between	the	State,	and	the	death	of	its	citizens,	and	in	particular,	those	deaths	
deemed	 to	warrant	 investigation—now	 they	 are	 also	an	 important	 element	of	 the	process	by	
which	 the	 State	 accumulates	 social	 data,	 data	 which	 is	 used	 to	 identify	 problems	 and	 shape	
policy.	 The	 problem	 here	 is	 clear:	 if	 Coroners	 are	 reluctant	 to	 reach	 a	 finding	 of	 suicide,	 as	
Walker,	 Chen	 and	 Madden	 (2008)	 contend,	 then	 their	 role	 in	 production	 of	 valid	 statistics,	
which	 in	 turn	direct	social	policies	and	programs	(targeting,	 for	example,	 suicide	prevention),	
becomes	significantly	compromised.		
	
Democracy	and	the	Coronial	Inquest	
This	 research	 seeks	 to	 investigate	 the	 English	 and	Welsh	 Coronial	 Inquest,	 particularly	 as	 it	
relates	to	the	accurate	investigation	of	potential	suicides.	In	doing	so,	it	also	seeks	to	make	some	
comparisons	 with	 how	 similar	 deaths	 are	 managed	 in	 Australia.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	
important	differences	between	the	two	systems.	The	most	significant	concerns	the	role	played	
by	the	inquest.	In	England	and	Wales,	all	deaths	that	are	considered	worthy	of	inquiry—which	
includes	 potential	 suicides—are	 necessarily	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 public	 inquest.	 In	 Australia,	 the	
same	 deaths	 are	 assessed	 solely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 documentary	 evidence,	 unless	 specific	
circumstances	dictate	otherwise.		
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	role	of	the	Coroner,	and	the	functioning	of	the	Coronial	Inquest,	is	
not	 just	 matters	 of	 abstract	 social	 and	 administrative	 interest.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that,	
historically,	both	are	central	to	how	English	democracy	came	to	be	shaped	and	understood,	and	
as	such,	questions	about	how	well	the	Coronial	system	works,	and	about	how	different	former	
British	colonies	have	chosen	to	refract	this	original	office	for	their	own	purposes,	continue	to	be	
asked.		
	
In	Bodies	of	Evidence,	Burney	(2000)	examines	the	historical	role	played	by	the	public	inquest	in	
placing	important	checks	on	State	abuse	of	power,	by	insisting	that	all	prison	deaths—and	most	
famously,	the	deaths	of	18	protesting	workers	killed	by	in	the	Peterloo	Massacre	in	1819—face	
public	 scrutiny	 and	 judgment.	 This	 notion,	 that	 questionable	 deaths	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 public	
investigation,	 an	 investigation	 accessible	 to,	 and	 readily	 understood	 by,	 all	 interested	 parties	
within	the	community,	became	central	to	English	conceptions	of	justice	and	democracy.	Indeed,	
much	of	Burney’s	book	examines	 the	complex	 tension	 that	 arose	within	 the	Coronial	 Inquest,	
between	the	voices	of	this	participatory	tradition,	and	the	bearers	of	new,	scientific	knowledge	
that	 sought	 to	 bring	medical	 expertise	 to	 the	 Inquest	 process,	 often	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 public	
understanding	and	involvement.	
	
…	 the	benefit	of	expert	governance,	particularly	 in	an	era	of	mass	democracy,	was	
that	it	could	draw	upon	advanced,	universalising	knowledge	in	the	service	of	public	
well‐being	 and,	 ultimately,	 public	 education.	 Its	 shortcomings,	 however,	 lay	 in	 its	
tendency	 to	 stifle	 the	very	 instruments	of	 civic	 education—the	 local,	 participatory	
institutions	in	which	an	active,	informed,	and	morally	elevated	citizenry	was	forged.	
(Burney	2000:	9)		
		
Arguably,	this	tension—or	at	least	a	modern	variant	on	it	(ie.	between	medicine	and	the	law)—
can	still	be	clearly	seen	within	 the	 fabric	of	contemporary	death	 investigation	(Carpenter	and	
Tait	2010).	Certainly,	there	was	some	expectation	that	this	tension	would	be	evidenced	within	
this	study,	and	there	were	some	minor	examples	of	this.	However,	what	was	uncovered	was	a	
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far	more	significant	tension,	a	tension	between	the	pastoral	and	the	governmental	functions	of	
the	Coroner;	between	what	appears	to	be	a	therapeutic	role	(in	looking	after	the	well‐being	of	
bereaved	 families),	 and	 an	 investigative	 and	 preventative	 role	 (investigative,	 in	 delivering	 an	
appropriate	 finding,	 and	 preventative,	 in	 contributing	 accurate	 data	 to	 inform	 social	 policy).	
This	paper	will	address	this	specific	issue	in	some	detail.		
	
Coronial	Inquests	and	Interviews	
This	 study	was	 conducted	within	 one	 geographic	 area	 in	 England.	 The	Research	 consisted	 of	
observations	 made	 at	 twenty	 public	 inquests	 into	 possible	 suicides,	 followed	 by	 hour‐long,	
semi‐structured	interviews	with	six	of	the	coroners	who	had	presided	over	the	above	inquests.	
	
From	 the	 observations	 made	 at	 inquest,	 three	 relevant	 conclusions	 were	 drawn.	 First,	 there	
appears	 to	 be	 no	 single	model	 for	 running	 a	 Coronial	 inquest.	 Far	 from	 being	 a	 uniform	 and	
consistent	 element	 of	 the	 English	 legal	 system,	 the	 Coronial	 Inquest	 takes	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
different	 forms.	 Though	 the	 Coroners	 are	 uniformally	 professional,	 patient,	 and	 skilled	 at	
managing	grieving	families,	each	Coroner	seems	to	organise	their	own	courtrooms	as	they	see	
fit.	Second,	 to	be	able	 to	reach	a	 finding	of	suicide,	 the	standard	of	proof	 is	extremely	high.	 In	
England,	 suicide	 determination	 is	 based	 around	 the	 criminal	 standard	 of	 ‘beyond	 reasonable	
doubt’,	rather	than	the	Australian	model,	which	has	adopted	the	civil	standard	of	‘on	the	balance	
of	 probabilities’.	 Finally,	 the	Coroners	 are	 often	 placed	under	 significant	 pressure	 throughout	
the	proceedings	by	the	deceased’s	family	not	to	bring	in	a	finding	of	suicide.	Almost	all	inquests	
are	 attended	by	 family	members,	 and	 even	where	 they	 appear	 inclined	 to	 accept	 a	 finding	 of	
suicide,	attempts	are	still	continually	made	to	control	the	general	narrative.	
	
From	 interviews	with	Coroners,	 four	 further	 issues	emerge,	 issues	which	are	both	 tied	 to	 the	
above	observations,	but	which	also	raise	some	important	questions	about	just	what	is	going	on	
in	Coronial	suicide	investigations.	
	
Inconsistency	between	Coroners	
First,	 there	 exists	 considerable	 slippage	between	different	Coroners	 as	 to	what	 is	 likely	 to	be	
considered	 suicide,	 and	 what	 is	 not.	 There	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 for	 this.	 As	
mentioned	 previously,	 there	 has	 always	 been	 a	 tension	 within	 Coronial	 death	 investigations	
between	those	who	regard	the	process	as	a	useful	application	of	the	scientific	quest	for	truth—
often	exemplified	by	a	different	approach	to	the	use	of	invasive	autopsy—and	those	who	place	
far	 more	 weight	 upon	 legal	 processes,	 and	 information	 gathered	 at	 the	 scene	 of	 death.	 This	
tension	extends	to	disagreement	of	who	ought,	and	who	ought	not,	be	eligible	to	be	a	Coroner:		
	
I	have	nothing	against	my	medical	colleagues,	but	I	do	think	it’s	a	job	for	a	lawyer	…	I	
think	 that	 Inquest	 law	 is	 now	 becoming	 so	 complex—it’s	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	
intellectual	ability,	but	I	think	you	need	legal	training,	and	to	have	performed	in	the	
court	system	to	really	be	able	to	deal	with	it.	(Coroner	4)	
	
A	 further	 reason	 for	 a	 seeming	 lack	 of	 consistency	 in	 reaching	 findings	 of	 suicide	 involves	
considerable	differences	in	experience,	ability,	and	levels	of	training	of	Coroners.		
	
When	 I	 started,	 there	 was	 no	 training	 whatsoever	 for	 Coroners	 …	 the	 Coroner	
Society	of	England	and	Wales	established	some	training	for	Coroners;	it	was	pretty	
limited	with	a	very	small	budget.	There’s	no	requirement	for	us	to	have	that	training	
…	so	there	is	inevitably	a	lack	of	consistency,	and	there	are	some	people	who	do	not	
go	on	any	training	at	all.	(Coroner	2)	
	
Regulating	Bereavement:	Inquests,	Family	Pressure	and	the	Gate	Keeping	of	Suicide	Statistics	
	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013							197	
There	 are	 also	 variations	 in	 funding	 and	 responsibilities.	 Some	Coroners	 are	well‐funded	and	
well‐resourced;	others	are	not,	which	affects	their	ability	to	complete	the	work	effectively	and	
consistently:	
	
You	go	and	see	Coroners	in	some	other	parts	of	the	country	and	they’re	working	out	
of	 the	back	kitchen,	 they’re	working	out	of	 a	Portacabin	…	 there	was	one	Coroner	
starting	to	hold	an	inquest,	could	only	have	the	village	hall	for	the	day,	had	to	move	
to	the	next	town	to	actually	conclude	the	inquest.	(Coroner	3)	
	 	
While	these	are	interesting	and	relevant	in	their	own	right,	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	one	
final	 reason	why	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 significant	 slippage	 between	 Coroners	 over	 findings	 of	
suicide	is	perhaps	more	important,	and	more	telling,	than	the	others.	That	is,	there	appears	to	
be	a	difference	of	opinion	over	the	central	role	of	the	Coroner;	some	Coroners	take	a	fairly	hard	
line	 over	 their	 determinations—understanding	 their	 role	 as	 fundamentally	 administrative—
while	others	see	their	role	in	a	more	pastoral	light,	pertaining	first	and	foremost	to	helping	the	
grieving	family.		
	
I’m	not	a	social	service.	I’m	supposed	to	be	making	an	inquiry	on	behalf	of	the	State,	
not	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 family,	 and	 if	 this	 person	 has	 taken	 their	 own	 life,	 and	 the	
evidence	satisfies	me	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	this	is	the	case,	what	verdict	
can	I	possibly	come	to	other	that	that	they	have	taken	their	own	life?	(Coroner	6)	
	
Which	can	be	directly	contrasted	with:	
	
I	often	engage	 the	 family	and	will	 say,	 ‘I’m	 thinking	along	 these	 lines.	What’s	your	
view?’	Sometimes	if	you	carry	the	families	with	you,	it’s	more	cathartic—it’s	totally	
wrong,	 but	 it’s	 a	more	 cathartic	 experience	 for	 them	…	 you	 put	 the	 family	 at	 the	
heart	of	the	inquiry.	(Coroner	4)	
	
It’s	 all	 about	 enabling	 people	 to	 get	 on	 with	 their	 lives	 …	 giving	 them	 closure,	
actually	 lifting	 them	 up	 and	 explaining	 things	…	 it’s	 not	what	 the	 law	 tells	 us	 it’s	
about,	but	that’s	the	reality	of	what	it	should	do	…	(Coroner	3)	
	
Underestimating	Rates	of	Suicide	
The	second	issue	to	emerge	from	the	interviews	involves	the	general	admission	by	the	Coroners	
that	 the	 Coronial	 inquest	 process	 acts	 to	 depress	 suicide	 rates,	 an	 observation	 supported	 by	
most	research	in	the	area	(Harrison	et	al	2009;	Walker	et	al	2008).	The	Coroners	note	that	the	
standard	of	proof	is	at	the	very	highest	end	of	‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’.	That	is,	the	notion	of	
‘beyond	 reasonable	 doubt’	 is	 not	 a	 singular	 measure;	 it	 is	 a	 continuum,	 with	 the	 finding	 of	
suicide	placed	at	the	furthest	end.		
	
The	 standard	 of	 proof	 of	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 as	 applied	 in	 the	 public	
prosecution	 services	 is	 quite	 a	 lot	 lower	 really	 …	 I	 doubt	 many	 people	 would	 be	
prosecuted	if	you	needed	the	level	of	sureness	you	need	for	a	suicide	verdict	…	Don’t	
misunderstand	 that	 there’s	 only	 one	 standard	 of	 proof,	 which	 is	 beyond	 a	
reasonable	 doubt,	 but	 then	 of	 course	 it’s	 up	 to	 you	 to	 interpret	 what’s	 beyond	 a	
reasonable	doubt.	(Coroner	1)	
	
Consequently,	 findings	 of	 suicide	 can	 be	 relatively	 hard	 to	 attain,	 which	 means	 that	 many	
suicides	 are	 classified	 as	 something	 else—even	 when	 most	 impartial	 observers	 might	 have	
reasonably	 concluded	 otherwise.	 This	 results	 in	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	
suicides	recorded	each	year.		
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Every	 Coroner	 does	 things	 differently,	 and	 like	 I	 say,	 a	 rough	 rule	 of	 thumb—if	
you’re	 looking	 at	 statistics,	 I	 can	 guarantee	 that	 suicide	 is	 under‐represented.	
Roughly,	I	say	you	could	add	a	third	onto	the	figure	…	(Coroner	4)	
	
We’re	 left	with	about	300	cases	a	year	which	we	 inquest	…	 I	would	 say	we	do	50	
suicides	a	year	out	of	300—genuine	suicide	verdicts.	Then	there	are	probably	about	
another	30	odd,	which	probably	are.	(Coroner	1)	
	
Family	Pressure	and	the	‘Therapeutic’	Coroner	
The	 third	 issue	 emerging	 from	 the	 interviews	 explains,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 why	many	 Coroners	
appear	reluctant	to	reach	a	finding	of	suicide.	Historically,	the	desperation	of	the	family	not	to	
have	a	suicide	finding	by	the	coroner	is	perfectly	understandable:		
	
If	 you	 go	 back	 in	 English	 law	150	 years	 or	 so,	 suicide	was	 an	 absolutely	 dreadful	
thing	to	do	to	yourself.	You	were	cheating	on	God;	you	would	not	have	any	hope	of	
resurrection	…	At	that	stage	Coroners	had	been	giving	burial	orders	which	said	that	
the	deceased	must	be	buried	at	the	junction	of	four	roads	with	a	stake	through	their	
body—and	no,	I’m	not	getting	mixed	up	with	Transylvania	here,	this	is	really	what	it	
said—where	beggars	could	spit	upon	their	graves	as	they	went	past.	(Coroner	5)	
	
While	 some	 Coroners	 profess	 relative	 immunity	 to	 the	wishes	 of	 family	members,	 others	 are	
aware	that	such	wishes	often	factor	into	their	overall	decision‐making	process.		
	
I	think	a	lot	of	Coroners—me	included—sometimes	take	a	sympathetic	view	of	the	
family,	and	perhaps,	well,	you	know	…	why	leave	the	family	with	the	stigma	of	this,	
when	we	can	actually	make	their	situation	better?	…	So,	 I	 think	Coroners,	 to	some	
extent,	 are	 softies,	 and	 might	 not	 necessarily	 bite	 the	 bullet	 and	 say,	 yes,	 this	 is	
suicide.	(Coroner	4)	
	
They	 tend	 to	 come	 in	numbers.	 If	 you’ve	 got	10	members	of	 the	 family	with	 their	
eyes	burning	on	you,	and	they	really	don’t	want	that	verdict,	it	is	very,	very	hard	…	
(Coroner	4)	
	
This	can	be	contrasted	with	the	standard	stated	approach:		
	
A	 Coroner	 has	 to	 divorce	 his	 own	 sensibilities	 from	 his	 legal	 responsibilities.	
(Coroner	5)	
	
It	boils	down	to	evidence	as	far	as	I’m	concerned.	It	boils	down	to	evidence,	and	if	
there’s	 doubt	 …	 I	 wouldn’t	 be	 persuaded	 just	 because	 they’re	 all	 shouting	 [the	
family]	…	 I’m	 afraid	 you’ve	 just	 got	 to	 be	 robust	 about	 it	 and	 stick	 by	 your	 guns.	
(Coroner	2)	
	
Clearly,	 there	 is	 a	 division	 here	 between	 those	 Coroners	 who	 see	 their	 principal	 task	 as	
providing	 comfort	 and	 closure	 to	 grieving	 families,	 and	 those	 for	 whom	 the	 job	 remains	
steadfastly	 administrative.	 Interestingly,	 this	 tension	 may	 well	 be	 relatively	 new,	 as	 there	 is	
little	 sign	 of	 it	 in	 Burney’s	 excellent	 book	mentioned	 earlier,	 on	 the	 English	 Coronial	 inquest	
during	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.	What	may	have	happened	here	are	the	
effects	 of	 what	 Freckelton	 (2008:	 576)	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 rise	 of	 ‘therapeutic	 jurisprudence’—
defined	as	‘the	study	of	the	role	of	the	law	as	a	therapeutic	agent’.		
	
Within	 this	 approach,	 the	 law	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 set	 of	 codes	 to	 be	 followed	without	 reflection,	
much	in	the	manner	of	Legal	Positivism;	such	codes	have	consequences	for	all	those	caught	up	
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in	the	proceedings.	As	such,	our	 legal	 institutions,	and	those	charged	with	making	them	work,	
are	 now	 deemed	 to	 have	 some	 responsibility	 for	 the	 mental	 and	 emotional	 wellbeing	 of	 all	
participants.	King	(2008:	4)	is	quite	explicit	in	his	call	for	an	increasingly	therapeutic	approach	
to	Coronial	practice:	
	
Coroners’	work	 is	 intimately	 connected	with	well‐being—a	concern	of	 therapeutic	
jurisprudence.	Part	of	 the	Coroner’s	 role	 is	 to	determine	whether	 there	are	public	
health	or	safety	issues	arising	out	of	the	death	and	whether	any	action	needs	to	be	
taken	 to	 remedy	any	problems,	 particularly	 those	 that	may	 cause	 future	deaths	…	
Moreover,	the	dead	person’s	family	suffer	grief	and,	depending	upon	circumstances	
of	the	death,	significant	trauma.	
	
Coroners	vs.	Statisticians	
Such	 ‘therapeutic’	 concern	 for	 the	wellbeing	of	 the	grieving	 family	 leads	on	 to	 the	 fourth	 and	
final	 issue	 emerging	 from	 the	 interviews.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	Coroners	 feel	 under	no	 obligation	 to	
make	their	findings	amenable	to	the	production	of	accurate	and	useful	suicide	statistics.	As	can	
be	 seen,	 most	 see	 their	 task	 as	 a	 fundamentally	 administrative	 function	 concerning	 the	
management	of	particular	kinds	of	death,	as	well	as	helping	families	deal	with	the	passing	of	a	
loved	one.	 They	 do	not	 see	 their	 job	 as	making	 life	 easy	 for	 those	 charged	with	 turning	 such	
deaths	 into	 meaningful	 numbers,	 and	 by	 adopting	 this	 approach,	 Coroner’s	 become—
consciously	or	otherwise—the	principal	gatekeepers	of	our	suicide	statistics.		
	
The	 statisticians	 will	 try	 and	 drill	 down,	 and	 sometimes	 we’ll	 get	 psychological	
surveys	of	my	files	…	they	go	through	and	the	try	and	figure	out	what	the	file	means	
so	they	get	the	true	suicide	picture.	So	I	said:	 ‘Hang	on	a	second;	I	sit	 in	court,	I’ve	
heard	the	evidence,	I’ve	made	a	judgment	on	what’s	happening	here,	and	you	want	
to	 go	 through	 the	 same	 material	 to	 see	 if	 you	 come	 to	 the	 same	 judgment	 or	 a	
different	 judgment?’.	 They	 said	 ‘Yeah’.	 ‘That’s	 fine’	 I	 said,	 ‘what	 you’re	 doing	 is	
meaningless,	but	just	do	it	if	you	want	to’.	(Coroner	3)	
	
We’ve	 now	 introduced	 narrative	 verdicts	 which	 are	 here	 to	 stay	 as	 far	 as	 I’m	
concerned,	 and	are	a	huge	boon	 for	 the	public,	 and	a	huge	benefit	 to	 the	Coroner’	
court.	 So	 I’m	 not	 very	 sympathetic	 to	 somebody	 coming	 along	 and	 saying:	 ‘well,	
you’re	disturbing	our	statistics’.	Coroner	6	
	
Those	 Coroners	who	 place	 greater	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 non‐governmental,	 non‐administrative	
elements	of	their	job—that	is,	who	emphasise	more	pastoral,	therapeutic	approaches	to	running	
an	 inquest—appear	 to	 have	 even	 less	 concern	 for	 the	 difficulties	 faced	 by	 those	 coding	
statistical	data	for	later	interpretation:		
	
You	know,	I	do	the	job	as	I	think	fit,	and	by	trying	to	put	families	first.	I	think	I’m	as	
guilty	 as	 anyone	 sometimes	 of	 being	 a	 softy.	 I	 appreciate	 that	 it	 must	 rankle	
statisticians	 completely,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 perhaps	 the	 way	 people	 can	 live	 with	
themselves	thereafter,	I	think	that	probably	is	a	better	aim.	(Coroner	4)	
	
You	can	make	a	difference	because	one	of	the	non‐statutory	functions	which	is	not	
recorded	 anywhere	 but	 a	 lot	 of	 us	 do	 it,	 is	 to	 try	 and	 help	 the	 family	 in	 closure,	
without	being	paternalistic.	 It	can	be	a	cathartic	exercise	and	to	that	extent	I	 think	
you’ve	 justified	 your	 own	 existence,	 never	 mind	 the	 State’s	 work	 which	 you	 do.	
(Coroner	5)	
	
This	 relative	 disregard	 for	 the	 governmental	 aspects	 of	 the	Coronial	 role—governmental	 in	 a	
Foucaultian	(1977)	sense	of	the	word,	the	effective	sketching	out	of	the	contours	of	community	
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life;	numbers	and	types	of	deaths	being	a	very	important	contour—raises	questions	about	just	
what	Coroners’	 principal	 functions	 ought	 to	 be.	 If	 the	 statistics	 their	 actions	 give	 rise	 to	bear	
only	a	passing	 resemblance	 to	any	 reasonable	ontology	of	suicide,	perhaps	 that	governmental	
responsibility	should	be	dealt	with	elsewhere.		
	
Or	perhaps	it	raises	questions	about	which	elements	of	governance	Coroners	actually	contribute	
to.	 Rather	 than	 simply	 managing	 the	 data	 of	 death,	 do	 Coroners	 now	 form	 part	 of	 the	
governance	of	subjective	 experience?	That	 is,	 particularly	on	 the	 issue	of	 suicide,	 are	 they	 are	
now	a	component	of	the	administrative	apparatus	that	manages	the	emotional	wellbeing	of	the	
population?	Rose	(1990)	refers	to	the	notion	of	a	 ‘therapeutic	community’;	 it	may	well	be	that	
Coroners	have	allocated	themselves	a	role	within	that.		
	
That	said,	it	is	important	to	avoid	describing	a	binary,	where	none	necessarily	exists.	In	his	book	
on	education,	Hunter	(1994)	notes	that	attempts	to	ascribe	simple,	two‐sided	logics	to	the	fabric	
of	 the	modern	 school,	 ignore	 the	 complex	 relationship	 between	 its	 bureaucratic	 components,	
and	 it’s	 long	 history	 of	 pastoral	 guidance.	 The	 English	 Coronial	 inquest	 appears	 to	 have	 an	
equally	 complex	 relationship	 between	 its	 bureaucratic	 and	 pastoral	 functions,	 a	 relationship	
that	has	yet	to	be	fully,	or	even	partially,	resolved.		
	
Conclusion	
This	study	 leads	 to	 three	central	observations:	 first,	given	the	evidence	assembled	here,	 if	 the	
British	inquest	is	any	measure	of	the	idiosyncratic	and	locally‐organised	way	in	which	potential	
suicides	are	addressed	and	adjudicated	upon,	then	comparative	suicide	statistics	(both	local	and	
international)	are,	at	best,	problematic,	at	worst,	all	but	meaningless.	
	
Second,	while	the	UK	Coroners	expressed	near	unanimous	support	for	the	stringent	standard	of	
proof	 required	 (in	 spite	 of	 the	 statistical	 inaccuracies	 this	 most	 certainly	 produces),	 and	
unanimous	support	for	the	continued	existence	of	a	compulsory	inquest	for	all	potential	deaths	
by	 suicide,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 few	 advantages	 in	Australia	 adopting	 the	 same	protocols	 and	
procedures.	The	only	argument	that	could	run	counter	to	this	would	involve	a	greater	emphasis	
upon	 therapeutic	 models	 of	 Coronial	 practice,	 which	 would	 lean	 towards	 emphasising	 the	
benefits	 of	 suicide	 inquests	 in	 aiding	 the	 grieving	 process	 of	 bereaved	 families.	 Given	 the	
problems	outlined	above,	and	given	we	have	no	historical	expectation	of	an	 inquest,	 let	alone	
the	high	 costs	 involved	 and	 the	 extra	workload	placed	upon	our	 already	 taxed	Coroners,	 this	
seems	highly	unlikely.		
	
Finally,	 the	 important	 question	 arises:	 what	 is	 the	 principal	 role	 of	 the	 inquest	 in	 suicide	
investigations?	 There	 seems	 to	 be	 little	 agreement	 among	 the	 English	 coroners	 interviewed.	
While	most	understand	and	accept	their	role	within	the	governmental	regulation	of	death,	this	
often	 seemed	 secondary	 to	 their	 less	 tangible	 pastoral	 role	 in	 helping	 the	 families	 deal	 with	
bereavement.	 The	 disagreement	 and	 relative	 confusion	 over	 their	 responsibilities	 may	
eventually	need	formal	clarification.		
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Abstract	
Indigenous	 commentators	 have	 long	 critiqued	 the	way	 in	which	 government	 agencies	 and	
member	of	academic	 institutions	 carry	out	 research	 in	 their	 social	 context.	Recently,	 these	
commentators	 have	 turned	 their	 critical	 gaze	 upon	 activities	 of	 Research	 Ethics	 Boards	
(REBs).	Informed	by	the	reflections	on	research	processes	and	by	Indigenous	Canadian	and	
New	Zealand	research	participants,	as	well	as	 the	extant	 literature,	this	paper	critiques	the	
processes	 employed	by	New	Zealand	REBs	 to	 assess	 Indigenous‐focused	or	 Indigenous‐led	
research	in	the	criminological	realm.		
	
	
Introduction	
Indigenous	 peoples	 from	 across	 various	 Settler	 Societies	 have	 long	 expressed	 concern	 at	 the	
impact	social	 research	carried	out	by	government	agencies	and	academic	 institutions	have	on	
them	 and	 their	 communities	 (see	 Battiste	 2000;	 Smith	 1999).	 More	 recently,	 Indigenous	
commentators	have	focused	their	critical	gaze	specifically	upon	the	activities	of	Research	Ethics	
Boards	 (REBs).	 Thus	 far,	 much	 of	 the	 critical	 Indigenous	 analysis	 demonstrates	 that	 a	
considerable	 amount	 of	 REB	 activity	 impinges	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 First	 Nation	 researchers	 and	
participants	 to	 pursue	 knowledge	 construction	 in	 ways	 that	 suit	 the	 epistemological	
‘requirements’	 of	 them	 and	 their	 communities.	 Informed	 by	 the	 author’s	 reflections	 on	 the	
institutional	ethics	process	and	research	with	First	Nations,	 those	of	 Indigenous	Canadian	and	
New	Zealand	research	participants,	and	the	extant	literature,	this	paper	critiques	the	processes	
employed	 by	New	 Zealand	REBs	 to	 assess	 Indigenous‐led	 criminological	 research.	 Key	 issues	
identified	 include	 a)	 a	 general	 lack	 of	 experience	 and	 expertise	 amongst	 REB	 members	 in	
researching	with	 Indigenous	 peoples	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 of	 the	 research	methodologies	
(including	ethics	protocols)	of	First	Nation	peoples;	b)	the	tendency	of	REBs	in	Settler	Societies	
to	 privilege	 the	 ‘liberal’	 notion	 of	 the	 autonomous	 research	 subject	 as	 the	 focus	 of	 their	
deliberations	 on	 ‘right	 research’	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 communitarian	 notions	 of	 research	
participation;	and	c)	an	reliance	on	formulaic,	tick‐the‐box	assessment	processes	that	inhibit	the	
development	of	socially	contextualised,	culturally	specific	ethics	protocols.		
	
For	researchers,	new	and	important	discoveries,	changes	in	perspective	and	practice	are	often	
the	outcome	of	reflexivity	on	both	research	and	the	research	process	(Watt	2007).	A	significant	
amount	of		reflective	exploration	relating	to	the	research	processes	has	focused	on	the	issue	of	
ethics	(see	Hallowell	et	al.	2004).	This	paper	seeks	to	add	to	the	reflexive	tradition	by	reporting	
on	the	ethics	process	in	research	at	a	NZ	tertiary	institution,	in	particular	to	explore	the	tensions	
that	arise	in	REBs	imposing	upon	First	Nation	researchers	and	their	advisors	and	participants,	
institutionally‐focused	ethics	protocols.		
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To	assume	that	the	Aboriginal	past	or	knowledge	can	be	adequately	explained	from	
a	 totally	 foreign	 worldview	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 cognitive	 imperialism	 and	 academic	
colonisation.	(Henderson	1997:	23,	emphasis	added)	
	
In	late	October	2009,	the	author	and	then	supervisor	submitted	the	requisite	ethics	forms	to	the	
REB1	at	 the	 institution	where	he	had	recently	enrolled	 for	his	doctorate.	The	research	project	
was	developed	to	explore	criminal	justice	policy	for	indigenous	peoples	in	the	NZ	and	Canadian	
contexts.	 The	 design	 utilised	 direct	 engagement	 with	 First	 Nation	 advisors,	 elders’	 and	
participants.	 This	 is	 approach	 is	 considered	 ethical	 conduct	 within	 indigenous	 research	
practices	(Battiste	2007,	Smith	1999).	As	part	of	the	institutional	requirements	that	have	arisen	
in	New	Zealand	universities,	ethics	applications	are	required	to	explain,	amongst	other	things,	
how	consent	will	be	gained	from	participants.	Pre‐constructed	forms	for	individual	participants	
to	sign	are	a	standard	component	the	application	requirements	of	the	majority	of	Settler	Society	
REBs.	However,	some	REBs	note	 the	 importance	of	recognising	consent	 is	culturally	 informed	
(e.	 g.	 Health	 Research	 Council	 2010).	 The	 researcher	 had	 recognised	 and	 valued	 the	 ethical	
protection	of	indigenous	communities,	and	sought	their	advice	on	ethical	research	practice.		
	
Directed	by	the	advice	of	First	Nation	advisors	in	both	New	Zealand	and	Canada,	the	protocols	
were	 constructed	 through	 direct	 collaboration	 with	 participants,	 elders’	 councils	 and	
experienced	 First	 Nation	 researchers	 in	 both	 jurisdictions.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 collaborative	
process,	 a	 research	 protocol	 was	 developed	 that	 privileged	 collective	 strategies	 for	 eliciting	
informed	 consent	 and	 gathering	 data.2	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 collaboratively	 constructed,	
community‐centred	 and	 contextualised	 research	 protocols	 developed	 by	 the	 author	 and	 his	
potential	participants,	the	REB	in	question	followed	a	heavily	standardised	process	for	assessing	
the	ethicality	of	both	a	researcher	and	specific	project.	It	was	evident	from	even	a	cursory	glance	
at	 the	 relevant	 background	 documents	 issued	 by	 the	 REB,	 supplemented	 by	 communications	
between	the	author,	his	supervisor	and	members	of	the	committee,	that	the	focus	of	their	ethics	
deliberations	centred	on	 institutionally‐defined	risk	avoidance	and	 thus,	 the	empowerment	of	
the	 institution	 to	 which	 they	 belonged	 (see	 for	 example,	 www.aut.ac.nz/research/research‐
ethics	 for	 the	 core	 documents,	 guidelines	 and	 protocols	 of	 the	 REB	 in	 question).	 The	
researcher’s	 previous	 experience	with	 REBs	 in	New	 Zealand,	 and	 as	 an	 occasional	 advisor	 to	
Maori	post‐graduates	applying	to	REBs	and	their	processes,	meant	that	resistance	to	the	ethics	
protocols	he	had	presented	in	the	application	was	highly	anticipated.3	This	was	due	in	the	main	
to	 the	decision	 to	privilege	 the	 ethics	protocols	 favoured	by	Maori	 and	Canadian	First	Nation	
participants	in	the	first	instance.		
	
The	 REB	 in	 question	 had	 already	 rejected	 a	 previous	 version	 of	 the	 proposal	 submitted	 in	
August	2009,	in	which	the	author	had	already	informed	the	REBs	that	privileging	of	individual‐
focused	 protocols	 for	 eliciting	 informed	 consent	 was	 not	 appropriate	 for	 the	 research.	
Subsequently,	 the	 author	 and	 his	 supervisor	 carried	 out	 further	 consultation	 and	 discussions	
with	research	advisors	and	participants	before	resubmitting	 the	application	 in	 late	October	of	
that	year.	The	revised	submission	included	a	thorough	critique	of	the	REB	rationale	for	rejecting	
the	 previous	 submission,	 while	 offering	 a	 dual‐consent	 process	 that	 ensured	 the	 researcher	
would	avoid	behaving	 ‘unethically’,	as	defined	by	First	Nation	participants.	The	author	and	his	
supervisor	 also	 sought	 to	 placate	 the	 REB	 by	 offering	 to	 use	 their	 preferred,	 individualised	
process;	as	set	out	in	this	extract	from	the	second	submission:	
	
Discussions	 between	 the	 primary	 researcher	 and	 First	 Nation	 advisors	 for	 this	
project	 indicate	 that	 the	 consent‐related	 processes	 preferred	 by	 ...	 University	 are	
unethical	 and	 culturally	 inappropriate	 for	 research	 engagement	 with	 these	 First	
Nations.	 It	would	appear	then	that	a	compromise	 is	required,	and	so	 the	 following	
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process	will	be	used	 to	satisfy	 the	requirements	of	 ...	with	 regards	confirmation	of	
informed	consent:	All	individual	participants	in	the	research	will	be	informed	of	the	
purpose	of	the	research	either	verbally,	or	through	receipt	of	a	written	copy	of	the	
PIS,	 which	 will	 be	 offered	 to	 them	 prior	 to	 primary	 researcher	 reading	 out	 the	
document	 ...	 The	 process	 required	 by	 ...	 University	 will	 be	 explained	 to	 all	
participants,	who	will	be	informed	that	the	requirements	of	the	institution	privileges	
informed	 consent	 evidenced	 through	 written,	 signed	 documents	 ...	 research	
participants	will	be	provided	an	opportunity	at	this	stage	of	the	process	to	respond	
to	the	request	for	written	confirmation	...	If	they	do	not	assent	[sic]	to	the	...	process	
then	the	primary	researcher	will	acknowledge	this	fact	in	their	research	notes	from	
that	particular	session.		
	
As	anticipated,	the	REB	rejected	the	compromise	offered	by	the	author	and	continued	to	attempt	
to	 force	 upon	 him	 and	 the	 research	 participants	 their	 preferred,	 individualised	 consent	 and	
ethics	 process.	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 more	 months	 were	 lost	 by	 the	 author	 and	 his	 supervisor	
negotiating	 with	 the	 REB	 in	 question,	 before	 we	 finally	 received	 formal	 institutional	 ethical	
approval	in	April	2010.	As	indicated	in	endnote	two,	the	author	added	questions	relating	to	the	
issues	arising	 from	 the	REB	process	 to	his	 research	 schedule.	The	 responses	of	Canadian	and	
Maori	 research	participants	 to	 these	questions	 form	an	 important	part	 of	 the	 critical	 analysis	
offered	in	the	second	part	of	this	paper.	However,	before	this	analysis	is	presented,	the	growing	
Indigenous	critique	of	the	institutionalised	ethics	process	is	explored.	
	
The	Indigenous	Critique	of	Research	Ethics	Boards	
Recently,	a	number	of	First	Nation	researchers	have	criticised	the	role	some	REBs	operating	in	
Settler	 Societies	 play	 in	 stifling	 Indigenous‐led,	 community‐centred	 research,	 whether	 in	
criminology	or	other	social	sciences.	A	common	theme	of	the	Indigenous	critique	has	been	the	
contribution	made	by	REBs	 in	 the	 colonising	project	 that	was,	 and	 is,	 ‘Western’	 research	 (e.g.	
Absolon	 2008;	 Bishop	 1998;	 Ellis	 and	 Earley	 2006;	 Glass	 and	 Kaufert	 2007;	 Schnarch	 2004;	
Smith	1999a;	Wax	1991).	 Indigenous	and	non‐Indigenous	academic	 critique	of	REBs	covers	a	
broad	range	of	issues,	including	(but	by	no	means	exclusively):	
	
 Individualism:	marked	 by	 the	 privileging	 of	 the	 autonomous	 research	 participant,	 and	
informed	 consent	 processes	 that	 force	 individualised	 protocols	 upon	 collectives	 (see	
Ellis	and	Earley	2006;	Glass	and	Kaufert	2007:	32‐33;	Piquemal	2000).	
 Limited	 expertise:	members	 of	 REBs	 often	 lack	 adequate	 disciplinary,	 epistemological	
and	 methodological	 expertise	 in	 Indigenous	 research/issues,	 resulting	 in	 an	 over‐
reliance	 on	 tick‐the‐box	 approaches	 that	 ensure	 the	 hegemony	 of	 institutionally‐
acceptable	protocols	(see	Smith	1997).	
 Universalistic	tendencies:	characterised	by	a	propensity	for	utilising	research	and	ethics	
processes	 based	 on	 Eurocentric	 notions	 of	 ‘right’	 (research)	 conduct,	 and	 essentialist	
notions	of	what	does/does	not	constitute	an	ethical	researcher	which,	when	combined,	
result	 in	 the	eulogising	of	 the	 ‘individual’	participant	and	 the	marginalisation	of	 social	
groups	 that	 utilise	 collectivist	 processes	 for	 guiding	 knowledge	 construction	 and	
dissemination	(see	Battiste	and	Henderson	2000;	Ermine	2000;	Wilson	2004).	
 Formulism:	a	reliance	on	standardised,	 formulaic,	 ‘tick‐the‐box’	approaches	to	research	
and	ethics	 that	mask	 the	 complexity	of	 the	 social	 context	within	which	 research	 takes	
place	(see	Hammersley	2006).	
	
In	 essence,	 as	 a	 researcher,	 the	 experience	 of	 REB	 conduct	 and	 the	 experiences	 of	 similar	
processes	shared	by	other	First	Nation	researchers,	correlates	with	the	issues	identified	in	the	
extant	 literature.	This	 is	especially	 true	of	 issues	 relating	 to	consent	and	preference	of	Settler	
Society	REBs	for	privileging	individual‐focused	research	protocols.	This	paper	will	focus	solely	
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on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 dominance	 and	 impact	 upon	 the	 Indigenous	 research	 context,	 of	 Settler	
Society	REBs	privileging	of	universalistic	notions	of	‘right’	conduct.	
	
Universalism	
	
[T]he	white	man	takes	his	own	mythology,	Indo‐European	mythology,	his	own	logos,	
that	is,	the	mythos	of	his	idiom,	for	the	universal	form	that	he	must	still	wish	to	call	
Reason.	(Jacques	Derrida	1982:	213)	
	
Universalism	 refers	 in	 the	 research	 context	 to	 ideological	presentations	 that	portray	Western	
‘social	scientific’	research	methods	and	methodologies	as	applicable	to	any	and/in	all	social	and	
cultural	contexts.	The	philosophical	principles	underpinning	 research‐related	universalism	are	
presented	by	Battiste	and	Henderson	(2000:	134)	as	follows:	
	
Eurocentric	thought	would	like	to	categorise	Indigenous	knowledge	and	heritage	as	
being	 peculiarly	 local,	 merely	 a	 subset	 of	 Eurocentric	 universal	 categories	 …	 It	
suggests	 one	 main	 stream	 and	 diversity	 as	 a	 mere	 tributary	 ...	 [t]ogether	
mainstreaming	 and	 universality	 create	 cognitive	 imperialism,	 which	 establishes	 a	
dominant	 group’s	 knowledge,	 experience,	 culture,	 and	 language	 as	 the	 universal	
norm.		
	
It	is	argued	here	that	the	research‐related	universalism	presents	as	a	key	operating	principle	for	
REBs	operating	 in	 Settler	 Societies	 such	as	New	Zealand.	This	 claim	 is	 evidenced	 through	 the	
type	of	case	study	that	forms	the	basis	of	this	paper,	as	well	as	other	Indigenous	commentaries	
(Battiste	 2007;	 Coram	 2011).	 Universalism	works	 as	 a	 dominant	 operational	 principle	 in	 the	
Settler	Society	context	despite	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	REBs	operating	in	the	context	offer	
guidelines	with	instructions	that	exhort	researchers	(and,	one	presumes,	the	REBs	themselves)	
to	 ‘respect	 difference’	 (e.g.	 see	 the	 ethics	 guidelines	 offered	 by	 the	 Health	 Research	 Council	
2010;	the	Ministry	of	Social	Development	2002;	and	AUT	University).		
	
The	 universalism	 that	 appears	 inherent	 in	 institutionalised	 ethics	 processes	 is	 based	 on	 a	
foundational	myth	 of	 contemporary	Western	 scholarship:	 that	 ‘White	 knowledge’	 is	 the	 only	
knowledge	worthy	of	consideration	and	only	‘white	approaches’	to	gathering	knowledge	can	be	
‘ethical’.	It	appears,	as	Best	describes	it	(cited	in	Ermine	2000:	62)	to	be	a	‘...	a	dictatorship	of	the	
fragment,	the	privileging	of	Eurocentrically‐derived	protocols,	leading	to	the	marginalisation	of	
the	“Other”’.	Furthermore,	it	is	founded	on	an	assumption	that	ethical	research	conduct	is	only	
possible	when	overseen	by	institutionally‐driven,	formalised	processes.	Arguably,	this	situation	
exists	 because	 of	 the	 mistaken	 assumption	 that	 the	 morals	 necessary	 for	 governing	 ‘ethical’	
research	activity	can	be	separated	from	‘real	life’	and	reduced	to	a	standardised	list	of	rules.	In	
contrast,	Christians	 (2007:	438)	argues	 that	 ‘[e]thics	 is	 located	 in	 the	sociocultural	 first	of	 all,	
instead	 of	 in	 rational	 prescriptions	 and	 impartial	 reflection’.	 From	 this	 position,	 because	 it	 is	
organic	 and	 socio‐culturally	 centred,	 ‘research	 ethics’	 or	 what	 constitutes	 ‘right	 conduct’	 is	
founded	 on	 the	 process,	 and	 within	 the	 site,	 of	 engagement	 between	 researcher(s)	 and	
participant(s).	In	comparison,	the	ethics	process	confronted	by	the	author	in	late	2009	‘assumes	
that	one	model	of	research	fits	all	forms	of	inquiry	…	[which]	presumes	a	static,	monolithic	view	
of	the	human	subject;	that	is	someone	upon	whom	research	is	done’	(Denzin	2008:	104).		
	
Perhaps	the	best	summation	of	the	risk	posed	to	Indigenous	research,	Indigenous	researchers,	
and	 Indigenous	 participants,	 from	 the	 foundational	 principle	 of	 (research	 and	 ethics‐based)	
universalism,	is	found	in	the	views	of	one	of	the	author’s	key	informants,	who	stated	that:	
	
The	issue	seems	to	me	to	be	about	their	[the	REBs]	authority,	and	not	about	the	best	
way	of	going	about	this	business.	As	Maori	we	have	the	right	to	determine	how	both	
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insiders	and	outsiders	 research	with	us	 ...	 reading	 that	document	 [the	REBs	written	
response	 to	 the	 author’s	 second	 ethics	 application]	 reads	 like	 they	 didn’t	want	 to	
understand	because	 it	was	easier	to	stick	with	what	 they	know.	That	 is	not	a	system	
based	on	everyone	being	the	same	[Universalism],	but	on	everyone	being	like	them.	It	
is	condescending	to	the	extreme	to	tell	us	our	ways	are	unethical.	(MII2)	
	
The	Condescending	Ethics	of	Research	Ethics	Boards	
	
‘Condescending	 ethics’	 –	 positions	 participants	 as	 the	 ‘Other’,	 reinforces	
powerlessness,	 and	 further	 marginalises	 them	 with	 knowledge	 production	
processes.	(Reid	and	Brief	2009:	83)	
	
We	 might	 begin	 to	 understand	 the	 current	 situation	 by	 analysing	 institutionalised	 ethics	
processes	 in	New	Zealand,	and	other	Settler	Societies,	as	a	contemporary	manifestation	of	 the	
condescending	ethos	 that	has	 informed	 the	practice	base	 for	 the	academies	 research	 activities	
regarding	First	Nations,	 since	 the	beginning	 of	 colonisation	 (Agozino	2003;	 Smith	1999).	 The	
condescension	of	institutionalised	REBs	and	their	processes	relates	directly	to	their	preference	
for	 individualised	 research	 ethics,	 and	 the	 categorisation	 of	 the	 ‘subject’	 as	 an	 autonomous	
entity	 to	 be	 engaged	 in	meaningful	ways	after	 the	 institutionally‐focused	 review	 process	 has	
been	undertaken.	And	it	 is	 in	this	subjugation	of	the	research	subject	that	we	find	the	basis	of	
the	institutional	form,	which	according	to	Eikeland	(2006:	42)	is	coloured	by	‘...	a	condescending	
attitude	following	almost	logically	from	its	own	point	of	view,	that	is,	position,	and	implied	in	its	
research	techniques,	be	they	observation,	experimentation,	interviews,	or	surveys’.	
	
Butz’s	 invocation	 of	 Habermas’	 concept	 of	 communicative	 action	 in	 relation	 to	 his	 own	
experiences	of	REBs,	provides	a	helpful	schema	for	understanding	the	condescending	ethos	of	
the	institutionalised	ethics	processes	discussed	here.	According	to	Butz,	Habermas	distinguishes	
between	 two	 principle	 forms	 of	 ‘action’	 in	 late	 modernity,	 Instrumental	 and	 Communicative.	
Instrumental	 action	 is	 ‘oriented	 to	 technical	 manipulation	 and	 control,	 and	 communicative	
action	 to	 the	 ideal	 of	 intersubjective	 understanding	 and	 consensus	 among	 individuals’	 (Butz	
2008:	250).	As	Butz	states	(2008:	250,	emphasis	his):	
	
The	 former	 is	 outcome	 oriented,	 the	 latter	 process	 oriented.	 For	 Habermas,	
communicative	action	 is	ethically	prior	to	 instrumental	action,	 in	 that	 the	 justice	of	
an	 outcome	 is	 contingent	 on	 the	 justice	 of	 the	 process	 that	 yielded	 it.	 In	
contemporary	modernity,	he	argues,	the	communicative	effort	to	reach	consensus	is	
frequently	sacrificed	to	the	imperative	of	bureaucratic	efficiency.	
	
It	is	easy	to	view	the	author’s	experience	of	REBs	in	New	Zealand	(and,	according	to	the	extant	
literature,	other	Settler	societies),	in	this	vein,	especially:		
	
...	[w]hen	it	is	assumed	that	the	problem	of	voluntary	informed	consent	is	solved	by	
asking	 participants	 individually	 to	 sign	 written	 consent	 agreements	 regardless	 of	
the	 research	 context,	 then	 a	 fully	 communicative	 appreciation	 of	 the	 adjectives	
voluntary	 and	 informed	 are	 subordinated	 to	 the	 instrumental	 purposes	 of	 the	
monitoring	 and	 controlling	 attached	 to	 the	 noun	 consent.	 (Butz	 2008:	 251	 –	
emphasis	his)		
	
Central	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 condescending	 nature	 of	 REB	 process	 and	 Indigenous	
research,	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 power.	 In	 the	 mythology	 of	 the	 development	 of	 contemporary	
research	ethics,	REBs	 arose	 from	concerns	of	power	 imbalances	between	 the	 researcher	 –	 all	
powerful,	and	therefore	 ‘potentially	dangerous’	–	and	the	research	subject	–	powerless	and	 in	
need	 of	 protection,	 provided,	 of	 course,	 by	 REBs	 as	 the	 independent	 arbiter	 of	 ‘righteous	
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research	 conduct’	 (Juritzen,	 Grimen	 and	 Heggen	 2011).	 Juritzen	 et	 al.	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	
expanding	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 power	 in	 the	 researcher‐research	 subject	 relationship	 to	
critically	encompass	‘ethics	committees	as	one	among	several	actors	that	exert	power	and	that	
act	 in	 a	 relational	 interplay	 with	 researchers	 and	 participants’	 (2011:	 640).	 Thus,	 given	 the	
considerable	power	REBs	wield,	 they	cannot	be	exempt	from	critical	commentary.	Let	us	now	
turn	to	explaining	how	and	why	condescending	ethics	processes	manifest	 themselves	through	
institutionally‐derived	REBs.	
	
Lack	of	Expertise,	REBs	and	Condescending	Ethics	
The	reported	experiences	of	First	Nation	commentators	and	researchers	points	consistently	to	
one	 key	 source	 of	 discontent	 with	 REBs	 which,	 in	 the	 author’s	 experience,	 is	 key	 to	
understanding	the	condescending	nature	of	the	interactions	between	these	institutional	bodies	
and	 First	 Nation	 people:	 that	 the	 membership	 of	 REBs	 is	 often	 lacking	 experience	 and	
knowledge	 of	 First	 Nation	 communities,	 and	 the	 core	 principles	 and	 practices	 related	 to	
research	 (Smith	 1999).	 Too	 often	 committees	 dominated	 by	 non‐Indigenous	 academics	 and	
external	advisors	who	then	decide	what	is/is	not	an	appropriate	set	of	ethics	protocols,	without	
the	requisite	socio‐cultural	experience	and	authority	(Glass	and	Kaufert	2007).		
	
In	similar	vein,	van	den	Hoonaard	(2006:	269)	contends	that	the	issue	for	many	researchers	are	
not	 the	 ethics	 protocols	 and	 guidelines	 developed	 by	 REBs	 to	 guide	 post‐graduate	 and	
researcher	conduct,	but	rather	how	these	protocols	are	interpreted	and	employed	by	committee	
members;	especially	where	members	clearly	have	little	experience	of	the	context	within	which	
proposed	 research	 is	 to	 take	 place.	 This	 argument	 is	 supported	 by	 significant	 literature	 (e.g.,	
Anthony	2004;	Bradley	2007;	Haggerty	2003)	and	backed	by	comments	made	by	the	author’s	
research	participants,	including	one	who	stated	that:		
	
In	my	dealings	with	IRBs,	I	 find	they	will	have	a	standard	ethics	guidelines;	go	to	the	
bibliography	and	all	the	usual	experts	are	there,	Henderson,	Smith	 ...	they	[REBs]	say	
the	 right	 things,	 consult,	 engage,	 privilege	 [the	 Indigenous],	 but	 the	 practice	 is	
different.	Mainly	white	committees,	no	experience	of	us,	who	 revert	 to	 their	ways,	 to	
what	they	understand	to	be	right.	(CII3)	
	
Arguably,	 in	 the	case	of	 Indigenous‐focused	research,	the	lack	of	knowledge	and	experience	of	
the	 research	 context	 is	 of	 greater	 risk	 to	 both	 researcher	 and	 participants	 than	 lack	 of	
disciplinary	 expertise.	 Hammersley	 (2006:	 4)	 describes	 the	 dangers	 thus:	 ‘Researchers’	
decisions	 about	 how	 to	 pursue	 their	 inquiries	 involve	 weighting	 ethical	 and	 other	
considerations	 against	 one	 another,	 and	 this	 requires	 detailed	 knowledge	 of	 the	 contexts	
concerned’.		
	
By	 drawing	 conclusions	 on	 the	 ethics	 of	 research	 situations	 they	 have	 little	 expertise	 in	 or	
knowledge	 of,	 and	 ignoring	 advice	 from	 those	 with	 the	 relevant	 experience,	 REBs	 place	
Indigenous	 researchers	 and	 their	 research	 participants	 in	 danger	 of	 carrying	 out	 or	
experiencing	 ‘unethical	 institutionalised	research’.	Hammersley	(2006:	6)	summarises	 the	key	
issue	thus:	
	
What	is	involved	here,	to	a	large	extent,	is	a	great	pretence:	ethics	committees	are	to	
operate	 as	 if	 making	 research	 decisions	 were	 a	 matter	 of	 applying	 a	 coherent	
[standardised]	set	of	ethical	rules	that	do	not	conflict	with	any	other	considerations,	
or	 that	override	 them,	 and	 that	 good	decisions	 can	be	made	without	having	much	
contextual	knowledge.		
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Conclusion	
One	of	the	key	motivators	for	the	rise	of	Indigenous	commentators’	critique	of	Western	modes	
of	knowledge	construction,	 especially	ethics	processes,	was	 the	role	 that	research	activity	has	
played	 in	 both	 the	 colonial	 and	 neo‐colonial	 contexts	 process	 in	 marginalising	 First	 Nation	
peoples	(Tauri	2009).	If	we	are	to	successfully	challenge	Eurocentric	hegemony	over	knowledge	
construction,	then	it	is	imperative	that	we	challenge	the	power	and	authority	the	academy	has	
over	 the	 knowledge	 production	 process;	 a	 process,	 and	 authority	 that	 is	 centralised	 within	
institutionally‐centred	 bodies	 such	 as	 REBs.	 One	 response	 is	 quite	 clear:	 for	 First	 Nations	 to	
develop	their	own	ethics	processes	that	provide	support	to	Indigenous	researchers	and	to	First	
Nation	peoples	confronted	by	the	condescending	ethos	of	 the	Academy	(although	 it	 is	beyond	
the	scope	of	this	paper	to	provide	greater	detail	on	how	such	bodies	might	work	and	what	they	
might	 look	 like).	 This	 ‘radical’	 call	 to	 action	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	
marginalise	 institutionally‐based	 REBs.	 Instead,	 it	 should	 interpreted	 as	 a	 call	 to	 construct	
Indigenous‐dominated	processes	that	have	as	their	first	duty,	the	protection	of	our	researchers	
and	research	participants	from	the	well	documented	problems	First	Nation	peoples	have	with	
institutionalised	 ethics	 processes	 in	 Settler	 Societies.	 ‘Doing	 it	 for	 ourselves’	 is	 an	 essential	
response	 to	 the	 well‐recorded	 issues	 with	 REBs,	 and	 is	 our	 right	 under	 the	 banner	 of	 self‐
determination.	For	while	we	might	grudgingly	acknowledge	that	the	stated	intentions	of	REBs	
and	their	members	are	‘to	do	good’	and	to	protect	the	vulnerable,	it	must	also	be	acknowledged	
that	in	the	first	instance	REBs	will	always	be	wedded	to	the	institutions	from	which	they	derive	
and	which	they	serve;	for	as	Bradley	(2007:	341)	relates:	
	
By	 controlling	 the	models	 of	 research,	who	 gets	 to	 speak	 and	how	 subjects	 get	 to	
represent	 themselves,	 IRBs	 are	 in	 a	 powerful	 position	 as	 part	 of	 the	 institutional	
structure.	 In	 this	 position	 they	 can,	 and	 often	 do,	 silence	 the	 voices	 of	 the	
marginalised	and	perpetuate	an	academic	political	 economy	and	a	 traditional	 top‐
down	 research	and	professional	model	 that	quantify	 and	objectify	human	 lives	by	
keeping	them	nameless,	faceless	and	voiceless.		
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 The	title	by	which	institutional	ethics	review	boards	are	known	can	vary	depending	on	geographic	 location,	 for	
example	 in	 the	US	 they	 are	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 RECs	 and	 IRBs,	while	 in	 Canada	 they	 are	 designated	REBs	 or	
GREBs.	The	term	REB	is	used	here	to	refer	to	all	committees	of	this	kind.		
2		 The	author	carried	out	thorough,	community‐level	negotiations	to	ensure	the	development	of	protocols	deemed	
‘ethical’	 by	 Maori	 and	 Canadian	 First	 Nations	 participants.	 The	 negotiations	 took	 place	 over	 a	 sixteen	 month	
period	via	phone,	email	and	during	two	visits	to	the	region	of	Canada	where	part	of	the	research	project	was	to	
take	 place.	 For	 the	 New	 Zealand	 context,	 the	 author	 was	 advised	 on	 appropriate	 research	 ethics	 by	 three	
prominent	Maori	researchers,	and	relied	in	part	on	extensive	research	and	engagement	with	Maori	communities	
over	 the	 previous	 15	 years	working	 in	 the	 academy	 and	 as	 a	 government	 official	working	 directly	with	Maori	
communities.		
3		 At	 around	 the	 same	 time,	 other	 Maori	 commentators	 were	 carrying	 out	 projects	 focused	 on	 concerns	 with	
institutional	ethics	processes,	including	the	protocols	of	REBs	and	their	impact	on	Maori	researchers	and	research	
participants	(e.g	Palmer	2009).		
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Abstract	
Like	many	 cautionary	 tales,	The	Hunger	Games	 takes	 as	 its	major	 premise	 an	 observation	
about	 contemporary	 society,	measuring	 its	 ballistic	 arc	 in	 order	 to	 present	 graphically	 its	
logical	conclusions.	The	Hunger	Games	gazes	back	to	the	panem	et	circenses	of	Ancient	Rome,	
staring	 equally	 cynically	 forward,	 following	 the	 trajectory	 of	 reality	 television	 to	 its	
unbearably	barbaric	end	point	–	a	sadistic	voyeurism	for	an	effete	elite	of	consumers.	At	each	
end	 of	 the	 historical	 spectrum	 (and	 in	 the	 present),	 the	 prevailing	 social	 form	 is	 Arendt’s	
animal	 laborans.	 Consumer	or	 consumed,	Panem’s	population	 is	 (with	 the	exception	of	 the	
inner	circle)	either	deprived	of	the	possibility	of,	or	distracted	from,	political	action.		
	
Within	 the	 confines	 of	 the	 Games	 themselves,	 Law	 is	 abandoned	 or	 de‐realised:	 Law	 –	 an	
elided	Other	in	the	pseudo‐Hobbesian	nightmare	that	is	the	Arena.	The	Games	are	played	out,	
as	 were	 gladiatorial	 combats	 and	 other	 diversions	 of	 the	 Roman	 Empire,	 against	 a	
background	resonant	of	Juvenal’s	concern	for	his	contemporaries’	attachment	to	short	term	
gratification	 at	 the	 expense	 the	 civic	 virtues	of	 justice	 and	 caring	which	 are	 (or	would	 be)	
constitutive	of	a	contemporary	form	of	Arendt’s	homo	politicus.		
	
While	 the	 Games	 are,	 on	 their	 face,	 ‘reality’	 they	 are	 (like	 the	 realities	 presented	 in	
contemporary	reality	television)	a	simulated	reality,	de‐realised	in	a	Foucauldian	set	design	
constructed	 as	 a	 distraction	 for	 Capitol,	 and	 for	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 Districts,	 a	 constant	
reminder	 of	 their	 subservience	 to	 Capitol.	 Yet	 contemporary	 Western	 culture,	 for	 which	
manipulative	reality	TV	is	but	a	symptom	of	an	underlying	malaise,	is	inscribed	at	least	as	an	
incipient	Panem,	Its	public/political	space	is	diminished	by	the	effective	slavery	of	the	poor,	
the	 pre‐occupation	 with	 and	 distractions	 of	 materiality	 and	 modern	 media,	 and	 the	
increasing	concentration	of	power/wealth	into	a	smaller	proportion	of	the	population.	
	
	
Man	…	nor	woman	neither	…	never	 is,	but	always	 to	be,	blessed.	 (Alexander	Pope,	
‘Essay	on	Man’,	with	assistance	from	Hamlet)	
	
Survivor	 is	evil	…	because	 it’s	 a	 revival	of	 the	Roman	Colosseum.	People	are	doing	
each	other	in	just	to	entertain	a	bunch	of	boobs.	(‘Mimetic	and	Monstrous	Act	in	the	
Hunger	Games’1)	
	
Introduction		
The	Hunger	 Games	 –	 the	 first	 of	 three	 novels	 in	 Suzanne	 Collins’s	 trilogy	 –	 presents	 a	 stark	
rendition	of	life	in	a	reconstructed	post‐Apocalyptic	North	America,	the	nation‐state	of	Panem.	
Panem	 has	 been	 rebuilt	 to	 the	 extremes	 of	 conspicuous	 consumption,	 self	 gratification,	 the	
vapid	celebration	of	youth	and	beauty,	and	a	decadent	and	sadistic	voyeurism	–	at	least	for	the	
residents	of	Capitol,	who	mirror	 the	Ancient	Roman	elite,	 supported	by	a	 ruthlessly	exploited	
population	 in	 ‘the	Districts’.	Their	occupations	seem,	so	 far	as	 they	appear,	 to	be	dedicated	 to	
aims	which	reflect	those	of	makeover	reality	TV	and	the	cult	of	celebrity,	a	life	which	is	‘utterly	
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artificial,	deeply	superficial,	a	triumph	of	exterior	presentation	over	inner	content,’	(Dixon	2007:	
60)	and	where	‘mindless	vanity	meets	amoral	medical	technology’	(Dixon	2007:	59).	
	
At	 the	 core	 of	 this	 cautionary	 tale	 are	 the	Games	 themselves:	 a	hi‐tech	 gladiatorial	 last‐child‐
standing	battle	staged	annually.	Twenty	four	adolescents,	two	from	each	of	the	12	Districts,	are	
chosen	 at	 random	 in	 a	 public	 ceremony	 styled	 the	 ‘reaping’	 –	 the	 survivor’s	 District	 will	 be	
showered	with	gifts	for	the	coming	year,	and	the	survivor	is	guaranteed	a	life	of	ease	back	home,	
‘untroubled	by	 the	 financial	 cares	of	 the	 everyday	world’	 (Dixon	2007:	53).	 Is	 it	 beginning	 to	
sound	familiar,	resonating	as	it	does	with	the	foundational,	if	illusory,	promises	of	much	reality	
TV.2	
	
For	 Jameson,	text	 is	a	surface	on	which	 is	written	a	continuous	and	collective	narrative	of	 the	
struggle	 to	 wrest	 ‘a	 realm	 of	 Freedom	 from	 a	 realm	 of	 Necessity’	 (Jameson	 2002:	 3).3	 For	
Arendt,	the	struggle	is	conceived	as	the	transcendence	of	the	mere	existence	of	animal	laborans	
(Arendt	 1968:	 199)	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 homo	 politicus.	 The	 residents	 of	 the	 Districts	 are	
quintessentially	 animal	 laborans,	 their	 lives	 consumed	 ‘with	 the	 acquisition	 of	 food’	 (Collins	
2012:	 378),	 immiserated	 to	 ‘the	 biological	 process	 of	 the	 human	 body,	 whose	 spontaneous	
growth,	metabolism	 and	 eventual	 decay	 are	 bound	 to	 the	 vital	 necessities	…	 fed	 into	 the	 life	
process	by	labour’	(Arendt	1959:	9).	The	residents	of	Capitol,	who	do	not	seem	to	labour	in	any	
conventional	sense,	are	nonetheless	equally	animal	 laborans.	Futility	is	their	labour	and	life	as	
‘dedicated	followers	of	fashion’	(see	Levin	1979:	528).		
	
As	labourer	or	fashionista,	each	is	denied	Arendt’s	redemption	from	labour	through	the	‘free	life	
of	political	action’	(Levin	1979:	528),	reserved	to	the	shadowy	power	within	Capitol	who	control	
Panem	–	a	perverse	homo	politicus,	since	their	co‐option	of	political	power	is	exercised,	not	as	
Arendt	 would	 optimistically	 suggest,	 to	 ‘inspire	 admiration	 in	 the	 present	 and	 future	 ages’	
(Arendt	 1959:	 176)	 or	 to	 ‘prove	 themselves		 of	 a	 “divine”	 nature’	 (Arendt	 1959:	 19),	 but	
simply	to	retain	the	‘absolute	domination	of	the	political’	(Hirvonen	2011:	102;	cf	Orwell	2004:	
329‐49).	
	
Panem’s	circenses	
The	Games	are	a	brutal	and	brutalising	demonstration	of	Capitol’s	power.	Having	crushed	the	
rebellious	Districts	in	the	Dark	Days,	Capitol’s	power	is	articulated	in	the	Treaty	of	Treason	as	a	
reminder	to	the	Districts	of	their	total	subjugation	to	Capitol	–	a	political	artefact	to	discipline	
and	punish	 those	who	would	 rise	up	 against	 authority.4	 Symbolically,	 the	Games	 are	Orwell’s	
dystopian	vision	of	a	‘boot	stamping	on	a	human	face,	for	ever’	(Orwell	2004,	334).		
	
District	 12’s	 tributes,	 Peeta	 Mellark	 and	 Katniss	 Everdeen,	 are	 a	 unique	 pairing.	 When	 her	
twelve	year	old	 sister,	Prim,	 is	 selected	at	 the	Reaping,	Katniss	 instinctively	volunteers	 in	her	
place.	 Peeta,	 the	 male	 tribute,	 just	 happens	 to	 have	 carried	 an	 unrequited	 infatuation	 with	
Katniss	 from	 their	 first	 day	 at	 school.	 Superficially,	 Katniss’s	 reaction	 calls	 to	 mind	 that	 of	
Theseus,	who	takes	 the	place	of	an	Athenian	 tribute	selected	 to	be	sacrificed	 to	 the	Minotaur.	
Her	self‐sacrificial	act,	however,	is	not	premeditated.	It	is,	in	fact,	neither	a	moral	nor	a	political	
decision,	 nor	 is	 it	 intended	 as	 a	 direct	 challenge	 to	 Capitol.	 It	 is	 a	 spontaneous,	 emotional	
reaction	to	her	sister’s	selection.	Theseus’s	insinuation	into	the	Athenian	tributes	was	a	planned	
attempt	to	end	Minos’s	continuing	domination	of	Athens	–	both	moral	and	political	acts.		
	
The	Games	themselves	present,	in	the	starkest	of	settings,	a	physical	and	cultural	space	in	which	
tributes	are	reduced	to	savagery,	wrestling	with	a	panoptic	and	manipulated	Nature,	 their	co‐
tributes	and	 themselves,	 for	 the	mere	possibility	of	survival.	Each	 is,	despite	alliances	such	as	
that	 formed	 between	 Katniss	 and	 Rue	 from	 District	 11,	 ultimately	 reduced	 to	 a	
singular/atomistic	 entity,	 decoupled	 from	 any	 form	 of	 the	 social	 since	 the	 shifting	 alliances	
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which	 form	and	reform	are	captive	to	the	zero‐sum	rule	of	the	Games,	which	renders	all	such	
alliances	futile.	
	
Katniss’s	predicament	metaphorises	the	imposition	of	a	 ‘dominant	cultural	 logic	or	hegemonic	
norm’	(Jameson	1991:	6)	that,	despite	dramatic	shifts	in	cultural	aesthetics,	political	structures	
and	modes	of	interpretation	between	Rome,	today	and	the	dystopic	future,	constantly	refocuses	
on	the	same	essential	struggle	for	power,	and	the	inevitability	of	oppression	as	an	instrumental	
artefact	 of	 power.	 This,	 from	 the	 reader’s	 perspective,	 is	 the	 Jamesonian	 social	 and	 historical	
nightmare,	 ‘a	 vision	 of	 the	 horror	 of	 life	 specifically	 grasped	 through	History	 itself’	 (Jameson	
1986:	72)	…	across	three	time	zones.	
	
Panem	exhibits	a	class	divide	not	simply	on	conventional	socio‐political	 lines,	but	a	 tyrannical	
division	between	 the	 largely	 faceless	 individuals	 exercising	power,	 and	 those	whose	 lives	are	
labour	(in	the	Districts)	and	those	in	Capitol	whose	life	is	apparently	no	more	than	conspicuous	
consumption,	 their	 labour	 a	 version	of	 ‘immateriality’	 (Hesmondhalgh	2010:	272),	 but	 labour	
nonetheless.	Whether	in	the	Districts	or	in	Capitol,	each	is,	in	their	own	way,	a	manifestation	of	
animal	 laborans,	 living	 out	 an	 existence	 which,	 though	 disparate	 in	 terms	 of	 security	 and	
comfort,	 remains	unified	as	 ‘unredeemable	 futility’	 (Arendt	1968,	1999).	Such	 ‘work’	parallels	
modern	Western	 liberalism’s	 valorisation	 of	 labour	 –	 a	 social	 dynamic	where	work	 becomes	
‘more	 than	 just	 earning	 a	 living’,	 but	 ‘incorporates	 and	 takes	over	 daily	 life’,	 encroaching	 into	
‘every	corner	of	everyday	life’	(McRobbie	2002,	99).	
	
Past,	Present	and	Future	–	Reality	TV	in	Transition	
The	Games,	set	in	the	pseudo‐Hobbesian	nightmare	constructed	for	the	amusement	of	Panem’s	
fatuous	elite	and	the	terrorisation	of	the	Districts,	offer	the	opportunity	to	grasp	the	historical	
past	 and	 a	 speculative	 post‐Apocalyptic	 future,	 envisioning	 them	 within	 the	 politico‐cultural	
imaginary	 of	 the	 present.	 One	 of	 the	 21st	 century’s	 manifestations	 of	 that	 struggle,	 the	
debasement	 of	 media	 culture	 to	 forms	 of	 ritual	 humiliation	 and	 exploitation,	 presents	 the	
spectre	of	an	(ever)	transitional	present	whose	socio‐political	roots	lie	in	the	gladiatorial	games	
and	whose	trajectory	points	seemingly	inevitably	towards	the	world	of	the	Games.	
	
At	 the	 far	 reaches	 of	 manipulative	 but	 ‘authentic’	 reality	 TV	 lies	 the	 Survivor‐style	 program.	
These	 construct	 a	 personal	 war	 of	 attrition	 offering	 ‘a	 ‘well	 produced’	 version	 of	 reality	
apparently	 more	 convincing	 than	 the	 transparently	 manipulative	 episodes	 of	 Big	 Brother’	
(Wright	 2004:	 10),	 while	 remaining	 faithful	 to	 the	 tradition	 of	 ‘humiliation	 and	 extreme	
behaviour’	(Mittel	2004:	89)	–	all	contained	in	a	highly	packaged	cultural	 form	(Enzensberger	
1982:	74).	The	battle	between	oppressor	and	oppressed	is,	for	the	contemporary	reader,	buried	
in	 this	 culturally	 comfortable	 trope	 of	 Survivor‐style	 reality	 television,	 snuggled	 in	 a	 cultural	
space	as	 familiar	 to	them	as	Roman	gladiatorial	combat	or	 the	survivalist	mentality	of	a	post‐
Apocalyptic	world	seem	alien.	
	
The	qualities	of	control	and	cruelty	 in	programs	 like	Survivor	 (Brenton	and	Cohen	2003:	114)	
are	 reflected	 and	 magnified	 in	 the	 dehumanisation	 of	 the	 Hunger	 Games	 and	 the	 panoptic	
technology	which	 renders	 them	possible	and	visible	 in	public	 space.	 In	doing	so,	 they	answer	
McDonald’s	rhetorical	 ‘What	if	we	kept	pushing	[the	envelope]	…	What	if	the	ethos	of	Survivor	
and	American	Idol	were	taken	to	its	logical	extreme?’	(McDonald	2012:	19).	Yet	the	only	people	
‘we’,	the	affluent	West,	can	relate	to	are	the	residents	of	Capitol,	‘glutted	with	food,	fashion	and	
reality	 television’	 (Schaffer	 2012:	 75),	 distanced	 from	 the	 realities	 of	 (or	 the	 need	 for)	 the	
political	 by	 the	 same	 distractions	 satirised	 by	 Juvenal:	 silently,	 apathetically	 or	 even	
inadvertently	 relinquishing	political	 action	 to	 the	 few	who	seek	or	 seize	power.	While	we	are	
not	 yet	 wholly	 enmeshed	 with	 the	 bio‐reconstruction	 of	 the	 Capitol‐fashionista,	 surgically	
altered	and	wildly‐maquillaged	 into	a	citizenry	conflating	Lady	Gaga	and	Jocelyn	Wyldenstein,	
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the	 commodification	 of	 beauty	 –	 the	 space	 where	 ‘mindless	 vanity	 meets	 amoral	 medical	
technology’	–	is	underway	and	accelerating	(Dziemianowicz	2004‐03‐31).5	
	
For	the	Games,	the	tributes	are	pushed	and	prodded,	draped	and	depilated	at	the	hands	of	the	
Capitol‐fashionista	to	provide	thematically	titillating	but	commodified	images	for	the	perverse	
delight	of	Capitol’s	viewers.	For	an	American	Idol‐style	pre‐Games	interview,	Katniss	is	rebuilt	
as	a	‘freakish’	un‐made	parody	of	what	Katniss	understands	as	being	human	(what	Reiff	would	
call	 ‘de‐creation’	(Reiff	2006:	98).	The	sexualisation	of	Glimmer	mirrors	the	 threat	 to	civilised	
culture	bequeathed	to	the	West	by	the	glamorisation	and	premature	inscription	of	adult	images	
onto	children.	This	phenomenon,	starkly	embodied	in	the	murder	of	JonBenet	Ramsay,	reads	as	
a	‘flash	point’	signalling	the	social	threat	posed	by	certain	aspects	of	mass	culture	(Giroux	1998:	
34).		
	
The	Games	materialise	and	perfect	the	observation	that	reality	TV	‘anticipates	the	exploitation	
of	…	 the	work	 of	 being	watched,	 a	 form	of	 production	wherein	 consumers	 are	 invited	 to	 sell	
access	 to	 their	 personal	 lives’	 (Hesmondhalgh	 2010	 268),	 although	 for	 the	 tributes,	 the	
invitation	 is	an	offer	 they	can’t	 refuse.	The	Games	valorise	a	 self‐destructive	performativity	of	
teenagers	 for	 the	perverse	entertainment	of	Capitol:	 the	disruption	of	 childhood,	 fitted	 to	 the	
quintessentially	adult	world	of	competition	and	death.	
	
The	Games:	Modernity	and	Civilisation	
It	is,	perhaps,	a	comfortable	assumption	that	we	–	humanity?	Western	liberalism?	–	are	in	some	
substantial	way	different	from	the	barbarity	displayed	in	Ancient	Rome.	Such	a	claim	lies	in	the	
decline	of	death	or	torture	as	punitive/public	spectacles	(see	e.g.	Foucault	1991:	116),6	or	the	
(largely)	successful	sublimation	of	both	the	massed	individual	and	the	collective	id	into	civilised	
and	civilising	social	phenomena,	possessing	a	‘relatively	higher	cultural	value’	(Deri	1939:	325;	
Hart	 1948:	 390).	 Sublimation	 thus	 channels	 human	 aggression	 into	 socially	 positive	 and	
productive	 actions	 conducive	 to	 civilisation,	 less	 dominated	 by	 the	 sadistic	 impulses	 of	 the	
‘primitive’	psyche	(Oesterdiekhoff	2009:	186‐7).	
	
The	 true	 rulers	 of	 Capitol	 are	 a	 visible,	 yet	 invisible	 force	 (Arendt	 1985:	 vi).	 Government	
appears	largely	as	the	uncivilised	traces	inscribed	on	the	bodies	and	minds	of	both	the	residents	
of	 Capitol	 and	 the	 Districts	 through	 the	 sadistic	 mechanisms	 of	 oppression.	 Capitol	 culture	
seemingly	 cannot	 ‘be	 comprehended	 by	 the	 Western	 liberal	 mind’	 (Etlin	 2002:	 2),	 defying	
Foucault’s	 ‘universal	 juridicism	 of	 modern	 society’	 (Foucault	 1991:	 223)	 which	 seems	 to	 fix	
limits	 on	 the	 exercise	 of	 power.	 The	 population	 is	 humiliated	 and	 degraded,	 separated	 from	
their	authentic	selves,	rendered	‘resistless’	(Reiff	2006:	100).	
	
Yet	 the	 world	 of	 Capitol	 is,	 of	 course,	 not	 wholly	 inconceivable	 to	 the	 Western	 mind.	 Its	
conceptualisation,	 however,	 must	 be	 defused	 by	 defensive	 strategies	 differentiating	 the	
oppositional	 forms	 of	 civilised|primitive	 and	 buttressing	 assumptions	 of	 a	 significant	
discontinuity	 ‘between	ancient	 [primitive]	and	modern	modes	of	 thinking’	 (Friedlander	1965:	
500).	Lapses	from	civilisation	are	thus	relegated	to	the	nightmare	Other,	the	product	either	of	a	
non‐Western	 temper	 which	 have	 not	 wholly	 passed	 from	 the	 primitive	 to	 the	 civilised	 (the	
Oriental	or	pre‐modern	‘savage	other’	(Springer	2009:	306),	or	to	modern	Western	regimes	like	
Nazism,	or	indeed	Capitol,	which	have	regressed,	exhibiting	atavistic	impulses	of	[non‐Western	
and	 non‐modern]	 irrationality,	 expressed	 in	 an	 ‘orgy	 of	 mass	 savagery’	 (Douglas	 1998:	 63;	
Haberer	2005:	493).		
	
If	Capitol’s	culture	is	determined	by	the	‘commanding	truths’	it	holds	sacred	(Reiff	2006:	80),	it	
is	expressed	as	an	inverted	anticulture	celebrating	the	perversity	of	suffering,	an	abandonment	
of	 aesthetic	mimesis	paralleling	 the	 abandonment	 of	 ethical	 values	 (McDonald	2012:	 15)	 and	
the	monstrous	realisation	of	self‐referential	power.	To	this	extent,	Capitol	(as	a	political	entity)	
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resonates	 with	 Arendt’s	 characterisation	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 manifestations	 of	
totalitarianism	 as	more	 than	mere	 extensions	 of	 previous	 regimes,	 but	 a	 new	 evil,	 for	whom	
power	is	an	end	in	itself.7		
	
Capitol’s	power	enlivens	Marx’s	observation	that	‘[c]apital	is	dead	labour	which,	like	a	vampire,	
only	 becomes	 alive	 by	 sucking	 out	 living	 labour,	 and	 the	more	 it	 sucks,	 the	more	 it	 is	 lively’	
(Marx	1968:	247).	It	embodies	the	‘meaner’	face	of	capitalism	developing	towards	the	end	of	the	
20th	and	into	the	21st	Century,	which	‘industrializes	the	mind’	(Enzensberger	1982:	3ff)	and	in	
which	 the	worker	must	 ‘sell	 not	 only	 her	 or	 his	 labour	…	but	 personality,	 self	 and	ultimately	
perhaps	 also	 soul’	 (Vandenberghe	 2008,	 880).	 Within	 such	 an	 architecture	 of	 power,	 the	
possibilities	 of	 a	 civil	 politics	 and	 the	 choice	 to	 be	 homo	 politicus	 are	 occluded	 by	 the	
‘eradication	of	alternative	means	of	livelihood,	civic	life	[such	as	it	is]	and	culture’	(Mitchell	and	
Rosati	2006:	145).	
	
Law	–	Law	Unmade	
Through	 the	 law	 imposing	 function,	 the	 ‘original	 and	 fundamental	 form	of	 violence	 that	 is	 in	
itself	 beyond	 the	 law	 and	 is	 thus	 neither	 legal	 nor	 illegal’	 (Hirvonen	 2011:	 102),	 Capitol	
seemingly	rejects	any	juridical	notion	of	humanity	as	an	abstraction	insofar	as	it	would	obscure	
what	are,	for	Capitol,	more	instrumental	signifiers.	Under	Nazi	rule,	as	Lichtenberger	suggests,	
the	meaningful	terms	were	‘compatriot’,	‘citizen’,	‘Jew’	and	so	on	(Lichtenberger	1937:	248).	For	
Capitol,	 the	 signifiers	 are	 the	neat	numerical	 and	hierarchical	 fragmentation	of	Districts	1‐12,	
the	salutary	lesson	of	the	obliterated	District	13,	and	the	‘consumers’	of	Capitol.	
	
The	Arena	is	a	place	abandoned	by	Law,	reconstituting	the	tributes	as	the	‘ultimate	limiting	case	
against	 which	 law	 is	 constituted’	 (Fitzpatrick	 2002:	 80).	 Here	 is	 a	 place	 where	 no	 Law	 is	 –	
indeed	 a	 place	 where	 Law	 is	 a	 marginalised	 or	 absent	 Other:	 Law.	 From	 any	 positivist	
perspective,	there	is	no	superordinating	or	inaugurating	statement	of	fiat	lex.	Paradoxically,	the	
Arena	is,	as	a	locus	of	bellum	universale,	the	place	of	Law	unmade.	And	to	add	irony	to	paradox,	
Law’s	unmaking	is	the	direct	product	not	just	of	any	law,	but	of	the	foundational	law	–	the	Treaty	
of	Treason	 (the	 first	product	 validated	by	Panem’s	Grundnorm).	Here,	 in	 the	 constitutive	pre‐
legal	 document	 of	 Panem,	 is	 the	 dominant	 legal	 phenomenon	 that	 grounds	 the	 existence	 of	
legitimate	authority:	fiat	non	lex.		
	
The	 narrative	 of	 Law	 provides	 precisely	 the	 ‘dramatised	 narrative’	 (Leiboff	 2012:	 387)	 that	
conforms	not	simply	to	chronological	events,	but	to	the	twin	aims	of	entertainment	and	control.	
As	 an	 apparatus	 of	 punitive	 justice,	 the	 panoptic	world	 (both	within	 and	without	 the	 Arena)	
‘bite[s]	 into	 this	 bodiless	 reality’	 (Foucault	 1991:	 16)	 –	 the	 world	 of	 shadow,	 facelessness,	
impalpable	 surveillance	 and	 retribution.	 Capitol	 thus	 harvests	 the	 strategic	 micro‐physics	 of	
power	 implied	 by	 panoptic	 insinuation	 (Foucault	 1991:	 26),	 the	 techno‐physics	 of	 the	
armaments	 supporting	 power,	 and	 a	 perverse	 metaphysics	 transcending	 juridicism	 itself,	
embodying	 the	wholesale	 invasion	 of	 the	 domains	 of	 ‘person,	 culture	 and	 nature	 in	 order	 to	
control	and	commodify	them’	(Vandenberghe	2008:	886).	Yet	the	‘slackening	of	the	hold	on	the	
body’	–	observed	by	Foucault	as	accompanying	the	decline	of	public	execution	(Foucault	1991:	
10)	–	 is	reversed.	Total	surveillance	and	self‐disciplinarity	are	coupled	with	a	re‐institution	of	
the	most	primitive	forms	of	liturgical	torture	and	death.	
	
Subversion	and	Imagination	–	The	Birth	of	Homo	Politicus	
Katniss’s	 battle	 differs	 from	 the	 Survivor‐on‐steroids	 demanded	 by	 Capitol.	 She	 displays	 a	
capacity	for	the	‘imagination	of	attunement’	(Antaki	2012:	13)	or	a	‘transformative	imagination’	
(Unger	1996:	6),	 embodying	 the	potential	 for	 relating	with	others,	 even	 in	 the	most	brutal	 of	
surroundings,	through	an	aesthetic	dimension	incommensurate	with	the	conceptualised	rigour	
of	the	‘rules	of	the	game’.	Cradling	Rue	as	she	lies	fatally	pierced	with	a	spear,	Katniss	sings	her	
to	 death	 –	 a	 concept	 which	 we	 might	 imagine	 is	 inconceivable	 to	 the	 Gamemakers,	 and	
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demonstrates	a	level	of	empathy	that	would	seem	inconsistent	with	the	possibility	of	survival,	
as	 she	 takes	 Rue’s	 hand	 and	 clutches	 it	 ‘like	 a	 lifeline	…	 [a]s	 if	 it’s	me	who’s	 dying,	 not	 Rue’	
(Collins	 2012:	 162).	 Katniss	 subtly	 rewrites	 death	 in	 an	 aesthetic	 modality	 –	 ars	 mortem	
bringing	enchantment	into	the	brutal	death	of	a	young	girl.	Into	this	anti‐Eden,	compassion	has	
insinuated	itself,	more	‘subtil	than	any	beast’.8		
	
Kant,	one	might	say,	has	triumphed	over	Hobbes.	
	
At	 the	 climax	 of	 the	 Games,	 when	 an	 arbitrary	 and	 disingenuous	 rule	 change	 allowing	 two	
victors	 if	 the	 last	 two	 standing	 are	 from	 the	 same	 District	 is	 (equally	 arbitrarily)	 reversed,	
Katniss	 and	 Peeta	 are	 faced	 with	 the	 inevitable	 zero‐sum	 equation.	 Only	 one	 of	 them	 can	
survive.	But	as	Peeta	re‐iterates	Capitol’s	political	truth	–	‘they	have	to	have	a	victor’	–	Katniss’s	
imagination	is	engaged	as	homo	politicus.	Instead	of	its	winner	take	all	paradigm,	Katniss	offers	
an	 unthinkable	 alternative	 –	 that	 the	 Games	 should	 have	 no	 winner.	 Ironically,	 the	 very	
ambivalence	 of	 the	 freedom	which	 exists	within	 the	Arena	 bounded	 by	 Law	provides	 for	 the	
possibility	 of	 (political)	 action,	 the	 very	 embodiment	 of	 Arendt’s	 freedom.	 Freed	 from	 the	
constraints	of	survival	(or	embracing	the	possibility	of	death),	she	is	free	to	explore	the	‘infinite	
novelties	of	action’	which	constitute	the	‘central	category	of	political	thought’	(McGowan	1998:	
56)	 in	order	 to	 reinvent	 the	 future	out	of	 ‘new	horizon[s]	of	possibilities	mapped	out	by	new	
radical	alternatives’	(Santos	1995:	572).		
	
Katniss’s	 solution	 is	 to	 threaten	 a	 suicide	 pact.	 Both	 she	 and	 Peeta	 will	 eat	 the	 poisonous	
nightlock	berries	rather	than	fight	it	out,	confronting	Capitol	with	an	unresolvable	paradox.	The	
outcome	might	as	readily	be	their	deaths	as	it	is	the	re‐reversal	of	the	amended	rule	and	their	
survival.	 That,	 though,	 is	 conceptually	 insignificant.	 Katniss’s	 action	 is	 political	 in	 itself	 …	
‘nothing	 justifies	 it,	 or	 is	 (necessarily)	 accomplished	 by	 it’	 (McGowan	 1998:	 61),	 its	 political	
nature	lying	in	its	defiance	and	destabilisation	of	the	paradigm	itself.	
	
Conclusion	
It	is,	of	course,	possible	to	read	The	Hunger	Games	as	a	perverse	hymn	to	love	–	more	agape	than	
eros,	 despite	 the	 obvious	 undercurrents	 of	 a	 tentative	 sexuality	 between	 Katniss	 and	 Peeta.	
Peeta’s	act	of	 charity	 in	 sharing	 the	bread	with	Katniss	bears	a	Eucharistic	 resonance	 in	 their	
nascent	relationship.	One	might	project	a	Christological	persona	onto	Katniss	at	the	moment	of	
apparent	self‐sacrifice	inherent	in	her	volunteering	to	take	Prim’s	place,	although	Peeta	(pieta?)	
might	wear	the	mask	of	Christ	more	comfortably.	Katniss‐as‐Dianna,	demonstrating	survivalist	
skills	 which	 defeat	 all‐comers,	 a	 latter‐day	 Theseus	 challenging	 King	 Minos	 and	 slaying	 the	
Minotaur,	stands	to	become	a	feminist	icon.	
	
Returning,	 then,	 to	 the	 Jamesonian	 axiom	 that	 all	 tropes	 are	 envisioned	 on	 a	 stage	 delimited	
only	by	 the	eternal	 struggle	between	oppressor	and	oppressed.	Arendt	offers	 two	answers	 to	
the	question	of	 oppression	 enmeshed	with	poverty,	 and	 the	 consequent	 condemnation	 of	 the	
oppressed	to	life	as	animal	laborans	(McGowan	1998:	42ff,	50ff).		
	
One	is	not	palatable	–	that	political	freedom	is	necessarily	achieved	only	by	a	small	proportion	
of	 the	population	at	 the	expense	of	 the	remainder.	Such	a	solution	was	embraced	squarely	by	
the	 Greek	 democratic	 project,	 relegating	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	 the	 population	 to	 life	
outside	the	political	domain	(McGowan	1998:	112).	The	other	solution	is	implausible	–	that	the	
efficiencies	 of	 production	 which	 twenty‐first	 century	 technology	 can	 bring	 to	 bear	 on	
production	 now	 creates	 the	 possibility	 of	 equal	 prosperity	 (and	 thus	 an	 open	 field	 for	 the	
possibility	of	freedom	in	Arendt’s	terms).	Yet	even	were	the	political	will	to	equality	emerge,	its	
administrative	 implementation	 is,	 itself,	 problematic	 (McGowan	 1998:	 51‐2).	 The	 problem	 of	
freedom	in	Arendtian	terms	is,	for	Panem,	clearly	resolved	in	terms	of	the	former,	unpalatable,	
possibility:	 that	 the	 price	 of	 political	 action	 is	 the	 ruthless	 relegation	 of	 not	 merely	 the	
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conventional	working	class,	but	the	seemingly	pampered	elite	of	Capitol	 itself,	 to	 the	status	of	
animal	laborans.		
	
For	Katniss	Everdeen	(oh!	so	nearly	anagrammatically	‘never	end’),	battle	resumes.	Man	…	nor	
woman	neither	…	never	is,	but	always	to	be	blessed:	freedom	is	eternally	deferred.	Even	in	her	
moment	 of	 triumph,	 her	 inspired	 and	 anathematic	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 Games	 reconstitutes	
the	battlefield	in	a	broader	landscape	‘so	much	worse	than	being	hunted	in	the	Arena’	(Collins	
2012:	246).	As	an	act	of	homo	politicus,	it	deprives	Capitol,	in	its	own	political	imagination,	of	the	
possibility	 of	 total	 power.	 Katniss	 now	 functions	 as	 a	 focal	 point	 for	 the	 redrawing	 of	 the	
battlescape:	 a	 localised	 episode	 perhaps,	 but	 one	 to	 be	 ‘inscribed	 in	 history	 …	 [through]	 the	
effects	which	it	induces	on	the	entire	network	in	which	it	is	caught	up’	(Foucault	1991:	27).		
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 B	McDonald,	 ‘Mimetic	 and	Monstrous	 Act	 in	 the	 Hunger	 Games’	 in	 G	 Dunn	 and	Michaud	N	 (eds.)	The	Hunger	
Games	and	Philosophy:	A	Critique	of	Pure	Treason,	Hoboken,	New	Jersey,	John	Wiley	and	Sons,	2012:	9.	
2		 The	illusory	nature	of	the	claims	of	reality	TV	is,	perhaps,	best	demonstrated	by	their	association	with	suicide:	the	
first	 recorded	 reality	 TV	 associated	 death	 in	 the	 US	 was	 that	 of	 Najai	 Turpin,	 one	 of	 16	 contestants	 in	 The	
Contender,	 who	 committed	 suicide	 after	 being	 eliminated	 in	 2005	 (see	
http://www.funtrivia.com/askft/Question110693.html).	 The	 following	 year,	 Nathan	 Clutter	 died	 after	 falling	
from	a	phone	 tower	 just	 after	 being	 eliminated	 (same	website).	The	Wrap	TV	 details	 eleven	 contestants	 in	US	
reality	 TV	 shows	 who	 have	 committed	 suicide	 between	 1997	 and	 2008:	
http://www.thewrap.com/tv/article/thewrap‐investigates‐11‐reality‐show‐players‐have‐committed‐
suicide_3409?page=0,0,	accessed	July	2012.	
3		 The	Marxian	 cast	 of	 the	 observation	 is	 apparent	 from	 Jameson’s	 reference	 to	Marx’s:	 ‘[b]eyond	 [the	 realm	 of	
necessity]	 begins	 the	 development	 of	 human	 energy	which	 is	 an	 end	 itself,	 the	 true	 realm	 of	 freedom,	which,	
however,	can	blossom	forth	only	with	this	realm	of	necessity	as	its	basis’,	K	Marx,	Capital,	New	York,	International	
Publishers,	1977,	III:	81.	
4		 The	text	of	the	Treaty	of	Treason,	imposed	after	the	uprising,	is	not	set	out	in	The	Hunger	Games	itself:	
‘In	penance	for	their	uprising	each	district	shall	offer	up	a	male	and	female	between	the	ages	if	12	and	
18	 at	 a	 public	 ‘Reaping.’	 These	 tributes	 shall	 be	 delivered	 to	 the	 custody	 of	 the	 Capitol.	 And	 then	
transferred	 to	 a	 public	 arena	 where	 they	 will	 Fight	 to	 the	 Death,	 until	 a	 lone	 victor	 remains.	
Henceforth	and	forevermore	this	pageant	shall	be	known	as	The	Hunger	Games.’	
5		 Television	advertising	by	plastic	surgeons	specifically	directed	at	breast	augmentation	has	begun	to	appear	 for	
the	first	time:	see	www.breast.com.au,	who	now	present	an	advertisement	during	Channel	7’s	‘Sunrise’	program	
in	which	 two	bras	discuss	how	wonderful	 the	one	 looks,	 now	 that	 they	have	had	 cosmetic	 surgery:	21	August	
2012.	 The	 extent	 of	 this	 commodification	 is	 apparent	 from	 the	 observation	 that	 ‘[t]he	 body	 has,	 in	 a	 sense,	
become	 just	 another	 consumer	 purchase	…	 Banks	 now	 offer	 loans	 for	 plastic	 surgery.	 American	 families	with	
annual	 incomes	under	$25,000	account	for	30	per	cent	of	all	cosmetic	surgery	patients.	Americans	spend	more	
each	year	on	beauty	than	they	do	on	education’,	Nelson	Z,	(2009)	Love	Me:	Cross‐Cultural	Manufacturing	of	Beauty,	
Contrasto,	Milan:	Introduction,	available	at	http://www.zednelson.com/?LoveMe:text.	
6		 The	decline	of	 the	public	 spectacle	 associated	with,	 for	 example,	 torture	 and	execution,	 and	 its	 replacement	 in	
most	 Western	 democracies	 with	 the	 deprivation	 of	 liberty	 and	 rights,	 rather	 than	 the	 infliction	 of	 pain	 or	
execution	is	a	singular	trope	of,	for	example,	Foucault’s	analysis	of	the	phenomenon	of	punishment	in	Discipline	
and	Punish:	The	Birth	of	the	Prison,	(1991)	London,	Penguin.	
7		 As	 such,	 Arendt’s	 characterisation	 of	 Nazism	 and	 Stalinism	 as	 totalitarian	 regimes	 dedicated	 solely	 to	 the	
retention	 of	 power	 for	 its	 own	 sake	 is	 at	 odds	 with,	 for	 example,	 O’Brien’s	 dismissal	 of	 German	 and	 Soviet	
dictatorships	 as	 delusional:	 ‘The	 German	 Nazis	 and	 the	 Russian	 Communists	 came	 very	 close	 to	 us	 in	 their	
methods,	 but	 they	 never	 had	 the	 courage	 to	 recognize	 their	 own	motives.	 They	 pretended,	 perhaps	 they	 even	
believed,	that	they	had	seized	power	unwillingly	and	for	a	limited	time,	and	that	just	round	the	corner	there	lay	a	
paradise	where	human	beings	would	be	free	and	equal’	(	G	Orwell,	Nineteen	Eighty‐Four:	340).	
8		 Genesis	3:1:	‘Now	the	serpent	was	more	subtil	than	any	beast	of	the	field	…’	(KJV).	
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Abstract	
While	 Downes	 (2011)	 rightly	 points	 out	 that	 criminology	 was	 born	 comparative,	 this	
comparative	focus	seems	to	have	been	lost	until	the	late	twentieth	century.	A	waning	belief	in	
the	post	war	penal	welfare	state,	rising	crime	rates	and	increasing	prison	populations	have	
altered	 this.	 Over	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 comparative	 criminological	 research	 has	 been	
studying	various	dimensions	of	punitiveness.	Therefore,	it	is	timely	to	critically	examine	the	
extent	to	which	the	current	evidence	is	capable	of	explaining	convergences	and	divergences	
in	 penal	 practice.	 Important	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 to	 test	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 global	 explanatory	
models	against	local	models	in	countries	that	appear	to	resist	the	dominant	trend,	such	as	the	
Netherlands	 and	 Canada.	 However,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 compare	 differences	 between	
autonomous	 jurisdictions	 in	 one	 country,	 for	 example,	 the	 states	 and	 territories	 within	
Australia.	 Further,	 regardless	 this	 wealth	 of	 contemporary	 comparative	 research,	 some	
questions	and	issues	have	not	been	resolved	yet	and	are	subject	for	further	analysis.	Finally	
we	discuss	new	directions	in	explaining	penal	policies	and	possible	optimistic	signs	for	penal	
reform	in	the	future.	
	
	
Introduction	
We	argued	in	a	previous	article	(Tubex	2013),	that	comparative	criminology	is	a	rather	young	
discipline,	 as	 crime	 and	 justice	 were	 not	 hot	 topics	 in	 the	 optimistic,	 generous	 and	 positive	
decades	following	the	Second	World	War.	However,	the	global	economic	crisis	of	the	seventies,	
the	subsequent	decline	of	belief	in	the	penal	welfare	state,	and	the	increase	in	crime	rates	and	
prison	 populations	 dramatically	 changed	 this	 picture.	 Criminologists	 started	 to	 look	 across	
borders	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 understand	what	 the	 causes	 of	 increasing	 prison	 populations	were.	
David	Garland’s	pioneering	‘Culture	of	Control’	(2001)	set	the	benchmark	for	an	understanding	
of	the	recent	trends	in	penal	policy.	Partly	as	a	reaction	to	his	work,	comparative	criminologists	
have	 produced	 a	 wealth	 of	 evidence	 and	 information	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 providing	
insight	 into	 what	 is	 impacting	 on	 prison	 populations.	 But	 despite	 the	 impressive	 output	 of	
comparative	 criminology	 over	 recent	 years,	 it	 is	 an	 ongoing	 struggle	 to	 understand	 what	 is	
driving	penal	policies	and	practices.	Using	imprisonment	rates1	as	a	measure	for	international	
comparison,	 we	 see	 that	 there	 is	 great	 diversity	 not	 only	 in	 the	 way	 countries	 have	 been	
responding	to	global	trends,	but	also	in	the	reasons	for	these	responses.	In	this	contribution,	we	
first	evaluate	the	viability	of	comparative	research	in	a	globalised	world,	we	discuss	the	lessons	
of	 comparative	 research,	 but	 we	 also	 identify	 gaps	 and	 anomalies	 before	 looking	 at	 new	
directions	in	this	area	of	research.	
	
The	Sense	of	Comparative	Research	in	a	Globalised	World	
The	impact	of	globalisation	on	crime	and	criminal	justice	is	an	important	consideration	from	the	
perspective	of	 comparative	 research.	As	Nelken	 (2011)	has	 asked,	 to	what	 extent	does	 it	 still	
make	sense	to	take	the	nation	state	as	the	object	of	comparison	in	a	globalised	world?	An	initial	
reason	for	asking	this	question	is	that	globalisation,	of	itself,	presents	specific	challenges	to	the	
credibility	 of	 nation	 states:	 as	 crime	 increasingly	 displays	 international	 dimensions,	 it	 is	
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becoming	more	and	more	difficult	for	nation	states	to	deal	with	it.	Globalists	claim	that	we	need	
a	 global	 criminology	 instead	 of	 comparative	 criminology	 to	 understand	what	 is	 happening	 in	
this	 field	 (Larsen	 and	 Smandych	 in	 Nelken	 2011).	 Another	 reason	 is	 the	 link	 between	
globalisation	and	punitiveness,	the	main	point	of	interest	of	comparative	criminology.	Baker	and	
Roberts	 (2005)	 point	 to	 the	 various	 reasons	 why	 ‘new	 punitiveness’	 is	 associated	 with	
globalisation.	They	argue,	however,	 that	globalisation	does	not	necessarily	cause	punitiveness,	
as	 it	 is	 not	 a	 universal	 trend.	 Globalisation	 is	 a	 complex	 phenomenon,	 which	 has	 definitely	
affected	penal	policies,	privileging	punitive	responses,	and	facilitating	‘policy	transfer’.		
	
Comparative	 criminologists	 have	 defended	 their	 discipline,	 pointing	 to	 differences	 between	
countries,	due	 to	 local	 features,	 values	and	cultures.	According	 to	Nelken	 (2011),	 globalism	 is	
too	often	confused	with	Americanism,	whereby	trends	in	the	US	are	supposed	to	lead	the	way	of	
what	is	going	to	happen	elsewhere	(Garland	2001;	Wacquant	2009),	while,	as	it	has	been	stated	
by	several	authors,	it	is	actually	the	US	that	should	be	considered	as	being	 ‘exceptionalist’	and	
an	‘outlier’	(Downes	2011;	Lacey	2011).	Further,	it	has	been	argued	that	for	every	global	model	
explaining	 levels	 of	 punitiveness,	 there	 are	 exceptions.	 The	 question	 is	 to	 what	 extent	 they	
‘confirm	the	rule’?	Globalisation	doesn’t	spell	convergence,	according	to	Lacey	(2011),	therefore,	
comparative	research,	on	a	national	and	regional	level,	is	crucial	to	understand	the	mechanisms	
by	 which	 master	 narratives	 affect	 penal	 policy	 in	 different	 ways	 in	 different	 countries.	
Meaningful	 comparative	 research	 needs	 to	move	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 the	 global	 and	 the	
local,	 refining	 the	 global	 model	 with	 local	 empirical	 data	 and	 findings,	 as	 features	 within	
individual	 countries	might	explain	how	and	why	 they	deviate	 from	the	 leading	pattern.	Along	
the	 same	 lines,	 Savelsberg	 (2011)	 concludes	 that	 both	 globalisation	 and	 cross‐national	
comparative	 research	 is	 needed,	 and	 that	 they	need	 to	be	 closely	 linked,	 as	 global	 trends	 are	
translated	in	a	nation‐specific	way	and	filtered	through	local	institutions.	Nelken	(2011)	agrees	
with	 this	 view,	 pleading	 that	 comparative	 research	 is	 particularly	 well	 placed	 to	 study	 the	
interaction	 between	 the	 global	 and	 local	 forces	 and	 the	ways	 how	 to	 best	 do	 this.	 Therefore,	
despite	globalisation,	comparative	research	still	has	a	place	within	criminology,	identifying	local	
dynamics	and	ways	out	of	the	doom	scenario	of	mass	imprisonment	(Lacey	2008).	
	
What	We	Do	and	Don’t	Know	
To	 critically	 examine	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 current	 evidence	 is	 capable	 of	 explaining	
convergences	 and	 divergences	 in	 penal	 practice,	 we	 discuss	 in	 the	 following	 paragraphs	 two	
deep‐rooted	explanatory	models	of	punitiveness,	and	test	their	validity	against	the	situation	in	
two	countries	that	appear	to	resist	the	dominant	trend:	the	Netherlands	and	Canada.	
	
Welfare	and	punitiveness	
First,	 a	 well	 established	 and	 solidly	 evidenced	 relationship	 is	 the	 one	 between	 welfare	 and	
punitiveness.	 Strong	 welfare	 states	 see	 criminality	 as	 a	 societal	 problem	 that	 needs	 to	 be	
addressed	with	a	social	policy	instead	of	a	penal	policy.	They	are	more	inclusive	and	have	lower	
prison	 numbers	 (Beckett	 and	Western	 2001;	 Downes	 and	 Hansen,	 2006).	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	
remarkable,	as	Nelken	(2009,	2010)	observes,	that	the	welfare	model	only	has	an	impact	on	the	
reaction	towards	crime,	but	not	on	crime	itself,	as	crime	was	going	up	at	a	time	that	the	welfare	
model	was	still	intact	and	generous	to	everyone.	So	the	question	remains	why	the	welfare	state	
failed	 in	 preventing	 increases	 in	 crime?	 Further,	 the	 welfare	 model	 as	 a	 protection	 against	
increasing	prison	rates	only	seemed	 to	work	 in	certain	countries,	 such	as	Scandinavia.	Others	
saw	 their	 prison	 populations	 going	 up	 while	 their	 welfare	 model	 was	 still	 in	 place.	 Downes	
(2011)	 points	 in	 this	 respect	 to	 the	 example	 of	 the	 Netherlands	 as	 being	 an	 anomaly,	
quintupling	 its	 prison	 population	 rate	while	 retaining	many	 of	 the	 features	 that	 should	 have	
protected	 it	 them	 against	 penal	 excess,	 being	 a	 social	 democracy	 and	 a	 relatively	 substantial	
welfare	state.	We	will	have	a	closer	look	at	the	Dutch	case.	
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A	Dutch	case	study	
The	 Netherlands	 has	 always	 been	 a	 tricky	 country	 for	 criminological	 analysis,	 and	 maybe	
therefore	 a	 good	 test	 case	 for	 the	 validity	 of	 explanatory	 models.	 For	 very	 many	 years	 the	
shining	 example	 of	 penal	 moderation,	 with	 imprisonment	 rates	 as	 low	 as	 18	 per	 100,000	
inhabitants	in	1973,	the	Netherlands	were	about	the	only	country	that	could	keep	pace	with	the	
US	in	the	way	it	multiplied	its	prison	population	(up	to	134	per	100,000	in	2005).	But	even	more	
interesting	 is	 the	 recent	 evolution	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 prison	 population	 has	 been	 on	 the	
decrease	 since	 2005	 (down	 to	 87	 per	 100,000	 in	 2011)	 (van	 Swaaningen	 2013).	 The	
explanations	given	for	this	rather	remarkable	trend	are	diverse	and	contradictory.	According	to	
Van	Dijk	(2011),	 it	has	all	 to	do	with	 the	registration	of	crime	and	developments	 in	 the	crime	
pattern.	Using	correct	data	and	similar	definitions	as	other	countries	do,	the	Dutch	fluctuations	
would	have	been	a	lot	less	distinctive:	they	were	initially	deflated	by	the	exclusion	of	mentally	ill	
convicts	held	in	private	clinics,	and	later	inflated	by	the	inclusion	of	 illegal	immigrants	held	in	
administrative	 detention	 centres	 and	 juveniles	 placed	 in	 institutions	 as	 a	 civil	 protection	
measure.	After	adjusting	for	these	two,	the	imprisonment	rate	in	2007	would	decrease	by	30%	–	
from	113	to	72	–	far	below	the	European	mean	of	119.	Further,	he	claims	–	relying	on	data	from	
the	International	Crime	Victims	Survey	–	that	the	growing	/	declining	imprisonment	rates	are	
much	more	closely	related	to	changes	in	(serious)	crime	instead	of	changes	in	punitiveness.	This	
claim	is	partly	confirmed	in	other	studies,	as	Vollaard	and	Moolenaar	(2009)	also	attribute	the	
increase	 in	 the	 prison	 population	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 drug	 and	 violence	 related	 cases	 brought	
before	 the	 judges.	But,	 as	Boone	and	Moerings	 (2007)	 indicate,	 this	does	not	mean	 that	 these	
offences	have	increased,	as	the	number	of	cases	sent	to	the	prosecutor	remains	stable,	it	is	the	
number	that	is	sent	to	the	courts	that	has	increased,	and	as	such,	it	is	an	expression	of	increased	
punitiveness.	 The	 decrease	 is,	 according	 to	 Vollaard	 and	 Moolenaar	 (2009),	 due	 to	 milder	
sentencing	practices	in	these	cases,	and	a	more	frequent	use	of	community	based	sentences	for	
less	serious	violent	acts.	Van	Dijk	(2011)	disagrees	with	the	latter,	as	alternative	sentencing	in	
his	 view	only	had	 a	marginal	 impact	 and	milder	 sentences	have	more	 to	do	with	an	 effective	
drop	in	the	number	of	serious	crimes	instead	of	the	judges’	practices.	According	to	him,	judges	
in	 the	 Netherlands	 are	 less	 influenced	 by	 external	 pressures	 because	 they	 are	 quite	
conservative,	appointed	for	life,	and	recruited	from	the	upper	layers	of	religious	pillars.	In	other	
words	the	Dutch	judges	are	an	elite	group	shielded	against	penal	populism,	while	in	the	UK	and	
US,	the	judiciary	is	more	responsive	to	political	pressure.	Vollaard,	Versteeg	and	van	den	Brakel	
(2009)	 confirm	 the	 drop	 in,	 particularly,	 property	 crimes	 and	 acts	 of	 violence,	 due	 to	
demographic	 and	 economic	 factors,	 while,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 there	 develops	 a	more	 stringent	
penal	policy	 towards	both	categories	of	crimes	/	offenders.	As	a	result	of	 this	 lower	tolerance	
and	 changed	 police	 practices,	 less	 serious	 cases	 were	 being	 brought	 before	 the	 judges	 and	
therefore	 resulted	 in	 lesser	 sentencing	 (Boone	 and	 Moerings	 2007;	 Vollaard	 and	 Moolenaar	
2009).	Other	authors	 (Boone	and	van	Swaaningen	2012;	van	Swaaningen	2013)	contextualise	
both	 developments	 in	 a	 broader	 framework:	 prison	 numbers	 increased	 because	 of	 a	 more	
punitive	 approach	 throughout	 the	 sentencing	 process	 (more	 reporting	 of	 crime,	more	 people	
sent	 to	court,	also	 for	 less	serious	offences,	more	use	of	 imprisonment	and	 longer	sentences).	
They	see	these	changes	as	a	result	of	the	pressure	of	a	changing	public	opinion	expressing	less	
tolerance	 towards	 some	minor	 forms	 of	 crime	 (cf.	 anti	 social	 behaviour	 orders)	 and	 towards	
people	who	are	different	in	any	way	(mentally	ill,	juveniles	and	illegal	immigrants).	The	recent	
decrease	in	the	imprisonment	rate	is	according	to	these	authors	related	not	only	to	changes	in	
the	crime	pattern,	but	also	to	policing	priorities	and	changing	penal	policies	towards	the	most	
vulnerable	 groups.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 criticism	 of	 the	 punitive	 approach.	 Due	 to	
miscarriages	of	 justice,	 the	media	 are	picking	up	on	 this	 trend	 and	 increasingly	 call	 in	 expert	
advice,	 and	 this	 is	 influencing	 the	 judiciary.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 crime	 is	 pushed	 down	 on	 the	
electoral	agenda	as	other	 concerns,	 as	 the	economic	crisis	and	healthcare,	have	become	more	
important.	 However,	 as	 van	 Swaaningen	 (2013)	 points	 out,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	
Netherlands	has	become	less	punitive,	as	there	are	various	examples	of	very	punitive	measures	
that	 have	 been	 taken	 since	 2005:	 they	 are	 directed	 towards	 specific	 groups	 of	 offenders,	
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implemented	in	the	community,	or	introduced	under	the	banner	of	crime	prevention.	According	
to	 van	 Swaaningen	 (2013)	 it	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 less	 punishment,	 but	 of	 different	 forms	 of	
punishment,	along	the	 lines	of	Foucault’s	 ‘penal‐welfare	complex’,	 in	which	welfare	provisions	
serve	to	discipline	the	population.	Imprisonment	has	been	replaced	by	other	strategies	of	crime	
control,	which	are	not	less	repressive	than	a	prison	sentence.		
	
From	 this	 case	 study	 we	 see	 how	 complex	 the	 explanation	 of	 prison	 populations	 can	 be,	 as	
perceived	changes	 in	crime	can	also	be	 the	result	of	changed	police	performance,	prosecution	
practices	 and	 sentencing,	which	 in	 their	 turn	 can	be	 an	 expression	 of	 increased	punitiveness.	
Using	victim	surveys	can	act	as	a	corrector	for	this	sort	of	analysis,	but	also	perceptions	of	crime	
and	victimhood	can	affect	 reporting	and	signal	decreasing	 tolerance.	 So	 it	 seems	 that,	despite	
their	 welfare	 model	 still	 being	 in	 place,	 the	 Netherlands	 has	 lost	 some	 of	 its	 ‘inclusionary’	
character	 over	 time.	 Decreasing	 tolerance	 towards	 some	 categories	 of	 crimes	 and	 offenders	
results	 in	 higher	 numbers	 of	 these	 ending	 up	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Failings	 of	 that	
system	 raise	 critical	 voices,	 but	nonetheless	 it	 seems	 to	 expand	 in	new	 forms	of	 punishment,	
outside	of	prison,	but	still	a	feature	of	a	punitive	society,	despite	the	fact	that	the	imprisonment	
rates	 are	 decreasing.	 After	 all,	 Lacey	 (2011)	 comments,	welfare	 provisions	 are	 not	 solely	 the	
result	of	humanity,	they	are	embedded	in	political	and	economical	dynamics	that	are	required	
for	their	ongoing	support.	This	leads	us	to	the	second	explanatory	model.	
	
Neo‐liberalism	and	punitiveness	
A	 second	 overarching	 theme	 that	 has	 gained	 rapid	 interest	 in	 criminological	 discourse	 is	 the	
relationship	between	neo‐liberalism	and	punitiveness.	As	Brown	(2011)	indicates,	this	has	been	
firmly	put	on	 the	criminological	 agenda	by	Wacquant	 (2009)	who	 identifies	neo‐liberalism	as	
the	 root	 cause	 of	 punitivism,	 challenging	 the	 predominance	 of	 ‘late	 modernity’	 in	 Garland’s	
(2001)	work.	While	Brown	(2011;	2012)	considers	this	approach	a	welcome	contribution	to	the	
debate,	 he	 fears	 that	 Wacquant’s	 interpretation	 of	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 neo‐liberalism	 might	
overstate	its	impact	and	lead	to	a	lack	of	attention	being	paid	to	counterbalancing	factors,	such	
as	 justice	 reinvestment.	 The	 theme	 has	 been	 picked	 up	 in	 recent	 work	 in	 comparative	
criminology,	 like	 the	 analysis	 of	 Cavadino	 and	Dignan	 (2006)	 and	 Lacey	 (2008),	 bringing	 the	
impact	of	political	economies	back	 in	 the	 limelight.	However,	while	both	analyses	are	starting	
from	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 political	 economy,	 they	 reach	 different	 conclusions.	 Lacey	 (2008,	 2011)	
identifies	 two	 main	 separate	 models:	 liberal	 market	 economies	 and	 co‐ordinated	 market	
economies,	putting	them	in	the	broader	context	of	their	political	and	economical	institutions,	as	
well	as	specific	legal	and	constitutional	structures,	their	relationship	with	the	bureaucracy	and	
judiciary,	as	well	as	with	the	media	and	public	opinion.	Building	on	their	earlier	work,	Cavadino	
and	 Dignan	 (2011)	 explore	 reasons	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	 neo‐liberalism	 and	
punitiveness.	They	see	as	 the	main	explanations	 the	political	 culture	and	 the	 interaction	with	
political	and	state	institutions	that	derive	from	the	different	political	economies,	as	well	as	the	
impact	 of	 public	 opinion	 and	 the	 media	 within	 these	 political	 economies,	 which	 shape	
punishment.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 consider	 Lacey’s	 (2008)	 emphasis	 on	 the	 political	 institutions’	
susceptibility	to	penal	populism	in	the	neo‐liberal	political	economy	as	too	limited.	In	regard	to	
the	association	between	neo‐liberalism	and	punitiveness,	we	also	find	exceptions	and,	again,	it	
is	Downes	(2011)	who	brings	this	up	with	regard	to	Canada.	In	the	following	we	zoom	in	on	the	
Canadian	situation.	
	
A	Canadian	case	study	
Commenting	on	the	Cavadino	and	Dignan	model	(2006),	Webster	and	Doob	(2011)	point	to	the	
fact	that	–	while	Canada	was	not	included	in	their	analysis	–	it	would	most	probably	have	been	
categorised	alongside	 the	Anglo‐Saxon	neo‐liberal	countries	 (with	 the	US,	England	and	Wales,	
Australia,	New	Zealand	and	South	Africa),	while	their	prison	population	has	been	stable	and	a	
lot	 lower	 than	 in	 the	 other	 countries	 belonging	 to	 this	 group.	 Actually,	 based	 on	 their	
imprisonment	rate,	Canada	would	be	closer	to	the	conservative	corporatist	countries	(such	as	
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Italy,	Germany,	 France,	Netherlands).	On	various	occasions	Doob	 and	Webster	have	 criticised	
the	fact	that	Canada	is	too	easily	thrown	in	the	same	basket	as	the	other	Anglo‐Saxon	countries	
they	 have	 historical	 and	 institutional	 connections	 with,	 and	 that	 criminologists	 have	 been	
mainly	 looking	at	 change,	 ignoring	 the	 interesting	example	of	Canadian	stability	 in	 the	prison	
population	for	over	about	50	years	(Doob	and	Webster	2006;	Webster	and	Doob	2007,	2011).	
According	 to	 these	 authors	 the	 stable	 prison	 population	 in	 Canada	 is	 explained	 by	 –	 using	
Tonry’s	 (2007)	dichotomy	–	reduced	risk	 factors	at	one	side	and	the	availability	of	protective	
factors	on	the	other	side.	According	to	them,	the	protective	factors	in	Canada	are	to	be	found	on	
the	following	levels:	
	
 Structural	 /	 political:	 Canada	 has	 a	 two	 tiered	 system,	 with	 the	 criminal	 law	 being	 a	
federal	 responsibility,	while	 the	administration	of	 justice	 is	 a	provincial	 responsibility,	
this	 structure	 protects	 the	 federal	 level	 from	 local,	 populist	 reactions.	 Further,	 victim	
advocacy	groups	don’t	have	strong	power,	politicians	show	great	reluctance	towards	the	
use	of	referenda	but	are	relying	on	career	civil	servants	and	experts	instead,	there	is	no	
politisisation	 of	 crime,	 and	 the	 judiciary	 is	 independent	 and	 has	 great	 discretionary	
power.		
 Cultural:	 public	 opinion	 in	Canada	doesn’t	 have	 the	moral	 taste	 for	harsh	punishment	
and	politicians	don’t	believe	in	it,	 further,	Canadians	want	to	be	seen	as	different	 from	
the	US,	and	they	adhere	to	different	values.		
 Historical:	there	is	a	long	tradition	of	a	‘culture	of	restraint’	and	scepticism	of	what	can	
be	achieved	by	imprisonment.		
	
According	 to	Webster	 and	Doob	 (2011),	penality	 is	more	 complex	 than	 the	political	 economy	
that	 Cavadino	 and	 Dignan	 (2006)	 describe,	 simple	 political	 or	 economical	 models	 are	
insufficient	 as	 an	 explanatory	 framework.	 As	 both	 Cavadino	 and	 Dignan	 (2006)	 and	 Lacey	
(2008)	 are	 focussing	 on	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 theoretically	 relevant	 factors,	 the	 explanatory	
power	of	their	approach	is	incomplete.	They	conclude	that	it	is	not	only	the	number	of	factors	
that	is	fundamental,	but	also	the	conceptual	approach	to	the	analysis	of	these	(multiple)	factors.	
It	 is	 particularly	 the	 interaction	between	 these	 structural,	 cultural,	 historical	 and	 institutional	
factors	that	explains	Canadian	penality.	The	same	factors,	but	in	another	context	might	result	in	
a	different	penal	reality.	The	 latter	might	be	happening	 in	Canada	at	 this	very	moment,	as	 the	
political	 climate	 seems	 to	 have	 hardened	 towards	 a	 more	 punitive	 discourse	 and	 the	 prison	
population	has	been	going	up	since	2006	(Webster	and	Doob	2011).	
	
According	to	this	case	study,	it	seems	that	Brown	is	right	in	warning	against	overstating	the	role	
of	 neo‐liberalism	 in	 driving	 punitiveness.	 The	 relationship	 between	 both	 seems	 to	 be	 much	
more	 loose	 and	 indirect,	 and	 depending	 on	 the	 sort	 of	 neo‐liberalism	 that	 is	 adopted	 and	
imposed	(Karstedt	2012,	2013).	This	 is	confirmed	 in	the	analysis	of	O’Mally	(2002),	where	he	
compares	 neo‐liberalism	 in	 the	US	 and	Australia.	 Neo‐liberalism	 in	 the	US	 is	more	 entangled	
with	 conservatism,	 while	 in	 Australia	 it	 is	 rooted	 in	 a	 more	 socio‐democratic	 tradition,	 and	
welfare	models	can	remain	intact	in	the	latter.	According	to	Brown	(2012)	imprisonment	rates	
in	Australia	and	other	leading	neo‐liberal	political	economies	might	have	more	to	do	with	race	
and	colonialism	/	post–colonialism,	than	with	neo‐liberalism.	This	claim	would	fit	with	the	fact	
that	 in	 Australia,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 other	 federal	 states	 with	 a	 comparable	 first	 nation,	 such	 as	
Canada,	 the	 imprisonment	 rates	 are	 the	 highest	 in	 the	 jurisdictions	 with	 large	 Indigenous	
populations.	
	
Indeed,	the	same	variance	as	we	see	on	a	global	scale	can	be	found	within	Australia.	But	even	
accounting	 for	 their	different	historical	origins	and	demographic	composition,	 recent	changed	
cannot	be	fully	covered:	where	Victoria	traditionally	has	low	imprisonment	rates	at	about	100	
per	100,000,	 they	recently	witnessed	an	increase	 from	94	 in	2004	to	112	in	2012.	New	South	
Wales	on	the	other	hand,	has	always	been	on	the	high	end	of	the	scale	with	imprisonment	rates	
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that	are	almost	double	the	Victorian	ones,	but	decreased	since	2009	from	204	to	171	in	2012.	
While	 these	 jurisdictions	 share	many	of	 the	 characteristics	 that	have	been	 identified	as	being	
important	 determinants	 for	 the	 size	of	 the	prison	population,	 local	 features	of	 these	 societies	
result	in	significant	differences	in	quantity	and	form	of	punishment.	Therefore,	there	is	a	need	
for	Australian	interstate	comparative	research,	analysing	the	differences	in	imprisonment	rates	
between	states	and	 territories	and	 their	evolution	over	 time,	defining	different	penal	 cultures	
and	 testing	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 global	 explanatory	models	 on	 the	 local	 level	 (cf.	 the	Australian	
Prison	Project	and	the	current	Future	Fellowship).	
	
New	Directions	in	Comparative	Research	
As	comparative	research	has	developed	over	the	 last	decades,	 the	main	focus	has	been	on	the	
rather	depressing	evolution	of	increasing	prison	populations	and	their	causes.	An	exception	to	
this	 rule	 is	 the	 work	 of	 Pratt	 who	 has	 extensively	 studied	 ‘Scandinavian	 exceptionalism’,	
claiming	that	egalitarianism	and	homogeneity	have	saved	the	Nordic	countries	from	the	move	to	
mass	imprisonment.	Nevertheless,	punitive	forces	appear	to	endanger	this	exceptional	position,	
with	Sweden	being	at	the	biggest	risk	(Pratt	and	Eriksson	2013).		
	
However,	 there	 seems	 to	 have	 emerged	 a	more	 positive	 perspective	 in	 this	 field,	 sometimes	
coming	from	unexpected	corners.	One	example	is	the	US,	for	recent	decades	considered	as	the	
archetype	 of	 penal	 expansionism,	 with	 a	 peerless	 imprisonment	 rate	 of	 743/100,000,	 but	
recently	 –	 since	 2009	 –	 the	 prison	 population	 has	 been	 going	 down.	 The	 imprisonment	 rate	
decreased	in	half	of	the	states,	it	has	stabilised	in	many	others	and	only	increased	in	a	handful	
(Green,	 2013).	 According	 to	 Green	 (2013),	 there	 is	 reason	 for	 penal	 optimism	 and,	 in	
contradiction	 with	 the	 dominant	 focus	 on	 American	 punitiveness,	 it	 is	 time	 to	 notice	 and	
appreciate	various	signs	of	penal	reform.		
	
To	understand	the	trajectories	described	above,	deviating	from	the	master	narratives	that	have	
been	defined	over	the	last	decades,	which	are	now	well	documented	in	various	studies,	we	need	
to	 broaden	 our	 lens	 and	 investigate	 factors	 other	 than	 the	 ‘usual	 suspects’.	 Behind	 the	more	
tangible	global	models	of	political	structures	and	economic	models,	lie	fundamental	values	and	
cultural	 norms,	 rooted	 in	 local	 historical	 backgrounds.	 In	 more	 recent	 work,	 investigating	
anomalies	 and	 unexpected	 changes,	we	 see	 an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
local,	 national,	 and	 even	 regional	 dynamics.	 Investigating	 differences,	 and	 more	 particularly	
strengths	to	form	a	bulwark	against	increasing	punitiveness,	promises	to	be	a	fruitful	future	for	
comparative	criminology.	
	
	
																																																													
	
1		 The	 number	 of	 prisoners	 out	 of	 100,000	 inhabitants.	 For	 a	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 advantages	 and	
disadvantages	of	using	imprisonment	rates	as	a	proxy	for	punitiveness,	see	Tubex	(2013).	
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